Lecture 14: Varieties of explanation in psychology. (6/2/1974). Section 4
[Abstract]The schools of psychology. Feigl's three languages of psychology. Incommensurability in the explanation of behaviour. The evidential basis of mentalist language. The explanation of facts and the explanation of phenomena. Molecular languages in the explanation of behavioral phenomena: cybernetics and neurophysiology. The identity of factual reference.
[References]
Download: Amsterdam lecture 14
Lecture 9: Definition in use and verification analysis (28/11/1973) Section 2
[Abstract]Entailment and the entailment test. The definition in use and its limitations. Some examples. The verification test and the verification principle.
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 09 - revised version.pdf
Lecture 12: Mentalist explanations - Believing and wanting (23/1/1974). Section 3
[Abstract]The dispositional character and the intentionality of mentalist explanations. Mentalism as a scientific theory. The logical structure of mentalist explanations
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 12.pdf
Lecture 13: Mentalist explanations - epistemology and ontology (30/1/1974). Section 3
[Abstract]The nature of the evidence for mentalist explanations. The ontological commitments of mentalist explanations
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 13.pdf
Aaron, P. G., & Joshi, R. M. (2006). Written Language Is as Natural as Spoken language: A Biolinguistic Perspective. Reading Psychology, 27(4), 263-311. doi:10.1080/02702710600846803
[Abstract]A commonly held belief is that language is an aspect of the biological system since the capacity to acquire language is innate and evolved along Darwinian lines. Written language, on the other hand, is thought to be an artifact and a surrogate of speech; it is, therefore, neither natural nor biological. This disparaging view of written language, even though propounded by some renowned linguists and biologists, has not gained universal acceptance. Dissenters such as linguists from the Prague circle who claim that written language is an independent system that deserves a status equivalent to that of spoken language have developed their argument along linguistic parameters. The present article also endeavors to show that written language is as natural as spoken language but does so from a biolinguistic perspective. Biolinguistics defines language as a product of biological adaptation in the Darwinian sense (Givon, 2002) and considers language to be innate and species specific (Jenkins, 2000). The present article presents evidence to show that, similar to spoken language, written language has adaptive value, evolved over time, and is relatively independent of spoken language. The Egyptian hieroglyphic writing, which has a history of about 4,000 years, is used for examining the proposition that written language evolved along Darwinian lines as much as spoken language did. It is concluded that written language is yet another manifestation of the natural endowment of the human mind and may not be treated as a proxy for speech. The educational implication is that, in literacy instruction, written language should be given as much importance in today's schools as elements of spoken language, such as phoneme awareness and phonological awareness.
[Citing Place (2000c) in context]
ABC Adelaide (2022-06-27). A Brain in a Jar as a Philosophical Statement [Radio Interview]. Drive, a daily (weekdays) radio program of ABC Radio Adelaide.
[Abstract]Jules Schiller of ABC Adelaide interviewed Thomas Place about his father's brain on display in a museum of the University of Adelaide.
Download: ABC Adelaide (2022) A Brain in a Jar as a Philosophical Statement.mp3
Adams, B. J., Fields, L., and Verhave, T. (1993) Effects of test order on intersubject variability during equivalence class formation. The Psychological Record, 43, 133-152.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Adams, C. D., & Dickinson, A. (1981). Instrumental responding following Reinforcer Devaluation. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section B, 33(2b), 109-112. doi:10.1080/14640748108400816
[Abstract]In two experiments, hungry rats were given instrumental lever-press training for an appetitive reinforcer and, in addition, were exposed to another type of food which was not contingent on lever pressing. In the first experiment, exposure to each type of food was on separate days, whereas in the second experiment rats were exposed to each type of food in strict alternation within each session. Subsequently, a food aversion was conditioned to the reinforcer for the experimental group and to the non-contingent food for the control group. In both experiments, animals with an aversion to the reinforcer responded less in an extinction test than animals with an aversion to the non-contingent food. Subsequent reacquisition tests confirmed that the aversion to the non-contingent food in the control group was of comparable strength with that to the reinforcer in the experimental group. The results were discussed in terms of whether the reinforcer is encoded in the associative structure set up by exposure to an instrumental contingency.
[6 referring publications by Place]
Aitchison, J. (1989). The articulate mammal: An introduction to psycholinguistics. Routledge.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Alston, W. P. (1971). Dispositions and occurrences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1(2), 125–154. www.jstor.org/stable/40230343
[Citing Place (1954)]
Alter, T. (2021). A defense of the supervenience requirement on physicalism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 10(4), 264–274. doi:10.1002/tht3.504
[Abstract]The supervenience requirement on physicalism says roughly that if physicalism is true then mental properties supervene on fundamental physical properties. After explaining the basis of the requirement, I defend it against objections presented by Lei Zhong (“Physicalism without supervenience,” Philosophical Studies 178 (5), 2021: 1529–44), Barbara Gail Montero (“Must physicalism imply supervenience of the mental on the physical?” Journal of Philosophy 110, 2013: 93–110), and Montero and Christopher Devlin Brown (“Making room for a this-worldly physicalism,” Topoi 37 (3), 2018: 523–32).
[Citing Place (1956)]
Alter, T. (2023). The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism. Oxford University Press
[Abstract]Torin Alter presents a compelling defence of the 'knowledge argument' against physicalism, pioneered by Frank Jackson. According to physicalism, consciousness is a physical phenomenon. The knowledge argument stars Mary, who learns all objective, physical information through black-and-white media and yet acquires new information when she first sees colors for herself: information about what it is like to see in color. Based partly on that case, Jackson concludes that not all information is physical. Alter argues that the knowledge argument succeeds in refuting all standard versions of physicalism: versions on which consciousness is grounded by what objective science reveals. Alter also argues that given further, plausible assumptions, the knowledge argument leads to Russellian monism, according to which there are intrinsic properties that both constitute consciousness and underlie properties described by physics, such as mass and charge. Alter explains how the knowledge argument establishes those two conclusions and defend it against numerous objections.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Alter, T., & Howell, R.J. (2022). Physicalism, supervenience, and monism. Synthese, 200(6), 515 doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03965-8
[Abstract]Physicalism is standardly construed as a form of monism, on which all concrete phenomena fall under one fundamental type. It is natural to think that monism, and therefore physicalism, is committed to a supervenience claim. Monism is true only if all phenomena supervene on a certain fundamental type of phenomena. Physicalism, as a form of monism, specifies that these fundamental phenomena are physical. But some argue that physicalism might be true even if the world is disorderly, i.e., not ordered by supervenience relations in the way commonly supposed (Montero in J Philos 110:92–110, 2013; Leuenberger in Inquiry 57:151–174, 2014; Montero and Brown in Topoi 37(3):523–532, 2018; Zhong in Philos Stud 178(5):1529–1544, 2021). Unless these authors intend to challenge the claim that physicalism is a type of monism—a claim so central to the dialectic in philosophy of mind that rejecting it risks changing the subject—they are committed to challenging a supervenience requirement for monism. We argue that monism entails that there are substantial supervenience relations among concrete phenomena: relations that would not obtain in a disorderly world. Our argument thus has implications for debates about physicalism and supervenience, and sheds light on an under-discussed issue: what is implied by classifying a theory in the philosophy of mind as a form of monism? We also argue that physicalism’s commitment to monism creates problems for via negativa physicalism, on which the physical is characterized negatively.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958). Intention. Blackwell.
[5 referring publications by Place]
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1965). The intentionality of sensation: a grammatical feature. In R. J. Butler (Ed.), Analytical Philosophy (pp. 158-180). Blackwell.
[8 referring publications by Place]
Anscombe, G. E. M., & Geach, P. T. (translators & editors) (1966). Descartes Philosophical Writings: A Selection. Nelson.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Apter, M. J. (1982). The experience of motivation: The theory of psychological reversals. Academic Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Apter, M. J. (1989). Reversal theory: Motivation, emotion, and personality. Routledge.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Aranyosi, I. (2011). A new argument for mind-brain identity. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62(3), 489-517, doi:10.1093/bjps/axr001
[Abstract]In this article, I undertake the tasks: (i) of reconsidering Feigl's notion of a ‘nomological dangler' in light of recent discussion about the viability of accommodating phenomenal properties, or qualia, within a physicalist picture of reality; and (ii) of constructing an argument to the effect that nomological danglers, including the way qualia are understood to be related to brain states by contemporary dualists, are extremely unlikely. I offer a probabilistic argument to the effect that merely nomological danglers are extremely unlikely, the only probabilistically coherent candidates being 'anomic danglers' (not even nomically correlated) and ‘necessary danglers' (more than merely nomically correlated). After I show, based on similar probabilistic reasoning, that the first disjunct (anomic danglers) is very unlikely, I conclude that the identity thesis is the only remaining candidate for the mental-physical connection. The novelty of the argument is that it brings probabilistic considerations in favor of physicalism, a move that has been neglected in the recent burgeoning literature on the subject.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Aristotle (1901). Posterior analytics. B.H. Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Aristotle (1925). Metaphysics (translated by W.D. Ross).
[4 referring publications by Place]
Aristotle (1936). Physics (Translated by H. G. Apostle). Oxford University Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Aristotle (1941). De Anima. In R. McKeon (Ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle. Random House.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Aristotle (1963) Categories (translated with notes by J. L. Ackrill) Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Armstrong, D. M. (1962). Bodily sensations. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Armstrong, D. M. (1968). A materialist theory of the mind. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[Citing Place (1956)] [24 referring publications by Place] [Reviews]
Armstrong, D. M. (1973). Epistemological foundations for a materialist theory of the mind. Philosophy of Science , 40(2), 178-193 doi:10.1086/288514
[Abstract]A philosophy might take its general inspiration from (1) commonsense; (2) careful observation; (3) philosophical argumentation; (4) the sciences; (5) “higher” sources of illumination. It is argued in this paper that it is bedrock commonsense, and the sciences, which are the most reliable foundations for a philosophy. This result is applied to the discussion and defense of a materialist theory of the mind.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Armstrong, D. M. (1978). Universals and Scientific Realism (two volumes). Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Armstrong, D. M. (1983). Recent work on the relation of mind and brain. In G. Fløistad (Ed.), Philosophy of Mind/Philosophie de l’esprit (pp. 45–79). Contemporary philosophy/La philosophie contemporaine, vol 4. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6932-2_3
[Abstract]The decade 1966–1976 saw an immense amount of valuable philosophical discussion concerning the relation between mind and brain. As a result, it has seemed best to be selective, both with respect to topics and to authors. Many important books and papers have had to be passed over. This chronicle confines itself almost entirely to cases where new philosophical positions, or striking new lines of argument, have been developed about the relation of mind and brain.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Armstrong, D. M. (1983). What is a law of nature? Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Armstrong, D. M. (1989). Universals: An opinionated introduction. Westview Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Armstrong, D. M. (1995). Postscript: “Naturalism, materialism, and first philosophy” reconsidered. In P. K. Moser, & J. D. Trout (Eds.), Contemporary materialism: a reader (pp. 35-47). Routledge.
[Citing Place (1988a)]
Armstrong, D. M. (1997). A world of states of affairs. Cambridge University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Armstrong, D. M. (2004). Review of U. T. Place, George Graham (ed), Elizabeth R. Valentine (ed), Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2004(12). ndpr.nd.edu/news/identifying-the-mind-selected-papers-of-u-t-place/
[Reviewed publication(s)]
Download: Armstrong (2004) Review of U. T. Place, George Graham (ed), Elizabeth R. Valentine (ed), Identifying the Mind - Selected Papers of U.T. Place.pdf
Armstrong, D. M. (2022). Lewis and the identity theory. In P. R. Anstey, & D. Braddon-Mitchell (Eds.), Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind (pp. 24-28). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780192843722.001.0001
[Citing Place (1956)]
Armstrong, D. M., & Place, U. T. (1991). A debate on dispositions: their nature and their role in causation, Part I: the Armstrong-Place debate. Conceptus: Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 25(66), 3-44.
[Talks] [1 citing publications] [1 referring publications by Place]
Armstrong, D. M., Martin, C. B., Place, U. T., & Crane, T. (Ed.) (1996). Dispositions: A debate. Routledge.
[Related] [1 citing publications] [11 referring publications by Place] [Reviews]
Armstrong, D. M., Place, U. T., & Martin, C. B. (1992). A debate on dispositions: their nature and their role in causation: Part II The Martin-Armstrong-Place debate. Conceptus: Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 26(68-69), 3-58.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Arnauld, A. and Nicole, P. (1662) La logique, ou l'art de penser.
[6 referring publications by Place]
Aserinsky, E., & Kleitman, N. (1955) Two types of ocular motility occurring in sleep.
Journal appl. Physiology. 8, 1-10.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Augustine of Hippo De Quantitate Animae.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Austin, C. J. (2018). Essence in the age of evolution: A new theory of natural kinds. Routledge.
[Abstract]This book offers a novel defence of a highly contested philosophical position: biological natural kind essentialism. This theory is routinely and explicitly rejected for its purported inability to be explicated in the context of contemporary biological science, and its supposed incompatibility with the process and progress of evolution by natural selection. Christopher J. Austin challenges these objections, and in conjunction with contemporary scientific advancements within the field of evolutionary-developmental biology, the book utilises a contemporary neo-Aristotelian metaphysics of "dispositional properties", or causal powers, to provide a theory of essentialism centred on the developmental architecture of organisms and its role in the evolutionary process. By defending a novel theory of Aristotelian biological natural kind essentialism, Essence in the Age of Evolution represents the fresh and exciting union of cutting-edge philosophical insight and scientific knowledge.
[Citing Place (1996g)]
Austin, J. L. (1956). Ifs and cans. Proceedings of the British Academy. Reprinted in J. L. Austin (1961), Philosophical Papers (Edited by J. O. Urmson, & G. J. Warnock, pp. 205-232). Oxford University Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Austin, J. L. (1961). Philosophical papers (Edited by J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock). Oxford University Press.
[9 referring publications by Place]
Austin, J. L. (1962a). Sense and sensibilia (Reconstructed by G. J. Warnock). Oxford University Press.
[15 referring publications by Place]
Austin, J. L. (1962b). How to do Things with Words (Edited by J. O. Urmson). Oxford University Press.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Awret, U. (2022). Holographic duality and the physics of consciousness. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 16. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2022.685699
[Abstract]This paper introduces a novel dual-aspect theory of consciousness that is based on
the principle of holographic-duality in modern physics and explores the prospects of
making philosophically significant empirical discoveries about the physical correlates
of consciousness. The theory is motivated by an approach that identifies certain
anti-physicalist problem intuitions associated with representational content and spatial
location and attempts to provide these with a consciousness-independent explanation,
while suspending questions about the hard problem of consciousness and the more
problematic “phenomenal character”. Providing such topic neutral explanations is “hard”
enough to make a philosophical difference and yet “easy” enough to be approached
scientifically. I will argue that abstract algorithms are not enough to solve this problem
and that a more radical “computation” that is inspired by physics and that can be
realized in “strange metals” may be needed. While speculative, this approach has
the potential to both establish necessary connections between structural aspects of
conscious mental states and the physical substrate “generating” them and explain why
this representational content is “nowhere to be found”. I will end with a reconsideration
of the conceivability of zombies.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Ayer, A. J. (1936/1946). Language, Truth and Logic (2nd Edition). Gollancz.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Ayer, A. J. (1940). Foundations of empirical knowledge. Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Ayer, A. J. (1947). Thinking and Meaning: Inaugural Lecture. H. K. Lewis.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Ayer, A. J. (1959). Privacy. British Academy Lecture.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Ayer, A. J. (1960). Professor Malcolm on dreams. Journal of Philosophy, 57, 517-535.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Azevedo Leite, D. (2018). The Twenty-First Century Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition: A Critical Appraisal [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Trento.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Azevedo Leite, D. (2021). Molecular and Cellular Theory of Human Cognition. In D. A. Leite, The Twenty-First Century Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition: A Critical Analysis (pp. 73-108). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-63680-7_4
[Abstract]In this chapter, the author compares the neo-mechanistic theory with one of its major contemporary competitors, the Molecular and Cellular Theory of Human Cognition (MCTHC). The aim of the author in this chapter is to evaluate to what extent the main arguments presented by the proponents of MCTHC against the neo-mechanistic theory, directed to particular aspects of it, represent great threats to the aspirations of the neo-mechanists. MCTHC supports a 'ruthless (strong) neuro-cognitive reductionism', as a form of scientific integration for cognitive and neural science, based on current neuroscientific work present in the field of molecular and cellular neuroscience. This theory presents a clear challenge to the neo-mechanistic theory, which is committed to causal and explanatory pluralism and a weak autonomy of higher-level sciences. After characterizing the neuroscientific reductionist position more precisely, the author discusses the neo-mechanists' answer to the challenge and their attempt to stand with pluralism, instead of reduction. A meticulous analysis of their replies shows, however, that the challenge of explanatory reduction cannot be overcome with the arguments the neo-mechanists provide, and their theory, therefore, needs to be understood ultimately as reductionist.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Azevedo Leite, D. (2021). The Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition. In D. A. Leite, The Twenty-First Century Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition: A Critical Analysis (Chapter 3, 39-70). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-63680-7_3
[Abstract]In the third chapter, the author provides a systematical and analytical exposition of the most central theoretical aspects of the Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition (MTHC). He shows that the theory is clearly committed to a form of physicalism, on the one hand, but it rejects certain kinds of traditional epistemological reductionist approaches, on the other hand. The framework attempts to offer a pluralist and integrative mechanistic view concerning the relationship between human brain and cognition; a view that is applied to phenomena and to theories overall in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience. This general pluralist integrative neuro-cognitive relation is the most important pillar grounding the theory's application to human cognition. Besides this, the author also investigates how the framework is applied in concrete to two paradigmatic cases of human cognitive phenomena: the first case is related to the perceptual system; and the second case, to the memory system. In this way, it is possible to evaluate the application of the theory to particular psychological phenomena.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Azrin, H. H., Hutchinson, R. R., & Sallery R. D. (1964). Pain-aggression toward inanimate objects. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 7, 223-228.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Azrin, N. H., Holz, W., Ulrich, R. & Goldiamond, I. (1961). The control of the content of conversation through reinforcement. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 4, 25-30.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Azrin, N. H., Hutchinson, R. R., & Hake, D. F. (1966). Extinction-induced aggression. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 9, 191-204.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Azzano, L., & Raimondi, A. (2022). New foundations of dispositionalism - introduction. Synthese, 200, 384. doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03847-z
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]
Baier, K. (1962). Smart on Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, X, 57-68.
[Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1960)] [3 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Baker, L. R. (1997). Why constitution is not identity. Journal of Philosophy, XCIV, 599-621.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Baker, M. C. (1992). Thematic conditions on syntactic structures: Evidence from locative applicatives. In I. M. Roca (Ed.), Thematic structure and its role in grammar (pp. 23-46). Foris Publications.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Baldwin, J. M. (1902). Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol.II. Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Ball, D. (2016). No help on the hard problem: Commentary on Reber on Origins of Mind. Animal Sentience, 11(8) doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1177
[Abstract]The hard problem of consciousness is to explain why certain physical states are conscious: why do they feel the way they do, rather than some other way or no way at all? Arthur Reber (2016) claims to solve the hard problem. But he does not: even if we grant that amoebae are conscious, we can ask why such organisms feel the way they do, and Reber’s theory provides no answer. Still, Reber’s theory may be methodologically useful: we do not yet have a satisfactory theory of consciousness, but perhaps the study of simple minds is a way to go about finding one.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Balogun, O.A. (2023). A central state materialistic interpretation of the Yoruba concept of person: A critique. In A. D. Attoe, S. S. Temitope, V. Nweke, J. Umezurike, & J. O. Chimakonam, (Eds), Conversations on African Philosophy of Mind, Consciousness and Artificial Intelligence. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-36163-0_3
[Abstract]In recent times, there have been a series of unresisted temptations to argue that the Yoruba concept of the human person fits very well into the framework of central state materialism, which states that mental events are identifiable with physical events occurring in the brain and central nervous system. This is because ara (human body), which is purely physical, can be taken to perform both material and immaterial functions. The chapter argues that while this is true; nonetheless, it is totally incorrect to reduce the Yoruba to central state materialists. The chapter states unequivocally that the performance of other vital components of the human person like emi (life-giving entity), ori (the bearer of human destiny), and ese (symbol of physical legs and spiritual efforts), suggests that the Yoruba concept of person, falls within the purview of dualism. It is argued further that the dualism of the Yoruba, which encourages harmonious interaction in the performances of both organs (material and immaterial), is fundamentally different from Cartesian dualism, which operates on the watertight distinction between the functions of the body and mind. The chapter recommends that a proper understanding of the Yoruba concept of a person can serve as a philosophical defence of Yoruba beliefs in spiritual entities, resolution of the traditional mind-body problem, and decolonization of the concept of mind, in contemporary Yoruba thought.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Bannister, D. (1968). The myth of physiological psychology. Bulletin of the British Psychology Society, 21, 229-31.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Bard, P. (1942). Neural mechanisms in emotional and sexual behaviour. Psychosom. Med., 4, 171-2.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Barnes-Holmes, D., Hayes, S. C., Dymond, S. & O’Hora, D. (2001). Multiple stimulus relations and the transformations of stimulus functions. In S. C. Hayes, D. Barnes-Holmes, & B. Roche (Eds.), Relational frame theory: A post-Skinnerian account of human language and cognition (Chapter 3, pp. 51-71). Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
[Abstract]The key concept in Relational Frame Theory is the concept of stimulus relation (Hayes, 1991, 1994; Barnes and Holmes, 1991; Hayes and Hayes, 1989, 1992; Hayes and Wilson, 1996). Understanding the implications of an RFT approach requires clarity about this concept and its flexibility. In this chapter we will attempt to characterize multiple stimulus relations and to distinguish this approach from a traditional class based approach. We will point to ways in which increasingly elaborate relational networks are acquired, modified, and brought under various forms of contextual control. Finally we will describe in some detail the kinds of data that are generated in RFT research, and show how methodological advances are beginning to permit more complex questions to be asked and answered.
[Citing Place (1998b) in context]
Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Bartlett, G. (2018). Functionalism and the problem of occurrent states. Philosophical Quarterly, 68(270), 1-20. doi:10.1093/pq/pqx043
[Abstract]In 1956 U. T. Place proposed that consciousness is a brain process. More attention should be paid to his word 'process'. There is near-universal agreement that experiences are processive--as witnessed in the platitude that experiences are occurrent states. The abandonment of talk of brain processes has benefited functionalism, because a functional state, as it is usually conceived, cannot be a process. This point is dimly recognized in a well-known but little-discussed argument that conscious experiences cannot be functional states because the former are occurrent, while the latter are dispositional. That argument fails, but it can be made sound if we reformulate it with the premise that occurrent states are processive. The only way for functionalists to meet the resulting challenge is to abandon the standard individuation of functional states in terms of purely abstract causal roles.
[Citing Place (1956) in context] [Citing Place (1967)]
Download: Bartlett (2018) Functionalism and the Problem of Occurrent States.pdf
Barwise, J., & Perry, J. (1983). Situations and attitudes. MIT Press.
[25 referring publications by Place]
Battista, J.R. (1978). The Science of Consciousness. In K. S. Pope, & J. L. Singer (Eds), The Stream of Consciousness. Emotions, Personality, and Psychotherapy. Springer. doi.:10.1007/978-1-4684-2466-9_4
[Citing Place (1956)]
Bauer, W. A. (2016). Physical Intentionality, Extrinsicness, and the Direction of Causation. Acta Analytica, 31, 397–417. doi:10.1007/s12136-016-0283-2
[Abstract]The Physical Intentionality Thesis claims that dispositions share the marks of psychological intentionality; therefore, intentionality is not exclusively a mental phenomenon. Beyond the standard five marks, Alexander Bird introduces two additional marks of intentionality that he argues dispositions do not satisfy: first, thoughts are extrinsic; second, the direction of causation is that objects cause thoughts, not vice versa. In response, this paper identifies two relevant conceptions of extrinsicness, arguing that dispositions show deep parallels to thoughts on both conceptions. Then, it shows that Bird’s discussion of direction of causation overlooks complexities of dispositionality and intentionality that problematize apparent differences between thoughts and dispositions. The paper ends with a discussion of why we find these parallels between thoughts and dispositions.
[Citing Place (1996g)]
Bauer, W. A. (2019). Powers and the Pantheistic Problem of Unity.
Sophia, 58(4), 563-580.
[Citing Place (1996g)]
Bauer, W. A. (2022). Causal Powers and the Intentionality Continuum. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781009214858
[Citing Place (1996g)]
Baum, W. M., & Heath, J. L. (1992). Behavioral explanations and intentional explanations in psychology. American Psychologist, 47(11), 1312-1317.
[Abstract]A recent criticism of behaviorism asserts that intentional explanations in psychology are acceptable and preferable to behavioral explanations. The philosopher Dennett justifies intentional explanations on the grounds that they are provisional and can be cashed out in principle. Skinner objected to such explanations on the grounds that they are never cashed out in practice. Their different views arise from their divergent goals for psychology: understanding intelligence and rationality versus understanding behavior. In the context of a science of behavior, intentional explanations only give the semblance of explanation because they rely on immediate causes that are fictional. Nonintentional explanations acceptable for a science of behavior are historical, much as in evolutionary biology. When Dennett's argument is applied to evolutionary biology, it becomes a justification of creationism.
[Citing Place (1987a) in context]
Beakley, B., & Ludlow, P. (Eds.) (1992). The Philosophy of Mind: Classical Problems and Contemporary Issues. MIT Press.
[Reprints in this collection]
Beasty, A. (1987). The role of language in the emergence of equivalence relations: A developmental study [Unpublished Ph.D. thesis]. University of Wales, Bangor, U.K.
[5 referring publications by Place]
Beasty, A., & Lowe, C.F. (1985). The role of language in the emergence of equivalence classes II: Evidence from developmental studies [Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, York].
[1 referring publications by Place]
Bechtel, W. (2012). Identity, reduction, and conserved mechanisms: Perspectives from circadian rhythm research. In S. Gozzano, & C. S. Hill: New perspectives on type identity: The mental and the physical (pp. 43-65). Cambridge University Press. mechanism.ucsd.edu/research/bechtel.identityreductionconservationconvergence.pdf
[Citing Place (1956)]
Beckermann A. (1992). Introduction - reductive and nonreductive physicalism. In A. Beckermann (Ed.), Emergence or reduction?: Essays on the prospects of nonreductive physicalism (pp. 1-21). De Gruyter.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Beckermann, A. (2007). Neue Überlegungen zum Eigenschaftsphysikalismus. In M. Pauen , M. Schütte , & A. Staudacher (Eds), Begriff, Erklärung, Bewusstsein. Neue Beiträge zum Qualia-Problem (pp. 143-170). Mentis. pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2555625
[Citing Place (1956)] [1 reprinting collections]
Beckermann, A. (2012). Aufsätze. Bd. 1: Philosophie des Geistes. Universitätsbibliothek Bielefeld. pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2508111
[Reprints in this collection]
Beckermann, A. (2012). Property Identity and Reductive Explanation. In S. Gozzano & C. Hill (Eds.), New Perspectives on Type-Identity (pp. 66-87). Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511687068.004
[Citing Place (1956)] [1 reprinting collections]
Bedford, E. (1956-1957). Emotions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LVII, 281-304.
[1 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Beloff, J. (1965). The identity hypothesis - A critique. In J. R. Smythies (Ed.), Brain and mind. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Beloff, J. (1995). The Searle fallacy and what we can learn from it. The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 20, 19-26.
[1 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Beloff, J. (1996). Searle's fallacy versus Place's nonsense: John Beloff replies to his critics The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Section Newsletter, 22, 14-16.
[Citing Place (1956)] [Is reply to] [1 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Beltrán-Gabrie, A., Lira, D., Quezada-Scholz, V.E., Arriaza, T. (2021). Theory and Interventions in Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Depression. In J.P. Jiménez, A. Botto, & P. Fonagy (Eds), Etiopathogenic Theories and Models in Depression. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-77329-8_6
[Abstract]The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how the cognitive-behavioral model understands the phenomenon of depression, and how this understanding translates into the development of clinically effective interventions. Cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) understands the psychological suffering of depression as part of an interactive process between behavior, thought, emotion, and context. Depending on the role that each of these dimensions plays in the expression of the problem, different techniques could be used, which can be focused on all or each of these components. We describe the etiopathogenesis of depression and its treatment. We review theories and basic research in the field of CBT and depression, as well as applied research that accounts for the efficacy of a wide range of CBT techniques in the treatment of depression, and an emerging field of research that is the search for mechanisms that explain change. The evidence is critically reviewed, advancing toward an integrative proposal of greater clinical utility.
[Citing Place (1988b)]
Bennett, J. (1976). Linguistic Behaviour. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Bentall, R. P., Lowe, C. F. and Beasty, A. (1985). The role of verbal behavior in human learning II: The development of fixed-interval responding. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 43, 165-181.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Berkeley, G. (1710) The principles of human knowledge.
[5 referring publications by Place]
Berlyne, D. E. (1960). Conflict, Arousal and Curiosity. McGraw-Hill.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Bertman, M.A. (1972). Basic particulars and the Identity Thesis. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, 3, 1–8. doi:10.1007/BF01800815
[Abstract]This paper begins with a discussion of the logical apparatus of Frege, where his use ofSinn suggests a modification of Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Then, it turns to Strawson's “basic particulars” with its essentially Kantian orientation. This brings forward the logical ground upon which the Identity Thesis rests. Finally, following Frege with some modifications, the paper suggests that an “ontological list” where concepts can be treated as objective (materially dependent) subsistent entities would be necessary in order to avoid errors of J. J. C. Smart and other analytic philosophers who hold the Identity Thesis.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Bickerton, D. (1990). Language and Species. University of Chicago Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Bickle, J. (2000). Editor's note. Brain and Mind, 1, 25. doi:10.1023/A:1010015620339
Download: Bickle (2000) Editor's Note.pdf
Bigelow, J., & Pargetter, R. (1999). Critical notice of Tim Crane, ed. Dispositions: A debate by D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place. doi:10.1080/00455091.1999.10715993
[Reviewed publication(s)]
Download: Bigelow & Pargetter (1999) Critical Notice of Dispostions - A Debate.pdf
Binswanger, L. (1947). Ausgewälhte Vorträge und Aufsätze. Francke.
[5 referring publications by Place]
Bird, A. (2001). Review of DAVID ARMSTRONG, CHARLIE MARTIN, and ULLIN PLACE, edited by TIM CRANE Dispositions: A Debate and STEPHEN MUMFORD Dispositions. doi:10.1093/bjps/52.1.137
[Reviewed publication(s)]
Download: Bird (2001) Review of Armstrong et al Dispositions.pdf
Bird, A. (2007). Nature's metaphysics: Laws and properties. Oxford University Press
[Citing Place (1996g)]
Bird, A. (2016). Overpowering (How the Powers Ontology Has Overreached Itself). Mind, 125(498),341-383. doi:10.1093/mind/fzv207 kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/overpowering-how-the-powers-ontology-has-overreached-itself(277eec92-feb9-4e98-9741-8d9fd31e55c6).html
[Abstract]Many authors have argued in favour of an ontology of properties as powers and it has been widely argued that this ontology allows us to address certain philosophical problems in novel and illuminating ways, for example causation, representation, intentionality, free will, and liberty. I argue that the ontology of powers, even if successful as an account of fundamental natural properties, does not provide the insight claimed as regards the aforementioned nonfundamental phenomena. I focus on and criticise the powers theory of causation presented by Mumford and Anjum (2011), and argue that related criticisms can be directed at other abuses of (the ontology of ) powers.
[Citing Place (1996g)]
Blackburn, I., Bishop, S., & Glen, A. J. (1981). The efficacy of cognitive therapy in depression: A treatment trial using cognitive therapy and pharmacotherapy - each alone and in combination. British Journal of Psychiatry ,139, 181-9.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Blackburn, S. (1996). The fertile comma [Review of the book 'Dispositions: A Debate' by D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place].
[Reviewed publication(s)]
Block, N. (2009). Comparing the major theories of consciousness. In M. S. Gazzaniga, E. Bizzi, L. M. Chalupa, S. T. Grafton, T. F. Heatherton, C. Koch, J. E. LeDoux, S. J. Luck, G. R. Mangan, J. A. Movshon, H. Neville, E. A. Phelps, P. Rakic, D. L. Schacter, M. Sur, & B. A. Wandell (Eds.), The cognitive neurosciences (pp. 1111–1122). Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
[Abstract]This article compares the three frameworks for theories of consciousness that are taken most seriously by neuroscientists: the view that consciousness is a biological state of the brain, the global workspace perspective, and an account in terms of higher order states. The comparison features the "explanatory gap", the fact that we have no idea why the neural basis of an experience is the neural basis of that experience rather than another experience or no experience at all. It is argued that the biological framework handles the explanatory gap better than do the global workspace or higher order views. The article does not discuss quantum theories or "panpsychist" accounts according to which consciousness is a feature of the smallest particles of inorganic matter. Nor does it discuss the "representationist" proposals that are popular among philosophers but not neuroscientists.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Block, N., & Alston, W. P. (1984) Psychology and philosophy. In M. H. Bornstein (Ed.), Psychology and its allied disciplines (Volume 1: The humanities, ch. 5, pp. 195-). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Bloomfield, L. (1933). Language. Holt.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and social imagery. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Blumenfeld, J. B. (1979). Phenomenal properties and the identity theory, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 57(4), 309-323. doi:10.1080/00048407912341341
[Citing Place (1956)]
Bobbs-Merrill (1969). Phil.163. Bobbs-Merrill reprint series in Philosophy.
