Place, U. T. (1973-10-24). Lecture 4: Cosmology 1. Reductionism (24/10/1973) Section 1
[Abstract]The nature of explanation. Reduction and analysis - conceptual, material, substantial and theoretical. The Reductionist Myth.
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 04 - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1978b). Natural kinds and psychophysical laws: Comments on the McGinn-Hopkins symposium (PAS 1978) [Unpublished paper].
[References]  [Is reply to]  
Download: 1978b Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws - Comments on the McGinn-Hopkins Symposium.pdf

Place, U. T. (1986d). Can a psychologist make sense of natural kind terms as rigid designators? [Paper presented at the Course on 'Meaning and Natural Kinds', Inter university Post graduate Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugo-slavia, 15-25 September 1986].
Note:
Revised by the author in 1993.
[References]  [Talks]  

Place, U. T. (1989b). Towards a connectionist version of the causal theory of reference. Acta Analytica, 4(5), 71-97.
[Abstract]The connectionist model of the brain as a parallel distributed processor (PDP) is invoked to provide a version of the the causal theory of the reference of natural kind terms and proper names which rejects Kripke's doctrine of rigid designation and retains the Port Royal-Hamilton thesis that the extension of a general term is determined by its comprehension or intension, together with Frege's thesis that the reference (Bedeutung) of a singular term is determined by its sense (Sinn).
[References]  [Talks]  [1 citing publications]  [3 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1989b Towards a Connectionist Version of the Causal Theory of Reference.pdf

Place, U. T. (1990b). Intensionalism, connectionism and the picture theory of meaning. Acta Analytica, 5(6), 47-63.
[Abstract]The connectionist model of the brain as a parallel distributed processor (PDP) is invoked in support of the view that the sense of singular terms and the intension of general terms and of more complex linguistic expressions determine (1) the reference of singular terms, (2) the extension of general terms, (3) the truth of propositions, (4) the validity of arguments, (5) the meaning of sentences.
Keywords: connectionism, conceptualism, correspondence theory of truth, extensionalism, intensionalism, ontology, philosophy of language, picture theory of meaning, universals
[References]  [Talks]  [5 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1990b Intensionalism, Connectionism and the Picture Theory of Meaning.pdf

Place, U. T. (1990d). Can social constructivism be reconciled with scientific realism [Presentation to the Course on the Philosophy of Science at the Inter-university Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, April 11th 1990]. Inter-university Centre, Dubrovnik
Keywords: conceptualism, connectionism, universals
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1990d Can Social Constructivism Be Reconciled With Scientific Realism.pdf

Place, U. T. (1991f). On the social relativity of truth and the analytic/synthetic distinction. Human Studies, 14, 265-285. doi:10.1007/bf02205609
[Abstract]Three solutions are examined to the problem of cultural chauvinism posed by the fact that the verb `to know' commits the speaker to the truth of what is known. Two, the doctrine that truth is socially relative and the doctrine that truth determination procedures are socially relative, are rejected. A third, the view that truth is relative to linguistic convention is defended. Holding this view commits the author to an intensionalist theory of reference, a conceptualist theory of universals, a defence of the analytic-synthetic distinction against Quine's critique, and the view that the basic principles of science are analytic.
[References]  [3 citing publications]  [14 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1991f On the Social Relativity of Truth and the Analytic Synthetic Distinction.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996m). Metaphysics as the empirical investigation of the interface between language and reality. Acta Analytica,11(15), 97-118.
[Abstract]The rules of syntax and semantics on conformity to which linguistic communication depends are construed as social conventions instilled and maintained by the error-correcting practices of a linguistic community. That conception argues for the revival of conceptual analysis construed as the empirical investigation of such conventions using the ethnomethodological thought experiment as its primary research tool, and for a view of metaphysics as the empirical study of the interface between utterances and the reality they depict.
[References]  [Talks]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1996m Metaphysics as the Empirical Study of the Interface between Language and Reality.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997f). De re modality without possible worlds. Acta Analytica, 12(19), 131-145.
[Abstract]A distinction is drawn between de dicto modality which is a matter of which propositions can, cannot and must be true, given the laws of logic, and de re modality which is a matter of which situations (events or states of affairs) can, cannot and must exist, given the laws of nature. It is argued that Kripke's de re modality, defined in terms of what is true in some possible world, no possible world and all possible worlds, is an unsatisfactory amalgam of the two.
[References]  [Talks]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1997f De Re Modality Without Possible Worlds.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997g). We needed the analytic-synthetic distinction to formulate mind-brain identity then: we still do [Conference presentation, presented at a Symposium on 'Forty years of Australian Materialism', June 21st 1997]. Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds.
[Abstract]Quine's (1951/1980) repudiation of the analytic-synthetic distinction undermines three principles fundamental to the view expounded in ‘Is consciousness a brain process?' (Place 1956): the idea that problems, such as that of the relation between mind and body, are partly conceptual confusions to be cleared away by philosophical analysis and partly genuine empirical questions to be investigated and answered decisively by the relevant empirical science, the distinction between the meaning of what the individual says when she describes her private experiences and the nature of the actual events she is describing as revealed by science, and the claim that, unless the connection is obscured by the different ways in which the two predicates come to be applied, co-extensive predicates become conceptually (intensionally) connected, and sentences asserting their identity become analytic. It is argued that, if the object is, as it should be, to assimilate this case to other cases of type-identity in science, rather than perpetuate the problem, these principles are still needed.
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1997g We Needed the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction to Formulate the Mind-Brain Identity Then We Still Do.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997k). Two theories of meaning: The two-factor dispositional/relational and the single factor relational [Presented at the Twenty Third Philosophy of Science Course, Inter-University Centre, Dubrovnik, 8th April 1997].
[Abstract]Theories of meaning are of two kinds, two-factor dispositional/relational theories and single factor relational theories. A two-factor dispositional/relational theory of meaning holds that the word 'meaning' has two senses: a primary and fundamental sense in which meaning is a disposition and a secondary and derivative sense in which meaning is a relation. (a) In the primary or dispositional sense, the meaning of a linguistic expression, such as a phrase or sentence, is a disposition, shared by relevantly competent speakers and interpreters of a particular natural language or technical code, to apply certain criteria (which they need not be able to state) in deciding whether or not a particular they encounter is either an instance to which, in the case of a general term or universally quantified sentence, the expression applies or, in the case of a singular term or singularly quantified sentence, the individual to which it refers. (b) In the secondary or relational sense, the meaning of a linguistic expression is the actual individuals assigned, by the application of those criteria, to the extension of a general term or universally quantified sentence or the actual individual referred to by a singular term or singularly quantified sentence when uttered on a particular occasion, as determined by the criteria. Taking their cue from Quine's (1951/1980) repudiation of the analytic/synthetic distinction, many philosophers have defended a purely relational/extensional theory of meaning in which dispositional notions such as 'intension', 'Sinn' ('sense'), 'analytic' and 'necessary' (defined in terms of what it is self-contradictory to deny) play no part. Motivation for the single-factor relational theory comes from logic. That for the two-factor dispositional relational theory defended here comes from psychology. The application of the two-factor theory to scientific principles such as 'Water is H₂O' and Ohm's Law is described.
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1997k Two Theories of Meaning - The Two-Factor Dispositional Relational and the Single Factor Relational.pdf

