Baum, W. M., & Heath, J. L. (1992). Behavioral explanations and intentional explanations in psychology. American Psychologist, 47(11), 1312-1317.
[Abstract]A recent criticism of behaviorism asserts that intentional explanations in psychology are acceptable and preferable to behavioral explanations. The philosopher Dennett justifies intentional explanations on the grounds that they are provisional and can be cashed out in principle. Skinner objected to such explanations on the grounds that they are never cashed out in practice. Their different views arise from their divergent goals for psychology: understanding intelligence and rationality versus understanding behavior.  In the context of a science of behavior, intentional explanations only give the semblance of explanation because they rely on immediate causes that are fictional. Nonintentional explanations acceptable for a science of behavior are historical, much as in evolutionary biology. When Dennett's argument is applied to evolutionary biology, it becomes a justification of creationism.
[Citing Place (1987a)]  
Citing Place (1987a) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
* One current influence in psychology that fosters intentional explanations is the cognitive view, characteristic not only of cognitive psychology but of many other areas as well. In two books, Brainstorms and The Intentional Stance, Daniel Dennett (1978a, 1987a) lent a philosopher's support to this cognitive view that was so often the target of Skinner's criticisms and so often critical in return. Dennett (1978b) focused directly on Skinner in an essay called "Skinner Skinned" in Brainstorms. Although The Intentional Stance contains little about Skinner, it expands on the earlier views and remains consistent with them.
As was true with Chomsky's (1959) review of Verbal Behavior, behaviorists have made little response, despite ample time (see MacCorquodale, 1970). In Zuriff's (1985) book, Behaviorism: A Conceptual Reconstruction, counterarguments can be found, but one has to look for them, and they are not directed specifically at Dennett. One direct response was made by the philosopher Ullin Place (1987), but the essay was not written from Skinner's point of view, and largely agreed with Dennett. Dennett's (1987b) response to Place indicates he felt no challenge; he was simply able to dismiss the arguments. In this article, we attempt a reply to Dennett that is both adequate and direct.