[Reprints in this collection]
Borghini, A. (2009). Dispositions and Their Intentions. In G. Damschen, R. Schnepf, & K. Stüber: Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind (pp. 204-220). De Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110211825.204
[Abstract]Dispositional Realism is the view according to which some denizens of reality – i.e., dispositions – are properties, may exist in the natural world, and have an irreducible modal character. Among Dispositional Realists, Charlie Martin, Ullin Place and George Molnar most notably argued that the modal character of dispositions should be understood in terms of their intentionality. Other Dispositional Realists, most notably Stephen Mumford, challenged this understanding of the modal character of dispositions. In this paper, I defend a fresh version of the intentional understanding of dispositions. I start by distinguishing between two questions about properties, respectively addressing their identity conditions and their individuation conditions. I, then, define categorical and dispositional properties in terms of their qualitative character, and examine their identity and individuation conditions. I conclude that the attribution of intentions is a conceptual tool introduced in order to alleviate the burdensome task of specifying the conditions of individuation of a disposition; however, such attribution does not affect the identity of a disposition.
[Citing Place (1996g)] [Citing Place (1999b)]
Boring, E. G. (1933). The Physical Dimension of Consciousness. Century.
[17 referring publications by Place]
Boring, E. G. (1940). Was this analysis a success? Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 35, 4-10. [Reprinted in S. Rachman (ed.) Critical Essays in Psychoanalysis. Oxford: Pergamon, 16-22.]
[1 referring publications by Place]
Boring, E. G. (1950). A history of experimental psychology (2nd edition; first edition: 1929). Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[6 referring publications by Place]
Borst, C. V. (1970a). Introduction. In C. V. Borst (Ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
[Citing Place (1956)] [2 referring publications by Place]
Borst, C.V. (Ed.). (1970). The mind-brain identity theory. Macmillan. doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15364-0_2
[Reprints in this collection]
Bradley, M. C. (1963). Sensations, Brain Processes and Colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 41, 385-393.
[Citing Place (1956)] [2 referring publications by Place]
Bradley, M. C. (1964). Critical Notice of Smart's Philosophy and Scientific Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XLII, 262-83.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Brain, Lord (1965) Some Aspects of the Mind-Brain Relationship In J. R. Smythies (Ed.)., Brain and Mind (pp. 63-79). Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Braithwaite, R. B. (1932). The nature of believing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 33, 129-146.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Brentano, F. (1874). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Duncker & Humblot.
[19 referring publications by Place]
Brentano, F. C. (1911/1973). Appendix to the classification of mental phenomena. In O.Kraus (Ed.), Psychology from an empirical standpoint (English translation L. L. McAlister (Ed.)). Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Brentano, F. C. (1930). Wahrheit und Evidenz: Erkenntnistheoretische Abhandlungen und Briefe, ausgewählt erläutert und eingeleitet von Oskar Kraus. Felix Meiner Verlag.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Breuer, J., & Freud, S. (1895). Studien über Hysteria.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Brewer, W. F. (1974). There is no convincing evidence for operant or classical conditioning in adult humans. In W. B. Weimer & D. J. Palermo (Eds.), Cognition and the Symbolic Processes (pp. 1-34). Erlbaum.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Bridgman, G. (1928). The logic of modern physics. Macmillan.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Broad, C. D. (1925). Mind and its place in nature. Routledge.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Broadbent, D. E. (1958). Perception and Communication. Pergamon.
[17 referring publications by Place]
Broadbent, D. E. (1961). Behaviour. Eyre and Spottiswoode.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Broadbent, D. E. (1971). Decision and Stress. Academic Press.
[14 referring publications by Place]
Broadbent, D. E. (1973). In Defence of Empirical Psychology. Methuen.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Brogden, W. J. (1939). Sensory preconditioning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 25, 323-332
[1 referring publications by Place]
Brogden, W. J., Lipman, E. A., & Culler, E. (1938). The role of incentive in conditioning and extinction. The American Journal of Psychology, 51, 109–117. doi:10.2307/1416419
[2 referring publications by Place]
Bromberger, S. (1965). An approach to explanation. In R.J. Butler (Ed.), Analytical Philosophy, Second Series (pp. 72-105). Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Brown, C. D., & Papineau, D. (2024). Illusionism and a posteriori physicalism; No fact of the matter Journal of Consciousness Studies
[Abstract]Illusionists and a posteriori physicalists agree entirely on the metaphysical nature of reality—that all concrete entities are composed of fundamental physical entities. Despite this basic agreement on metaphysics, illusionists hold that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, whereas a posteriori physicalists hold that it does. One explanation of this disagreement would be
that either the illusionists have too demanding a view about what consciousness requires, or the a posteriori physicalists have too tolerant a view. However, we will argue that this divergence of opinion is merely an upshot of the semantic indeterminacy of the term ‘conscious’ and its cognates. We shall back up this diagnosis by showing how semantic indeterminacy of the kind in
question is a pervasive feature of language. By illustrating this pattern with a range of historical examples, we shall show how the dispute between the illusionists and their a posteriori physicality opponents is one instance of a common kind of terminological imprecision. The disagreement between the illusionists and the a posteriori physicalists is thus not substantial. In effect, the two sides differ only about how to make an indeterminate term precise. The moral is that they should stop looking for arguments designed to settle the dispute in their favour.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Brown, P. L., & Jenkins, H. M. (1968). Auto-shaping of the pigeon's key-peck. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 11, 1-8.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Brown, P., & Levinson, S. (1978). Universals in language use: politeness phenomena. In E. N. Goody (Ed.), Questions and politeness: Strategies in social interaction. Cambridge University Press. Reissued with corrections, new introduction and new bibliography as Politeness: Some Universals of Language Usage. Cambridge: C
[2 referring publications by Place]
Brown, R. (1973). A First Language: The Early Stages. Harvard University Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Brown, R. (2012). The brain and its states. In S. Edelman, T. Fekete, & N. Zach (Eds.), Being in time: Dynamical models of phenomenal experience. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Buckareff, A. A. (2023). Pantheism, omnisubjectivity, and the feeling of temporal passage. Religions, 14(6), 758. doi:10.3390/rel14060758
[Abstract]By “pantheism” I mean to pick out a model of God on which God is identical with the totality of existents constitutive of the universe. I assume that, on pantheism, God is an omnispatiotemporal mind who is identical with the universe. I assume that, given divine omnispatiotemporality, God knows everything that can be known in the universe. This includes having knowledge de se of the minds of every conscious creature. Hence, if God has knowledge de se of the minds of every conscious creature, then divine omniscience implies omnisubjectivity. Assuming that eternalism is true, robust temporal passage is an illusion. But, conscious creatures, such as human persons, experience robust temporal passage. If God has the attribute of omnisubjectivity, then God experiences temporal passage. However, God also has a unified experience of the entire spatiotemporal continuum. God’s having these two perspectives creates a tension for pantheism given that God would seem to experience both temporal passage and an absence of temporal passage. I compare non-personal pantheism and personal pantheism and consider which one has better resources to answer the foregoing puzzle. I argue that personal pantheism is better equipped to address this problem than non-personal pantheism.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]
Bühler, K. (1907). Tatsachen und Probleme zu einer Psychologie der Denkvorgange I. Über Gedanken. Arch. Ges. Psychol., 9, 297-365.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Bunge M. (1977). Emergence and the mind. Neuroscience, 2(4), 501–509.
doi:10.1016/0306-4522(77)90047-1
[Citing Place (1956)]
Burgess, A. (1972). A Clockwork Orange. Lorrimer.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Burgess, P. W. & Shallice, T. (1996). Confabulation and the control of recollection. Memory, 4, 359-411.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Burgos, J. E. (2004). Realism about behavior. Behavior and Philosophy, 32, 69-95.
[Abstract]Behavior analysis emphasizes the study of overt animal (human and nonhuman) behavior as a subject matter in its own right. This paper provides a metaphysical foundation for such an emphasis via an elucidation of a thesis that I generically call “realism about behavior,” where by “realism” I mean an assertion of mind-independent existence. The elucidation takes the form of a conceptual framework that combines a property-exemplification account of events with modal realism in the context of three opposing philosophies of mind: property dualism, reductive physicalism, and type behaviorism. Each philosophy leads to the thesis that at least one possible world exists in which counterparts of all actual behavioral events occur and no counterpart of any actual “mental” (either nonphysical, neuro-mental, or behavioro-mental) event occurs. The third thesis is false because it violates the assumption that nothing can exist independently of itself, which leads to a rejection of type behaviorism. The other two theses provide the sought-after foundation through a counterfactual characterization of behavior qua behavior as a scientific subject matter. Its study thus becomes the study of behavior as if the nonphysical and the neural did not exist, even if they may factually exist and play a causal role in behavior. Some implications are discussed.
[Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1997f)]
Burgos, J. E. (2016). Antidualism and antimentalism in radical behaviorism. Behavior and Philosophy, 43 1-37.
[Abstract]Radical behaviorism (RB) is antidualistic and antimentalistic. Antidualism is the rejection of ontological dualism, the partition of reality into physical and nonphysical. Antimentalism is the rejection of the ontological theses that mind is causal, internal, subjective, and nonbehavioral in nature. Radical behaviorists conflate both rejections, based on depictions of mentalism as inherently dualistic. However, such depictions are fallacious. Mental causation and mind as internal are fundamentally incompatible with dualism and hence inherently materialistic. Mind as subjective and nonbehavioral in nature are compatible with dualism, but can be construed materialistically. I exemplify with the mind-brain identity theory. The same arguments apply to functionalism, which is also materialistic and provides a more plausible philosophical interpretation of cognitive psychology as a paradigmatic example of mentalism at work in psychology. I propose that radical behaviorists’ accusations of dualism against mentalism rely on an invalid redefinition of “dualism” in terms other than the physical-nonphysical partition. All of this only weakens RB’s antimentalism. Radical behaviorists are advised to stop making those accusations and adopt a behavioristic ontology of mind, such as mind-behavior identity, to reject alternative nondualistic ontologies.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Burgos, J. E. (2020). A Goldilocks approach to the philosophy-science relation. Behavior and Philosophy, 48, 47-68.
[Abstract]The Goldilocks Principle recommends sometimes seeking just the right amount of something. In this paper, I apply this principle to pursue a more judicious view of the relation between philosophy (P) and science (S). Extreme views contrary to GA depict the PS relation as one of destructive incompatibility, indifferent independence, or toxic asymmetric dependence. Contrary to both extremes, the Goldilocks Approach (GA) suggests more moderate depictions of P and S as sufficiently diverse to enjoy professional sovereignty and disagree, but also sufficiently compatible to enable meaningful interdisciplinary cooperation. GA also advises a greater emphasis on case-based investigation that gives equal importance to the context of justification (analytic normative considerations about the logic of linguistic products) and the context of discovery (descriptions of the biopsychosocial aspects of the processes that lead to such products). All this makes for a more balanced, potentially constructive and fruitful relation in selected matters. I exemplify with cases at the intersections between psychology and the Ps of language, mind, and S.
[Citing Place (1999a)]
Burnheim, J (c. 1968). Intentionality and materialism (Unpublished paper presented to the Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney).
[11 referring publications by Place]
Burt, C. (1968). Brain and consciousness. British Journal of Psychology, 59, 55-69.
[Abstract]What light has been thrown on the problem of consciousness by recent researches on the brain, particularly those carried out by the many new techniques which have become available during the last fifteen years? It appears (i) that the nerve cell differs in no essential way, either in its basic structure or in its metabolic processes, from other gland-like cells, though, like all cells, it is differentiated for its specific function; (ii) that conduction in the nerve fibre is a relatively simple electro-chemical process; (iii) that the transmission of the nerve impulse across the synapse is chemical, and the transmitter substances are of a familiar hormonal character; and (iv) that, apart from the greater complexity and the greater instability of the synaptic thresholds, there are no essential differences between those parts of the neuronal network (n.g. the cortex) which are accompanied by consciousness and those parts (e.g. the spinal cord) which are not. A comparison of the specific micro-neural situations in which consciousness does and does not arise suggests that the brain functions, not as a generator of consciousness, but rather as a two-way transmitter and detector; i.e. although its activity is apparently a necessary condition, it cannot be a sufficient condition, of conscious experience.
[Citing Place (1956)] [2 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Burt, C. (1969). Brain and consciousness. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 22, 29-36.
[Citing Place (1956)] [Is reply to] [2 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Burton, M. (1982). Theses on the verbal community. Behaviour Analysis, 3(3), 26–29.
[Abstract]Suggests that consciousness be examined in a materialistic way that recognizes the influence of societal forces, neither reducing phenomenon to biological processes nor invoking speculative metaphysics (Freudian or otherwise). This argument is presented as a set of theses, and references for each thesis are included.
[1 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Byrne, D. (2016) Do phenomenal concepts misrepresent? Philosophical Psychology, 29(5), 669-678, doi:10.1080/09515089.2015.1108398
[Abstract]Many contemporary physicalists concede to dualists that conscious subjects have distinctive “phenomenal concepts” of the phenomenal qualities of their experiences. Indeed, they contend that idiosyncratic characteristics of these concepts facilitate responses to influential anti-physicalist arguments. Like some some other critics of this approach, James Tartaglia (2013) maintains that phenomenal concepts express contents that conflict with physicalism, but as a physicalist, the moral he distinctively draws from this is that phenomenal concepts misrepresent. He contends further that the contemporary physicalists’ account cannot accommodate this feature, and that in consequence, physicalists should abandon phenomenal concepts and return to the identity theory championed by Place and Smart in the 1950s. I respond to Tartaglia by identifying lacunae in his interpretation of contemporary physicalism and arguing that phenomenal concepts as conceived by the contemporary physicalists do not express contents that support either dualist or physicalist metaphysics: they are “metaphysically neutral.”
[Citing Place (1956)]
Cabanis, P. J. G. (1802). Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Cameron, N. (1938). Reasoning, regression and communication in schizophrenics. Psychological Monographs, 50(1), 1-34.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Canfield, T. H. (1941). Sex determination of day-old chicks, II. Type variations. Poultry Science, 20, 327-328.
[5 referring publications by Place]
Cannon, W. B. (1929). Bodily changes in pain, hunger, fear and rage.
Appleton-Century.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Carnap R. (1932). Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache [Psychology in Physical Language]. Erkenntnis, 3, 107 – 142.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Carnap R. (1934). Logische Syntax der Sprache [Translated by Amethe Smeaton asThe Logical Syntax of Language, London: Routledge, 1937]. Springer.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Carnap R. (1942). Introduction to Semantics. Harvard University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Carnap, R. (1938). The Unity of Science. Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Cartwright, N. (1983), How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Cartwright, N. (1989). Nature's Capacities and their Measurement. Oxford University Press.
[8 referring publications by Place]
Catania, A. C., & Harnad, S. (Eds.) (1988). The selection of behavior. The operant behaviorism of B. F. Skinner: Comments and consequences. Cambridge University Press.
[Reprints in this collection] [2 referring publications by Place]
Catania, A. C., Shimoff, E., & Matthews, B. A. (1989). An experimental analysis of rule-governed behavior. In S. C. Hayes (Ed.), Rule-Governed Behavior: Cognition, Contingencies and Instructional Control, pp. 119-150. Plenum Press, .
[3 referring publications by Place]
Catania, A.C. (2002). The verbal behavior of Ullin T. Place. European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 3(1), 1-5. doi:10.1080/15021149.2002.11434199
[Abstract]Ullin Place died on 2 January 2000. His contributions to philosophy and to behavior analysis have earned him an enduring place in our new century. This memorial uses text from his correspondence to illustrate the scope of his life's work and the perseverance and courage with which he faced its end.
Download: Catania (2002) The Verbal Behavior of Ullin T. Place.pdf
Catania, A.C. (2003). Ullin T. Place: A life in verbal behavior. Behavior and Philosophy, 31, 173-180. behavior.org/resources/130.pdf
[Abstract]Ullin T. Place died on 2 January 2000. His contributions to philosophy and to behavior analysis have earned him an enduring place in our new century. This memorial uses text from his correspondence to illustrate the scope of his life's work and the dignity, perseverance, and courage with which he faced its end.
Download: Catania (2003) Ullin T. Place - A Life in Verbal Behavior.pdf
Chadwick-Jones, J. K. (1989). Baboon charades. The Psychologist, 2, 58-61.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Chalmers, D. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journnal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 200-219.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Chalmers, D. (2018). The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 25(9-10), 6-61.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Chalmers, D. J. (1996) The conscious mind. Oxford University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]The book is an extended study of the problem of consciousness. After setting up the problem, I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible and that if one takes consciousness seriously, one has to go beyond a strict materialist framework. In the second half of the book, I move toward a positive theory of consciousness with fundamental laws linking the physical and the experiential in a systematic way. Finally, I use the ideas and arguments developed earlier to defend a form of strong artificial intelligence and to analyze some problems in the foundations of quantum mechanics.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Chalmers, D. J. (2002). Philosophy of mind: classical and contemporary readings. Oxford University Press
[Reprints in this collection]
Chalmers, D. J. (2020). Idealism and the mind-body problem. In W. Seager (Ed.), The routledge handbook of panpsychism (pp. 353–373). Routledge.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Chambliss, B. (2018). The mind–body problem. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 9(4), e1463. doi:10.1002/wcs.1463
[Abstract]The mind–body problem is the problem of explaining how the happenings of our mental lives are related to physical states, events and processes. Proposed solutions to the problem vary by whether and how they endorse physicalism, the claim that mental states are ultimately “nothing over and above” physical states, and by how they understand the interactions between mental and physical states. Physicalist solutions to the mind–body problem have been dominant in the last century, with the variety of physicalism endorsed (reductive or nonreductive) depending upon both the outcome of philosophical arguments and methodological developments in the cognitive and neural sciences. After outlining the dominant contemporary approach to the mind–body problem, I examine the prospects for a solution in light of developments in the cognitive sciences, especially the scientific study of consciousness.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Champagne, M. (2018). Consciousness and the philosophy of signs: How Peircean semiotics combines phenomenal qualia and practical effects. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 19. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-73338-8
[Abstract]It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy. The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period – its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound. Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in philosophy forward.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Chappell, V. C. (Ed.). (1962). The Philosophy of Mind. Prentice-Hall.
[Citing Place (1954)] [Reprints in this collection] [1 referring publications by Place]
Chase, S. (1968). Selectivity in multidimensional stimulus control. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 66, 787-792.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Chater, N. (1989). Learning to respond to structure in time. R.S.R.E. Malvern Technical Report, September 1989.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Chernoff, F. (2022). ‘Truth’, ‘justice’, and the American wave… function: comments on Alexander Wendt's Quantum Mind and Social Science.
International Theory, 14, 146 - 158. doi:10.1017/S1752971921000099
[Abstract]This paper examines several aspects of Alexander Wendt's Quantum Mind and Social Science. The paper questions the nature of the task, as ontologies are debated in a scientific field once there is a widely accepted substantive theory that stands in need of interpretation, as with Newtonian physics or quantum mechanics; doing this job for international relations (IR) is highly questionable give that there is no widely accepted substantive theory of IR that needs an interpretation. Second, the paper questions Wendt's view of the consequences for ontology of quantum theory being replaced in the future; Wendt the interpretation of the history of science maintains that in the physical sciences a new theory subsumes the older theory, including its ontology. But, this seems to misread history, while the empirical content of classical physics is subsumed by relativity theory, it is far from true that the former's ontology was subsumed. The ontologies are in sharp contrast. The paper raises questions also about the notion of ‘truth’ and of the meaningfulness of evaluative concepts like ‘justice’.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Chisholm, R. (1957). Perceiving: a Philosophical Study. Cornell University Press.
[9 referring publications by Place]
Chisholm, R. (1967). Intentionality. In P. Edwards (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. Mouton.
[19 referring publications by Place]
Chomsky, N. (1959). Review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior. Language, 35, 26-58.
[28 referring publications by Place]
Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. MIT Press.
[11 referring publications by Place]
Chomsky, N. (1967). The General Properties of Language. In F. L. Darley (Ed.), Brain Mechanisms Underlying Speech and Language. Grune and Stratton.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Chomsky, N. (1968). Language and Mind. Harcourt, Brace and World.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Chomsky, N. (1980). Rules and representations. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 1-15.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Chomsky, N. (1987). On the nature, use and acquisition of language. In N. Chomsky, Generative Grammar: Its Basis, Development and Prospects. Kyoto University of Foreign Studies.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Chomsky, N., Place, U. T., & Schoneberger, T. (Ed.) (2000). The Chomsky-Place Correspondence 1993-1994 The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 7-38. doi:10.1007/BF03392953
[Abstract]Edited correspondence between Ullin T Place and Noam Chomsky, which occurred in 1993-1994, is presented. The principal topics are (a) deep versus surface structure; (b) computer modeling of the brain; (c) the evolutionary origins of language; (d) behaviorism; and (e) a dispositional account of language. This correspondence includes Chomsky's denial that he ever characterized deep structure as innate; Chomsky's critique of computer modeling (both traditional and connectionist) of the brain; Place's critique of Chomsky's alleged failure to provide an adequate account of the evolutionary origins of language, and Chomsky's response that such accounts are “pop-Darwinian fairy tales”; and Place's arguments for, and Chomsky's against, the relevance of behaviorism to linguistic theory, especially the relevance of a behavioral approach to language that is buttressed by a dispositional account of sentence construction.
[4 citing publications]
Download: Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000) The Chomsky-Place Correspondence.pdf
Christofidou, A. (2018) Descartes’ Dualism versus Behaviourism. Behavior and Philosophy, 46, 63-99.
[Abstract]My analysis straddles Descartes’ metaphysics and some parts of contemporary philosophy, especially regarding consciousness, and aims to show that once our understanding is freed from philosophical habits that affect current debates, Descartes’ views offer an opportunity to draw important insights. Primarily, I examine Descartes’ mind-body dualism and contrast it with behaviourism, particularly with philosophical behaviourism, focusing on Gilbert Ryle’s dispositional behaviourism and his attacks on Descartes’ dualism. The discussion takes the form of Objections and Replies, presenting the two thinkers in some sort of dialogue with one another. This brings out clearly who is distorting our ordinary language, violating the logical geography of concepts, committing a category mistake, and systematically misleading us. Ryle’s two well-known accusations – the category mistake, and the dogma of the ghost in the machine – are turned, by a reductio ad absurdum, against his own commitments, leading to an evaluation of his highly paradoxical view, and showing how it collapses in on itself. The closing parts touch upon, but do not pursue, some fundamental concerns about personhood and the self, the metaphysics of mind, freedom, and moral significance, and raise the question of what our deepest concerns and responsibility in the twenty-first century must be.
[Citing Place (1999a) in context]
Churchland P. S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain MIT Press
[4 referring publications by Place] [Reviews]
Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78,67-90.
[2 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Churchland, P. M. (1988). Matter and Consciousness (Revised Edition). MIT Press.
Note:
First edition: 1984
[Citing Place (1956)] [7 referring publications by Place]
Churchland, P. S., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1989). Neural representation and neural computation. In L. Nadel, L. A. Cooper, P. Culicover, & R. M. Harnish (Eds.), Neural Connections, Mental Computation. MIT Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Clark S. (1717) A Collection of Papers, which passed between the late Learned Mr. Leibniz, and Dr. Clarke, In the Years 1715 and 1716. James Knapton
[1 referring publications by Place]
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7-19. doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.7 era.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/1312/TheExtendedMind.pdf
[1 reprinting collections]
Coates, A. (2022). Unmanifested powers and universals. Synthese, 200. doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03476-6
[Abstract]According to a well-known argument against dispositional essentialism, the nature of unmanifested token powers leaves dispositional essentialists with an objectionable commitment to the reality of non-existent entities. The idea is that, because unmanifested token powers are directed at their non-existent token manifestations, they require the reality of those manifestations. Arguably the most promising response to this argument works by claiming that, if properties are universals, dispositional directedness need only entail the reality of actually existing manifestation types. I argue that this response fails, because no version of the response can adequately accommodate dispositions of the sort that follow from Coulomb’s law. This result both defeats an important argument that dispositional essentialists ought to be realists about universals and appears to leave dispositional essentialists with a problematic commitment to either non-relational connections or a Meinongian ontology.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]
Cobb, M. (2020). The idea of the brain. A history. Profile Books.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Cohen, L. J. (1968). Criteria of Intensionality II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes, XLII, 123-142.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Cohen, L. J. (1981). Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4(3), 317-331. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00009092
[Abstract]The object of this paper is to show why recent research in the psychology of deductive and probabilistic reasoning does not have "bleak implications for human rationality," as has sometimes been supposed. The presence of fallacies in reasoning is evaluated by referring to normative criteria which ultimately derive their own credentials from a systematisation of the intuitions that agree with them. These normative criteria cannot be taken, as some have suggested, to constitute a part of natural science, nor can they be established by metamathematical proof. Since a theory of competence has to predict the very same intuitions, it must ascribe rationality to ordinary people.
Accordingly, psychological research on this topic falls into four categories. In the first, experimenters investigate conditions under which their subjects suffer from genuine cognitive illusions. The search for explanations of such performance errors may then generate hypotheses about the ways in which the relevant information-processing mechanisms operate. In the second category, experimenters investigate circumstances in which their subjects exhibit mathematical or scientific ignorance: these are tests of the subjects' intelligence or education. In the third and fourth categories, experimenters impute a fallacy where none exists, either because they are applying the relevant normative criteria in an inappropriate way or because the normative criteria being applied are not the appropriate ones.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Cole, D. J., & Foelber, R. (1984). Contingent materialism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 65, 74-85. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1984.tb00214.x
[Citing Place (1956)]
Colgrave, B. and Mynors, R. A. B. (Eds.) (1969). Bede's Ecclesiastical History of the English People. Oxford University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Comte, A. (1830-1842). Cours de Philosophie Positive (6 Volumes).
[5 referring publications by Place]
Condillac, E. B. de (1746/1947). Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines. Ouvrage où l'on réduit á un seul principe tout ce qui concerne l'entendement humain. In: Oeuvres Philosophiques de Condillac. Georges LeRoy.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Corballis, M. C. (2009). The evolution of language, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1156(1), 19-43.
[Abstract]Language, whether spoken or signed, can be viewed as a gestural system, evolving from the so-called mirror system in the primate brain. In nonhuman primates the gestural system is well developed for the productions and perception of manual action, especially transitive acts involving the grasping of objects. The emergence of bipedalism in the hominins freed the hands for the adaptation of the mirror system for intransitive acts for communication, initially through the miming of events. With the emergence of the genus Homo from some 2 million years ago, pressures for more complex communication and increased vocabulary size led to the conventionalization of gestures, the loss of iconic representation, and a gradual shift to vocal gestures replacing manual ones—although signed languages are still composed of manual and facial gestures. In parallel with the conventionalization of symbols, languages gained grammatical complexity, perhaps driven by the evolution of episodic memory and mental time travel, which involve combinations of familiar elements—Who did what to whom, when, where, and why? Language is thus adapted to allow us to share episodic structures, whether past, planned, or fictional, and so increase survival fitness.
[Citing Place (2000c) in context]
Cornman, J. W. (1962). The identity of mind and body. Journal of Philosophy, LIX, 486-492.
[1 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Corriveau, M. (1972). Phenomenology, psychology, and radical behaviorism: Skinner and Merleau-Ponty on behavior. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 3(1), 7–34. doi:10.1163/156916272X00029
[Abstract]Defines radical behaviorism and differentiates it from conventional behaviorism, emphasizing the different manner in which they understand or methodologically define human behavior. The radical behaviorism of B. F. Skinner is compared with the phenomenological and psychological thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. These comparisons include the presuppositions of Skinner's psychology, the subject-object dichotomy, the meaning of man's having a world and being in the world, and the nature of human behavior as seen in the light of the outcome of these analyses. It is concluded that there is a fundamental incompatibility between their presuppositions and that phenomenological psychology offers a broader and deeper viewpoint of human behavior.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Cortesi, B. (2023). The Thesis of Revelation in the Philosophy of Mind: A Guide for the Perplexed. Argumenta, (2023), 1-20. doi:10.14275/2465-2334/20230.cor
[Abstract]The thesis of experiential revelation—Rev for brevity—in the philosophy of mind claims that to have an experience—i.e., to be acquainted with it—is to know its nature. It is widely agreed that although at least moderate versions of Rev might strike one as plausible and perhaps even appealing, at least up to a certain extent, most of them are nonetheless inconsistent with almost any coherent form of physicalism about the mind. Thus far, the issue of the alleged tension between Rev and physicalism has mostly been put in the relevant literature in terms of phenomenal concepts—those concepts which refer to phenomenal properties, or qualia, and characterize them in terms of the peculiar quality(ies) they exhibit—and some kind of “special feature” those concepts allegedly possess. I call this version of Rev C-Rev. This paper aims to suggest that while it is true that phenomenal concepts reveal the nature of their referent(s)—i.e., it is a priori, for a subject possessing the concept and just in virtue of possessing it, what it is for the referent(s) of the concept to be part of reality—this feature of them, in turn, rests on a non-conceptual non-propositional kind of knowledge, namely, sui generis introspective knowledge by acquaintance of one’s own phenomenally conscious states. I call this version of Rev A-Rev. §1 provides some introductory material. In §2 I discuss two arguments that have recently been put forth to undermine the cogency of C-Rev against physicalism. §3 elaborates on the historical roots of C-Rev. §4 presents some of the major arguments which have been offered for A-Rev. A few concluding remarks close the paper.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Costall, A. (1980). The limits of language: Wittgenstein's later philosophy and Skinner's Radical Behaviorism.
Behaviorism, 8, 123-131. www.jstor.org/stable/27758959
[1 referring publications by Place]
Costall, A. P. (2012). Against representationalism: James Gibson’s neglected intellectual debt to E. B. Holt. In E. P. Charles (Ed.), A new look at new realism: the psychology and philosophy of E. B. Holt (Vol. 1, pp. 243-262). (History and Theory of Psychology; Vol. 1). Transaction Publishers.
[Abstract]Representationalism has become identified with the new cognitivism, along with its computer analogies. Representationalism has also been subject to serious criticism over a similarly long period. The primary purpose of James Gibson's work was to challenge just one of the main justifications for representationalism, the supposed "poverty of the stimulus." Gibson's ambivalence about his "intellectual debts" also applied to E. B. Holt, who had taught Gibson at Princeton in the late 1920s. Gibson, like Holt, was a leading member of the twentieth-century psychology's "awkward squad." Holt could understand the attractions of dualism: Dualism is ever a compromise. Holt went on to point out that the apparent advantage of representationalism in explaining misperception is entirely spurious, simply because it is unable to explain anything else. Despite the combative tone of Gibson's writings, representationalism, as such, is seldom the target of his polemics.
[Citing Place (1999a)]
Cowey, A. (1974). Atrophy of retinal ganglion cells after removal of striate cortex in a rhesus monkey. Perception, 3, 257-260.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Cowey, A., & Stoerig, P. (1995). Blindsight in monkeys. Nature, 373(6511), 247-249.
[12 referring publications by Place]
Cowey, A., & Stoerig, P. (1997). Visual detection in monkeys with blindsight. Neuropsychologia, 35, 929-939.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Crane, T. (1995). The mental causation debate. Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 69(Supplementary), 211-236.
[Abstract]This paper is about a puzzle which lies at the heart of contemporary physicalist theories of mind. On the one hand, the original motivation for physicalism was the need to explain the place of mental causation in the physical world. On the other hand, physicalists have recently come to see the explanation of mental causation as one of their major problems. But how can this be? How can it be that physicalist theories still have a problem explaining something which their physicalism was intended to explain in the first place? If physicalism is meant to be an explanation of mental causation, then why should it still face the problem of mental causation?
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Crane, T. (1996). Introduction to "Dispositions: A Debate". In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin, U. T. Place & Tim Crane (Ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. Routledge
[Citing Place (1956)]
Crane, T. (1998). The efficacy of content: A functionalist theory. In J, Bransen, & S. E. Cuypers (Eds), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 77. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-94-011-5082-8_10
[Citing Place (1996g)]
Crane, T. (1998). Intentionality as the mark of the mental. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 43, 229-251. doi:10.1017/S1358246100004380
[Citing Place (1996g)]
Crawford, S. (2013). The Myth of Logical Behaviourism and the Origins of the Identity Theory. In M. Beaney (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy (1 ed., pp. 621-655). Oxford University Press. www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/the-myth-of-logical-behaviourism-and-the-origins-of-the-identity-theory(cfcb411c-26f1-4c55-a275-1c4ed0eb949c).html
[Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (2000f)]
Crawford, S. (2011) General Introduction. In S. Crawford, (Ed.), Philospohy of mind (4 volumes): Critical concepts of philosophy www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/general-introduction(5f3fd60a-e056-4818-8777-8a4b4c33fa6d).html philarchive.org/archive/CRAPOM
[Citing Place (1956)]
Crawford,S. (Ed.) (2011). Philosophy of Mind: Critical Concepts of Philosophy (4 volumes). Routledge
[Reprints in this collection]
Crowther, L. M., Dugdale, N., & Lowe, C. F. (1991). How does naming promote stimulus equivalence? The effects of relational and non-relational instructions during name training. [Poster presented at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College, London].
