Publications of Place that refer to Popper (1963). Conjectures and Refutations
Lecture 9: Definition in use and verification analysis (28/11/1973) Section 2
Entailment and the entailment test. The definition in use and its limitations. Some examples. The verification test and the verification principle.
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 09 - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1999e). Token- versus type-identity physicalism. Anthropology and Philosophy, 3(2), 21-31.
The observation that identity is a relation between two names or descriptions which refer to the same individual (token-identity) or the same kind or class of things (type-identity) suggests that, unless the descriptions in question are specified, physicalism, understood as the claim that every mentally specified state or process is identical with some physically specified state or process, is empty hand-waving. It can be argued on behalf of the type-identity physicalist that future psycho-physiological research will allow us to specify which types of mentally-specified states or processes are identical with which physically-specified states or processes. No such possibility can be envisaged if token-identity physicalism (Davidson 1970/1980) is true. Consequently, the case for token-identity physicalism must rest on an a priori argument. But the argument which Davidson offers is inconclusive. Token-identity physicalism is, therefore, in serious danger of being side-lined, should evidence supporting the stronger type-identity thesis be forthcoming.
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Download: 1999e Token- versus Type-Identity Physicalism.pdf