Place, U. T. (1998-06-19). Workshop on 'Consciousness and the Identity Theory'. Conference on 'Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Issues', Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Bremen, Germany, 19 June 1998.
[Abstract]This workshop will examine whether the thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain differs from other cases of what I call “compositional type-identities“ in science, such as 'Water is H₂O', 'The temperature of a body is its rate of molecular motion', 'Lightning is an electric discharge through the atmosphere', only to the extent that the brain process or processes in question have not yet been precisely specified by neuroscientific research. The rapid development of such research in recent years makes it likely that such exact specification will soon be possible. It is, therefore, imperative that we examine whether the analogy holds good, or whether the alleged disanalogies are such as to rule out such identification. We begin with a brief history of the identity theory, beginning with Boring (1933), Place (1954; 1956), Feigl (1958; 1967), Smart (1959), followed by a glance at subsequent developments, such as eliminative materialism (Feyerabend 1963; Rorty 1965; Churchland 1981), central state materialism (Armstrong 1968), token identity physicalism (Davidson 1970/1980), Kripke's (1972/1980) intuition, and the qualia problem (Nagel 1974). We shall then examine topics such as the nature of the identity relation, the 'is' of composition versus the 'is' of identity, Boring's claim that perfect correlation is identity, the process whereby compositional type identities become analytic, with a consequent change in the meaning of the common sense concept involved, once they become matters of established scientifc fact, before considering some of the alleged disanalogies between the consciousness brain-process case and standard cases of compositional type-identity.
[References]  

Place, U. T. (1999e). Token- versus type-identity physicalism. Anthropology and Philosophy, 3(2), 21-31.
[Abstract]The observation that identity is a relation between two names or descriptions which refer to the same individual (token-identity) or the same kind or class of things (type-identity) suggests that, unless the descriptions in question are specified, physicalism, understood as the claim that every mentally specified state or process is identical with some physically specified state or process, is empty hand-waving. It can be argued on behalf of the type-identity physicalist that future psycho-physiological research will allow us to specify which types of mentally-specified states or processes are identical with which physically-specified states or processes. No such possibility can be envisaged if token-identity physicalism (Davidson 1970/1980) is true. Consequently, the case for token-identity physicalism must rest on an a priori argument. But the argument which Davidson offers is inconclusive. Token-identity physicalism is, therefore, in serious danger of being side-lined, should evidence supporting the stronger type-identity thesis be forthcoming.
[References]  [7 citing publications]  [1 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1999e Token- versus Type-Identity Physicalism.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999h). The picture theory of meaning: A rehabilation [Conference presentation; presented to the IUC Conference on Epistemology, Bled, Slovenia, 31st May - June 5th 1999].
[Abstract]I argue the case for a rehabilitation of the "picture theory" of the meaning of sentences expounded by Wittgenstein (1921/1971) in the Tractatus, but abandoned by him in moving from his earlier to his later philosophy. This rehabilitation requires the replacement of 'facts' as the objects which sentences depict by 'situations' (Barwise and Perry 1983) and the recognition that the situation depicted by a sentence is an "intentional object" (Brentano 1871/1995). It also implies a different view of the way his sense (Sinn)/reference (Bedeutung) distinction should be applied to the meaning of sentences from that maintained by Frege (1892/1960) himself. Such a theory opens the door to a thorough-going empiricist theory of the acquisition of both concepts and sentence structure.
Keywords: picture theory of meaning
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1999h The Picture Theory of Meaning - A Rehabilitation.pdf