[1 referring publications by Place]
Croxford, J., Bayne, T. (2024). The case against organoid consciousness. Neuroethics, 17(13). doi:10.1007/s12152-024-09548-3
[Abstract]Neural organoids are laboratory-generated entities that replicate certain structural and
functional features of the human brain. Most neural organoids are disembodied—completely decoupled from sensory input and motor output. As such, questions about their potential capacity for consciousness are exceptionally difficult to answer. While not disputing
the need for caution regarding certain neural organoid types, this paper appeals to two broad constraints on any adequate theory of consciousness — the first involving the dependence of consciousness on embodiment; the second involving the dependence of consciousness on representations—to argue that disembodied neural organoids are not plausible candidates
for consciousness.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Crumley, J. S. (2022). Introduction to metaphysics. Broadview Press
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Crystal, D. (1985). A Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics. Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Curry, D. S. (2018). Beliefs as inner causes: The (lack of) evidence. Philosophical Psychology, 31(6), 850-877. doi:10.1080/09515089.2018.1452197
[Abstract]Many psychologists studying lay belief attribution and behavior explanation cite Donald Davidson in support of their assumption that people construe beliefs as inner causes. But Davidson’s influential argument is unsound; there are no objective grounds for the intuition that the folk construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior. Indeed, recent experimental work by Ian Apperly, Bertram Malle, Henry Wellman, and Tania Lombrozo provides an empirical framework that accords well with Gilbert Ryle’s alternative thesis that the folk construe beliefs as patterns of living that contextualize behavior.
[Citing Place (1996c) in context]
Curry, D.S. (2021). How beliefs are like colors. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03144-1
[Abstract]Double dissociations between perceivable colors and physical properties of colored objects have led many philosophers to endorse relationalist accounts of color. I argue that there are analogous double dissociations between attitudes of belief—the beliefs that people attribute to each other in everyday life—and intrinsic cognitive states of belief—the beliefs that some cognitive scientists posit as cogs in cognitive systems—pitched at every level of psychological explanation. These dissociations provide good reason to refrain from conflating attitudes of belief with intrinsic cognitive states of belief. I suggest that interpretivism provides an attractive account of the former (insofar as they are not conflated with the latter). Like colors, attitudes of belief evolved to be ecological signifiers, not cogs in cognitive systems.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
D. Hume (1740). An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature. Reprinted in type facsimile with an introduction by J. M. Keynes and P. Sraffa. Cambridge University Press, 1938
[1 referring publications by Place]
D'Oro, G. (2023). Why Collingwood Matters: A Defence of Humanistic Understanding. Bloomsbury Publishing.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Danckert, J., & Rossetti, Y. (2005). Blindsight in action: what can the different sub-types of blindsight tell us about the control of visually guided actions? Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 29(7), 1035–1046 doi:10.1016/J.NEUBIOREV.2005.02.001 www.academia.edu/19599266/Blindsight_in_action_what_can_the_different_sub_types_of_blindsight_tell_us_about_the_control_of_visually_guided_actions
[Abstract]Blindsight broadly refers to the paradoxical neurological condition where patients with a visual field defect due to a cortical lesion nevertheless demonstrate implicit residual visual sensitivity within their field cut. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, through a selective review of the blindsight literature we propose a new taxonomy for the subtypes of residual abilities described in blindsight. Those patients able to accurately act upon blind field stimuli (e.g. by pointing or saccading towards them) are classified as having ‘action-blindsight’, those whose residual functions can be said to rely to some extent upon attentive processing of blind field stimuli are classified as demonstrating ‘attention-blindsight’, while finally, patients who have somewhat accurate perceptual judgements for blind field stimuli despite a complete lack of any conscious percept, are classified as having ‘agnosopsia’ — literally meaning ‘not knowing what one sees’. We also address the possible neurological substrates of these residual sensory processes. Our second aim was to investigate the most striking subtype of blindsight, action-blindsight. We review the data relevant to this subtype and the hypotheses proposed to account for it, before speculating on how action-blindsight may inform our normal models of visuomotor control.
[Citing Place (2000a)]
Danto, A.C. (1965). Basic Actions. American Philosophical Quarterly, 1, 141-148.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Darwin, C. (1859). On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection. Murray.
[5 referring publications by Place]
Darwin, C. (1872). Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals Murray.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, reasons and causes. Journal of Philosophy, 60, 685-700.
[6 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Davidson, D. (1967). Truth and meaning. Synthese, 17, 304-323.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Davidson, D. (1967). Causal relations. Journal of Philosophy, 64, 691-703.
[1 referring publications by Place] [2 reprinting collections]
Davidson, D. (1969). The Individuation of Events. In N. Rescher (Ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel pp. 216-234). Reidel.
[7 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Davidson, D. (1970). Mental events. In L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and theory. Duckworth.
[16 referring publications by Place] [4 reprinting collections]
Davidson, D. (1976). Hempel on explaining action. Erkenntnis, 10, 239-253.
[1 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Clarendon Press.
[Reprints in this collection] [1 referring publications by Place]
Davidson, D. (1982). Rational animals. Dialectica, 36, 317-327.
[8 referring publications by Place]
Day, W. F. (1969). On certain similarities between the Philosophical Investigations of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the operationism of B. F. Skinner. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 12, 489-506.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Day, W. F. (1969). Radical behaviorism in reconciliation with phenomenology. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 12(2), 315–328. doi:10.1901/jeab.1969.12-315
[Abstract]Discusses a symposium on behaviorism and phenomenology which focuses on the "current state of affairs of psychology as a science." An attempt is made to prove B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorism "capable of encompassing a productive phenomenology." Basic dimensions of radical behaviorism are described, "the way in which radical behaviorism might profitably proceed to interact with problems that are often considered phenomenological in nature" is illustrated, and a discussion of the problems which are incurred in establishing an "effective reconciliation of radical behaviorism and phenomenology" is presented.
[1 referring publications by Place]
DeHaene, S. (2020). How we learn. Why brains learn better than any machine ... for now.. Viking.
Dennett, D. C. (1978). Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on the mind and psychology. Bradford.
[11 referring publications by Place]
Dennett, D. C. (1978). Current issues in the philosophy of mind. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(4), 249-261.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. MIT Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Dennett, D. C. (1987). Skinner Placed (A commentary on Place's Skinner Re-skinned). In S. Modgil, & C. Modgil (Eds.), B. F. Skinner, Consensus and Controversy (Part XI, Skinner and the 'Virtus dormitiva' argument, pp. 245-248). Falmer Press.
[Citing Place (1987a)] [Is reply to] [1 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Download: Dennett (1987) Skinner Placed.pdf
Dennett, D. C. (2016). Illusionism as the obvious default theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 65-72.
[Abstract]Using a parallel with stage magic, it is argued that far from being seen as an extreme alternative, illusionism as articulated by Frankish should be considered the front runner, a conservative theory to be developed in detail, and abandoned only if it demonstrably fails to account for phenomena, not prematurely dismissed as 'counter-intuitive'. We should explore the mundane possibilities thoroughly before investing in any magical hypotheses.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Descartes, R. (1637). Discours de la Méthode.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Descartes, R. (1641/1954). Meditations on First Philosophy, 2nd Edition. In G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach (Trs. & Eds.), Descartes: Philosophical Writings. Nelson.
[7 referring publications by Place]
Descartes, R. (1649). Les passions de l'âme.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Deutscher, M. (1967). Mental and physical properties. In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The identity theory of mind (pp. 65-83). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Deutscher, M. (2021). Towards Continental Philosophy. Reason and Imagination in the Thought of Max Deutscher. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
[Abstract]Through a curated selection of papers written over four decades by one of Australia’s leading philosophers, this collection demonstrates the impact of Continental philosophy on philosophical thought in Australia.
The development of specific philosophical problems, over a period of more than forty years by a philosopher whose first training was ‘pre-continental’, shows that it is possible to achieve interaction between ‘continental’ and ‘pre-continental’ methods in philosophy, even while recognizing their distinctiveness. These essays ‘work towards’ continental philosophy in the ways they pay attention to language, to how we experience things and are experienced by others, and to the structures of language and power that frame what it is possible to say and to hear, to write and to read.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Devany, J. M., Hayes, S. C., & Nelson, R. O. (1986). Equivalence class formation in language-able and language-disabled children. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 46; 243-257.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Diaper, D., & Huyck, C. (2022). Cell Assembly-based Task Analysis (CAbTA). In K. Arai (Ed.), Intelligent Computing. Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems, vol 283. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-80119-9_22 eprints.mdx.ac.uk/33474/
[Abstract]Based on an Artificial Neural Network model, Cell Assembly-based Task Analysis is a new method that outputs a task performance model composed of integrated mind-brain Cell Assemblies, which are currently believed to be the most plausible, general organisation of the brain and how it supports mental operations. A simplified model of Cell Assemblies and their cognitive architecture is described and then used in the method. A brief sub-task is analysed. The method’s utility to research in Artificial Intelligence, neuroscience and cognitive psychology is discussed and the possibility of a General Theory suggested.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Dickins D. W. (2001). Equivalence is to do with symbols, and it is cognitive, European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 2(1), 53-56. doi:10.1080/15021149.2001.11434171
[Citing Place (1995/6) in context]
Dickins D. W. (2005). On aims and methods in the neuroimaging of derived relations. Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior, 84(3), 453–483. doi:10.1901/jeab.2005.92-04
[Abstract]Ingenious and seemingly powerful technologies have been developed recently that enable the visualization in some detail of events in the brain concomitant upon the ongoing behavioral performance of a human participant. Measurement of such brain events offers at the very least a new set of dependent variables in relation to which the independent variables familiarly manipulated in the operant laboratory may be explored. Two related paradigms in which a start has been made in such research concern the derivation of novel or emergent relations from a baseline set of trained relations, and include the phenomenon of transitive inference (TI), observed in studies of stimulus equivalence (SE) and serial learning (SL) or seriation. This paper reviews some published and forthcoming neuroimaging studies of these and related phenomena, and considers how this line of research both demands and represents a welcome synthesis between types of question and levels of explanation in behavioral science that often have been seen as antithetical.
[Citing Place (1995/6) in context]
Dickins, D. W. (2011). Transitive Inference in Stimulus Equivalence and Serial Learning. European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 12(2), 523–555.
[Abstract]The logical and behavioural properties of stimulus equivalence (SE) sets and serial learning (SL) sets are different, yet either can be derived from a randomly presented number of overlapping premise pairs, and both show transitive inference (TI). A within-participant experiment is reported which attempted to base both types of set on the same stimuli. To provide an ‘ecologically valid’ context the stimuli were photographs of 2 imaginary groups of 7 students ordered within each group by ‘exam grades’. Participants were given respondent-type training in ‘study phases’ in which the 12 premise pairs of photos were randomly presented without a response being required, alternating with ‘response phases’ in which the 10 participants in the ‘SE first’ group received matching-to-sample trials and the 10 in the ‘SL first’ group received trials with the study pairs of stimuli, in which they had to indicate whether these were in the same order as in the study phase or had been switched around. TI testing was then first conducted using the same requirement as in training, followed by similar tests using the other kind of response requirement. In a parallel sorting test participants were shown the 14 photos in random array on a screen and were asked to arrange them into 2 ordered groups. is sorting test was given 3 times, (1) after initial training on either SE or SL; (2) after TI testing with the same paradigm; (3) after TI testing with the opposite paradigm. Though the yield of accurate responding on the TI tests was poor, performance on initial TI testing was both more accurate and showed greater positive transfer to the other kind of TI test when SL preceded SE than vice versa. Results on the sorting task gave stronger indications of set formation than the TI tests, particularly in the SL first group. There were signs of the predicted increase in accuracy and decrease in RT as a function of increasing numbers of nodes in SL in the SL-first group, and some sign of the predicted inverse relation between accuracy and nodal number in SE for the SE-first group. When the groups switched to the opposite types of test to that on which they had been trained both showed an overall reduction in RTs and both showed decreasing RTs with increasing numbers of nodes. Unsurprisingly the experiment raised more questions than it could answer but suggested ways in which the similarities and differences between SL and SE, and how they interact, may be further explored.
[Citing Place (1995/6) in context]
Dickins, D. W. (2015). A Simpler Route to Stimulus Equivalence? A Replication and Further Exploration of a “Simple Discrimination Training Procedure” (Canovas, Debert and Pilgrim 2014). The Psychological Record, 65, 637–647. doi:10.1007/s40732-015-0134-3
[Abstract]In a recent paper in this journal, Canovas, Debert and Pilgrim (The Psychological Record, 65(2), 337–346, 2015), in their second experiment, taught participants to make one key press to each of three simple visual stimuli and an alternative response to another three. They then trained two new key presses to one stimulus from each class, which then transferred to the other stimuli in each class. When subsequently presented with compounds of two stimuli, participants indicated “correct” to within-class compounds, but “incorrect” to between-class compounds. The present study starts with a successful replication of this seemingly new way of establishing stimulus equivalence classes, with an added matching-to-sample test at the end. In two further experiments, the visual stimuli were replaced by non-words, with two further non-words to be said aloud in place of key-presses. These showed that it was possible to establish two or three equivalence classes using such initial discrimination training, even when the prior demonstration of functional equivalence classes by transfer-of-training to a second set of responses was omitted. Other ways of conceptualizing these methods of training are considered, together with some implications for enlarging our understanding of equivalence class formation.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]
Dickins, D. W. (2015). Stimulus Equivalence: A Laboratory Artefact or the Heart of Language? [Doctoral thesis]. University of Huddersfield. eprints.hud.ac.uk/26942/
[Abstract]This thesis surveys some of the implications of the presented collection of publications, all of which address the phenomenon of stimulus equivalence. Stimulus equivalence SE is first operationally defined in terms of Sidmans trio of criteria: symmetry, transitivity, and reflexivity (Sidman & Tailby, 1982). Then some of its main features – the phenomenon of delayed emergence, the effects of nodes, and the influence of properties of the stimuli used, including nameability and meaningfulness - as exemplified in the empirical studies presented, are evaluated in the light of recent literature. The variety of ways in which SE classes may be formed are described, and the question of when SE relations take effect – during the training of the base relations, or subsequently, or only in the course of unreinforced testing for derived relations – is discussed. The effects of nodal number in multi-nodal linear classes are examined and contrasted with those in serial learning. Some methods of chronometric and protocol analysis, as developed in some of the collected studies, are described, and the outlines of a model of SE class formation they might help to form is presented. The role of naming and of language in general is discussed as a sufficient route to SE class formation, but not one that is perhaps necessary for its laboratory demonstration. The role of SE in the opposite direction, in the ontogeny and phylogeny of language, is considered. Here, besides learned speculation, more empirical studies are awaited, of children, and some new developments in comparative cognition. Highlights are described of the few brain imaging studies implicating SE, following the pioneering empirical study and the earlier review in the presented collection. The survey ends by again extolling the relevance of Tinbergen's (1963) four levels of explanation in behavioural biology to see the phenomena of SE in appropriate perspective.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]
Dickins, D. W. (2022). Bliss in that dawn: The beginnings of operant psychology in the UK History & Philosophy of Psychology, 23(1), 33-49. doi:10.53841/bpshpp.2022.23.1.33
[Abstract]Although the first research in the UK to achieve what amounted to operant conditioning (Grindley, 1932) was published in the same year as Skinner’s pioneer publication no similar procedure seems to have been carried out in Britain until Hurwitz founded an operant laboratory at Birkbeck, (then Birkbeck College), University of London, in the early 1950s, presumably inspired by his meeting with Skinner in 1951, and their subsequent friendship. It certainly was an import from America, fortified by local solutions for providing suitable control equipment. The author was a student of Hurwitz at Birkbeck (1957–1961) and was researching (1961–1964) close by at University College (UCL). There follows a largely biographical account of how operant conditioning, initially mostly in rats, spread around universities in the UK. Many of the people concerned, and others not mentioned, shared their ideas at meetings of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group (EABG) that informally sprang up in the early 1960s, initially without funding or its own journal. In coordination with the later emergence of the European Association for Behaviour Analysis (EABA) and its associated journal (European Journal of Behaviour Analysis) the organisation of the EABG has become established in Bangor, and holds regular biennial meetings at University College, London, alternating with those of the EABA in other parts of Europe. The EABG continues to attract many foreign attendees, including from the US, but some of its earlier enthusiasts no longer attend, whilst those attending mostly see themselves as Behaviour Analysts, reflecting changes both in the theory and practice of operant psychology. While operant technology remains a useful tool for those seeking a broad biological and authentic evolutionary understanding of behaviour, the philosophy of operant psychology as an all-encompassing approach to behavioural science has proved divisive.
[Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1981a)] [Citing Place (1995/6)] [Citing Place (1996a)] [Citing Place (1998d)] [Citing Place (1998e)]
Dickins, D. W., Singh, K., Roberts, N., Burns, P., Downes, J., Jimmieson, P., & Bentall, R. (2001). An fMRI study of stimulus equivalence. Neuroreport, 12(2), 405-411. www.academia.edu/download/43697924/An_fMRI_study_of_stimulus_equivalence20160313-1683-54en2k.pdf
[Abstract]In order to study brain activation during the formation of equivalence relations, 12 subjects (mean age 27.6 yrs) underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) during matching-to-sample (MTS) tests of (1) previously trained arbitrary relationships between iconic stimuli and the untrained, emergent relations of (2) symmetry, (3) transitivity, and (4) symmetry with transitivity, plus a test of verbal fluency (VF). Brain activation was similar in all MTS tasks and in the VF task. In particular, both types of task activated dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and posterior parietal cortex bilaterally. However VF, but not the MTS tasks, activated Broca's area. In three of the four MTS tasks, behavioural accuracy was significantly correlated with left lateralisation of DLPFC activity. Brain activation patterns during equivalence thus resembled those involved in semantic processing underlying language, without involving regions concerned with the simple sub-vocal articulation of stimulus names.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]
Dickins, T. E. (2001). On the origin of symbols. Connexions, (5), 2-18
Note:
About the journal:
Connexions - An online journal of cognitive science. ISSN 1368-3233
In the period 1997 - 2003 there appeared 6 issues.
The journal is archived at www.keithfrankish.com/connexions/
[Citing Place (1995/6)] [Citing Place (2000c)] [Citing Place (2000g)]
Dickins, T. E. (2002). A behaviourist's perspective on the origins of language. History & Philosophy of Psychology, 4(1), 31-42.
[Abstract]The article discusses behaviorist's perspective on the origins of language. The Massive Modularity Hypothesis has been a feature of recent approaches within Evolutionary Psychology (EP). EP sees its task as that of explaining the proximate psychological mechanisms that have been selected to resolve ultimate adaptive problems during the ancestry of species. The discrete nature of adaptive problems affords a discretely organized cognition. Sidman Stimulus Equivalence (SSE) is a kind of stimulus equivalence. SSE is defined as the formation of equivalence classes with reference to the formal properties of a mathematical equivalence set which are reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity. These properties are best explained with reference to the laboratory procedures used to induce them.
Dickins, T. E. (2003). General Symbol Machines: The First Stage in the Evolution of Symbolic Communication. Evolutionary Psychology, 1(1), 192-209. doi:10.1177/147470490300100116
[Abstract]Humans uniquely form stimulus equivalence (SE) classes of abstract and unrelated stimuli, i.e. if taught to match A with B and B with C, they will spontaneously match B with A, and C with B, (the relation of symmetry), and A with C (transitivity). Other species do not do this. The SE ability is possibly the consequence of a specific selection event in the Homo lineage. SE is of interest because it appears to demonstrate a facility that is core to symbolic behavior. Linguistic symbols, for example, are arbitrarily and symmetrically related to their referent such that the term banana has no resemblance to bananas but when processed can be used to discriminate bananas. Equally when bananas are perceived the term banana is readily produced. This relation is arguably the defining mark of symbolic representation. In this paper I shall detail the SE phenomenon and argue that it is evidence for a cognitive device that I term a General Symbol Machine (GSM). The GSM not only sets the background condition for subsequent linguistic evolution but also for other symbolic behaviors such as mathematical reasoning. In so doing the GSM is not particularly domain-specific. The apparent domain-specificity of, for example, natural language is a consequence of other computational developments. This introduces complexity to evolutionary arguments about cognitive architecture.
[Citing Place (1995/6) in context]
Dickins, T. E. (2004). Social constructionism as cognitive science. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 34(4), 333-352. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.2004.00253.x eprints.mdx.ac.uk/9462/
[Abstract]Social constructionism is a broad position that emphasizes the importance of human social processes in psychology. These processes are generally associated with language and the ability to construct stories that conform to the emergent rules of 'language games'. This view allows one to espouse a variety of critical postures with regard to realist commitments within the social and behavioural sciences, ranging from outright relativism (language constructs all of our concepts) to a more moderate respect for the 'barrier' that linguistic descriptions can place between us and reality. This paper first outlines some possible social constructionist viewpoints and then goes on to show how each of them conforms to the basic principles of information theory. After establishing this relation the paper then argues that this leads to a deal of commonality between social constructionist positions and the baseline aims of cognitive science. Finally, the paper argues that if information theory is held in common this both suggests future research collaborations and helps to 'mop up' some of the arguments surrounding realist commitments.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Dickins, T. E. (2021). Tom Dickins about Ullin Place on Twitter.
[Abstract]I attended various talks by Ullin Place. He used to sit and read from an MS and occasionally pause for long periods of time and then write fairly copious notes in the margins correcting himself. Once done the talk would continue taking a different line than previously suggested.
— Behavioural Science Lab Middlesex (@BSL_MDX) January 15, 2021
Dickins, T. E., & Dickins, D. W. (2001). Symbols, stimulus equivalence and the origins of language. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 221-244. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
www.jstor.org/stable/27759429
[Abstract]Recent interest in the origins of language, within the strongly cognitive field of Evolutionary Psychology, has predominantly focused upon the origins of syntax (cf. Hurford, Knight, & Studdert-Kennedy, 1998). However, Ullin Place's (2000a) theory of the gestural origins of language also addresses the more fundamental issue of the antecedents of symbols, and does so from a behaviorist perspective, stressing the importance of the peculiarly human ability to form stimulus equivalence classes. The rejection by many developmental psychologists of a behaviorist account of language acquisition has led to a modular and distinctly nativist psychology of language (cf. Pinker, 1994, 1997; Pinker & Bloom, 1990). Little has been said about the role or nature of learning mechanisms in the evolution of language. Although Place does not provide any defense of a behaviorist linguistic ontogeny, this is no reason to rule out his phylogenetic speculations. We aim to outline Place's evolutionarily parsimonious view of symbol origins and their relation to stimulus equivalence. We applaud Ullin Place for bringing symbols into focus within the broader discipline of language origins and suggest that he has raised an interesting set of questions to be discussed in future work.
[Citing Place (1995/6)] [Citing Place (2000c)] [Citing Place (2000g
)]
Download: Dickins (2001) Symbols, Stimulus Equivalence and the Origins of Language.pdf
Dickinson, A. (1980). Contemporary Animal Learning Theory. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Dickinson, A. (1988). Intentionality in animal conditioning. In L. Weiskrantz (Ed.), Thought without Language. Oxford University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Dickinson, A., & Balleine, B. (1993). Actions and responses: The dual psychology of behaviour. In N. Eilan, R. A. McCarthy, & B. Brewer (Eds.), Spatial representation: Problems in philosophy and psychology (pp. 277–293). Blackwell Publishing.
[1 referring publications by Place]
DiFrisco, J. (2018). Token physicalism and functional individuation. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 8, 309–329. doi:10.1007/s13194-017-0188-y
[Abstract]Token physicalism is often viewed as a modest and unproblematic physicalist
commitment, as contrasted with type physicalism. This paper argues that the
prevalence of functional individuation in biology creates serious problems for token physicalism, because the latter requires that biological entities can be individuated physically and without reference to biological functioning. After characterizing the main philosophical roles for token physicalism, I describe the distinctive uses of functional individuation in models of biological processes. I then introduce some requirements on token identity claims that arise from a position on individuation and identity known as sortalism. An examination of biological examples shows that these sortalist requirements cannot be plausibly met due to differences between individuation by functional biological criteria and by physical criteria. Even without assuming sortalism, token physicalism faces the more basic problem of excluding functionally
irrelevant detail from the individuation of biological tokens. I close by suggesting that the philosophical roles for token identity are better fulfilled by a notion of token composition, which promotes a hierarchical picture of individuality.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Dilworth, J. (2005). The Reflexive Theory of Perception. Behavior and Philosophy, 33, 17-40.
[Abstract]The Reflexive Theory of Perception (RTP) claims that perception of an object or property X by an organism Z consists in Z being caused by X to acquire some disposition D toward X itself. By using U. T. Place's intentional analysis of dispositions a dispositional analysis of perceptual representation is developed.
Download: Dilworth (2005) The Reflexive Theory of Perception.pdf
Dollard, J. J., & Miller, N. E. (1950). Personality and Psychotherapy McGraw & Hill.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Dollard, J., Doob, L. W., Miller, W. D., & Sears, R. R. (1939). Frustration and aggression. Yale University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Donahoe, J. W. (1991). The selectionist approach to verbal behavior: potential contributions of neuropsychology and connectionism. In L. J. Hayes, & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Dialogues on Verbal Behavior: Proceedings of the First International Institute on Verbal Relations (Chapter 6, pp. 119-145). Context Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Donahoe, J. W., Burgos, J. E., & Palmer, D. C. (1993). A selectionist approach to reinforcement. Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior, 60(1), 17–40. doi:10.1901/jeab.1993.60-17
[1 referring publications by Place]
Donahoe, J. W., Palmer, D. C., & Burgos, J. E. (1997). The S-R issue: clarification of its status in Donahoe and Palmer's Learning and Complex Behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 67, 193-212.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Dove, G. (2018). Redefining physicalism. Topoi, 37(3), 513-522 doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9405-0
[Abstract]Philosophers have traditionally treated physicalism as an empirically informed metaphysical thesis. This approach faces a well-known problem often referred to as Hempel’s dilemma: formulations of physicalism tend to be either false or indeterminate. The generally preferred
strategy to address this problem involves an appeal to a hypothetical complete and ideal physical theory. After demonstrating that this strategy is not viable, I argue that we should redefine physicalism as an interdisciplinary research program seeking to explain the mental in terms of the physical that encompasses the physical sciences, the psychological and brain sciences, and philosophy. Redefining physicalism in this way improves upon previous reconstructive accounts while avoiding the indeterminacy associated with orthodox forms of futurist physicalism.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Dowty, D. (1991). Thematic proto-roles and argument selection. Language, 67(3), 547-619.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Dreßing, A. R. (2015). Conscious intentions: Do we need a creation myth? - A Commentary on Elisabeth Pacherie. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND (Chapter 29 ). MIND Group. doi:10.15502/9783958570849
[Abstract]We experience ourselves as agents, performing goal-directed actions in the world. In her paper about Conscious Intentions: The social creation myth Pacherie develops a creation myth about the function of conscious intentions, based on her hierarchical concept of individual motor actions and joint action. In this creation myth, conscious intentions are not understood as internal mental states with a teleofunctional role. Having a conscious intention exerts a specific contribution to motor control and conscious intentions might have a potential causal power in this myth.
In this commentary I want to postulate, that Pacherie’s social creation myth is more than a myth but rather the search for an explanation of the function of conscious intentions in the physical world. It tries to explain the feature of the intention being conscious that endows it with its particular causal function. Yet — speaking about a causal function — the potential analytical and neuroscientific limitations of a causal function of conscious intentions in the social creation myth have to be analysed with regard to the argument of causal closure and results of experimental approaches to the causal relevance of conscious intentions. I argue
that despite these limitations the social creation myth could be an important step on the way of finding an explanation about the function of conscious intentions, if the question about the function of conscious intentions is slightly adjusted and is not understood in a strictly causal way.
[Citing Place (1960)]
Dretske, F. (1997). What good is consciousness? Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 27(1), 1-15.
[1 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Dugdale, N. (1987). A search for symmetry in the conditional discriminations of language-trained chimpanzees [Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, Manchester, April 1987].
[2 referring publications by Place]
Dugdale, N. (1988). The role of naming in stimulus equivalence: Differences between humans and animals [Unpublished Ph.D. thesis]. University of Wales.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Dugdale, N., & Lowe, C.F. (1990). Naming and stimulus equivalence. In D. E. Blackman, & H. Lejeune (Eds.), Behaviour analysis in theory and practice: Contributions and controversies (pp. 115-138). Erlbaum.
[7 referring publications by Place]
Duhem, P. (1914). La théorie physique: son objet et sa structure. (English translation as The aim and structure of physical theory (1954)). Chevalier et Rivière.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Dummett, M. (1973). Frege: Philosophy of Language. Duckworth.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Dupré, J. (1988). Materialism, physicalism, and scientism, Philosophical Topics, 16(1), 31-56. www.jstor.org/stable/43154014
[Citing Place (1956)]
Durkheim, E. (1912). Les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse. English translation (1915) as The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life by J. W. Swain. Allen & Unwin.
[1 referring publications by Place]
E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1940). The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People. Clarendon Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Eccles, J. C. (1953). The Neurophysiological basis of mind. Clarendon.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Edelman, G. M. (1973). Antibody structure and molecular immunology. Science, 180, 830-840.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Edelman, G. M. (1973). Molecular recognition in the immune and nervous systems. In F. G. Worden, J.-P. Swazey, & G. Adelman (Eds.), The Neurosciences: Paths of Discovery (pp. 65-74). MIT Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Edelman, G. M. (1974). The problem of molecular recognition by a selective system. In F. J. Ayala, & T. Dobzhansky (Eds.) Studies in the Philosophy of Biology (pp. 45-56). Macmillan, .
[1 referring publications by Place]
Edelman, G. M. (1987). Neural darwinism: The theory of neuronal group selection Basic Books.
[7 referring publications by Place]
Edelman, S. (2023). Selfless Consciousness. In: The Consciousness Revolutions (Chapter 1). Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-24012-6_1
[Abstract]Tower of power. The brain’s virtual reality. Identity theory. Computation all the way down. No cognition without representation. What makes representation special and how it can give rise to basic phenomenal awareness. Stimulus and response and awareness and zombies. Slipping into the future. Once again, with feeling. The Gang of Four. Minimal consciousness. The first revolution.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Edwards, W. (1954). The theory of decision making. Psychological Bulletin, 51, 380-417.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Eilifsen, C. & Arntzen, E. (2017). Effects of Immediate Tests on the Long-Term Maintenance of Stimulus Equivalence Classes. The Psychological Record, 67(4), 447-461. doi:10.1007/s40732-017-0247-y
[Abstract]It has been suggested that stimulus equivalence is a central component of language and symbolic behavior. When teaching symbolic behavior, the goal is often to achieve a more or less permanent alteration of an individual's behavioral repertoire. As such, it seems important to assess not only variables affecting the establishment of stimulus equivalence but also variables affecting continued stimulus control exerted by stimulus equivalence class members over time. The current study investigated the role of the test for stimulus equivalence on the long-term maintenance of stimulus equivalence classes. Using one-to-many conditional discrimination training, 24 adult participants were taught to respond in line with three five-member stimulus classes. One group of 12 participants immediately completed a test for stimulus equivalence, and 12 other participants did not receive such a test. All 24 participants were subsequently tested for trained and derived relations under extinction conditions 2 and 4 weeks later without any further exposure to the contingencies of the conditional discrimination training. Results showed no differences between the two groups, with four participants in each group responding in accordance with both trained conditional discriminations and stimulus equivalence in the 4-week test. Six additional participants did, however, display systematic conditional performance during retention tests only partly consistent with the experimenter-defined classes.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]
Eilifsen, C., & Arntzen, E. (2021) Mediated Generalization and Stimulus Equivalence Perspectives on Behavior Science, 44, 1–27. doi:10.1007/S40614-021-00281-3
[Abstract]From the 1930s to the 1970s a large number of experimental studies on mediated generalization were published, and this research tradition provided an important context for early research on stimulus equivalence. Mediated generalization and stimulus equivalence have several characteristics in common, notably that both traditions seek to experimentally investigate derived responding among arbitrarily related stimuli in human participants. Although studies of stimulus equivalence are currently being regularly published, few studies investigate mediated generalization in humans today, and the research tradition is mainly of historical interest. The current article will give an account of the origin, the development, and the demise of research on mediated generalization, including a presentation of publication trends, experimental methodology, and the conceptual context research on mediated generalization took place within. Finally, some thoughts on the demise of mediated generalization and its relevance for modern research on stimulus equivalence and other types of derived responding are presented, including reflections on the observability of explanatory variables and the use of inferential statistics.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]
Ekwall, E. (1959). Etymological notes on English place-names. Lunds Universitets Årsskrift, N.F. Avd. 1 Bd. 53 Nr 5. (Lund Studies in English. XXVII.)
[1 referring publications by Place]
Ellia, F., & Chis-Ciure, R. (2022). Consciousness and complexity: Neurobiological naturalism and integrated information theory. Consciousness and Cognition, 100. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2022.103281
[Abstract]In this paper we take a meta-theoretical stance and aim to compare and assess two conceptual frameworks that endeavor to explain phenomenal experience. In particular, we compare Feinberg & Mallatt’s Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) and Tononi’s and colleagues Integrated Information Theory (IIT), given that the former pointed out some similarities between the two theories (Feinberg & Mallatt 2016c-d). To probe their similarity, we first give a general introduction into both frameworks. Next, we expound a ground-plan for carrying out our analysis. We move on to articulate a philosophical profile of NN and IIT, addressing their ontological commitments and epistemological foundations. Finally, we compare the two point-by-point, also discussing how they stand on the issue of artificial consciousness.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Estes, W. K., & Skinner, B. F. (1941). Some quantitative properties of anxiety. J. Exp. Psychol., 29, 390-400.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. (1937). Witchcraft, oracles and magic among the Azande. Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Evans, R. (2004). Book Review of Krakow, I (2002) Why the Mind-Body Cannot be Solved. Minds & Machines. 14(3), 403-407.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Evans, R. I. (1968). B. F. Skinner: The Man and his ideas. Dutton.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Eysenck, H. J. (1953). Uses and Abuses of Psychology. Penguin.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Eysenck, H. J. (Ed.) (1960). Behaviour Therapy and the Neuroses Pergamon.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Fantl, J. (1997). Review of D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place, 'Dispositions: A Debate'.
[Reviewed publication(s)]
Download: Fantl (1997) Review of Disposition - A Debate.pdf
Farah, M. J. (1990). Visual Agnosia: Disorders of Object Recognition and what they tell us about Normal Vision.. M.I.T. Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Fargas-Malet, M., & Dillenburger, K. (2016). Intergenerational transmission of conflict-related trauma in Northern Ireland: A behaviour analytic approach. Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma, 25(4), 436-454. doi:10.1080/10926771.2015.1107172
[Abstract]Intergenerational transmission of trauma describes the impact that traumatic events experienced by one generation have for the subsequent generation. In Northern Ireland, violent conflict raged between 1969 and 1998, when a peace process begun. This study explored to what extent (if any) parents’ experiences of the conflict influenced how children perceived life in this society. Parents completed a questionnaire, and their children drew 2 pictures, depicting Northern Ireland now and before they were born. Children’s behaviors and awareness of the conflict were influenced by their parents’ experiences and narratives, their age, gender, and school. Parental narrative about the violence was influenced by individual learning history, the child’s age and gender, and present circumstances. A behavior analytic approach is offered.
[Citing Place (1988b) in context]
Farrell, B. A. (1950). Experience. Mind, LIX, 170-198
[1 referring publications by Place]
Farrell, B. A. (1965). Review of the book The Behavioral Basis of Perception by J. G. Taylor. Mind, 74, 259-280
[Citing Place (1956)]
Farrer, W. (1915). Early Yorkshire Charters (Vol. II). Ballantyne, Hanson & Co.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Fechner, G. (1860). Elemente der Psychophysik (Two Volumes. English translation of Volume I as Elements of Psychophysics. H. E. Adler (trans.), D. H. Howes and E. G. Boring (eds.) (1966). Holt, Rinehart and Winston). Breitkopf and Hartel,
[3 referring publications by Place]
Feigl, H. (1950). The mind-mody problem in the development of logical empiricism. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4. Reprinted in H. Feigl and M. Broadbeck (Eds.) (1953), Readings in the Philosophy of Science (pp. 612-626). Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Feigl, H. (1958). The "Mental" and the "Physical", In H. Feigl, M. Scriven, & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Vol II, pp. 370-497). University of Minnesota Press.
[Citing Place (1956)] [14 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Feigl, H. (1967). The "Mental" and the "Physical": The Essay and a Postscript. University of Minnesota Press.
[Reprints in this collection] [4 referring publications by Place]
Ferster, C. B. (1958). Control of behavior in chimpanzees and pigeons by time out from positive reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 72, Whole No. 461.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Ferster, C. B., & Skinner, B. F. (1957). Schedules of reinforcement Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[8 referring publications by Place]
Festinger, L. (1957) A theory of cognitive dissonance Stanford University Press.
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Feyerabend, P. (1962). Explanation, reduction and empiricism. In H. Feigl & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Vol.III, pp. 28-97). University of Minnesota Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Feyerabend, P. K. (1957-1958). An Attempt at a Realistic Interpretation of Experience.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LVIII, 143-170.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Feyerabend, P. K. (1963). Materialism and the mind-body problem. The Review of Metaphysics, XVII, 49-66.
[Abstract]This paper has a twofold purpose. First, it defends materialism against a certain type of attack which seems to be based upon a truism but which is nevertheless completely off the mark. And secondly it intends to put philosophy in its proper place.
[6 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Feyerabend, P. K. (1975). Against method. New Left Books
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Fields, L., Adams, B. J., and Verhave, T. (1993). The effects of equivalence class structure on test performances. The Psychological Record, 43, 697-712.
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Fine, G. (1980). The one over many. The Philosophical Review, LXXXIX, 197-240.
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Fisher, A. R. J. (2022). The two Davids and Australian Materialism. In P. R. Anstey, & D. Braddon-Mitschell (Eds.), Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind (pp. 29-51). Oxford University Press.
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Flew, A. G. N. (Ed.) (1972). A dictionary of philosophy. Pan.
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Flew, A. G. N. (Ed.). (1964). Body, Mind, and Death. The Macmillan Company.
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Fodor, J. (1975). The language of thought. Crowell.
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Fodor, J. A. (1983). The Modularity of Mind. MIT Press.
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Fodor, J. A. (1987). Psychosemantics. MIT Press.
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Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis. Cognition, 28, 3-71.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Fodor, J.A. (1980). Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive Psychology. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 63-73.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Ford, S. (2010). What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world? Powerful structure [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Queensland. philpapers.org/go.pl?aid=FORWFP
[Abstract]This Thesis engages with contemporary philosophical controversies about the nature of dispositional properties or powers and the relationship they have to their non-dispositional counterparts. The focus concerns fundamentality. In particular, I seek to answer the question, ‘What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world?’ The answer I defend is that fundamental categorical properties need not be invoked in order to derive a viable explanation for the manifest world. My stance is a field-theoretic view which describes the world as a single system comprised of pure power, and involves the further contention that ‘pure power’ should not be interpreted as ‘purely dispositional’, if dispositionality means potentiality, possibility or otherwise unmanifested power or ability bestowed upon some bearer. The theoretical positions examined include David Armstrong’s Categoricalism, Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties, Brian Ellis’s New Essentialism, Ullin Place’s Conceptualism, Charles Martin’s and John Heil’s Identity Theory of Properties and Rom Harré’s Theory of Causal Powers. The central concern of this Thesis is to examine reasons for holding a pure-power theory, and to defend such a stance. This involves two tasks. The first requires explaining what plays the substance role in a pure-power world. This Thesis argues that fundamental power, although not categorical, can be considered ontologically-robust and thus able to fulfil the substance role. A second task—answering the challenge put forward by Richard Swinburne and thereafter replicated in various neo-Swinburne arguments—concerns how the manifestly qualitative world can be explained starting from a pure-power base. The Light-like Network Account is put forward in an attempt to show how the manifest world can be derived from fundamental pure power.
Note:
CHAPTER 8 ULLIN PLACE: CONCEPTUALISM - OUTLINE 131
CHAPTER 9 ULLIN PLACE: CONCEPTUALISM - DISCUSSION 137
9.1 Truthmakers for Dispositional Properties 137
9.2 The Causal Role of the Microstructure 140
9.3 Summary and Conclusions 141
[Citing Place (1996c)] [Citing Place (1996d)] [Citing Place (1996e)] [Citing Place (1996f)] [Citing Place (1996g)] [Citing Place (1999b)] [Citing Place (1999f)]
Fordyce, W. E. (1978). Learning processes in pain. In R. A. Sternbach (Ed.), The psychology of pain. Raven Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Foxall, G. R. (1999). The contextual stance. Philosophical Psychology, 12(1), 25-46. doi:10.1080/095150899105918
[Abstract]The contention that cognitive psychology and radical behaviorism yield equivalent accounts of decision making and problem solving is examined by contrasting a framework of cognitive interpretation, Dennett’ s intentional stance, with a corresponding interpretive stance derived from contextualism. The insistence of radical behaviorists that private events such as thoughts and feelings belong in a science of human behavior is indicted in view of their failure to provide a credible interpretation of complex human behavior. Dennett’ s interpretation of intentional systems is an exemplar of the interpretive stance radical behaviorism requires; a corresponding interpretive position can be based initially on a radical behaviorist view of human behavior and its determinants. This "contextual stance" is ontologically and methodologically distinct from the intentional stance over the range of explanations for which scientific psychology, cognitive or behaviorist, is responsible.
[Citing Place (1987a)] [Citing Place (1992f)]
Frankish, K. (2016). Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 23(11-12), 11-39. https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/imp/jcs/2016/00000023/f0020011/art00002
[Abstract]This article presents the case for an approach to consciousness that I call illusionism. This is the view that phenomenal consciousness, as usually conceived, is illusory. According to illusionists, our sense that it is like something to undergo conscious experiences is due to the fact that we systematically misrepresent them (or, on some versions, their objects) as having phenomenal properties. Thus, the task for a theory of consciousness is to explain our illusory representations of phenomenality, not phenomenality itself, and the hard problem is replaced by the illusion problem. Although it has had powerful defenders, illusionism remains a minority position, and it is often dismissed as failing to take consciousness seriously. This article seeks to rebut this accusation. It defines the illusionist programme, outlines its attractions, and defends it against some common objections. It concludes that illusionism is a coherent and attractive approach, which deserves serious consideration.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Frede, M. & Patzig, G. (1988). Aristoteles "Metaphysik Z": Text, Überzetzung und Kommentar (2 Vols.). Beck.
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Freeman, F., & Thomas, D. R. (1967). Attention vs. cue utilization in generalization testing. [Paper presented at Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago.]
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Frege, G. (1879). Begriffschrift (English translation by P. T. Geach. In P. T. Geach & M. Black (Eds.) (1960), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 2nd. Ed. Blackwell).
[16 referring publications by Place]
Frege, G. (1884). Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: eine logische-mathematische Untersuchung ueber den Begriff der Zahl (English translation as The foundations of arithmetic: A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number by J. L. Austin, 1950. Philosophical Library).
[7 referring publications by Place]
Frege, G. (1891). Function and concept. Jenaischer Gesellschaft für Medicin und Naturwissenschaft (English translation by P. T. Geach. In P. T. Geach & M. Black (Eds.) (1960), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (2nd. Ed.). Blackwell.)
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Frege, G. (1892). Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100, 25-50.
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Frege, G. (1893). Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, begriffschriftliche abgeleitet (vol. I). Jena. English translation as The Basic Laws of Arithmetic by M. Furth, University of California Press, 1964.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Frege, G. (1894). Review of E. G. Husserl Philosophie der Arithmetik. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 103, 313-332. English translation of "illustrative extracts" by P. T. Geach. In P. T. Geach, & M. Black (Eds.), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Blackwell, 1952.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Frege, G. (1918). Der Gedanke. Eine logische Untersuchung. Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, I, 58-77. English translation as 'The thought. A logical enquiry' by A. and M. Quinton (1956). In Mind LXV: 289-311.
[6 referring publications by Place]
Frege, G. (1952). Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Eds. P. T. Geach & M. Black; 1952 first edition, 1960 second edition, ). Blackwell.
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French, J. D. (1960). The reticular formation. In J. Field et al. (Eds.), Handbook of Physiology, Sect. 1, Vol. 2. American Physiological Society.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Frere, S. (1967). Britannia: a history of Roman Britain. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Freud, S (1923). Das Ich und das Es (English translation as The Ego and the Id).
[1 referring publications by Place]
Freud, S. (1900). Die Traumdeutung. Franz Deuticke.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Freud, S. (1904). Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens (English translation as The Psychopathology of Everyday Life).
[1 referring publications by Place]
Freud, S. (1916-1917). Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse (English translation as Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis),
[4 referring publications by Place]
Freud, S. (1920). Jenseits des Lustprinzips Internationaler Psycho-analytischer Verlag.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Fried, M. (2020). Kuhn's challenge: conceptual continuity and natural kinds [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. Birkbeck, University of London. eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/40475
[Abstract]Thomas Kuhn poses a fundamental worry about explaining scientific progress, which I call Kuhn's Challenge. The Challenge consists of two related questions: (A) If the meanings of key terms change between theories on either side of a paradigm shift, how can we still say that these theories are about the same thing? (B) Even if we assume that two theories address the same subject matter, how can we determine which one is better? A popular reply to Kuhn is to adopt a semantics for natural kind terms influenced by Kripke in Naming and Necessity and Putnam in "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", according to which such terms rigidly refer - independently of theory changes - to the same kinds across possible worlds and through time. I argue that this approach can explain extra-theoretical conceptual continuity only if we assume that all natural kinds have the same essence type. Though Kripke and Putnam take for granted that this essence type is microstructural, I argue that in practice, many sciences postulate natural kinds with other essence types, such as historical or functional essences; and that when new discoveries are made, prompting paradigm shifts, the relevant essence type may change. Moreover, which type is relevant to which science is as much a matter of decision as of discovery. Such a claim may seem to threaten realism about natural kinds. I argue, however, that we can be both pluralists and realists, if we recognise that conceptual continuity is secured ex post. Contrary to those who have argued for similar positions, I claim that we need not give up the rigidity of natural kind terms or the global ambitions of realism. In the end I show how the framework I have developed illuminates the debate over Kripke's argument against Physicalism in the philosophy of mind.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Friend, T. (2021). Megarian Variable Actualism. Synthese, 199, 10521–10541. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03257-7
[Abstract]Megarian Actualism is the denial of unmanifesting powers. Aristotle called such a view ‘buffoonery’ and dispositionalists have provided compelling reasons for the contrary platitude that powers need not manifest. Even so, drawing on extant treatments of quantitative powers I’ll suggest that many of the powers which feature in quantitative lawlike equations are plausibly interpreted as Megarian. This is because the powers described by such equations are best understood as being directed towards all the values of exhaustive manifestation variables. I’ll discuss the prospects for generalising these Megarian characteristics to powers not typically represented in strict quantitative terms. The result will be a strong basis for a scientifically informed and plausible dispositionalist account: Megarian Variable Actualism.
[Citing Place (1999b) in context]
Frischberg, N. (1979). Historical change: from iconic to arbitrary. In E. Klima, U. Bellugi (Eds.), The signs of language. Harvard University Press.
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Frishberg, N. (1975). Arbitrariness and iconicity: Historical change in American Sign Language. Language, 51, 696-719.
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Gaeta, R. (no date). Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Melbourne
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Galadí, J.A. (2023). The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview of Proposed Solutions. In T. Lopez-Soto, A. Garcia-Lopez, & F. J. Salguero-Lamillar (Eds), The Theory of Mind Under Scrutiny (Pp. 435–467). Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-46742-4_13
[Abstract]The Philosophy of Mind consists of problems concerning aspects and properties of the human mind. The most important of these problems is that of the relation between mind and body, or, more generally, between mental and physical phenomena. Usually referred to as the mind-body problem, this has been one of the fundamental problems in Philosophy since René Descartes (1596–1650) and his critics introduced it four centuries ago. The mental seems, at first glance, completely different from the physical. Physical properties are public, i.e., equally observable by everyone, but mental properties are not. It can be deduced that someone feels pain by his behaviour, but only that person can feel it directly. Conscious mental events are private in the sense that the subject has privileged access to them that no one has for the physical. Conscious experiences, such as the smell of jasmine, are completely different from the configurations and movements, however complex, of particles, atoms and molecules, or the physical changes of cells and tissues. Despite this, conscious phenomena do not seem to arise out of nothing, but from physical-biological processes in the body, especially from neural processes in the brain. But how can physical-biological systems have states such as thoughts, fears and hopes?
[Citing Place (1956)]
Galileo (1623). Il saggiatore.
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Gallese, V. (1998). From neurons to meaning: Mirror neurons and social understanding [Paper presented to the Second Annual Conference of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Bremen, Germany, June 21st 1998].
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Galton, A. (1984). The logic of aspect. Oxford University Press.
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Garfinkel, H. (1964). Studies in the routine grounds of everyday activities. Social Problems, 11, 225-250. Reprinted with revisions in H. Garfinkel (1967), Studies in Ethnomethodology (pp. 35-75). Prentice-Hall.
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Garfinkel, H. (1967). Studies in Ethnomethodology Prentice-Hall.
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Garrett, R. (1985). Elbow room in a functional analysis: Freedom and dignity regained. Behaviorism, 13, 21-36
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Gascoigne, N. (2023). Philosophy of mind: Mind-body identity and eliminative materialism. In M. Müller (Eds.), Handbuch Richard Rorty. Springer VS. doi.:10.1007/978-3-658-16253-5_36
[Abstract]A critical outline is given of Rorty’s early, ‘eliminativist’ attempt to formulate a materialist version of the mind-body identity theory that does not fall foul of the ‘irreducible properties objection’ (the thought that if mental states are brain states then the latter must exhibit the same properties as the former). An explanation is offered of why Rorty continued to describe himself as a materialist/physicalist despite having come to reject any version of mind-body identity.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Gasking, D. A. T. (1960). Learning theory, language and reality,
Australian Journal of Science, 22, 324-330.
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Geach, P. T. (1949-50). Russell's theory of description. Analysis, 10, 84-92.
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Geach, P. T. (1950). Subject and predicate. Mind, 59, 461-482.
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Geach, P. T. (1957) Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
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Geach, P. T. (1962). Reference and Generality. Cornell University Press.
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Geach, P. T. (1972). Logic Matters. Blackwell
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Gehrz, R. D., Black, D. C., and Solomon, P. M. (1984). The formation of stellar systems from interstellar molecular clouds. Science, 292, 327-338.
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George, F. H. (1962). Cognition Methuen & Co.
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Gibson, J. J. (1959). Perception as a function of stimulation. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: Study of a science (Vol. 1). McGraw-Hill.
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Gibson, J. J. (1974). Overt and covert attention [Unpublished "Purple Peril"]. commons.trincoll.edu/purpleperils/1972-1979/overt-and-covert-attention/
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Houghton Mifflin Company.
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Gibson, J. R., & Maunsell, H. R. (1997). Sensory modality specificity of neural activity related to memory in visual cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology, 78(3), 1263-1275.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Giorgi, A. (1975). Convergences and divergences between phenomenological psychology and behaviorism: A beginning dialogue. Behaviorism, 3(2), 200–212.
[Abstract]Convergences between phenomenological psychology (PP) and behaviorism include opposition to dualism between the physical world and mental representations, and between a real visible man and an "inner" man with conscious states of which he alone is aware. Additionally, both views favor cautious use of theories, especially those which utilize hypothetico-deductive methodology, and a careful, descriptive, rather than inferential approach to behavior. Behaviorism and PP also share opposition to physiological reductionism. The 2 viewpoints diverge regarding their understanding of science. PP is more sensitive to the difference between natural and human phenomena and contends that the latter cannot be adequately dealt with by means of the scientific approach applicable with the former. Rather, a broader and more naively descriptive approach must be adopted. A further difference is that PP accepts intentionality in man's viewpoint of the world while behaviorism accounts for man strictly in terms of external relations. Finally, the phenomenologist is more likely to eschew the language of control in describing man and, instead, emphasize a careful description of the meanings man imposes on his world.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Giorgi, R., & Lavazza, A. (2018). Mental causation. APhEx, 17.
[Abstract]This article aims to provide a brief overview of the mental causation problem and its proposed solutions. Indeed, mental causation turns out to be one of the most difficult philosophical conundrums in contemporary philosophy of mind. In the first two sections, we offer an outline of the problem and the philosophical debate about it, and show that the mental causation problem is pivotal within the contemporary philosophy of mind. In the third section, we focus on the most popular models of mental causation, namely Kim's and Davidson's accounts, also discussing the objections raised against them. In the final section, we take into consideration some recent proposals poised to solve the mental causation problem, including powerism. Given the logical and metaphysical plausibility of almost all these different options, our conclusion is that mental causation is still an open problem and it is far from being resolved.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Goldberg, A. E. (1995) Constructions: A construction approach to argument structure. The University of Chicago Press
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Goldiamond, I. (1966). Perception, language and conceptualization rules. In B. Kleinmuntz (Ed.), Problem solving: Research, method and theory (pp. 183-224). New York: Wiley.
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Goldin-Meadow, S., & Mylander, C. (1984). Gestural communication in deaf children: The effects and non-effects of parental input on early language development. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 49, 1-121.
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Goldin-Meadow, S., & Mylander, C. (1990). Beyond the input given: The child's role in the acquisition of language. Journal of Child Language, 17, 527-563.
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Goldstein, K., & Scheerer, M. (1941). Abstract and concrete behavior: An experimental study with special tests. Psychological Monographs, 53(2).
[1 referring publications by Place]
Goldstick, D. (2021). In Defence of David Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Perception. Dialogue, 1-16. doi:10.1017/S0012217320000438
[Abstract]There are no qualia. The phenomenological difference between seeing and visualizing something is that the propositions which the experient begins to believe in the first case are only entertained in the second. We can know what it's like to be a bat by knowing that their echolocation informs them non-inferentially of the shapes, sizes, and directional distances away of nearby surfaces. The terms for secondary qualities like colours, though, are names of the type-properties they designate, tracing back causally to a verbal 'baptism,' and so experients don't know the character of colour experiences until they study brain physiology.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Gollub, L. (1977). Conditioned reinforcement: Schedule effects. In W. K. Honig, & J. E. R. Staddon (Eds.), Handbook of operant behavior. Prentice-Hall.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Goodman, N. (1965). Fact, fiction and forecast (2nd Edition, first edition 1955). Bobbs-Merrill.
[19 referring publications by Place]
Goodwyn, E. (2021). Bodies and minds, heaps and syllables. Synthese, 199, 8831–8855. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03184-7
[Abstract]In this paper the explanatory gap of the philosophy of mind is explored, and found to have a similar structure even in different framings of the mind–body problem (MBP). This leads to the consideration that the MBP may be a special case of the more general whole-part problem: how do properties of wholes arise from the particular assembly of isolated parts? The conclusion is argued that only an approach of mereological holism offers (some) solace from the explanatory gap problem, exchanging it for a reverse explanatory gap problem that has more promising prospects for future solution, possibly in the form of integrated information theory. These considerations, along with the problem of explaining qualia lead to a proposed solution to the MBP in holistic cosmopsychism.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Gouveia, S.S. (2022). Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Methodological Analysis. Springer Nature.
doi:10.1007/978-3-030-95369-0
[Citing Place (1956
)]
Gozzano, S., & Hill, S. C. (2012). Introduction. In S. Gozzano, & C. S. Hill, New perspectives on type identity: The mental and the physical (pp. 1-15).
[Citing Place (1956)]
Graham, G, (2019). Behaviorism. In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition). plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/behaviorism/
[Abstract]It has sometimes been said that “behave is what organisms do.” Behaviorism is built on this assumption, and its goal is to promote the scientific study of behavior. The behavior, in particular, of individual organisms. Not of social groups. Not of cultures. But of persons and animals.
In this entry I consider different types of behaviorism. I outline reasons for and against being a behaviorist. I consider contributions of behaviorism to the study of behavior. Special attention is given to the so-called “radical behaviorism” of B. F. Skinner (1904–90). Skinner is given special (not exclusive) attention because he is the behaviorist who has received the most attention from philosophers, fellow scientists and the public at large. General lessons can also be learned from Skinner about the conduct of behavioral science in general. The entry describes those lessons.
[Citing Place (2000b) in context]
Graham, G. (2000a). Ullin Thomas Place: 24 October 1924 - 2 January 2000. Brain and Mind, 1, 181-182. doi:10.1023/A:1010032528485
[Citing Armstrong & Place (1991)] [Citing Place (1981a)] [Citing Place (1981b)] [Citing Place (1991f)] [Citing Place (1992d)] [Citing Place (1992f)] [Citing Place (1996g)] [Citing Place (2000a)]
Graham, G. (2000b). Ullin Thomas Place, 1924 - 2000. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 74-77, Memorial Minutes (pp. 116-117). American Philosophical Association.
Graham, G. (2004). Self-Ascription: Thought Insertion. In J. Radden (Ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion (pp. 89-105). Oxford University Press.
[Citing Place (1999a)] [Citing Place (2000a)]
Graham, G. (2013). The disordered mind: An introduction to philosophy of mind and mental illness (Second Edition).
Routledge.
[Citing Place (1999a)]
Graham, G., & Horgan, T. (2002). Sensations and grain processes. In J.H. Fetzer (Ed.), Consciousness Evolving (pp.63-86). John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/aicr.34.08gra
[Abstract]This chapter celebrates an anniversary, or near anniversary. As we write it is just more than 40 years since U. T. Place's "Is consciousness a brain process" appeared in the The British Journal of Psychology, and just less than 40 since J. J. C. Smart's "Sensations and brain processes" appeared, in its first version, in The Philosophical Review. These two papers arguably founded contemporary philosophy of mind.
This paper is about the current status of the philosophy of consciousness (which we take to be phenomenal consciousness) and what the philosophical program for doing the philosophy of the consciousness mind is and where it can, and can't, rely on cognitive science.
The grain project is the scientific program in cognitive science that involves investigating the causal roles associated with phenomenal consciousness at several levels of detail or resolution.
We argue that even if the causal grain of phenomenal consciousness were to become fully understood within cognitive science, various theoretical options concerning qualia that are presently live theoretical options in philosophical discussion would all still remain live theoretical options.
[Citing Place (1956)] [1 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Graham, G., & Valentine, E. R. (Eds.). (2004). Identifying the mind: Selected papers of U. T. Place Oxford University Press.
[Reprints in this collection] [1 citing publications] [Reviews]
Greenberg, G. (1983). Psychology Without the Brain.
Psychological Record, 33, 49–58. doi:10.1007/BF03394821
[Abstract]This paper presents a critique of the currently dominant neurological reductionism that pervades contemporary psychology. The argument is made that while the brain is certainly involved in behavior it is not the source of it. Rather, a more parsimonious approach to understanding the behavior of organisms can be found in an epigenetic orientation. It is suggested that the concept of evolution holds much promise for theoretical advance within psychology.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Greenfield, P. M., & Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. (1990). Grammatical combinations in pan paniscus: Processes of learning and invention in the evolution and development of language. In S. T. Parker, & K. R. Gibson (Eds.), Language and intelligence in monkeys and apes: Comparative developmental perspectives. Cambridge University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Greenspoon, J. (1954). The effect of two non-verbal stimuli on the frequency of two verbal response classes (). American Psychologist, 9, 384.
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Greenspoon, J. (1955). The reinforcing effect of two spoken sounds on the frequency of two responses. American Journal of Psychology, 68, 409-416.
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Grensted, L.W. (1930). God. A Study of the Implications of Recent Psychology for Religious Belief and Practice: The Bampton Lectures for 1930. Longmans.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Grice, G. R. (1948). The relation of secondary reinforcement to delayed reward in visual discrimination learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 38, 1-16.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Grice, H. P. (1957). Meaning. Philosophical Review, 66, 377-388.
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Grice, H. P. (1958). Utterer's meaning, a Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning. Foundations of Language, 4, 225-242.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Grice, H. P. (1975/1989). Logic and conversation (The 1967 William James Lectures, Harvard University). In P. Cole, & J. L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and semantics 3: Speech acts, Academic Press, 1975. In H. P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Part 1). Harvard University Press, 1989.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Grice, H. P. (1978). Further notes on logic and conversation. In P. Cole (Ed.), Syntax and semantics 9: Pragmatics. Academic Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Griffiths, A. P. (1962-3). On belief. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 63, 167-186. Reprinted in Griffiths, A. P. (Ed.) (1967). Knowledge and Belief (pp. 127-143). Oxford University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Grimshaw, J. (1990). Argument structure. MIT Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Gross, R. D. (1987). Psychology: The science of mind and behaviour. Hodder and Stoughton.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Gudmundsson, K. (2018). The Skinner-Chomsky debate: The centrality of the dilemma argument. Behavior and Philosophy, 46, 1-24.
[Abstract]The Skinner-Chomsky debate has been with us for a long time but has never been fully resolved. Outside behaviorism, Chomsky’s review is generally highly praised. Behaviorists have, however, countered by demonstrating many inaccuracies, misquotes, and basic errors couched in Chomsky’s emotional language. The purpose of this paper is to show that both parties are right. Although much of Chomsky’s criticisms miss the mark, one very basic point that Chomsky himself endlessly repeats is yet unresolved. This part of Chomsky’s is called the dilemma argument and is shown to be a valid constructive critique that behaviorists would do well to address. Therefore, it is necessary to go in some detail into this criticism. It is about time to flesh out its basic structure in order to add clarity to its examination. It is however, not the purpose of this paper to answer this criticism but only to highlight it. This will be a determined attempt at clarity, never giving up even when wading through Chomsky’s general emotional attitude – to say the least.
[Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000)] [Citing Place (1981b)]
Guidi, G. (1908) Recherches expérimentales sur la suggestibilité. Archives de Psychologie, 8, 49-54.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Gunner, D. L. (1967). Professor Smart's "Sensations and brain processes". In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The identity theory of mind (pp. 1-20). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Gusman, S. (2016). The Phenomenological Fallacy and the Illusion of Immanence: Analytic Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology Against Mental Reification. Diametros, (48), 18-37.
[Abstract]Throughout the history of analytic philosophy the notion of the ‘phenomenological fallacy’ originally formulated by Place, has been used to criticize reification of the mental. Although this fallacy was originally not used to criticize the phenomenological tradition, it has popped up recently in debates between analytic philosophers and phenomenologists. However, a study of the history of both traditions reveals that a polemical notion similar, if not identical, to the phenomenological fallacy can be found within the phenomenological tradition, namely Sartre’s ‘illusion of immanence’. In this article, I will explicate these two polemical notions and place them in the context of their respective traditions. This will reveal that both notions must be understood as criticism of a certain form of representationalism I will call ‘dual-world representationalism’. This deep-rooted similarity between analytic philosophy of mind and phenomenology, in turn, sheds a new light on current discussions between the two traditions. On a final note, I compare the criticism to the views of Metzinger, a contemporary analytic philosopher who uses the phenomenological fallacy to accuse his adversaries.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1954)] [Citing Place (1956)]
Gustafson, D. F. (Ed.) (1964). Essays in Philosophical Psychology. Anchor Books
[Reprints in this collection]
Guthrie, E. R. (1935). The Psychology of Learning Harper.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and Intervening. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Hall, G. A. (1998). Promoting synthesis in the analysis of verbal relations. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 15, 113-116.
[Abstract]This paper argues that an important direction for the analysis of verbal relations is a synthesis of different specialty areas that study the same behavioral events. It appears that certain benefits may accrue from translating among conceptual frameworks and integrating research findings (where applicable) from the different specialty areas. Such interdependence may yield a more comprehensive view of the overall subject matter and reduce unnecessary duplication of effort by workers in different areas.
[Citing Place (1991a) in context]
Hamilton, W. (1860-1861). Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic (2nd Ed., H.L.Mansel and J.Veitch, Eds.). Blackwood.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Hamilton, W. (1860). Lectures on Logic (H. L. Mansel and J. Veitch, Eds.). Blackwood
[6 referring publications by Place]
Hamlyn, D. W. (1964). Causality and human behaviour. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 38, 125-142. www.jstor.org/stable/4106605
[Citing Place (1956)]
Hammerton, M. (1962). An investigation into the optimal gain from a velocity control system. Ergonomics, 5, 539-543.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Hannegan, W. (2018). Dispositional essentialism, directedness, and inclination to an end. Journal of Philosophical Research, 43, 191-204. doi:10.5840/jpr2018828132
[Abstract]Dispositional essentialists U. T. Place, George Molnar, and C. B. Martin hold that dispositions are intrinsically directed to their manifestations. Thomists have noted that this directedness is similar to Thomistic directedness to an end. I argue that Place, Molnar, and Martin would benefit from conceiving of dispositional directedness as the sort of directedness associated with Thomistic inclinations. Such Thomistic directedness can help them to account for the production of manifestations; to justify their reliance on dispositional directedness; to show the causal relevance of dispositions; and to motivate their view that dispositions are not reducible to categorical bases. I argue, moreover, that Thomistic inclination to an end does not succumb to the most common objections to finality: it is not mentalistic or vitalistic, and it does not involve backwards causation. Place, Molnar, and Martin, therefore, can embrace the directedness associated with Thomistic inclination—and reap its benefits—without incurring any high metaphysical cost.
[Citing Place (1996g)] [Citing Place (1999b)]
Hare, R. M. (1952). The Language of Morals Oxford University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Harlow, H. F. (1959). Learning set and error factor theory. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: a study of a science (Vol. 2). McGraw- Hill.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Harris, Z. (1951) Structural Linguistics. University of Chicago Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Hartley, D. (1749) Observations on Man 1749.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Harvey, W. (1628). Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in Animalibus. Frankfurt
[1 referring publications by Place]
Harzem, P., & Miles, T. R. (1978). Conceptual issues in operant psychology Wiley.
[20 referring publications by Place]
Hayes, S. C. (1987). Relational frames: is stimulus equivalence a special case of a more general phenomenon? [Paper presented to the Thirteenth Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Nashville, Tennessee].
[1 referring publications by Place]
Hayes, S. C. (1991). A relational control theory of stimulus equivalence. In L. J. Hayes, & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Dialogues on Verbal Behavior: Proceedings of the First International Institute on Verbal Relations.. Context.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Hayes, S. C. (Ed.) (1989). Rule-Governed Behavior: Cognition, Contingencies and Instructional Control Plenum.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Hayes, S. C. and Brownstein, A. (1985). Verbal Behavior, equivalence classes, and rules: new definitions, data and directions. [Paper presented to the Eleventh Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Columbus, Ohio].
[1 referring publications by Place]
Hayes, S. C., & Hayes, L. J. (1992). Verbal relations and the evolution of behavior analysis. American Psychologist, 47, 1383-1395.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Hayes, S. C., Hayes, L. J., & Reese, H. W. (1988). Finding the philosophical core: A review of Stephen C. Pepper’s World hypotheses: A study in evidence. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 50, 97-111. doi:10.1901/jeab.1988.50-97
[1 referring publications by Place]
Hayes, S. C., Hayes, L. J., Reese, H. W., & Sarbin, T. R. (Eds.). (1993). Varieties of scientific contextualism. Context Press.
[Abstract]This volume explores a wide range of contextualistic views within psychology and the social sciences. It is composed of 13 chapters, followed by brief discussions that elaborate and elucidate the contributions. It is intended for the professional and students in the social sciences. "Varieties of Scientific Contextualism" is one of only a handful of volumes focusing exclusively on contextualism as a world view.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Hebb, D. O. (1946). Emotion in man and animal: an analysis of the intuitive process of recognition. Psychol.Rev., 53, 88-106
[1 referring publications by Place]
Hebb, D. O. (1949). The Organization of Behavior Wiley.
[5 referring publications by Place]
Hegel, G.W.F. (1807/1931). Phänomenologie des Geistes (English translation as The Phenomenology of Mind by J. B. Baillie. Macmillan).
[2 referring publications by Place]
Heidelberger, M. (2003). The mind-body problem in the origin of Logical Empiricism: Herbert Feigl and psychophysical parallelism. In P. Parrini, W. C. Salmon, & M. H. Salmon (Eds.), Logical Empiricism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (pp. 233-262). University of Pittsburgh Press.
[Citing Place (1988a)] [Citing Place (1990a) in context]
Heider, F. (1958). The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. Wiley.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Heil, J. (1970). Sensations, experiences and brain processes. Philosophy, 45(173), 221-226. www.jstor.org/stable/3749624
Keywords: mind-brain identity theory, phenomenological fallacy, topic neutrality
[Citing Place (1956)]
Heil, J. (2004). Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Heil, J. (2022). Armstrong's revenge. In P. R. Anstey, & D. Braddon-Mitchell (Eds.), Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780192843722.001.0001
[Citing Place (1956
)]
Heil, J. (2022). The incremental chain of being. In S. Wuppuluri, & I. Stewart (Eds), From Electrons to Elephants and Elections. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-92192-7_2
[Citing Place (1956)]
Heritage J. C. (1985). Recent developments in conversation analysis. Sociolinguistics, 15, 1-19.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Herman, L. M. (1987). Receptive competencies of language-trained animals In J. S. Rosenblatt, C. Beer, M.C. Busnel, & P. J. B. Slater (Eds.), Advances in the Study of Behaviour. Academic Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Herman, L. M., Kuczaj, S. A., & Holder, M. D. (1993). Responses to anomalous gestural sequences by a language-trained dolphin: Evidence for processing of semantic relations and syntactic information. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 122(2), 184-194.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Herman, L. M., Pack A. A., & Morrel-Samuels, P. (1993). Representational and conceptual skills of dolphins. In H. R. Roitblat, L. M. Herman & P. Nachtigall (Eds.), Language and communication: Comparative perspectives. Erlbaum.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Herman, L. M., Richards, D. G., & Wolz, J. P. (1984). Comprehension of sentences by bottlenosed dolphins. Cognition, 16, 129-219.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Herman, L.M., & Uyeyama, R.K. (1999). The dolphin's grammatical competency: Comments on Kako (1999). Animal Learning & Behavior, 27, 18-23. doi:10.3758/BF03199426
[Is reply to] [1 referring publications by Place]
Herrnstein, R. J., Loveland, D. H. & Cable, C. (1976). Natural concepts in pigeons. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 2, 285-302.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Hewes, G. W. (1973a). An explicit formulation of the relationship between tool-using, tool-making and the emergence of language. Visible Language, 7, 101-127.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Hewes, G. W. (1973b). Primate communication and the gestural origin of language. Current Anthropology, 14, 5-24.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Hewes, G. W. (1976). The current status of the gestural theory of language origins. In S. R. Harnad, H. D. Steklis, & J. Lancaster (Eds.), Origins and evolution of language and speech. New York Academy of Science.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Heyes, C., & Dickinson, A. (1990). The intentionalty of animal action. Mind and Language, 5, 87-104.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Hilgard, E. R., & Marquis, D.G. (1940), Conditioning and Learning. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Hintikka, J. (1962). Knowledge and Belief Cornell University Press
[1 referring publications by Place]
Hinton, J. M. (1967). Illusions and identity. Analysis, 27, 65-76.
doi:10.2307/3326799
Note:
A revised version from February 1969 is reprinted in C. V. Borst (Ed.) (1970), The mind-brain identity theory. Macmillan.
[Citing Place (1956)] [1 reprinting collections]
Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Hocutt, M. (1967). In defence of materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 27(3), 366-385. doi:10.2307/2106063 www.jstor.org/stable/2106063
[Citing Place (1956)]
Hocutt, M. (2009). Private events. Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 105-117.
[Abstract]What are “private events” and what is their significance? The term is B. F. Skinner‟s, but the idea is much older. Before J. B. Watson challenged their methods and their metaphysics, virtually all psychologists assumed that the only way to discover a person‟s supposedly private states of mind was to ask her about them. Not a believer in minds, Skinner nevertheless agreed that sensations, feelings, and certain unspecified forms of “covert behavior” cannot be observed by others, because they take place inside the body underneath the skin. Then he added that these inner events are of interest only to the physiologist; the concern of the behavior analyst is how intact organisms interact with their environment, not how their inward parts interact with each other. That compromise enabled Skinner to pursue behavior analysis in disregard of neurophysiology, which there was at the time no good way to study anyhow. But Skinner‟s talk of ineluctably private events was ill considered and ill conceived. There is no well understood sense in which people observe their own sensations, feelings, and “covert behavior,” but if these take place inside the body, as it is reasonable to believe, the physiologist can observe them given the sophisticated new machines now available. And since these events inside the body vary with circumstances and influence behavior, the psychologist cannot afford to ignore what the physiologist has to say about them. Black box psychology is out of date. Though it is opaque, the skin is not an epistemological barrier.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Hoffman, D. D. (2008). Conscious realism and the mind-body problem. Mind and Matter, 6(1), 87–121 cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ConsciousRealism2.pdf
[Abstract]Despite substantial efforts by many researchers, we still have no scientific theory of how brain activity can create, or be, conscious experience. This is troubling, since we have a large body of correlations between brain activity and consciousness, correlations normally assumed to entail that brain activity creates conscious experience. Here I explore a solution to the mind-body problem that starts with the converse assumption: these correlations arise because consciousness creates brain activity, and indeed creates all objects and properties of the physical world. To this end, I develop two theses. The multimodal user interface theory of perception states that perceptual experiences do not match or approximate properties of the objective world, but instead provide a simplified, species-specific, user interface to that world. Conscious realism states that the objective world consists of conscious agents and their experiences; these can be mathematically modeled and empirically explored in the normal scientific manner.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Holland, J. G., & Skinner, B. F. (1961). The Analysis of Behavior: A Program for Self-Instruction. McGraw-Hill.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Holman, E. L. (2023). Panpsychism and the mind-body problem in contemporary analytic philosophy, Intellectual History Review. doi:10.1080/17496977.2023.2283925
[Abstract]Not so long ago, the idea that analytic philosophers would be taking panpsychism seriously would have been hard to believe. That is because in its early, logical positivist, stage, the analytic movement earned the reputation of being militantly anti-metaphysical. But analytic philosophy has come a long way since the heyday of logical positivism; and, in fact, the dialectic of recent debates on the mind–body problem among analytic philosophers has pushed many of them in the direction of panpsychism. In this paper, I want to explain how this has come about and take a look at some of the versions of panpsychism that have emerged. This will involve running through a quick history of debates on the mind–body problem since about 1960, focusing on how panpsychism has been proposed as a promising, though not unproblematic, way of breaking an apparent impasse that has emerged between more standard physicalist and dualist theories of mind. Along the way, I will also have occasion to comment on the prospects of panpsychism as a respectable scientific theory and how a number of scientists stand on this.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Holth, P. (2001). The persistence of category mistakes in psychology. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 203-219. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759428
[Abstract]Gilbert Ryle's book The Concept of Mind was published in 1949. According to Ryle, his "destructive purpose" was to show that "a family of radical category mistakes" is the source of the "official doctrine," that is, a "double-life theory," according to which "with the doubtful exception of idiots and infants in arms every human being has both a body and a mind." By numerous examples, Ryle showed quite forcefully how psychology and philosophy at the time were misled into asking the wrong kinds of questions. More than 50 years have elapsed since the original publication of Gilbert Ryle's book and, as Ullin T. Place wrote shortly before passing away, Ryle's conceptual analysis is now due, if not overdue, for a comeback. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the persistent relevance of category mistakes to current problems in the analysis of behavior.
[Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1999a)] [Citing Place (1999e)] [Citing Place (2000f)]
Download: Holth (2001) The Persistence of Category Mistakes in Psychology.pdf
Honderich, T., & Burnyeat, M. (Eds.) (1979). Philosophy as it is. Penguin Books
[Reprints in this collection]
Hook, S. (Ed.) (1960). Dimensions of mind Collier Books.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Horgan, T., & Tienson, J. (1996). Connectionism and the philosophy of psychology. MIT Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Horne, P. J., & Lowe, C. F. (1996). On the origins of naming and other symbolic behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 65, 185-241. www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1350072/pdf/jeabehav00215-0185.pdf
[7 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Horner V. M., & Gussow, J. D. (1972). John and Mary: A pilot study in linguistic ecology. In C. B. Cazden, V. P. John, & D. Hymes (Eds.), Functions of language in classroom. Teacher's College Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Horst, S. (2009). Naturalisms in Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy Compass, 4(1), 219-254.
[Abstract]Most contemporary philosophers of mind claim to be in search of a ‘naturalistic’ theory. However, when we look more closely, we find that there are a number of different and even conflicting ideas of what would count as a ‘naturalization’ of the mind. This article attempts to show what various naturalistic philosophies of mind have in common, and also how they differ from one another. Additionally, it explores the differences between naturalistic philosophies of mind and naturalisms found in ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. Section 1 introduces a distinction between two types of project that have been styled ‘naturalistic’, which I call philosophical naturalism and empirical naturalism. Sections 2 to 6 canvass different strands of philosophical naturalism concerning the mind, followed by a much briefer discussion of attempts to provide empirical naturalizations of the mind in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the essay with a consideration of the relations between philosophical and empirical naturalism in philosophy of mind, arguing that at least some types of philosophical naturalism are incompatible with empirical naturalism.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Hout, A. van (1998). Event semantics of verb frame alternations: A case study of Dutch and its acquisition Routledge.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Hull, C. L. (1920). Quantitative aspects of the evolution of concepts. Psychological Monographs, 28(123).
[2 referring publications by Place]
Hull, C. L. (1933) Hypnosis and Suggestibility. Appleton-Century.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles of Behavior. Appleton Century.
[9 referring publications by Place]
Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise on Human Nature (L.A. Selby-Bigge, Ed., 2nd Edition, P.H. Nidditch, Ed. - 1978. Clarendon Press).
[6 referring publications by Place]
Hume, D. (1777). Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals (L.A. Selby-Bigge, Ed. (1902), 2nd Edition. Clarendon Press).
[12 referring publications by Place]
Humphrey, G. E. (1951). Thinking, an introduction to its experimental psychology Methuen.
[8 referring publications by Place]
Humphrey, N. K. (1974). Vision in a monkey without striate cortex: a case study. Perception, 3, 241-255.
[9 referring publications by Place]
Husserl, E. G. (1891). Philosophie der Arithmetik. Saale.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Husserl, E. G. (1900). Logische Untersuchungen.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Huxley, A. (1932). Brave New World Chatto and Windus.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Huxley, T. H. (1893). Collected Essays (Vol.I). Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Huxley, T. H. (1899). On the hypothesis that animals are automata, and its history. In: Method and results: Essays (pp. 199-250). D. Appleton & Co. (Paper dated 1874)
[1 referring publications by Place]
Inge, W. R. (1899). Christian Mysticism. Considered in Eight Lectures Delivered before the University of Oxford: The Bampton Lectures for 1899. Methuen.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Inge, W. R. (1918). The Philosophy of Plotinus: The Gifford Lectures at St. Andrews 1917-1918 (2 Vols). Longmans, Green.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Inge, W. R. (1927/1935). Protestantism (Revised Edition). Nelson.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Ingthorsson, R. D. (2015). The Regress of Pure Powers Revisited. European Journal of Philosophy, 23(3), 529–41. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00548.x
[Abstract]The paper aims to elucidate in better detail than before the dispute about whether or not dispositional monism—the view that all basic properties are pure powers—entails a vicious infinite regress. Particular focus is on Alexander Bird’s and George Molnar’s attempts to show that the arguments professing to demonstrate a vicious regress are inconclusive because they presuppose what they aim to prove, notably that powers are for their nature dependent on something else. I argue that Bird and Molnar are mistaken. It is true that dispositional monism is popularly assumed to characterise powers as dependent entities, but this is not what the arguments aim to prove. They merely aim to demonstrate that it would be absurd to assume that all properties are dependent in this way. Finally, it is argued that there is an unresolved tension in Bird’s and Molnar’s account of powers. They characterise them as being for their nature dependent on the manifestations that they are for, and yet ontologically independent of those same manifestations. Until that tension is resolved, their accounts are not equipped to remove the threat of vicious regress.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]
Jackendorff, R. (1987). The status of thematic relations in linguistic theory. Linguistic Inquiry, 18(3), 369-411.
[1 referring publications by Place]
James, E., Keppler, J., L Robertshaw, T., & Sessa, B. (2022). N,N-dimethyltryptamine and Amazonian ayahuasca plant medicine. Human psychopharmacology,, e2835 . doi:10.1002/hup.2835
[Abstract]Objective: Reports have indicated possible uses of ayahuasca for the treatment of
conditions including depression, addictions, post‐traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and specific psychoneuroendocrine immune system pathologies. The article assesses potential ayahuasca and N,N‐dimethyltryptamine (DMT) integration with contemporary healthcare. The review also seeks to provide a summary of selected literature regarding the mechanisms of action of DMT and ayahuasca; and assess to what extent the state of research can explain reports of unusual phenomenology.
Design: A narrative review.
Results: Compounds in ayahuasca have been found to bind to serotonergic receptors, glutaminergic receptors, sigma‐1 receptors, trace amine‐associated receptors,
and modulate BDNF expression and the dopaminergic system. Subjective effects are associated with increased delta and theta oscillations in amygdala and hippocampal regions, decreased alpha wave activity in the default mode network, and stimulations of vision‐related brain regions particularly in the visual association cortex. Both biological processes and field of consciousness models have been proposed to explain subjective effects of DMT and ayahuasca, however, the evidence supporting the proposed models is not sufficient to make confident conclusions. Ayahuasca plant medicine and DMT represent potentially novel treatment modalities.
Conclusions: Further research is required to clarify the mechanisms of action and
develop treatments which can be made available to the general public. Integration between healthcare research institutions and reputable practitioners in the Amazon is recommended.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
James, W. (1884). What is emotion. Mind, 9, 188-205.
[1 referring publications by Place]
James, W. (1890). Principles of Psychology (2 Volumes). Holt.
[10 referring publications by Place]
Janković, I. (2022). The language of physicalism: A conceptual review of physicalist ontology. Synesis: Journal for Humanities and Social Sciences, 3(3), 7-21. doi:10.7251/SIN2203001J
[Abstract]In this paper, the author explores the development and influence of the language of physicalism on the understanding of the mind and body problem. Firstly, we will address the early development and, later, the transformation of physicalism from a language methodology to a metaphysical theory, which will receive its final form in the philosophy of mind. The chapter will be concluded with a short review of the identity theory, and consequently, the
question about the legitimacy of the identification of philosophical and scientific concepts will arise. Afterwards, in the second chapter, the author will use the so-called problem picture in order to provide a conceptual analysis of the language of physicalism. That way, we will demonstrate how the transformation of crucial philosophical notions emerges from a wider linguistic and contextual background. In this case, philosophical concepts, or language, are influenced by the metaphysics of scientism. Finally, instead of a summary, the last chapter will provide a short sketch of the ontogrammatical method, whose task is to shed light upon ontological transformations via conceptual and linguistic analysis
[Citing Place (1956)]
Jastrow, J. (1900). Fact and Fable in Psychology Houghton-Mifflin.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Jaworski, W. (2014). Hylomorphism and the Metaphysics of Structure. Res Philosophica, 91(2), 179-201.
[Abstract]Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle; it accounts for what things are and what they can do. My goal is to articulate a metaphysic of hylomorphic structure different from those currently on offer. It is based on a substance-attribute ontology that takes properties to be powers and tropes. Hylomorphic structures emerge, on this account, as powers to configure the materials that compose individuals.
[Citing Place (1996c)] [Citing Place (1996g)]
Jaworski, W. (2017) Psychology without a mental-physical dichotomy. In W. M.R. Simpson, R. C. Koons, & N, J. Teh (Eds.), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science (Chapter 11, pp. 261-291). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315211626-14
[Abstract]Is there a mental-physical dichotomy? Philosophers, scientists, and many ordinary folk seem to think so. We often speak of the difference between mental health and physical health, or between the mental aspects of athletic performance and the physical ones. In addition, standard definitions of psychology typically imply that it is the science of mental phenomena, and that the latter comprise a subject matter that distinguishes the methods of psychology from those of biology, chemistry, or physics. But the mental-physical dichotomy generates mind-body problems: persistent philosophical problems understanding how mental phenomena are related to physical phenomena. These problems suggest that there is a conceptual instability at the very foundations of psychological science. A hylomorphic metaphysic provides an alternative. It implies that there is nothing canonical about the mental-physical dichotomy; any distinctions we draw between mental and nonmental subject-matters or physical and nonphysical ones are mere artifacts of our descriptive and explanatory interests. This suggests an understanding of psychological science that is not based on a mental-physical dichotomy.
[Citing Place (1996c)] [Citing Place (1996g)]
Jefferson, G. (1979). A technique for inviting laughter and its subsequent acceptance/declination. In G. Psathas (Ed.), Everyday language: Studies in ethnomethodology. Irvington Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Jefferson, G. (1980) The abominable Ne? An exploration of post-response pursuit of response. Sprache der Gegenwart, Schriften des Instituts für deutsche Sprache, 54 (Dialogforschung Jahrbuch 1980 des Instituts für deutsche Sprache), 53-88.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Jefferson, G. (1980). Final Report to the Social Science Research Council on the Analysis of Conversations in which "Troubles" and "Anxieties" are Expressed.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Jefferson, G. (1980). On "trouble-premonitory" response to inquiry. Sociological Inquiry, 50, 153-185.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Jefferson, G. (1981). The abominable "Ne?": A working paper exploring the phenomenon of post-response pursuit of response. University of Manchester, Department of Sociology Occasional Paper no. 6.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Jefferson, G. (1988). On the sequential organization of troubles-talk in ordinary conversation. Social Problems, 35, 418-441.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Jenner, F.A., Gjessing, L.R., Cox, J.R., Davies-Jones, A., Hullin, R.P. & Hanna, S.M. (1967). A manic-depressive psychotic with persistent forty-eight hour cycle, British Journal of Psychiatry, 113, 895-910. doi:10.1192/bjp.113.501.895
[1 referring publications by Place]
Jerne, N. K. (1955). The natural selection theory of antibody formation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A., 41, 849-856.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Jerne, N. K. (1967). Antibodies and learning: Selection versus instruction. In G. C. Quarton, T. Melnechuk, & F. O. Schmitt (Eds.), The Neurosciences: A Study Program (pp. 200-205). Rockefeller University Press, .
[1 referring publications by Place]
Jhannesson, A. (1949). Origins of Language: Four Essays. Leiftur.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Jhannesson, A. (1950). The gestural origins of language. Nature, 166, 60-61.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Johnson, W. E. (1921). Logic. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Jones, E. E. & Gerard, H. B. (1967). Foundations of social psychology. Wiley.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Jordan, M. I. (1986). Attractor dynamics and parallelism in a connectionist sequential machine. Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Erlbaum.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Joyce, J. A. A. (1926). Ulysses. Shakespeare
[1 referring publications by Place]
Jungbauer, T. J. (2024). A Madhyamaka critique of Jaegwon Kims supervenience argument. Comparative Philosophy, 15(1), 67-96. doi:10.31979/2151-6014(2024).150108
[Abstract]Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience argument objects to the possibility of emergent
causation (both downward and same-level) based on both (1) the causal overdetermination of
both (a) higher-level emergent events and (b) lower-level basal events, and (2) the causal
closure principle of the physical domain. Kim argues that emergent causation entails
epiphenomenalism. Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy skeptically critiques the primary
(ultimate) existence of causal phenomena and instead suggests that all such phenomena may
only be secondarily (conventionally) existent. Mādhyamikas acknowledge that, conventionally,
emergent phenomena appear to cause both basal phenomena and other emergent phenomena.
However, contra Kim, Mādhyamikas doubt that causal relations ultimately exist between, or
among, emergent phenomena and basal phenomena because they doubt that anything
ultimately exists. As such, the Madhyamaka critique of causality may provide a skeptical
response to Kim because Kim assumes that both emergent and basal phenomena are primarily
existent. Altogether, I argue that if we draw upon and accept the Madhyamaka critique of
causality, then we may resolve Kim’s problem of epiphenomenalism by reconceptualizing
causality as a relation obtaining conventionally between phenomena, while remaining silent
on the status of causation at the ultimate level of truth. By arguing this point, I do not mean to
suggest that the Madhyamaka critique of causality, while plausible, is in fact correct. Rather,
I intend only to show that plausible responses to Kim’s argument may be found by considering
less commonly taught philosophical traditions in relation to Kim’s metaphysical assumptions.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Kako, E. (1999). Elements of syntax in the systems of three language-trained animals. Animal learning & behavior, 27, 1-14.
[1 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Kammerer, F. (2021). The illusion of conscious experience. Synthese, 198, 845–866. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-02071-y philpapers.org/archive/KAMTIO-4.pdf
[Abstract]Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely counterintuitive: the idea that consciousness is an illusion strikes most people as absurd, and seems almost impossible to contemplate in earnest. Defenders of illusionism should be able to explain the apparent absurdity of their own thesis, within their own framework. However, this is no trivial task: arguably, none of the illusionist theories currently on the market is able to do this. I present a new theory of phenomenal introspection and argue that it might deal with the task at hand.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Kant, I. (1781/1787). Kritik der reinen Vernunft (First edition 1781, second edition 1787, English translation as The critique of pure reason). Hartknoch
[14 referring publications by Place]
Kant, I. (1785/1948). Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (English translation as The Moral Law: Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, by H.J.Paton. Hutchinson).
[1 referring publications by Place]
Kantor, J. R. (1959). Interbehavioral psychology. In Principia Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Katz, J. J., & Fodor, J. A. (1963). The structure of a semantic theory. Language, 39, 170-210.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Keane, D. (2022-06-26). Philosopher UT Place donates brain to University of Adelaide after dedicating his life to studying the mind. ABC News (https://www.abc.net.au/news). www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-26/u-t-place-philosophy-of-brains-and-minds-university-of-adelaide/101158816
Download: Keane (2022) Philosopher UT Place donates brain to University of Adelaide after dedicating his life to studying the mind - ABC News.pdf
Keller, F. S. & Schoenfeld, W. N. (1950). Principles of psychology.
Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Kelly, G. A. (1955). The Psychology of Personal Constructs Norton.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Kennedy, C. H. (1999). Early to bed, early to rise ... Sleep deprivation causes response patterns to reorganize [Conference presentation, given at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College, London, March 1999].
[1 referring publications by Place]
Kenny, A. (1963). Action, emotion and will Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[6 referring publications by Place]
Key, B., Zalucki, O.H., & Brown, D.J. (2022). A first principles approach to subjective experience. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 16. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2022.756224
[Abstract]Understanding the neural bases of subjective experience remains one of the great
challenges of the natural sciences. Higher-order theories of consciousness are typically
defended by assessments of neural activity in higher cortical regions during perception,
often with disregard to the nature of the neural computations that these regions
execute. We have sought to refocus the problem toward identification of those neural
computations that are necessary for subjective experience with the goal of defining
the sorts of neural architectures that can perform these operations. This approach
removes reliance on behaviour and brain homologies for appraising whether non-human
animals have the potential to subjectively experience sensory stimuli. Using two basic
principles—first, subjective experience is dependent on complex processing executing
specific neural functions and second, the structure-determines-function principle—we
have reasoned that subjective experience requires a neural architecture consisting of
stacked forward models that predict the output of neural processing from inputs. Given
that forward models are dependent on appropriately connected processing modules
that generate prediction, error detection and feedback control, we define a minimal
neural architecture that is necessary (but not sufficient) for subjective experience. We
refer to this framework as the hierarchical forward models algorithm. Accordingly,
we postulate that any animal lacking this neural architecture will be incapable of
subjective experience.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Kievit, R. A. (2014). Turtles all the way down? Psychometric approaches to the reduction problem [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. Univerity of Amsterdam hdl.handle.net/11245/1.417009
[Abstract]The question of how different explanatory levels in scientific inquiry are related to each other is known as the reduction problem. This thesis focuses on a specific domain of this question, namely how we should relate brains to (psychological) behaviour. The central position of this thesis is that this question is ultimately a measurement problem. That is, in order to understand the relationship between brains and minds, we need to formulate measurement models that can relate observable variables (e.g. response times, brain activity, brain structure) to the underlying constructs we are interested in (e.g. memory capacity, intelligence or personality differences). Moreover, in the case of relating brains to behaviour, theories from philosophy of mind can be translated into such measurement models, thereby guiding empirical inquiry and simultaneously providing an empirical test of philosophical theories. Further extensions of these ideas focus on the application of representational geometry, whereby the structure of neural and behavioural patterns are used to relate brain and behaviour, and the examination of cases where inferences across explanatory levels goes awry (known as Simpson’s Paradox). Based on empirical applications in several domains it is concluded that supervenience theory, which suggests a fundamentally asymmetrical relationship between brain and mind, is most in line both with theoretical considerations and empirical data.
[Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1999e)]
Kievit, R. A., Romeijn, J. W., Waldorp, L. J., Wicherts, J. M., Scholte, H. S., & Borsboom, D. (2011). Mind the Gap: A psychometric approach to the reduction problem. Psychological Inquiry, 22(2), 67-87. doi:10.1080/1047840X.2011.550181
[Abstract]Cognitive neuroscience involves the simultaneous analysis of behavioral and neurological data. Common practice in cognitive neuroscience, however, is to limit analyses to the inspection of descriptive measures of association (e.g., correlation coefficients). This practice, often combined with little more than an implicit theoretical stance, fails to address the relationship between neurological and behavioral measures explicitly. This article argues that the reduction problem, in essence, is a measurement problem. As such, it should be solved by using psychometric techniques and models. We show that two influential philosophical theories on this relationship, identity theory and supervenience theory, can be easily translated into psychometric models. Upon such translation, they make explicit hypotheses based on sound theoretical and statistical foundations, which renders them empirically testable. We examine these models, show how they can elucidate our conceptual framework, and examine how they may be used to study foundational questions in cognitive neuroscience. We illustrate these principles by applying them to the relation between personality test scores, intelligence tests, and neurological measures.
Note:
A reply to the comments of this target article by the same authors is Modeling Mind and Matter.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Kievit, R. A., Romeijn, J. W., Waldorp, L. J., Wicherts, J. M., Scholte, H. S., & Borsboom, D. (2011). Modeling mind and matter: Reductionism and psychological measurement in cognitive neuroscience. Psychological Inquiry, 22(2), 139-157. doi:10.1080/1047840X.2011.567962
[Abstract]According to Karlin (1983), “the purpose of models is not to fit the data but to sharpen the questions” (Krukow, Nielsen, & Sassone, 2008, p. 3782). Given the rich and insightful commentaries we received, our approach to the reduction problem can be considered a success in this respect. The commenters have taken our ideas and expanded them both in breadth and depth. They have also critically examined the assumptions of our approach. In general, the commentaries suggest that the implementation of conceptually guided psychometric models is viable, is empirically tractable, and can be improved and revised on the basis of empirical and conceptual advances. Most important, they show that psychometric models yield increased depth and precision in dialogues concerning the foundational questions of cognitive neuroscience. In this rejoinder, we address the core points of criticism and present an expansion of the ideas we formulate in the Kievit et al. (this issue) target article, based on the ideas and suggestions offered by the commenters. Our focus is on the following set of themes that figured centrally in the comments: (a) What is the role of mechanisms with respect to our approach, (b) what explanatory levels should we study; (c) why should we engage in reductive science in the first place, (d) how can psychometric models be extended, (e) what interpretations of causality and realism are relevant for psychometric models, and (f) what philosophical positions can be translated into measurement models.
Note:
This article is a reply to the comments of the target article by the same authors: Mind the Gap.
[Citing Place (1999e)]
Killeen, P. R., & Jacobs, K. W. (2017) Coal Is Not Black, Snow Is Not White, Food Is Not a Reinforcer: The Roles of Affordances and Dispositions in the Analysis of Behavior. The Behavior Analyst, 40(1), 17-38. doi:10.1007/s40614-016-0080-7
[Abstract]Reinforcers comprise sequences of actions in context. Just as the white of snow and black of coal depend on the interaction of an organism’s visual system and the reflectances in its surrounds, reinforcers depend on an organism’s motivational state and the affordances — possibilities for perception and action — in its surrounds. Reinforcers are not intrinsic to things but are a relation between what the thing affords, its context, the organism, and his or her history as capitulated in their current state. Reinforcers and other affordances are potentialities rather than intrinsic features. Realizing those potentialities requires motivational operations and stimulus contexts that change the state of the organism — they change its disposition to make the desired response. An expansion of the three-term contingency is suggested in order to help keep us mindful of the importance of behavioral systems, states, emotions, and dispositions in our research programs.
[Citing Place (1987a)]
Kim, J. (1971). Materialism and the criteria of the mental. Synthese, 22, 323–345 doi:10.1007/BF00413431 http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43820/1/11229_2004_Article_BF00413431.pdf
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Kim, J. (1973). Causes and counterfactuals. Journal of Philosophy, LXX, 570-572.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Kim, J. (1998). The mind–body problem after fifty years. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 43, 3-21.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Kimble, G.A., & Garmezy, N. (1963). Principles of general psychology Ronald.
[5 referring publications by Place]
Kinsey, A. C., Pomeroy, W. B., Martin, C. E., & Gebhard, P. H. (1953). Sexual behaviour of the human female. Saunders
[1 referring publications by Place]
Kneale, W. (1968). Intentionality and intensionality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 42, 73-90.
[9 referring publications by Place]
Kneale, W. (1969). [Review of A Materialist Theory of Mind by D. M. Armstrong.] Mind, 78(310), 292-301.
www.jstor.org/stable/2252380
[Citing Place (1956)]
Kneale, W., & Kneale, M. (1962). The Development of Logic. Clarendon Press.
[5 referring publications by Place]
Koffka, K. (1921) Die Grundlagen der psychischen Entwicklung (English translation as The Growth of the Mind, 1924).
[1 referring publications by Place]
Köhler, W. (1921). Intelligenzprüfungen auf Menschenaffen. (English translation by E. Winter as The Mentality of Apes, 1927, 2nd ed. Routledge & Kegan Paul). Springer.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Köhler, W. (1925). The Mentality of Apes. Kegan Paul.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Koksvik, O. (2010). Metaphysics of consciousness. In G. Oppy, & N. Trakakis (Eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australasia. Monash University Publishing.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Konorski, J. (1948). Conditioned Reflexes and Neuron Organization (English translation by S. Garry. Cambridge University Press).
[3 referring publications by Place]
Koslicki, K., & Massin, O. (2023). A plea for descriptive social ontology. Synthese, 202(60). doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04263-7
[Abstract]Social phenomena—quite like mental states in the philosophy of mind—are often regarded as potential troublemakers from the start, particularly if they are approached with certain explanatory commitments, such as naturalism or social individualism, already in place. In this paper, we argue that such explanatory constraints should be at least initially bracketed if we are to arrive at an adequate non-biased description of social phenomena. Legitimate explanatory projects, or so we maintain, such as those of making the social world fit within the natural world with the help of, e.g., collective intentionality, social individualism, and the like, should neither exclude nor influence the prior description of social phenomena. Just as we need a description of the mental that is not biased, for example, by (anti)physicalist constraints, we need a description of the social that is not biased, for example, by (anti)individualist or (anti)naturalist commitments. Descriptive social ontology, as we shall conceive of it, is not incompatible with the adoption of explanatory frameworks in social ontology; rather, the descriptive task, according to our conception, ought to be recognized as prior to the explanatory project in the order of inquiry. If social phenomena are, for example, to be reduced to nonsocial (e.g., psychological or physical) phenomena, we need first to understand clearly what the social candidates for the reduction in question are. While such descriptive or naïve approaches have been influential in general metaphysics (see Fine 2017), they have so far not been prominent in analytic social ontology (though things are different outside of analytic philosophy, see esp. Reinach (1913). In what follows, we shall outline the contours of a descriptive approach by arguing, first, that description and explanation need to be distinguished as two distinct ways of engaging with social phenomena. Secondly, we defend the claim that the descriptive project ought to be regarded as prior to the explanatory project in the order of inquiry. We begin, in Section 2, by considering two different ways of engaging with mental phenomena: a descriptive approach taken by descriptive psychology and an explanatory approach utilized in analytic philosophy of mind. We take these two ways of approaching the study of the mind to be analogous to the distinction we want to draw in social ontology between a descriptive and an explanatory approach to the study of social phenomena. We consider next, in Section 3, how our approach compares to neighboring perspectives that are familiar to us from general metaphysics and philosophy more broadly, such as Aristotle’s emphasis on “saving the appearances”, Strawson’s distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics, as well as Fine’s contrast between naïve and foundational metaphysics. In Section 4, we apply the proposed descriptive/explanatory distinction to the domain of social ontology and argue that descriptive social ontology ought to take precedence in the order of inquiry over explanatory social ontology. Finally, in Section 5, we consider and respond to several objections to which our account might seem to be susceptible.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Kosslyn, S. M., Thompson, W. L., Kim, I. J. & Alpert, N. M. (1995). Topographical representations of mental images in primary visual cortex. Nature, 378, 496-498.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Krasner, L. (1958). Studies of the conditioning of verbal behavior. Psychological Bulletin, 55, 148-170.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Kripke, S. (1972). Naming and necessity. In G. Harman and D. Davidson (Eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Reidel.
[15 referring publications by Place]
Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity Blackwell.
[8 referring publications by Place]
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd Edition, enlarged). University of Chicago Press.
[7 referring publications by Place]
Kuschel, R. (1973). The silent inventor: The creation of a sign language by the only deaf-mute on a Polynesian island. Sign Language Studies, 3, 1-27
[1 referring publications by Place]
Kvale, S., & Grenness, C. E. (1967). Skinner and Sartre: towards a radical phenomenology of behavior, Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 7, 128-150.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. I. Lakatos, & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire and dangerous things. Chicago University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
LaRock, E. (2006). Why neural synchrony fails to explain the unity of visual consciousness. Behavior and philosophy, 34, 39-58.
[Abstract]A central issue in philosophy and neuroscience is the problem of unified visual consciousness. This problem has arisen because we now know that an object's stimulus features (e.g., its color, texture, shape, etc.) generate activity in separate areas of the visual cortex (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). For example, recent evidence indicates that there are very few, if any, neural connections between specific visual areas, such as those that correlate with color and motion (Bartels & Zeki, 2006; Zeki, 2003). So how do unified objects arise in visual consciousness? Some neuroscientists propose that neural synchrony is the mechanism that binds an object's features into a unity (e.g., see Crick, 1994; Crick & Koch, 1990; Engel, 2003; Roelfsema, 1998; Singer, 1996; von der Malsburg, 1996, 1999). I argue, on both empirical and philosophical grounds, that neural synchrony fails to explain the unity of visual consciousness
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
LaRock, E. (2008). Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process? International Philosophical Quarterly, 48(2), 201-229. doi:10.5840/ipq20084827
[Abstract]I argue on the basis of recent findings in neuroscience that consciousness is not a brain process, and then explore some alternative, non-reductive options concerning the metaphysical relationship between consciousness and the brain, such as weak and strong accounts of the emergence of consciousness and the constitution view of consciousness. I propose an Aristotelian account of the strong emergence of consciousness. This account motivates a wider ontology than reductive physicalism and makes reference to formal causation as a way explaining the causal power of consciousness. What is meant by formal causation, in this context, is that consciousness has the causal power to organize or control neuronal activity. This notion of causation is elaborated and supported by recent findings in the neurosciences. An advantage of this empirically informed approach is that proponents of the irreducibility of consciousness no longer need to rely upon conceptually based arguments alone, but can build a case against reductive physicalism that has a significant empirical foundation.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Lashley, K. S. (1929). Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence. University of Chicago Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Lashley, K. S. (1930). The mechanism of vision. I. A method for rapid analysis of pattern-vision in the rat. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 37, 453-460.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lashley, K. S. (1930). Basic neural mechanisms in behavior. Psychological Review, 37, 1-24.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Lashley, K. S. (1938). The mechanism of vision. XV. Preliminary studies of the rat's capacity for detail vision. Journal of General Psychology, 18, 123-193.
[6 referring publications by Place]
Lashley, K. S. (1951). The problem of serial order in behavior. In L. A. Jeffress (Ed.), Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior: The Hixon Symposium. Wiley.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lau, H. (2022). In Consciousness we Trust: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Subjective Experience. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198856771.001.0001
[Abstract]This book puts forward a mechanistic account of subjective experience based on a review of the current cognitive neuroscience literature on conscious perception, attention, and metacognition. It is argued that current empirical studies are often misinterpreted. An undue focus has been placed on perceptual capacity rather than subjective experience per se. Null findings are often overemphasized despite the limited sensitivity of the methods used. A synthesis is proposed to combine the advantages and intuitions of both global and local theories of consciousness. This is discussed in the context of our understanding of the sense of agency, emotion, rationality, culture, philosophical theories, and clinical applications. Taking insights from both physiology and current research in artificial intelligence, the resulting view directly addresses the qualitative nature of subjective experience.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Lazzeri, F., & Zilio, D. (2023) Commitments with reductive and emergent relations in behavior. Behavior and Philosophy, 51, 102-124
[Abstract]The philosophical debate on reduction and emergence commonly springs from the division of domains (and subdomains) correlated with the sciences, such as biological domains (e.g., genetics and physiology) and psychological domains (e.g., learning, perception, emotions). These domains are interconnected, with some depending on or composed of elements from others. The debate revolves around whether certain domains are reducible or irreducible to those on which they depend or are composed. In this work, following an examination of common interpretations of the notions of reduction and emergence, we aim to identify and compare radical behaviorism and molar behaviorism as regards the reducibility or irreducibility between the following pairs of domains: (i) behavioral – physiological; (ii) psychological – behavioral; (iii) teleological – contingencies of natural or operant selection; and (iv) cultural – behavioral. This article contributes, among other things, to explaining several core similarities and differences between radical behaviorism (as worked out by B. F. Skinner) and molar behaviorism (as worked out by W. M. Baum and H. Rachlin); as well as some conceptual aspects pertaining to the identity of behavior analysis and its interfaces with related research areas both in natural and social sciences.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Lea, S. E., Wills, A. J., Leaver, L. A., Ryan, C. M., Bryant, C. M., & Millar, L. (2009). A comparative analysis of the categorization of multidimensional stimuli: II. Strategic information search in humans (Homo sapiens) but not in pigeons (Columba livia). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 123(4), 406. doi:10.1037/a0016851
[Abstract]Pigeons and undergraduates learned conditional discriminations involving multiple spatially separated stimulus dimensions. Under some conditions, the dimensions were made available sequentially. In 3 experiments, the dimensions were all perfectly valid predictors of the response that would be reinforced and mutually redundant; in 2 others, they varied in validity. In tests with stimuli in which 1 of the 3 dimensions took an anomalous value, most but not all individuals of both species categorized them in terms of single dimensions. When information was delivered as a function of the passage of time, some students, but no pigeons, waited for the most useful information, especially when the cues differed in objective validity. When the subjects could control information delivery, both species obtained information selectively. When cue validities varied, almost all students tended to choose the most valid cues, and when all cues were valid, some chose the cues by which they classified test stimuli. Only a few pigeons chose the most useful information in either situation. Despite their tendency to unidimensional categorization, the pigeons showed no evidence of rule-governed behavior, but students followed a simple “take-the-best” rule.
[Citing Place (1988b) in context]
Leach, S. (2019). U. T. Place and the mystical origin of modern physicalism. Think, 18(53), 75-78. doi:10.1017/S1477175619000228
[Abstract]An introduction to the role of U. T. Place in the development of modern physicalism.
[Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (2004)]
Leeper, R. W. (1948). A motivational theory of emotion to replace "emotion as disorganised response", Psychol. Rev., 55, 5-21.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lehman, H. C. (1935). The creative years in science and literature. Science Monthly, 43, 151-162.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Leibniz, G. W. F. von (1964). Selections. In A. G. N. Flew (Ed.), Body, Mind and Death (pp. 149-153). Macmillan.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Leibniz, G. W. von (1951). Selections (Edited by P .P. Wiener). Scribner.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Leigland, S. (1996). An experimental analysis of ongoing verbal behavior: Reinforcement, verbal operants, and superstitious behavior. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 13(1), 79-104. doi:10.1007/BF03392908
[Abstract]Four adult humans were asked to asked to "find" and talk about a particular topic to a person in an adjoining room, and were instructed that they would hear a short beep (the only form of reply from the other person) when they were talking about the topic, or were "close" to the topic. In Session 1, the experimenter in the adjoining room presented the beeps in the manner of shaping, or the differential reinforcement of successive approximations, "toward" the designated topic. In Session 2, the same conditions were in effect but the experimenter was unable to hear the subject and the beeps were presented noncontingently in a way that roughly matched the frequency and distribution of presentations in Session 1. In Session 3, shaping conditions were again in effect but with a different topic than that designated for Session 1. Audio recordings were transcribed in a way that was designed to show the progress of shaping over time. These and additional forms of supporting data and accompanying rationale are presented and discussed in detail. Issues raised by the methodology and results of the experiment include the nature of the verbal operant, superstitious verbal behavior, and a variety of methodological issues relevant to the experimental analysis of ongoing or continuous verbal behavior.
[Citing Place (1991a) in context]
Leigland, S. (1996). The functional analysis of psychological terms: In defense of a research program. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 13(1), 105-122. doi:10.1007/BF03392909
[Abstract]In 1945, B. F. Skinner outlined a proposal that psychological or mentalistic terms found in natural language might be analyzed empirically in terms of the variables, conditions, and contingencies of which they may be observed to be a function. Such an analysis would enable discriminations to be made between different classes of variables that enter into the control of the term. In this way, the analysis would clarify what is traditionally called the "meanings" of such terms as they occur as properties of verbal behavior. Despite his expressed confidence in the success of such a program, Skinner largely abandoned the functional analysis of psychological terms in favor of the development of a promising new field; the experimental analysis of behavior. The present paper argues that the original program is of great importance as well, and for the following reasons: (a) to make full, immediate, and (most importantly) effective contact with the range of issues and terms of central importance to the traditionally and culturally important concepts of "mind" and "mental life" (and thereby demonstrating the relevance of radical behaviorism to the full range of human and verbal behavior); and (b) to extend the methodology of the functional analysis of verbal behavior more generally. Such a research program would demonstrate, through an empirically-based scientific analysis, that the philosophical problems concerning "mental life" may be productively analyzed as problems of verbal behavior. Issues of methodology are discussed, and possible methodological strategies are proposed regarding the confirmation of behavior analytic interpretations of mentalistic terms.
[Citing Place (1993c) in context]
Leigland, S. (1998). Current Status and Future Directions of the Analysis of Verbal Behavior - The Methodological Challenge of the Functional Analysis of Verbal Behavior The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 15(1),125-127. doi:10.1007/BF03392933
[Citing Place (1991a) in context] [Citing Place (1997d) in context]
Leigland, S. (2000). A contingency interpretation of Place’s contingency anomaly in ordinary conversation. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 161-165. www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2755454/pdf/anverbbehav00028-0161.pdf doi:10.1007/BF03392962
[Abstract]A verbal phenomenon often reported in the research literature of conversation analysis is reviewed. The phenomenon involves the observation that spoken sentences often receive consequences from listeners, and that the effect of these consequences appears to be variability in sentence emission, whereas the absence of such consequences appears to produce response persistence. If the speaker's sentences function as units of verbal behavior and the listener's responses function as reinforcers, the effect seems to run contrary to reinforcement contingency effects observed in the laboratory, where reinforcement produces response differentiation and extinction produces an increase in response variability and a decrease in the response class previously selected by reinforcement. An interpretation of the conversation phenomenon is presented, employing standard reinforcement contingencies for which the behavioral dynamics involved may be seen when speaker's sequence of sentences is construed as a behavior chain.
[Citing Place (1991a)] [Citing Place (1997a)] [Citing Place (1997d)]
Download: Leigland (2000a) A Contingency Interpretation of Place's Contingency Anomaly in Ordinary Conversation.pdf
Leigland, S. (2000). Remembering Ullin Place. The Behavior Analyst, 23(1), 99-100. doi:10.1007/BF03392003
Download: Leigland (2000b) Remembering Ullin Place.pdf
Leigland, S. (2003). Private Events and the Language of the Mental : Comments on Moore Behavior and Philosophy, 31, 159-164
[Citing Place (1993c) in context]
Leigland, S. (2014). Contingency horizon: On private events and the analysis of behavior. The Behavior analyst, 37(1), 13-24 doi:10.1007/s40614-014-0002-5
[Abstract]Skinner’s radical behaviorism incorporates private events as biologically based phenomena that may play a functional role with respect to other (overt) behavioral phenomena. Skinner proposed four types of contingencies, here collectively termed the contingency horizon, which enable certain functional relations between private events and verbal behavior. The adequacy and necessity of this position has met renewed challenges from Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism and Baum’s molar behaviorism, both of which argue that all “mental” phenomena and terminology may be explained by overt behavior and environment–behavior contingencies extended in time. A number of lines of evidence are presented in making a case for the functional characteristics of private events, including published research from behavior analysis and general experimental psychology, as well as verbal behavior from a participant in the debate. An integrated perspective is offered that involves a multiscaled analysis of interacting public behaviors and private events.
[Citing Place (1993c) in context]
Lenin, V. I. (1908) Materialism and empirio-criticism.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lerner, R. M. (1986). Concepts and theories of human development (2nd Edition). Erlbaum.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Leslie, J. C. (2001). Broad and deep, but always rigorous: Some appreciative reflections on Ullin Place's contributions to Behaviour Analysis. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 159-165. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759425
[Abstract]Ullin Place's contributions to the literature of behaviour analysis and behaviourism span the period from 1954 to 1999. In appreciation of his scholarship and breadth of vision, this paper reviews an early widely-cited contribution ("Is consciousness a brain process?" British Journal of Psychology, 1956, pp. 47-53) and a late one which should become widely cited ("Rescuing the science of human behavior from the ashes of socialism," Psychological Record, 1997, pp. 649-659). It is noted that the sweep of Place's work links behaviour analysis to its philosophical roots in the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and also looks forward to the further functional analysis of language-using behaviour.
[Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1981a)] [Citing Place (1981b)] [Citing Place (1982)] [Citing Place (1983d)] [Citing Place (1992f)] [Citing Place (1997b)] [Citing Place (1997d)] [Citing Place (1998e)]
Download: Leslie (2001) Broad and Deep but Always Rigorous - Some Appreciative Reflections on Ullin Place's Contributions to Behaviour Analysis.pdf
Levin, B. (1993). English verb classes and alternations: A preliminary investigation. The University of Chicago Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Levinson, S. C. (1983). Pragmatics. Cambridge University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Lewin, K. (1935). A Dynamic Theory of Personality McGraw Hill.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lewin, K. (1936). Principles of Topological Psychology McGraw Hill.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lewin, K. (1946). Behavior and development as a function of the total situation. In L.Carmichael, (Ed.), Manual of Child Psychology (pp. 791-844). Wiley.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lewis, D. K. (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Harvard University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lewis, D. K. (1975). Languages and Language. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, VII, 3-25. University of Minnesota Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lewis, D.K. (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy, 70, 556-567.
[4 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Lewis, H. (2001). Ullin Place and Mind-Brain Identity. History & Philosophy of Psychology, 3(1), 32-38.
[Abstract]The article presents an account of philosopher Ullin Place's contribution to the philosophy of mind. Ullin's project to demonstrate the reality and adaptive utility of the personality-transformation induced by mystical experience was thus the motor of his choice of undergraduate and postgraduate subjects of study. According to him the phenomenon of conscious experience which appears in the self-reports of human subjects and for whose existence those reports are the objective evidence is an integral and vital part of the causal mechanism in the brain which transforms input into output, stimulus into response, thereby controlling the interaction between the organism and its environment.
Lewis, H. A. (1979). The argument from evolution. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, LIII, 207-221.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Liberman, A. M. (1993). Some Assumptions about Speech and How They Changed Haskins Laboratories status report on speech research, 113, 1-32.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Linden, E. (1975). Apes, men and language Dutton.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lindsley, D. B. (1960). Attention, consciousness, sleep and wakefulness. In J. Field et al. (Eds.), Handbook of Physiology, Sect. 1, Vol. 3, American Physiological Society.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Lindsley, O. R., Hobika, J. H. & Etsten, B. E. (1961) Operant behavior during anaesthesia recovery. Anaesthiology, 22, 937-946.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lindsley, O.R. (1962). A behavioral measure of television viewing. Journal Advertising Research, 2(3), 2-12.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lindsley, O.R. (1964). Direct measurement and the prosthesis of retarded behaviour. Journal of Education, 47, 62-81. precisionteaching.pbworks.com/f/lindsley1964-DMPR.pdf
[3 referring publications by Place]
Linschoten, J. (1964). Idolen van de psycholoog. Bijleveld.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lippman, G., & Meyer, M. E. (1967). Fixed interval performance as related to instructions and to subject's verbalisations of the reinforcement contingency. Psychonomic Science, 8, 135-36.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Livanios, V. (2021). Manifestation and unrestricted dispositional monism. Acta Analytica. doi:10.1007/s12136-021-00476-y
[Abstract]Most metaphysicians agree that powers (at least the non-fundamental ones) can exist without being manifested. The main goal of this paper is to show that adherents of an unrestricted version of Dispositional Monism cannot provide a plausible metaphysical account of the difference between a situation in which a power-instance is not manifested and a situation in which a manifestation of that power-instance actually occurs unless they undermine their own view. To this end, two kinds of manifestation-relation (token-level and type-level, respectively) are introduced and it is argued that dispositional monists should appeal to the former in order to offer the required account. After defending the introduction of token-level-manifestation-relations against objections to their metaphysical robustness and explanatory non-redundancy, it is finally argued that their existence is incompatible with the core tenet of an unrestricted form of Dispositional Monism because they cannot be powers.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]
Llinás, R. R., & Grace, A.A. (1989). Intrinsic 40 Hz oscillatory properties of layer IV neurons in guinea pig cerebral cortex in vitro. Society of Neuroscience Abstracts, 15, 660.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lloyd, A. C. (1981). Form and Universal in Aristotle Cairns.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Loaiza, J. R. (2024). Functionalism and the emotions. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 75(1), 233-251 doi:10.1086/715207
[Abstract]Functionalism as a philosophical position has been recently applied to the case of emotion research. However, a number of objections have been raised against applying such a view to scientific theorizing on emotions. In this article, I argue that functionalism is still a viable strategy for emotion research. To do this, I present functionalism in philosophy of mind and offer a sketch of its application to emotions. I then discuss three recent objections raised against it and respond to each of them. These objections claim that functionalism is intractable because (i) it does not support a scientifically interesting taxonomy of emotions for experimental settings, (ii) it is inherently teleological, and (iii) it cannot be falsified. I argue that these objections either rely on a simplified version of functionalism as a philosophical position or they pose challenges that functionalists can readily address. Lastly, I conclude by drawing some lessons these objections suggest for a tractable functionalist account of emotions.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Local, J. K., Kelly, J. & Wells, W. H. G. (1986). Towards a phonology of conversation: turn-taking in Tyneside English. Journal of Linguistics, 22, 411-437.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Locke, J. (1690). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Bassett.
[9 referring publications by Place]
Lorenz, K. (1935). Der Kumpan in der Umwelt des Vogels; die Artgenoße als auslösendes Moment sozialer Verhaltungsweisen. Journal of Ornithology, 83, 137-213 & 289-413. [English translation as Companionship in bird life: fellow members of the species as releasers of social behavior in C. H. Schiller (Ed.) (1957), Instinctive Behavior. Internati
[3 referring publications by Place]
Lorenz, K. (1966). On aggression. Methuen,
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lovibond, S. H. (1954). The object sorting test and conceptual thinking in schizophrenia. Australian Journal of Psychology, 6, 52-70.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lowe, C. F. (1979). Determinants of human operant behaviour. In M. D. Zeiler, & P. Harzem, P. (Eds.), Advances in the analysis of behaviour. Vol. 1 Reinforcement and the organisation of behaviour (pp. 159-192). Wiley.
[6 referring publications by Place]
Lowe, C. F. (1983). Radical behaviourism and human psychology. In G. C. L. Davey (Ed.), Animal models and human behaviour (pp. 71-93). Wiley.
[6 referring publications by Place]
Lowe, C. F. (1992). From conditioning to consciousness: The cultural origins of mind [Inaugural lecture by C. Fergus Lowe, Psychology, 29th November, 1989]. Coleg Prifysgol Gogledd Cymru/University College of North Wales.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Lowe, C. F. & Beasty, A. (1987). Language and the emergence of equivalence relations: a developmental study. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 40: A49.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Lowe, C. F. and Higson, P. J. (1983). Is all behaviour modification 'cognitive'? In E. Karas (Ed.), Current Issues in Clinical Psychology (Vol.1, pp. 207-227). Plenum.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Lowe, C. F., Beasty, A., & Bentall, R. P. (1983). The role of verbal behavior in human learning: Infant performance on fixed-interval schedules. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 39, 157-164.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Lowe, C.F. (1986). The role of verbal behaviour in the emergence of equivalence relations [Paper presented to the Twelfth Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Milwaukee, Wisconsin].
[1 referring publications by Place]
Luce, D. R. (1966). Mind-body identity and psycho-physical correlation. Philosophical Studies, 17(1), 1-7. doi:10.1007/BF00452165
[Citing Place (1956)]
Luck, S. J., & Beach, N. J. (1996). Visual attention and the binding problem: a neurophysiological perspective. In R. Wright (ed.), Visual Attention. Oxford University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Lucretius De Rerum Naturae
[1 referring publications by Place]
Ludwig, K. (2003). The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview. In S. P. Stich, & T. A. Warfield, (Eds.),The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 1). Wiley, doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch1
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Lumsden, D. & Ulatowski, J. (2023). Virtue, Self-Narratives, and the Causes of Action. Acta Analytica 23 October 2023. doi:10.1007/s12136-023-00569-w
[Abstract]Virtues can be considered to play a causal role in the production of behaviour and so too can our self-narratives. We identify a point of connection between the two cases and draw a parallel between them. But, those folk psychological notions, virtues and self-narratives, fail to reduce smoothly to the underlying human physiology. As a first step towards handling that failure to connect with the scientific framework that is the familiar grounding for our understanding of causation, we consider the causal theory of action, a leading theory of action, which shows how reasons, understood as an appropriate pair of beliefs and desires, can be treated as causes of action. Davidson’s picture is based on cause as a relation between events, which can have both a description in scientific terms and in folk psychological terms. The character of both virtues and self-narratives is not that of events, even extended ones, so we need to refer to examples of scientific explanation that incorporate structural properties of objects. While we retain the spirit of the causal theory, we wish to guard against any unwarranted optimism that an explicitly scientific explanation for human action lies in our future, drawing on Chomsky’s view that a causal explanation of human actions is likely to remain beyond human science forming capacities. We take a mild-realist view of virtues and self-narratives, in the style of Dennett. We argue that, in spite of that limited form of realism, underlined by Chomsky’s mysterian position in this domain, we still need to frame our explanations of behaviour based on virtues and self-narratives in causal terms.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Luria, A. R. (1961). The Role of Speech in the Regulation of Normal and Abnormal Behavior Liveright.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Luria, A.R. (1932). The Nature of Human Conflicts Liveright.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Lycan, W. G. (1969). On "Intentionality" and the Psychological. American Philosophical Quarterly, 6, 305-311.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Lycan, W. G. (1981). Form, function, and feel. The Journal of Philosophy, 78, 24-50.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Lycan, W. G. (Ed.) (1999). Mind and Cognition (2nd Edition). Basil Blackwell.
[Abstract]In the Acknowledgements it is stated that the reprint of Place (1956) 'Is consciousness a brain proces' incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g) 'We needed the analytic-synthetic distinction to formulate mind-brain identity then: we still do.' Paper presented at a Conference on 'Forty Years of Australian Materialism', University of Leeds, June 1997; however, the revisions are lacking in this reprint, but see the downloads of Place (1956).
[Reprints in this collection] [1 referring publications by Place]
Lycan, W. G. (Ed.). (1990). Mind and Cognition. Basil Blackwell.
[Reprints in this collection]
Lycan, W. G., & Prinz, J. J. (Eds.) (2008). Mind and cognition: An anthology (3rd ed). Blackwell Publishing
[Abstract]First published in 1990, Mind and cognition: An anthology is now firmly established as a popular teaching apparatus for upper level undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of mind. This collection of classic and contemporary articles in philosophy of mind and cognition provides the reader with an overview of the complex, sophisticated, and sometimes conflicting developments in theories of mind that have taken place over the last 50 years, making available to students, teachers, and researchers the very best and most influential contributions to the discipline. For this new edition, 20 new readings are included and substantial revisions aim to strike a balance between the traditional areas of philosophy of mind and cutting edge areas of philosophy of cognitive science, such as situated cognition, animal minds, and emotion. The emphasis in selection throughout has been on quality and teachability, making this volume a vital resource.
[Reprints in this collection]
Lyons, W. (2001). Matters of mind. Routledge
[Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1990a)]
Lyons, W. (Ed.). (1995). Modern Philosophy of Mind. Everyman.
[Reprints in this collection]
Maccorquodale, K. (1969). B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior: A retrospective appreciation. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 12, 831-841.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Macdonald, C. (1989). Mind-body identity theories. Routledge.
[Citing Place (1956)] [1 referring publications by Place]
Mach, E. (1885). Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations. English translation C. M. Williams. Open Court, 1897.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Mackie, J. L. (1962). Counterfactuals and Causal Laws. In R. J. Buttler (Ed.), Analytical Philosophy (pp. 66-80), Blackwell.
[11 referring publications by Place]
Mackie, J. L. (1974). The Cement of the Universe. Oxford University Press.
[8 referring publications by Place]
Mackintosh, N. J. (1977). Conditioning as the perception of causal relations. In E. E. Butts, & J. Hintikka (Eds.), Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences (pp. 241-250). Reidel.
[1 referring publications by Place]
MacPhail, E. M., & Reilly, S. (1989). Rapid acquisition of a novelty versus familiarity concept by pigeons (Columba livia). Journal of Experimental Psychology (Animal Behaviour Processes), 15, 242-252.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Malatesti, L. (2012). The knowledge argument and phenomenal concepts. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Malatesti, L. (2013). Zombies, the uniformity of nature, and contingent physicalism: A sympathetic response to Boran Berčić. Prolegomena, 12(2), 245–259.
[Abstract]Boran Berčić, in the second volume of his recent book Filozofija (2012), offers two responses to David Chalmers’s conceivability or modal argument against physicalism. This latter argument aims at showing that zombies, our physical duplicates who lack consciousness, are metaphysically possible, given that they are conceivable. Berčić’s first response is based on the principle of the uniformity of nature that states that causes of a certain type will always cause effects of the same type. His second response is based on the assumption that the basic statements of physicalism in philosophy of mind are or should be contingently true. I argue that if Berčić’s first defence is aimed at the conceivability of zombies, it is unsatisfactory. Moreover, I argue that a quite similar argument, offered by John Perry in his book Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness (2001), is afflicted by a similar problem. Nevertheless, under a more plausible interpretation, Berčić’s argument might be taken to attack the metaphysical possibility of zombies. This version of the argument might be effective and has the merit to point out a so far overlooked link between the discussion of the Chalmers’s conceivability arguments against physicalism and the modal strength of causal links and natural laws. Then, I argue that Berčić’s second defence of physicalism, which cannot be combined consistently with his first one, in any case, should not be formulated in the terms of contingent physicalism.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Malcolm, N. (1959). Dreaming. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[7 referring publications by Place]
Malcolm, N. (1964). Scientific materialism and the identity theory. Dialogue, III, 115-125
[Citing Place (1956) in context] [2 reprinting collections]
Malebranch, N. (1674). La Recherche de la Verité.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Manzotti, R. (2006). Consciousness and existence as a process. Mind and Matter, 4(1), 7-43.
[Abstract]The problem of consciousness is traditionally conceived as the impossible task of justifying the emergence of an inner world of experiences, qualia and/or mental representations out of a substratum of physical things conceived as autonomously existing. I argue that an alternative approach is possible but it requires a conceptual reconstruction of consciousness and existence, the two being different perspectives on the same underlying process. On this basis, I present a view of direct (conscious) perception that supposes that there is a unity between the activity in the brain and the events in the external world. The outlined process is here referred to as onphene. I will use the example of the rainbow as an intuition pump to introduce the new perspective. Eventually, the same approach is used to explain other kinds of consciousness: illusions, memory, dreams, and phosphenes. The view presented here shares some elements with neo realism and can be considered as a form of radical externalism.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Manzotti, R. (2006). An alternative view of conscious perception. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(6), 45-79.
[Abstract]I present a view of conscious perception that supposes a processual unity between the activity in the brain and the perceived event in the external world. I use the rainbow to provide a first example, and subsequently extend the same rationale to more complex examples such as perception of objects, faces and movements. I use a process-based approach as an explanation of ordinary perception and other variants, such as illusions, memory, dreams and mental imagery. This approach provides new insights into the problem of conscious representation in the brain and phenomenal consciousness. It is a form of anti-cranialism different from but related to other kinds of externalism.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Manzotti, R. (2016). Experiences are objects. Towards a mind-object identity theory. Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 7(1), 16-36. doi:10.4453/rifp.2016.0003
[Abstract]Traditional mind-body identity theories maintain that consciousness is identical with neural activity. Consider an alternative identity theory – namely, a mind-object identity theory of consciousness (OBJECTBOUND). I suggest to take into consideration whether one’s consciousness might be identical with the external object. The hypothesis is that, when I perceive a yellow banana, the thing that is one and the same with my consciousness of the yellow banana is the very yellow banana one can grab and eat, rather than the neural processes triggered by the banana. The bottom line is that one’s conscious experience of an object is the object one experiences. First, I outline the main hypothesis and the relation between mind, body, and object. Eventually, I address a series of traditional obstacles such as hallucinations, illusions, and commonsensical assumptions.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Manzotti, R. (2017). Consciousness and object: A mind-object identity physicalist theory. John Benjamins Publishing Company. doi:10.1075/aicr.95
[Abstract]What is the conscious mind? What is experience? In 1968, David Armstrong asked “What is a man?” and replied that a man is “a certain sort of material object”. This book starts from his question but proceeds along a different path. The traditional mind-brain identity theory is set aside, and a mind-object identity theory is proposed in its place: to be conscious of an object is simply to be made of that object. Consciousness is physical but not neural.
This groundbreaking hypothesis is supported by recent empirical findings in both perception and neuroscience, and is herein tested against a series of objections of both conceptual and empirical nature: the traditional mind-brain identity arguments from illusion, hallucinations, dreams, and mental imagery. The theory is then compared with existing externalist approaches including disjunctivism, realism, embodied cognition, enactivism, and the extended mind. Can experience and objects be one and the same?
[Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1988a)]
Manzotti, R. (2021) The boundaries and location of consciousness as identity
theories deem fit. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofica e Psicologia, 12(3), 225-241.
doi:10.4453/rifp.2021.0022
[Abstract]In this paper I approach the problem of the boundaries and location of consciousness in a strictly physicalist way. I start with the debate on extended cognition, pointing to two unresolved issues: the ontological status of cognition and the fallacy of the center. I then propose using identity to single out the physical basis of consciousness. As a tentative solution, I consider Mind-Object Identity (MOI) and compare it with other identity theories of mind.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Manzotti, R., & Moderato, P. (2010). Is neuroscience adequate as the forhtcoming “mindscience”? Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 1-29.
[Abstract]The widespread use of brain imaging techniques encourages conceiving of
neuroscience as the forthcoming "mindscience". Perhaps surprisingly for many, this conclusion is still largely unwarranted. The present paper surveys various shortcomings of neuroscience as a putative "mindscience". The analysis shows that the scope of mind (both cognitive and phenomenal) falls outside that of neuroscience. Of course, such a conclusion does not endorse any metaphysical or antiscientific stance as to the nature of the mind. Rather, it challenges a series of assumptions that the undeniable success of neuroscience has fostered. In fact, physicalism is here taken as the only viable ontological framework — an assumption that does not imply that the central nervous system exhausts the physical domain. There are other options like behavior, embodiment, situatedness, and externalism that are worth considering. Likewise, neuroscience is not the only available epistemic option as to the understanding of mind.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Marcel, A. J. (1983a). Conscious and unconscious perception: experiments on visual masking and word recognition. Cognitive Psychology, 15, 197-237.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Marcel, A. J. (1983b). Conscious and unconscious perception: an approach to the relations between phenomenal experience and perceptual processes. Cognitive Psychology, 15, 238-300.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Marcel, A. J. (1988). Phenomenal experience and functionalism. In A. J. Marcel, & E. Bisiach (Eds.), Consciousness in contemporary science. Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Marek, J. C. (1994). On the relation of the mental and the physical In R. Casati, B. Smith, & G. White (Eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium. 15-22 August 1993 Kirchberg am Wechsel (Austria) (pp. 139-145). Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Marmodoro, A. (2010). Do powers need powers to make them powerful? From pandispositionalism to Aristotle In A. Marmodoro (Ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations (pp. 337 - 352). Routledge.
[Abstract]Do powers have powers? More urgently, do powers need further powers to do what powers do? Stathis Psillos says they do. He finds this a fatal flaw in the nature of pure powers: pure powers have a regressive nature. Their nature is incoherent to us, and they should not be admitted into the ontology. I argue that pure powers do not need further powers; rather, they do what they do because they are powers. I show that at the heart of Psillos’ regress is a metaphysical division he assumes between a pure power to φ and its directedness towards the manifestation of φ-ing, i.e. between a pure power and its essence. But such an ontological division between an entity and its essence has already been shown by Aristotle to be detrimental, condemning the entity to a regressive nature.
I show that Psillos’ regress is but an instance of Aristotle’s regress argument on the relation between an entity and its essence. I compare Aristotle’s, Bradley’s, and Psillos’ regresses, showing that Bradley’s and Psillos’ (different) conclusions from the regress arguments lead to impasses. I then build on Aristotle’s directive against regressive natures, arguing with him that an entity is not other than its nature (being divided from its nature by a relation between them). Rather, an entity is an instantiated nature itself. The Aristotelian position I put forward explains how the oneness of the entity is achieved by its being an instance of a type. Thus, the regress is blocked, and the nature of pure powers is shown to pose no threats of an ontological or epistemological kind, if physics gave us reasons to posit pure powers.
[Citing Place (1996g)] [Citing Place (1999b)]
Marmodoro, A. (2022). What’s Dynamic About Causal Powers? A Black Box!. In C. J. Austin, A. Marmodoro, A. Roselli (Eds): Powers, Time and Free Will (Chapter 1). Synthese Library, vol 451. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-92486-7_1
[Abstract]Modern science cannot do without Aristotelian powers – thus have argued Cartwright and Pemberton (2013) among many others. Aristotelian powers are essentially dynamic entities, which account for causal phenomena, and thus explain how change comes about in the world. In this chapter I argue that explaining causation in terms of interacting causal powers places causation … beyond the reach of our understanding(!) – because causal interaction shows us what powers do, and not what powers are. Metaphysicians by and large agree that the intrinsic nature of powers is to be dynamic entities. I contend here that their dynamism is irreducible, and crucially, unknowable, rendering what powers are ‘black boxes’ to us, despite multiple attempts of defining them in the literature. The sciences discover only how powers behave, and classify them teleologically to tell us what they do. Powers, however, are mysterious and unexplorable black boxes to us, even though they are indispensable in our scientific explanations of change in the world.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context] [Citing Place (1999b) in context]
Marr, M. J. (2003). The what, the how, and the why: The explanation of Ernst Mach. Behavior and Philosophy, 31, 181-192. www.jstor.org/stable/27759457
Download: Marr (2003) The What, the How, and the Why - The Explanation of Ernst Mach.pdf
Martin, C. B., & Pfeifer, K. (1986). Intentionality and the non-psychological. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 46, 531-554.
[13 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Martin, C. B. (1954). Low Claim Assertions [Unpublished M.S. copy].
[3 referring publications by Place]
Martin, C. B. (1984). Anti-realism and the world's undoing. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 65, 3-20.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Martin, C. B. (1987). Proto-language Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65, 277-289.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Martin, C. B. (1994). Dispositions and conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly, 44 , 1-8.
[6 referring publications by Place]
Martin, C. B. (1996). Final replies to Place and Armstrong. In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place, T. Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate (pp. 178-9). Routledge
[1 referring publications by Place]
Martin, C. B. (2000). A remembrance of an event - Foreword to "The Two Factor Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation" by Ullin T. Place. Brain and Mind, 1, 27. doi:10.1023/A:1010091822636
Download: Martin (2000) A Remembrance of an Event.pdf
Matos, M. A, & Passos, M. L. R. F. (2006). Linguistic Sources of Skinner's Verbal Behavior. The Behavioral Analyst, 29(1), 89–107. doi:10.1007/BF03392119
[Abstract]Formal and functional analyses of verbal behavior have been often considered to be divergent
and incompatible. Yet, an examination of the history of part of the analytical approach used in
Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957/1992) for the identification and conceptualization of verbal
operant units discloses that it corresponds well with formal analyses of languages. Formal
analyses have been carried out since the invention of writing and fall within the scope of
traditional grammar and structural linguistics, particularly in analyses made by the linguist
Leonard Bloomfield. The relevance of analytical instruments originated from linguistic studies
(which examine and describe the practices of verbal communities) to the analysis of verbal
behavior, as proposed by Skinner, relates to the conception of a verbal community as
a prerequisite for the acquisition of verbal behavior. A deliberately interdisciplinary approach is
advocated in this paper, with the systematic adoption of linguistic analyses and descriptions
adding relevant knowledge to the design of experimental research in verbal behavior.
[Citing Place (1985d)]
Matos, M. A., & Passos, M. L. (2010). Emergent Verbal Behavior and Analogy: Skinnerian and Linguistic Approaches. The Behavior Analyst, 33(1), 65–81
[Abstract]The production of verbal operants not previously taught is an important aspect of language productivity. For Skinner, new mands, tacts, and autoclitics result from the recombination of verbal operants. The relation between these mands, tacts, and autoclitics is what linguists call analogy, a grammatical pattern that serves as a foundation on which a speaker might emit new linguistic forms. Analogy appears in linguistics as a regularity principle that characterizes
language and has been related to how languages change and also to creativity. The approaches of neogrammarians like Hermann Paul, as well as those of Jespersen and Bloomfield, appear to have influenced Skinner’s understanding of verbal creativity. Generalization and stimulus equivalence are behavioral processes related to the generative grammatical behavior described in the analogy model. Linguistic forms and grammatical patterns described in analogy are part of the contingencies of reinforcement that produce generalization and stimulus equivalence. The analysis of verbal behavior needs linguistic analyses of the constituents of linguistic forms and their combination patterns.
[Citing Place (1985a) in context]
Maung, H.H. (2019). Dualism and its place in a philosophical structure for psychiatry. Med Health Care and Philos, 22, 59-69. doi:10.1007/s11019-018-9841-2
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Maxwell, N. (1968). Understanding sensations, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 46(2,) 127-145. doi:10.1080/00048406812341111 philpapers.org/go.pl?id=MAXUS&aid=MAXUS.1
[Abstract]My aim in this paper is to defend a version of the brain process theory, or identity thesis, which differs in one important respect from the theory put forward by J.J.C. Smart. I shall argue that although the sensations which a person experiences are, as a matter of contingent fact, brain processes, nonetheless there are facts about sensations which cannot be described or understood in terms of any physical theory. These 'mental' facts cannot be described by physics for the simple reason that physical descriptions are designed specifically to avoid mentioning such facts. Thus in giving a physical explanation of a sensation we necessarily describe and render intelligible that sensation only as a physical process, and not also as a sensation. If we are to describe and render intelligible a person's sensations, or inner experiences, as sensations, and not as physical processes occurring in that person's brain, then we must employ a kind of description that connot be derived from any set of physical statements
[Citing Place (1956)]
McAlister, L. L. (1973). Chisholm and Brentano on intentionality. In L. L. McAlister, The Philosophy of Brentano. Humanities Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
McClelland, J. L., & Rumelhart, D. E. (1988). Explorations in parallel distributed processing: A handbook of models, programs, and exercises MIT Press.
[7 referring publications by Place]
McDougall, W. (1923). Outline of psychology Scribner.
[2 referring publications by Place]
McGinn, C. (1977). Anomalous monism and Kripke's cartesian intuitions. Analysis, 37(2), 78-80. doi:10.1093/analys/37.2.78
[Abstract]I am going to argue that Davidson's anomalous monism1 is not imperilled by Kripke's animadversions on the identity theory. The argument will turn crucially upon a sharp distinction between type-type and token-token identity theories.
[1 referring publications by Place]
McGinn, C. (1991). The Problem of Consciousness. Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]
McGinn, C., & Hopkins, J. (1978). Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 52, 195-236.
[1 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
McIntire, K. D., Cleary, J., & Thompson, T. (1987). Conditional relations by monkeys: Reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity.
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 47, 279-285.
[1 referring publications by Place]
McKitrick, J. A case for extrinsic dispositions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81(2), 155-174. doi:10.1080/713659629
[Abstract]Many philosophers think that dispositions are necessarily intrinsic. However, there are no good positive arguments for this view. Furthermore, many properties (such as weight, visibility, and vulnerability) are dispositional but are not necessarily shared by perfect duplicates. So, some dispositions are extrinsic. I consider three main objections to the possibility of extrinsic dispositions: the Objection from Relationally Specified Properties, the Objection from Underlying Intrinsic Properties, and the Objection from Natural Properties. These objections ultimately fail.
[Citing Place (1999b) in context]
McLaughlin, B. P. (1994). Epiphenomenalism. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), A companion to the philosophy of mind (pp. 277-88). Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]
McLaughlin, B. P., & Planer, R. J. (2014). The contributions of U. T. Place, H. Feigl, and J. J. C. Smart to the identity theory of consciousness. In Andrew Bailey (Ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers (Chapter 6, pp. 103-128). Bloomsbury Academic.
McLeish, J., Martin, J. (1975). Verbal behavior: A review and experimental analysis. The Journal of General Psychology, 93, 3-66.
[1 referring publications by Place]
McPherson, A., Bonem, M., Green, G., &Osborne, J. G. 1984). A citation analysis of the influence of Skinner's Verbal Behavior. The Behavior Analyst, 7, 149-155.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Medlin, B. (1967). Ryle and the mechanical hypothesis. In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The identity theory of mind (pp. 94-150). University of Queensland Press.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Medlin, B. (1969). Mental states. Australian Humanist, March, 29.
[Citing Place (1956)] [1 referring publications by Place]
Melden, A. I. ( 1961). Free Action Routledge & Kegan Paul.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Mellor, H. ( 1991). In defence of dispositions. In Matters of Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Messerschmidt, R. O. (1927). A suggestibility scale [Unpublished thesis presented for the degree of M.A.] Ohio State University.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Mettrie, J. O. de la (1748). L'homme machine.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Metzinger, T. (2003). Being no one: The self-model theory of subjectivity. MIT Press.
[Abstract]This book is about consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective. Its a main thesis is that no such things as selves exist in the world: Nobody ever was or had a self. All that ever existed were conscious self-models that could not be recognized as models. The author offers a representationalist and functionalist analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective is. This book is also, and in a number of ways, an experiment. The reader will find conceptual tool kits and new metaphors, case studies of unusual states of mind, as well as multilevel constraints for a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The author introduces two theoretical entities--the "phenomenal self-model" and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation"--that may form the decisive conceptual link between first-person and third-person approaches to the conscious mind and between consciousness research in the humanities and in the sciences.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Meynell, H. (1973). The mental and the physical. The Heythrop Journal, 14(1), 35-46. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2265.1973.tb00695.x
[2 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Michael, J. (1982). Distinguishing between discriminative and motivational functions of stimuli. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 37(1), 149-155. www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1333126/pdf/jeabehav00072-0149.pdf
[Abstract]A discriminative stimulus is a stimulus condition which (1) given the momentary effectiveness of some particular type of reinforcement (2) increases the frequency of a particular type of response (3) because that stimulus condition has been correlated with an increase in the frequency with which that type of response has been followed by that type of reinforcement. Operations such as deprivation have two different effects on behavior. One is to increase the effectiveness of some object or event as reinforcement, and the other is to evoke the behavior that has in the past been followed by that object or event. "Establishing operation" is suggested as a general term for operations having these two effects. A number of situations involve what is generally assumed to be a discriminative stimulus relation, but with the third defining characteristic of the discriminative stimulus absent. Here the stimulus change functions more like an establishing operation than a discriminative stimulus, and the new term,"establishing stimulus," is suggested. There are three other possible approaches to this terminological problem, but none are entirely satisfactory.
[11 referring publications by Place]
Michel, M. (2019). The mismeasure of consciousness: A Problem of coordination for the Perceptual Awareness Scale. Philosophy of Science, 86(5), 1239–1249. doi:10.1086/705509
[Abstract]As for most measurement procedures in the course of their development, measures of consciousness face the problem of coordination, i.e., the problem of knowing whether a measurement procedure actually measures what it is intended to measure. I focus on the case of the Perceptual Awareness Scale to illustrate how ignoring this problem leads to ambiguous interpretations of subjective reports in consciousness science. In turn, I show that empirical results based on this measurement procedure might be systematically misinterpreted.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Miles, T. R. (1994). Ordinary Language: The contributions of Gilbert Ryle and John Austin to the Experimental Analysis of Behavior. The Behavior Analyst, 17, 25-33.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Mill, J. S. (1843). A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive, being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation Routledge.
[9 referring publications by Place]
Millenson, J.R. (1967). Principles of behavioral analysis Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Miller, G.A. (1951). Language and communication McGraw-Hill.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Miller, J. (1998, July 20). Acquiring spontaneous spoken language: the role of simple syntax and ready-made phrases [Conference presentation at the 6th International Pragmatics Conference, Reims].
[1 referring publications by Place]
Miller, J. (1998). Acquiring spoken language and learning written language [Conference presentation abstract]. In 6th International Pragmatic Conference, 19-24 July 1998, Reims, France: Abstracts. International Pragmatic Association (IPrA).
[1 referring publications by Place]
Miller, N. E. (1948). Studies in fear as an acquirable drive: I. Fear as motivation and fear reduction as reinforcement in the learning of new responses. J. Exp. Psychol., 38, 89-101.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Miller, S. M. (2001). Binocular rivalry and the cerebral hemispheres with a note on the correlates and constitution of visual consciousness. Brain and Mind, 2(1), 119-149. www.researchgate.net/publication/45657840_Binocular_Rivalry_and_the_Cerebral_Hemispheres_With_a_Note_on_the_Correlates_and_Constitution_of_Visual_Consciousness
[Abstract]In addressing the scientific study of consciousness, Crick and Koch state, “It is probable that at any moment some active neuronal processes in your head correlate with consciousness, while others do not: what is the difference between them?” (1998, p. 97). Evidence from electrophysiological and brain-imaging studies of binocular rivalry supports the premise of this statement and answers to some extent, the question posed. I discuss these recent developments and outline the rationale and experimental evidence for the interhemispheric switch hypothesis of perceptual rivalry. According to this model, the perceptual alternations of rivalry reflect hemispheric alternations, suggesting that visual consciousness of rivalling stimuli may be unihemispheric at any one time (Miller et al., 2000). However, in this paper, I suggest that interhemispheric switching could involve alternating unihemispheric attentional selection of neuronal processes for access to visual consciousness. On this view, visual consciousness during rivalry could be bihemispheric because the processes constitutive of attentional selection may be distinct from those constitutive of visual consciousness. This is a special case of the important distinction between the neuronal correlates and constitution of visual consciousness.
[Citing Place (1990a) in context]
Miller, S. M. (2007). On the correlation/constitution distinction problem (and other hard problems) in the scientific study of consciousness. Acta Neuropsychiatrica, 19(3), 159-176. doi:10.1111/j.1601-5215.2007.00207.x
[Abstract]Objective: In the past decade, much has been written about the hard problem of consciousness in the philosophy of mind. However, a separate hard problem faces the scientific study of consciousness. The problem arises when distinguishing the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and the neural constitution of consciousness. Here, I explain this correlation/constitution distinction and the problem it poses for a science of phenomenal consciousness. I also discuss potential objections to the problem, outline further hard problems in the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness and consider the ontological implications of these epistemological issues.
Methods: Scientific and philosophic analysis and discussion are presented.
Results: The correlation/constitution distinction does indeed present a hard problem in the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness. Refinement of the NCC acronym is proposed so that this distinction may at least be acknowledged in the literature. Furthermore, in addition to the problem posed by this distinction and to the hard problem, the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness also faces several other hard problems.
Conclusion: In light of the multiple hard problems, it is concluded that scientists and philosophers of consciousness ought to (i) address, analyze and discuss the problems in the hope of discovering their solution or dissolution and (ii) consider the implications of some or all of them being intractable. With respect to the latter, it is argued that ultimate epistemic limits in the study of phenomenal consciousness pose no threat to physicalist or materialist ontologies but do inform our understanding of consciousness and its place in nature.
[Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1990a)] [Citing Place (1999e)] [Citing Place (2000d)]
Miller, S., & Konorski, J. (1928). Sur une forme particulière des réflexes conditionelles. Comptes Rendus des Séances de la Société de Biologie et de ses Filiales, 99, 1155-1157.
Note:
[For a more detailed description of these experiments in English see Konorski (1948), pp. 211-235.]
B. F. Skinner has translated this 1928 paper concerning the formation of Type 2 conditioned reflexes. Konorski comments on his original theses in a postscript. See: Miller, S., & Konorski, J. (1969). On a particular form of conditioned reflex. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 12(1), 187–189. https://doi.org/10.1901/jeab.1969.12-187.
The article starts with this note of Skinner:
[Translator's Note: This important paper appeared under the title "Sur une forme particulière des réflexes conditionnels" in Les comptes rendus des séances de la société de Biologie. Société polonaise de biologie. Volume XCIX, page 1155, June 1928. When my paper "Two types of conditioned reflex and a pseudo-type" was published in The Journal of General Psychology (1935, 12, 66-67), Konorski and Miller replied in a paper called "On two types of conditioned reflex", which appeared in the same journal (1937, 16, 264-272). They sent me a copy and I was therefore able to answer in the same issue. The paper was called "Two types of conditioned reflex: a reply to Konorski and Miller". (1937, 16, 272-279.)
The present translation was sent to Professor Konorski and some changes suggested by him have been made. The word particulière has a much richer meaning in French than in English. In addition to personal or private, it suggests something special or unusual. A key phrase appears in French as follows: The dog flexes its leg pour former ainsi le complexe conditionnel total.
Professor Konorski has supplied the Postscript, giving his present views.
B. F. Skinner]
[4 referring publications by Place]
Mills, J. (2022). A Critique of Materialism. In J. Mills (Ed.), Psychoanalysis and the Mind-Body Problem (Chapter 1). Routledge
[Abstract]In the boon of medical, scientific, and technological progress, materialism has gained increasing explanatory power in deciphering the enigma of mind. But with the proliferation and acceptance of cognitive science, psychic reality has been largely reduced to a physical ontology. In this chapter, the author explores the ground, scope, and limits to the materialist framework and shows that while bio-neurochemical-physiology is a necessary condition for mental functioning, it is far from being a sufficient condition for adequately explaining the human being. This becomes especially significant when examining the question of selfhood, freedom, personal autonomy, and the phenomenal quality of the lived experience.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Mills, S. T. (1989). Connectionism, the classical theory of cognition and the hundred step constraint. Acta Analytica, 4, 5-38.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Milner, A. D., & Goodale, M. A. (1995). The Visual Brain in Action. Oxford University Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Mitchell, N. (Host) (2006, September 23). The mind-body problem Down Under [Audio podcast episode]. In All in the mind. ABC Radio National. https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/allinthemind/the-mind-body-problem-down-under/3347916 Last retrieved November 18, 2020
[Abstract]Mind. Brain. Are they the same thing, or is the mind something special? The conundrum has perplexed us for centuries. Descartes' split the two - into a spiritual, soul-like mind and fleshly, material brain. But in 1956 a group of 'renegade' Oxford graduates Down Under, now international stars in philosophy, launched a challenge. Consciousness and the brain were united, and any talk of mental spooks and ghosts in the machine was out...almost. Now in their 80s, David Armstrong and Jack Smart join Natasha Mitchell and others to reminisce on taking Descartes to task.
Download: Mitchell (2006) The Mind-Body Problem Down Under.mp3 Audio file Mitchell (2006) The Mind-Body Problem Down Under.pdf Transcript
Mitchell, P., & Riggs, K. (2000). A proposal for the development of a mental vocabulary, with special reference to pretence and false belief. In P. Mitchell, & K. Riggs (Eds.), Children's reasoning and the mind (pp. 51-80). Psychology Press.
[Citing Place (1954)]
Moerk, E. L. (1983). The Mother of Eve: As a first language teacher. Ablex.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Molière (1673). Le Malade Imaginaire.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Monk, R. (1990). Ludwig Wittgenstein: The duty of genius. Jonathan Cape.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Montague, P. R., Gally, J. A., & Edelman, G. M. (1991). Spatial signalling in the development and function of neural connections. Cerebral Cortex, 1, 199-220.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Moore, G. E. (1936). Is existence a predicate? Proceedings of the Aristotalian Society, Supp. Vol. 15, 175-188. Reprinted in A. G. N. Flew (1953), Logic and Language, Series II. Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Moore, G. E. (1953). Some main problems of philosophy Allen and Unwin
[1 referring publications by Place]
Moore, J. (1995). Radical Behaviorism and the Subjective-Objective Distinction. The Behavior Analyst, 18, 33–49. doi:10.1007/BF03392690
[Abstract]The distinction between subjective and objective domains is central to traditional psychology, including the various forms of mediational stimulus-organism-response neobehaviorism that treat the elements of a subjective domain as hypothetical constructs. Radical behaviorism has its own unique perspective on the subjective-objective distinction. For radical behaviorism, dichotomies between subjective and objective, knower and known, or observer and agent imply at most unique access to a part of the world, rather than dichotomous ontologies. This perspective leads to unique treatments of such important philosophical matters as (a) dispositions and (b) the difference between first- and third-person psychological sentences.
[Citing Place (1993c)]
Moore, J. (2000). Words Are Not Things. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 143-160. doi:10.1007/BF03392961
[Abstract]On a traditional view, words are the fundamental units of verbal behavior. They are independent, autonomous things that symbolically represent or refer to other independent, autonomous things, often in some other dimension. Ascertaining what those other things are constitutes determining the meaning of a word. On a behavior-analytic view, verbal behavior is ongoing, functional operant activity occasioned by antecedent factors and reinforced by its consequences, particularly consequences that are mediated by other members of the same verbal community. Functional relations rather than structure select the response unit. The behavior-analytic point of view clarifies such important contemporary issues in psychology as (a) the role of scientific theories and explanations, (b) educational practices, and (c) equivalence classes, so that there is no risk of strengthening the traditional view that words are things that symbolically represent other things.
[Citing Place (1981a) in context] [Citing Place (1981b) in context] [Citing Place (1982) in context] [Citing Place (1983d) in context]
Moore, J. (2001). On Distinguishing Methodological from Radical Behaviorism, European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 2(2), 221-244, doi:10.1080/15021149.2001.11434196
[Abstract]Methodological behaviorism may be understood as an umbrella term that subsumes a broad range of intellectual positions in psychology. The positions arose because of influences from both outside and inside psychology. Two influences from outside psychology are from philosophy: logical behaviorism and analytic philosophy. An influence from inside psychology is the conventional interpretation of operationism. Four principal methodological behaviorist positions may be characterized in terms of a combination of ontological and methodological assumptions. Skinner?s radical behaviorism may be distinguished from methodological behaviorist positions on the basis of (a) its conception of verbal behavior as ongoing operant activity, rather than logical, symbolic, or referential activity; and (b) its conception of private events as behavioral in character, rather than mental.
[Citing Place (1993c)] [Citing Place (1999a)] [Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000)]
Moore, J. (2001). On psychological terms that appeal to the mental. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 167-186. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
[Abstract]A persistent challenge for nominally behavioral viewpoints in philosophical psychology is how to make sense of psychological terms that appeal to the mental. Two such viewpoints, logical behaviorism and conceptual analysis, hold that psychological terms appealing to the mental must be taken to mean (i.e., refer to) something that is publicly observable, such as underlying physiological states, publicly observable behavior, or dispositions to engage in publicly observable behavior, rather than mental events per se.
However, they do so for slightly different reasons. A third viewpoint, behavior analysis, agrees that (a) some terms are functionally related to (i.e., occasioned by) the link between publicly observable behavior and publicly observable features of the environment, (b) some terms are dispositional, and (c) a purely private language could not arise. However, behavior analysis also recognizes that some psychological terms relate to private behavioral events, such as occur when speakers report internal sensations or engage in covert behavior.
[Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1992f)] [Citing Place (1993c)] [Citing Place (1999a)] [Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000)]
Download: Moore (2001) On Psychological Terms that Appeal to the Mental.pdf
Moore, J. (2008). Conceptual foundations of radical behaviorism. Sloan.
[Abstract]Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism is intended for advanced
undergraduate or beginning graduate students in courses within behavior analytic curricula dealing with conceptual foundations and radical behaviorism as a philosophy. Each chapter of the text presents what radical behaviorism says about an important topic in a science of behavior, and then contrasts the radical behaviorist perspective with that of other forms of behaviorism, as well as other forms of psychology.
[Citing Place (1993c) in context] [Citing Place (1999a) in context]
Moore, J. (2011). A review of Baum’s review of Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 95(1), 127–140.
[Abstract]Baum expressed numerous concerns about my Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism in his review. If his review were an independent submission and I were an independent referee, I would recommend that his review be rejected and that he be encouraged to revise and resubmit, once he has studied the field a bit more and clarified for himself and journal readers several important matters. I outline two sets of concerns that he might usefully clarify in his revision: (a) the important contributions of B. F. Skinner to a book about radical behaviorism, and (b) the nature of private behavioral events. In particular, the methodological behaviorism inherent in Baum’s position needs to be resolved.
[Citing Place (1999a)]
Moore, J. (2013). Mentalism as a Radical Behaviorist Views It — Part 2. The Journal of Mind and Behavior, 34(3), 205-232. doi:10.2307/43854394
[Abstract]Part 1 of this review suggested that mentalism consists in explanations of behavior in terms of causal mental states and processes. These causal mental states and processes are inferred to reside in an unobservable dimension beyond that in which behavior occurs, and to function differently from environmental events, variables, and relations. One of those functions is inferred to be mediation, in which environmental events trigger a mediating state or process, which in turn triggers a response. For mentalism, an explanation should properly focus on specifying the causal role of the mediator, rather than talking about observable relations. Part 1 further suggested that mentalism is actually as integral to mediational neobehaviorism as it is to cognitive psychology, even though each claims to differ from the other. Part 2 continues the review of mentalism by addressing the relations among mentalism, operationism, and the meaning of scientific verbal behavior, especially when the verbal behavior involves private behavioral events. The review then considers some sources of mentalism, along with examples of how mentalism is supported in philosophy. Finally, the review summarizes the radical behaviorist opposition to mentalism. Overall, the review concludes that radical behaviorism differs from both cognitive psychology and mediational neobehaviorism, which radical behaviorism regards as comparably mentalistic.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Morford, J. P. (1996). Insights into language from the study of gesture: a review of research on the gestural communication of non-signing deaf people. Language & Communication, 16, 165-178.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Morford, J. P., Singleton, J. L., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (1993). The role of iconicity in manual communication. In K. Beals, G. Cooke, D. Kathman, S. Kita, K.-E. McCullough, & D. Testen (Eds.) Papers from the Chicago Linguistic Society, 29, Volume 2: The Parasession (pp. 243-253).
[2 referring publications by Place]
Morgan, C. Lloyd (1894). Introduction to Comparative Psychology Scott.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Morgan, L. H. (1877). Ancient Society Holt.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Morick, H. (Ed.). (1970). Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Scott-Foresman.
[Reprints in this collection]
Morris, C. W. (1938). Foundations of the theory of signs. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. I, no. 2 (pp. 78-137). University of Chicago Press.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Morris, C. W. (1946). Signs, banguage and behavior Prentice-Hall.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Morris, E. K. (1997). Some reflections on contextualism, mechanism, and behavior analysis. The Psychological Record, 47, 529-542. doi:10.1007/BF03395245 core.ac.uk/download/pdf/60541821.pdf
[Abstract]Recent conceptual work in behavior analysis has argued that the discipline is not mechanistic, but contextualistic, in world view. This argument has been contested, however, and a mechanism-contextualism debate has ensued. In taking the side of contextualism, I offer four reflections on the controversy. These concern (a) confusions concerning Pepper’s purpose in writing his book and its place in the debate, (b) misunderstandings about the meanings of context and contextualism, (c) the pragmatic implications of theories of truth in world views other than contextualism, and (d) the evolution of ontology from mechanism to contextualism. In the end, behavior analysis may benefit from this debate by evolving as a world view unto its own for its science of behavior. The two-the world view and the science-are inexorably interrelated.
[Citing Place (1994c)] [Citing Place (1996q)] [Citing Place (1996j)] [1 referring publications by Place] [Reviews]
Morse, W. H., & Herrnstein, R. J. (1956). The maintenance of avoidance behaviour using the removal of a conditioned positive reinforcer as the aversive stimulus. American Psychologist, 11, 430 (Abstract).
[1 referring publications by Place]
Mortensen, C. (2015). The Brain of Ullin T. Place [Brochure for the display of Place's brain in the Abbie Museum of Anatomy, University of Adelaide]. connect.adelaide.edu.au/nodes/view/25979
Note:
The brain of Ullin T Place is held by the Vernon-Roberts Museum (of which the Abbie Anatomy Collection is a part), which is located on the Ground Floor of Helen Mayo South of the University of Adelaide. The brain is displayed in the front display window and can be viewed during teaching hours, no appointment required.
Download: Mortensen (2015) The Brain of Ullin T Place.pdf
Moruzzi, G., & Magoun, H. W. (1949). Brain stem reticular formation and activation of the EEG. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology. 1, 455-473.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Mourik-van den Bergh, E. van, & T. W. Place (1972). Wat is dromen Psychologisch Laboratorium, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Mowrer, O. H. (1950). Learning theory and personality dynamics Ronald.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Mørch, H. H. (2023). Non-Physicalist Theories of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781009317344
[Abstract]Is consciousness a purely physical phenomenon? Most contemporary philosophers and theorists hold that it is, and take this to be supported by modern science. But a significant minority endorse non-physicalist theories such as dualism, idealism and panpsychism, among other reasons because it may seem impossible to fully explain consciousness, or capture what it's like to be in conscious states (such as seeing red, or being in pain), in physical terms. The main non-physicalist theories of consciousness are introduced and the most important arguments for them, are explained and considered how they each respond to the scientific and other arguments in support of physicalism.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Mørch, H.H. (2020). Does dispositionalism entail panpsychism? Topoi, 39, 1073–1088. doi:10.1007/s11245-018-9604-y
[Abstract]According to recent arguments for panpsychism, all (or most) physical properties are dispositional, dispositions require categorical grounds, and the only categorical properties we know are phenomenal properties. Therefore, phenomenal properties can be posited as the categorical grounds of all (or most) physical properties—in order to solve the mind–body problem and/or in order avoid noumenalism about the grounds of the physical world. One challenge to this case comes from dispositionalism, which agrees that all physical properties are dispositional, but denies that dispositions require categorical grounds. In this paper, I propose that this challenge can be met by the claim that the only (fundamentally) dispositional properties we know are phenomenal properties, in particular, phenomenal properties associated with agency, intention and/or motivation. Versions of this claim have been common in the history of philosophy, and have also been supported by a number of contemporary dispositionalists (and other realists about causal powers). I will defend a new and updated version of it. Combined with other premises from the original case for panpsychism—which are not affected by the challenge from dispositionalism—it forms an argument that dispositionalism entails panpsychism.
[Citing Place (1996g)]
Mumford, S. (1995). Dispositions, bases, overdetermination and identities. Ratio, 8, 42-62.
[Abstract]In this paper I aim to make sense of our pre-theoretic intuitions about dispositions by presenting an argument for the identity of a disposition with its putative categorical base. The various possible ontologies for dispositions are outlined. The possibility of an empirical proof of identity is dismissed. Instead an a priori argument for identity is adapted from arguments in the philosophy of mind. I argue that dispositions occupy, by analytic necessity, the same causal roles that categorical bases occupy contingently and that properties with identical causal roles are identical. The validity of the argument depends upon the possibility of overdetermination of disposition manifestations being rejected. ‘Ungrounded dispositions’ are dismissed as not genuine dispositions. Identity conditions for dispositions and categorical bases are outlined.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Mumford, S. (1998). Dispositions. Routledge
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1. Mumford's reply (in Chapter 5) to Place, U. T. (1996d). A conceptualist ontology. In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin. U. T. Place, & T. Crane (Ed.) Dispositions: A debate (Chapter 4, pp. 49-67). Routledge.
2. Preface to the Paperback Edition from 2003.
[Citing Armstrong, Martin, Place & Crane (1996)] [Citing Place (1996d)] [Citing Place (1996g)] [Is reply to]
Download: Mumford (1998) Place's Dualism.pdf Mumford (2003) Preface to the Paperback Edition of Mumford (1998) Dispositions.pdf
Mumford, S. (1998). Book review of Dispositions: a Debate by D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place and edited with introduction by Tim Crane. Philosophical Quarterly, 48(193), 548-550. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00123
[Reviewed publication(s)]
Download: Mumford (1998) Book Review of Dispositions - a Debate.pdf
Mumford, S. (1999). Intentionality and the physical: A New theory of disposition ascription. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(195), 215-225. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00138
[Abstract]This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we take disposition ascriptions to be functional characterizations of properties, then we can explain all that was appealing about the new alternative without the unacceptable consequences.
[Citing Place (1996c)] [Citing Place (1996d)] [Citing Place (1996g)] [Is reply to] [2 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Mumford, S. (2006). The ungrounded argument. Synthese, 149, 471–489. doi:10.1007/s11229-005-0570-8
[Citing Place (1996g)]
Mun, C. (2021). We are living in a material world. In C. Mun, Interdisciplinary Foundations for the Science of Emotion (Chapter 5). Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-71194-8_5
[Abstract]In this chapter, I begin by providing a brief history of the mind-body problem, and I argue that the philosophical commitment to dualism stands as a barrier to a thoroughly unified interdisciplinary approach to research and theorizing in the science of emotion. I then explain the significance of David J. Chalmers’ (The Conscious Mind: In Search of A Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) hard problem of consciousness and meta-problem of consciousness (Chalmers Journal of Consciousness Studies 25: 6–61, http://consc.net/papers/metaproblem.pdf, 2018; Journal of Consciousness Studies 27: 201–226, 2020) for interdisciplinary research and theorizing in the science of emotion. Finally, I present and argue in favor of a materialistic solution to Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness, which will also include a solution to the meta-problem of consciousness, over eliminative materialism, eliminativism, and interactionist dualism. In doing so, I provide an additional foundation—semantic dualism—for my proposed framework for interdisciplinary research and theorizing in the science of emotion (meta-semantic pluralism about emotion), as well as the first foundation for my theory of emotion as a sui generis kind of embodied cognition, which I refer to as semantic dualism about emotion (semantic dualisme).
[Citing Place (1956)]
Munn, N. L. (1950). Handbook of Psychological Research on the Rat: An Introduction to Animal Psychology. Houghton-Mifflin.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Muñoz-Suárez, C. (2015). Introduction: Bringing Together Mind, Behavior, and Evolution. In C. Muñoz-Suárez, & F. De Brigard (Eds), Content and Consciousness Revisited (Chapter 1, pp. 1-27). Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-17374-0_1
[Abstract]In Sect. 1.1 I discuss the main concepts and hypotheses introduced in Content and Consciousness . In Sect. 1.2 I sketch the context of interdisciplinary research surrounding Content and Consciousness’s birth. Finally, in Sect. 1.3, I introduce the chapters of this volume.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Munsat, S. (1969). Could Sensations be Processes? Mind, lxxvii, 24-251.
[Citing Place (1956)] [1 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Murray, D. K. C. (1986). Silent speach acts and their cognitive effects. In M. B. Papi & J. Verscheuren (Eds.), The pragmatic perspective: Selected papers from the 1985 International Pragmatics Conference . Benjamins
[1 referring publications by Place]
Myers, C. S. (1923). The evolution of feelings. Australian Journal of Psychology & Philosophy, 1(1), 3-11. wellcomecollection.org/works/ejurcrhs
[3 referring publications by Place]
Myin E., & Zahnoun, F. (2018). Reincarnating the identity theory. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 2044. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02044 www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02044
[Abstract]The mind/brain identity theory is often thought to be of historical interest only, as it has allegedly been swept away by functionalism. After clarifying why and how the notion of identity implies that there is no genuine problem of explaining how the mental derives from something else, we point out that the identity theory is not necessarily a mind/brain identity theory. In fact, we propose an updated form of identity theory, or embodied identity theory, in which the identities concern not experiences and brain phenomena, but experiences and organism-environment interactions. Such an embodied identity theory retains the main ontological insight of its parent theory, and by invoking organism-environment interactions, it has powerful resources to motivate why the relevant identities hold, without posing further unsolvable problems. We argue that the classical multiple realization argument against identity theory is built on not recognizing that the main claim of the identity theory concerns the relation between experience and descriptions of experience, instead of being about relations between different descriptions of experience and we show how an embodied identity theory provides an appropriate platform for making this argument. We emphasize that the embodied identity theory we propose is not ontologically reductive, and does not disregard experience.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Myin, E. (2016). Perception as something we do. Journal of consciousness studies, 23(5-6), 80-104. https://www.academia.edu/download/43094596/PASWD_JCS_resubmission_clean.pdf penultimate draft
[Abstract]In this paper, I want to focus on the claim, prominently made by sensorimotor theorists, that perception is something we do. I will argue that understanding perceiving as a bodily doing allows for a strong non-dualistic position on the relation between experience and objective physical events, one which provides insight into why such relation seems problematic while at the same time providing means to relieve the tension. Next I will show how the claim that perception is something we do does not stand in opposition to, and is not refuted by, the fact that we often have perceptual experience without moving. In arguing that cases of motionless perception and perception-like experience are still doings it will be pointed out that the same interactive regularities which are engaged in in active perception still apply to them. Explaining how past interactive regularities can influence current perception or perception-like experience in a way which remains true to the idea that perception is a doing, so I will argue, can be done by invoking the past -- the past itself, however, not its representation. The resulting historical, non-representational sensorimotor approach can join forces with Gibsonian ecological psychology -- provided that such is also understood along lines that don't invoke externalist remnants of contents.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Myin, E., & Loughlin, V. (2018). Sensorimotor and Enactive Approaches to Consciousness. In R. J. Gennaro (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook Of Consciousness (pp. 202-215). Routledge.
[Abstract]According to the sensorimotor approach, perceptual experience is something we do, not something that happens in us. That is, having perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of engaging with our environments in particular ways. We will argue that the sensorimotor position should best be seen as a form of identity theory. Unlike in the classical identity position however, the sensorimotor approach identifies conscious experience, not with internal or neural processes, but with bodily processes in spatially and temporally extended interactions with environments. After having considered some of the most common objections to the sensorimotor view of perception and perceptual awareness as something we do, we will compare the sensorimotor approach with other enactivist positions, namely Mind/Life Continuity Enactivism, and Radical Enactivism.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Nagel, T. (1965). Physicalism. The Philosophical Review, 74(3), 339–356. doi:10.2307/2183358
[Citing Place (1956)] [2 reprinting collections]
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review, 83, 435-450.
[3 referring publications by Place] [2 reprinting collections]
Nanay, B. (2000). Philosophical Questions in the Evolution of Language. Commentary on Place on Language-Gesture. Psycoloquy, 11(29). www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.029
[Abstract]This commentary is an analysis of how Ullin Place's target article relates to the most important questions in the evolution of language, such as: (1) the relation between the evolution of language and that of "theory of mind"; (2) the question of the role of group structure in human evolution; (3) the evolution of representational capacities needed for language; (4) the selective force of the evolution of language. I argue that not only does Place ignore the problems underlying these issues, but in most cases he also assumes different and sometimes contradictory answers to the questions, weakening his otherwise convincing conclusion.
[Citing Place (2000c)] [Is reply to]
Download: Nanay (2000) Philosophical Questions in the Evolution of Language.pdf
Nannini, S. (2023) The mind-body problem in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 14(1-2), 118-134. doi:10.4453/rifp.2023.0009
[Abstract]Here, I examine the main philosophical solutions to the mind-body problem distinguishing between “historicist” solutions that (more or less clearly) separate philosophy from science and solutions that instead result from a double “cognitive turn”, and see “continuity” between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. The “historicist” solutions include ontological dualism (together with “skepticism” and “new mysterianism”), epistemological dualism, subjective idealism, and absolute idealism. In this group, transcendental idealism, phenomenology, and neutral monism are the solutions most open to a dialogue between philosophy and science. The “naturalistic” solutions can be divided into four groups: (1) behaviorism (psychological, logical, philosophical-analytical behaviorism); (2) materialism (identity theory, physicalism); (3) “weak naturalism” (functionalism, anomalous monism, “biological naturalism”, liberal naturalism, emergentism); (4) “strong naturalism” (“cognitive neo-evolutionism”, eliminativism). These offer a physicalist-eliminative solution to the mind-body problem (here called “soft physicalistic eliminativism”) that allows for more continuity between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences.
[Citing Place (1954) in context] [Citing Place (1956) in context] [Citing Place (1988a) in context] [Citing Place (1998a) in context]
Nath, S. (2013). U. T. Place as a Behaviourist. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 3(9), 183-185. www.ijsrp.org/research-paper-0913/ijsrp-p2125.pdf
Download: Nath (2013) UT Place as a Behaviourist.pdf
Nath, S. (2013). Resolution of some problems in the identity theory of mind. IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, 10(5), 51-57.
Download: Nath (2013) Resolution of Some Problems in the Identity Theory of Mind.pdf
Nath, S. (2014a). J. J. C. Smart in defence of Place's identity theory of mind. IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, 19(2), 26-29.
Download: Nath (2014) JJC Smart in Defence of Place's Identity Theory of Mind.pdf
Nath, S. (2014b). Type-token dichotomy in the identity theory of mind. Journal of Business Management & Social Sciences Research, 3(4), 1-5
Download: Nath (2014) Type-Token Dichotomy in the Identity Theory of Mind.pdf
Nathan M. J. (2021). The Mind-Body Problem 3.0. In F. Calzavarini, & M. Viola (Eds.), Neural Mechanisms (Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 17). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-54092-0_12
[Abstract]This essay identifies two shifts in the conceptual evolution of the mind-body problem since it was molded into its modern form. The “mind-body problem 1.0” corresponds to Descartes' ontological question: what are minds and how are they related to bodies? The "mind-body problem 2.0" reflects the core issue underlying much discussion of brains and minds in the twentieth century: can mental states be reduced to neural states? While both issues are no longer central to scientific research, the philosophy of mind ain't quite done yet. In an attempt to recast a classic discussion in a more contemporary guise, I present a "mind-body problem 3.0." In a slogan, this can be expressed as the question: how should we pursue psychology in the age of neuroscience?
[Citing Place (1956)]
Natsoulas T. (1967). What are perceptual reports about? Psychological bulletin, 67(4), 249–272. doi:10.1037/h0024320
[Abstract]This article presents a discussion of some methodological and substantive issues associated with the use of reports in perceptual experiments. The distinction between "report" and "response" is first clarified and a definition of report behavior is proposed. The relation of reference (aboutness) is next considered in the context of phenomenal vs. cognitive reports. At a less level, two pairs of contrasting proposals on the referents of perceptual reports are used to bring earlier questions to focus. One pair stems from philosophical approaches to the question of this article. The other arises in a current controversy concerning what psychophysical scales measure. A brief discussion of the role of e's own perceptual experience is followed by a review of methods for establishing report validity.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Natsoulas T. (1983). What are the objects of perceptual consciousness? American Journal of Psychology, 96(4), 435-67. doi:10.2307/1422567
[Abstract]Four answers to the title question are critically reviewed. (a) The first answer proposes that we perceive our brain events, certain occurrences in our brain that appear to us as parts of the environment. (b) Gestalt psychology distinguishes the phenomenal from the physical and proposes that we always perceive some aspect of our own phenomenal world--which is isomorphic but not identical to certain of our brain events. (c) J. J. Gibson held that our perceptual experiences are registrations of properties of the external environment--which is, therefore, perceived directly (i.e., without experiencing anything else). (d) The fourth answer comprehends perceptual experience to be a qualitative form of noninferential awareness of the apparent properties of specific environmental things. It differs from Gibson's answer in several respects, including the claim that some aspect of the external world appears to us whenever we have perceptual experience.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Natsoulas, T. (1977). On Perceptual Aboutness. Behaviorism, 5(1), 75–97. www.jstor.org/stable/27758886
[Citing Place (1972a)]
Neisser, J. (2017). What subjectivity is not. Topoi, 36, 41-53. doi:10.1007/s11245-014-9256-5
[Abstract]An influential thesis in contemporary philosophy of mind is that subjectivity is best conceived as inner awareness of qualia. (Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Oxford University Press, London, 2001) has argued that this unique subjective awareness generates a paradox which resists empirical explanation. On account of this "paradox of subjective duality," Levine concludes that the hardest part of the hard problem of consciousness is to explain how anything like a subjective point of view could arise in the world. Against this, I argue that the nature of subjective thought is not correctly characterized as inner awareness, that a non-paradoxical approach to the first-person perspective is available, and that the problem about subjectivity should be distinguished from the perennial problem of qualia or phenomenal properties.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human Problem Solving. Prentice Hall.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Nichols, C. (1983) Neurobiology and Social Theory: Some Common and Persistent Problems. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 13(2), 207-234.
doi:10.1177/004839318301300207
[Citing Place (1956
)]
Nidditch, P. H. (1960). Elementary Logic of Science and Mathematics. University Tutorial Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological review, 84(3), 231-259.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Noble, W., & Davidson, I. (1996). Human evolution, language and mind: A psychological and archaeological inquiry. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Nye, R. D. (1975). Three views of man: perspectives from Sigmund Freud, B. F. Skinner and Carl Rogers. Brooks Cole.
[1 referring publications by Place]
O'Connor, J. (Ed.). (1969). Modern Materialism. Harcourt, Brace and World.
[Reprints in this collection]
Oderberg, D.S. (2017). Finality revived: powers and intentionality. Synthese, 194, 2387–2425. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1057-5
[Abstract]Proponents of physical intentionality argue that the classic hallmarks of intentionality highlighted by Brentano are also found in purely physical powers. Critics worry that this idea is metaphysically obscure at best, and at worst leads to panpsychism or animism. I examine the debate in detail, finding both confusion and illumination in the physical intentionalist thesis. Analysing a number of the canonical features of intentionality, I show that they all point to one overarching phenomenon of which both the mental and the physical are kinds, namely finality. This is the finality of ‘final causes’, the long-discarded idea of universal action for an end to which recent proponents of physical intentionality are in fact pointing whether or not they realise it. I explain finality in terms of the concept of specific indifference, arguing that in the case of the mental, specific indifference is realised by the process of abstraction, which has no correlate in the case of physical powers. This analysis, I conclude, reveals both the strength and weakness of rational creatures such as us, as well as demystifying (albeit only partly) the way in which powers work.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context] [Citing Place (1999b) in context]
Olds, J. & Milner, P. (1954). Positive reinforcement produced by electrical stimulation of septal area and other regions of the rat brain. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 47, 419-427.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Olton, D. S., & Schlosberg, P. (1978). Food-searching strategies in young
rats: Win-shift predominates over win-stay. Journal of Comparative and
Physiological Psychology, 92, 609-618.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Opie, J. (2011). Consciousness. In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (Eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia & New Zealand. Melbourne VIC 3004, Australia. philarchive.org/archive/OPIC
[Citing Place (1956) in context] [Citing Place (1989a) in context]
Oppenheim, P. & Putnam, H. (1958). Unity of science as a working hypothesis. In H. Feigl, M. Scriven & G. Maxwell (Eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (II, pp. 3-36). University of Minnesota Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Osgood, C. E. (1953). Method and Theory in Experimental Psychology. Oxford University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). The Measurement of Meaning. University of Illinois Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Oswald, I. (1966). Sleep. Penguin Books.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Ott W. (2021). The case against powers. In B. Hill, H. Lagerlund, & S. Psillos (Eds.), Reconsidering causal powers: Historical and conceptual perspectives (pp. 149-167). Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]Powers ontologies are currently enjoying a resurgence. This would be dispiriting news for the moderns; in their eyes, to imbue bodies with powers is to slide back into the scholastic slime from which they helped philosophy crawl. I focus on Descartes’s ‘little souls’ argument, which points to a genuine and, I think persisting, defect in powers theories. The problem is that an Aristotelian power is intrinsic to whatever has it. Once this move is accepted, it becomes very hard to see how humble matter could have such a thing. It is as if each empowered object were possessed of a little soul that directs it and governs its behavior. Instead of attempting to resurrect the Aristotelian power theory, contemporary philosophers would be best served by taking their inspiration from its early modern replacement, devised by John Locke and Robert Boyle. On this view, powers are internal relations, not monadic properties intrinsic to their bearers. This move at once drains away the mysterious directedness of Aristotelian powers and solves the contemporary version of the little souls argument, Neil Williams’s ‘problem of fit.’
[Citing Place (1999b) in context]
Owen, J. L. (2002). A retrospective on behavioral approaches to human language: And some promising new developments. American Communication Journal, 5(3).
[Abstract]Early schools of behaviorism, namely, "classical" and "methodological," hold only limited implications for studies in human language behavior. In contrast, contemporary radical behaviorism is not only relevant, but it is dramatically more so due to its recent breakthroughs in the area of relational frame theory. Unfortunately, the few articles on behaviorism found in communication journals deal primarily with classical and methodological behaviorisms. References to radical behaviorism are rare, superficial, and out of touch with recent developments. A major purpose of this article is to draw some sharp distinctions among the three major behaviorisms: "classical," "methodological," and "radical"; and, to capture each of their unique perspectives on human language behavior. A second purpose is to show how radical behaviorism-especially in light of its recent progress in relational frame theory-provides the basis for a comprehensive behavioral theory of complex human language behavior. In doing so, it also provides a viable alternative to the cognitive theories that continue to dominate the field of communication studies.
[Citing Place (1997a) in context]
Owen, J. L. (Ed.). (1997). Context and communication behavior. Context Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Page, W. (1912). The Victoria History of the County of York (Vol. II). Constable.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Pallier, C. (2013. Age effects in language acquisition and attrition. In J. J. Bolhuis, & M. Evereart, M. (Eds), Birdsong, Speech, and language exploring the evolution of mind and brain. MIT. www.pallier.org/papers/Pallier.chapterBolhuis.2013.pdf
Pallier, C., Dehaene, S., Poline, J-B., LeBihan, D., Argenti, A-M., Dupoux, E. and Mehler, J. (2003). Brain imaging of language plasticity in adopted adults: can a second language replace the first?. Cerebral Cortex, 13(2), 155--161. www.pallier.org/papers/Pallier_cerebralcortex2003.pdf
[Abstract]Do the neural circuits that subserve language acquisition lose plasticity as they become tuned to the maternal language? We tested adult subjects born in Korea and adopted by French families in childhood; they have become fluent in their second language and report no conscious recollection of their native language. In behavioral tests assessing their memory for Korean, we found that they do not perform better than a control group of native French subjects who have never been exposed to Korean. We also used event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging to monitor cortical activations while the Korean adoptees and native French listened to sentences spoken in Korean, French and other, unknown, foreign languages. The adopted subjects did not show any specific activations to Korean stimuli relative to unknown languages. The areas activated more by French stimuli than by foreign stimuli were similar in the Korean adoptees and in the French native subjects, but with relatively larger extents of activation in the latter group. We discuss these data in light of the critical period hypothesis for language acquisition.
Palmer, D. C. (1999). A Call for Tutorials on Alternative Approaches to the Study of Verbal Behavior. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 16, 49-55.
[Citing Place (1992a) in context] [Citing Place (1998b)]
Palmer, D. C. (2000). Chomsky's Nativism Reconsidered The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17, 51-56
[Citing Place (1992a)]
Palmer, D. C. (2000a). Dedication Ullin Place: 1924-2000. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 5.
[Abstract][This dedication is followed by The Chomsky-Place Correspondence 1993-1994]
Download: Palmer (2000) Dedication Ullin Place 1924-2000.pdf
Palmer, D. C. (2000b). In memoriam Ullin Place: 1924-2000. The Behavior Analyst, 23(1), 95-98. doi:10.1007/BF03392002
Download: Palmer (2000) In Memoriam Ullin Place.pdf
Palmer, D. C. (2001). Behavioural interpretations of cognition. History & Philosophy of Psychology, 3(1), 39-45.
Download: Palmer (2001) Behavioural Interpretation of Cognition.pdf
Palmer, D. C. (2006). On Chomsky's Appraisal of Skinner's Verbal Behavior: A Half Century of Misunderstanding. The Behavior Analyst, 29(2), 253-67. doi:10.1007/BF03392134
[Abstract]The history of the writing of Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957), Chomsky’s review (1959), and MacCorquodale’s rebuttal (1970) are briefly summarized. Chomsky’s recent reflections on his review are analyzed: Chomsky’s refusal to acknowledge the review’s errors or its aggressive tone is consistent with his polemical style but comes at a minor cost in consistency and plausibility. However, his remarks about the place of Skinner’s work in science reveal misunderstandings so great that they undercut the credibility of the review substantially. The gradual growth in the influence of Skinner’s book suggests that its legacy will endure.
[Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000) in context] [Citing Place (1981b)]
Palmer, D. C. (2007). Verbal Behavior: What is the Function of Structure? European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 8(2), 161-175. doi:10.1080/15021149.2007.11434280
[Abstract]How can structural phenomena in verbal behavior be subsumed by a functional account? There are functional segments of behavior longer than the fundamental verbal operants identified by Skinner, segments that “hang together” but are seldom repeated. Verbal behavior conditions the behavior of the listener with respect to an object, condition, or state of affairs, and an utterance is functionally complete when it has done so. Using the effect on the listener as a defining criterion, a behavioral analysis identifies units of analysis that embrace the functional properties of the everyday concept of the sentence, but such units are more flexible and sensitive to context. They can be understood, in part, as autoclitic frames and the variable terms that are interwoven with such frames. Some speculations are offered on how autoclitic frames are acquired and how they are interwoven with other verbal operants.
[Citing Place (1981b)]
Palmer, D. C. (2008). Verbal Behavior: What is the Function of Structure? European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 8, 161-175.
[Abstract]How can structural phenomena in verbal behavior be subsumed by a functional account? There are functional segments of behavior longer than the fundamental verbal operants identified by Skinner, segments that “hang together” but are seldom repeated. Verbal behavior conditions the behavior of the listener with respect to an object, condition, or state of affairs, and an utterance is functionally complete when it has done so. Using the effect on the listener as a defining criterion, a behavioral analysis identifies units of analysis that embrace the functional properties of the everyday concept of the sentence, but such units are more flexible and sensitive to context. They can be understood, in part, as autoclitic frames and the variable terms that are interwoven with such frames. Some speculations are offered on how autoclitic frames are acquired and how they are interwoven with other verbal operants.
[Citing Place (1981b)]
Palmer, D. C., & Donahoe, J. W. (1992). Essentialism and selectionism in cognitive science and behavior analysis. American Psychologist, 47, 1344-1358.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Papineau, D. (2002). Thinking about consciousness. Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001
[Abstract]Elaborates a materialist view of consciousness. The central thesis of the book is that while conscious states are material, we humans have two quite different ways of thinking about them. We can think about them materially, as normal parts of the material world, but we can also think about them phenomenally, as states that feel a certain way. These two modes of thought refer to the same items in reality, but at a conceptual level they are distinct. By focusing on the special structure of phenomenal concepts, David Papineau is able to expose the flaws in the standard arguments against materialism, while at the same time explaining why dualism can seem so intuitively compelling. The book also considers the prospects for scientific research into consciousness, and argues that such research often promises more than it can deliver. Once phenomenal concepts are recognized for what they are, many of the questions posed by consciousness research turn out to be irredeemably vague.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Papineau, D. (2020). The problem of Consciousness. In U. Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]Consciousness raises a range of philosophical questions. We can distinguish between the How?, Where?, and What? questions. First, how does consciousness relate to other features of reality? Second, where are conscious phenomena located in reality? And, third, what is the nature of consciousness? In line with much philosophical writing over the past fifty years, this chapter will focus mostly on the How? question. Towards the end I shall also say some things about the Where? question. As for the What? question, a few brief introductory remarks will have to suffice.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956) in context]
Pappas, G. S. (1977). Armstrong’s Materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7(3)- 569-592. doi:10.1080/00455091.1977.10717033
[Citing Place (1954)] [Citing Place (1956)]
Parsons, T. (1951). Illness and the role of the physician: A sociological perspective. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 21, 452-460. Reprinted in C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray (Eds.) (1953), Personality in Nature, Society and Culture (Second Edition, pp. 609-617). Knopf.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Pashler, H. (1991). Shifting visual attention and selecting motor responses: distinct attentional mechanisms. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 17, 1023-1040.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Pashler, H. E. (1997). The Psychology of Attention. MIT Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Passmore, J. A. (1966). A hundred years of philosophy (second edition). Duckworth.
[Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1960)] [1 referring publications by Place]
Patmore, C. K. D. (1877). The Unknown Eros and Other Odes. George Bell.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Patmore, C. K. D. (1895). The Rod, the Root and the Flower. George Bell.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Pauen, M. & Stephan, A. (Eds.) (2002). Phänomenales Bewusstsein – Rückkehr zur Identitätstheorie?. mentis
[Reprints in this collection]
Pavlov, I. P. (1927). Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex (English translation by G. V. Anrep). Oxford University Press.
[12 referring publications by Place]
Pavlov, I. P. (1938). Twenty Years of Objective Study of the Higher Nervous Activity (Behaviour) of Animals (6th Edition). State Biological and Medical Publishing House.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Peano, G. (1894). Notations de Logique Mathématique. Bocca.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Pearce, J.M. (1988). Stimulus generalization and the acquisition of categories by pigeons. In L. Weiskrantz (Ed.) Thought without Language (pp. 132-155). Clarendon Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Pearce, J.M. (1989). The acquisition of an artificial category by pigeons. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 41B, 381-406.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Pelczar, M. (2021). Modal arguments against materialism. Noûs, 55(2), 426-444. doi:10.1111/nous.12320
[Abstract]We review existing strategies for bringing modal intuitions to bear against materialist theories of consciousness, and then propose a new strategy. Unlike existing strategies, which assume that imagination (suitably constrained) is a good guide to modal truth, the strategy proposed here makes no assumptions about the probative value of imagination. However, unlike traditional modal arguments, the argument developed here delivers only the conclusion that
we should not believe that materialism is true, not that we should believe that it is false.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Pelczar, M. (2022). The case for panpsychism: a critical assessment. Synthese, 200(4), 1-22. doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03775-y
[Abstract]According to panpsychists, physical phenomena are, at bottom, nothing but experiential phenomena. One argument for this view proceeds from an alleged need for physical phenomena to have features beyond what physics attributes to them; another starts by arguing that consciousness is ubiquitous, and proposes an identification of physical and experiential phenomena as the best explanation of this alleged fact. The first argument assumes that physical phenomena have categorical natures, and the second that the world’s experience-causing powers or potentials underdetermine its physical features. I argue that panpsychists are not entitled to these assumptions.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Pelczar, M. (2023). Phenomenalism: A metaphysics of chance and experience. Oxford University Press
[Citing Place (1956)]
Pellionisz, A., & Llinás, R. (1979). Brain modeling by tensor network theory and computer simulation. The cerebellum: distributed processor for predictive coordination. Neuroscience, 4, 323-348.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Penelhum, T. (1957). The logic of pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Reearch, 17, 488-503.
[Citing Place (1954)] [2 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Pepper, S. C. (1942). World hypotheses. University of California Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Pepperberg, I. M. (1987). Interspecies communication: A tool for assessing conceptual abilities in the African Grey parrot. In G. Greenberg, & E. Tobach (Eds.), Cognition, language and consciousness: Interactive levels. Erlbaum.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Pepperberg, I. M. (1990). Referential mapping: A technique for attaching functional significance to the innovative utterances of an African Grey parrot (Psittachus erithacus).
Applied Psycholinguistics, 11, 23-44.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Pepperberg, I. M. (1992). A search for equivalence classes in an African Grey Parrot: Equivalence involving objects and auditory and visual labels (Unpublished paper presented to the 15th Symposium on Quantitative Analyses of Behavior (Stimulus Relations), June 14th 1992). Harvard University.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Pereboom, D. (2011). Consciousness and the prospects of physicalism. Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]This book explores how physicalism might best defended and formulated. Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out. The first draws on the open possibility that introspective representations fail to represent mental states as they are in themselves. More specifically, introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, and it may be that these properties really lack such features. The seriousness of this open possibility is enhanced by an analogy with our perceptual representations of secondary qualities. Our vision represents colors as having certain qualitative natures, and it is an open possibility, widely regarded as actual, that colors actually lack them. If it’s possible that representing phenomenal properties introspectively attributes to them qualitative natures that they actually lack, then the force of the anti-physicalism arguments might well be blunted. The second response exploits the possibility that our ignorance of things in themselves consists in part in our lack of knowledge of the fundamental intrinsic properties of things. This idea has been developed by Bertrand Russell and more recently by David Chalmers into a framework for a unified account of the mental and the physical. Currently unknown or incompletely understood fundamental intrinsic properties provide the categorical bases for the known physical dispositional properties, and would also yield an account of consciousness. While there are non-physicalist versions of this position, some are amenable to physicalism. The book’s third theme is a defense of a nonreductive account of physicalism. The version of the nonreductive view endorsed departs from others in that it rejects the token identity of psychological and microphysical entities of any sort. The deepest relation between the psychological and the microphysical is constitution, where this relation is not to be explicated by the notion of identity.
[Citing Place (1956)]
Perin, C. T. (1943). A quantitative investigation of the delay-of-reinforcement gradient. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 32, 37-51.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Perky. C. W. (1910). An Experimental study of imagination. American Journal of Psychology, 21, 422-452.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Pernu T. K. (2017). The five marks of the mental. Frontiers in Psychology, 8. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01084
[Abstract]The mental realm seems different to the physical realm; the mental is thought to be dependent on, yet distinct from the physical. But how, exactly, are the two realms supposed to be different, and what, exactly, creates the seemingly insurmountable juxtaposition between the mental and the physical? This review identifies and discusses five marks of the mental, features that set characteristically mental phenomena apart from the characteristically physical phenomena. These five marks (intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity) are not presented as a set of features that define mentality. Rather, each of them is something we seem to associate with phenomena we consider mental, and each of them seems to be in tension with the physical view of reality in its own particular way. It is thus suggested how there is no single mind-body problem, but a set of distinct but interconnected problems. Each of these separate problems is analyzed, and their differences, similarities and connections are identified. This provides a useful basis for future theoretical work on psychology and philosophy of mind, that until now has too often suffered from unclarities, inadequacies, and conflations.
[Citing Place (1996g)]
Pessoa Jr., O. (2021). The colored-brain thesis. Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, 22(1), 84-93. doi: 10.4013/fsu.2021.221.10
[Abstract]The “colored-brain thesis”, or strong qualitative physicalism, is discussed from historical and philosophical perspectives. This thesis was proposed by Thomas Case (1888), in a non-materialistic context, and is close to views explored by H. H. Price (1932) and E. Boring (1933). Using Mary’s room thought experiment, one can argue that physicalism implies qualitative physicalism. Qualitative physicalism involves three basic statements: (i) perceptual internalism, and realism of qualia; (ii) ontic physicalism, charaterized as a description in space, time, and scale; and (iii) mind-brain identity thesis. In addition, (iv) structuralism in physics, and distinguishing the present version from that suggested by H. Feigl and S. Pepper, (v) realism of the physical description. The “neurosurgeon argument” is presented, as to why the greenness of a visually perceived avocado, which (according to this view) is present in the brain as a physical-chemical attribute, would not be seen as green by a neurosurgeon who opens the observer’s skull. This conception is compared with two close views, Russellian (and Schlickian) monisms and panprotopsychism (including panqualityism). According to the strong qualitative physicalism presented here, the phenomenal experience of a quale q is identical to a physico-chemical quality q, which arises from a combination of (1) the materiality ω associated with the brain, and (2) the causal organization or structure of the relevant elements of the brain Σ, including in this organization the structure of the self: (Σω)q. The “explanatory gap” between mental and physical states is shifted to a gap between the physico-chemical qualities q and the organized materiality of a specific brain region (Σω)q, and is seen as being bridged only by a set of non-explanatory postulates.
[Citing Place (1956) in context] [Citing Place (2000f) in context]
Peters, R. S. (1958). The Concept of Motivation. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Phelips, V. (Philip Vivian) (1906/1934) . The Churches and Modern Thought: An Inquiry into the Grounds of Unbelief and an Appeal for Candour (Second Edition in the Thinker's Library). Watts.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Piaget, J. (1923). Le langage et la pensée chez l'enfant (Many editions. Translated as The Language and Thought of the Child. Routledge & Kegan Paul.). Delachaux et Niestlé.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Piaget, J. (1932). The Moral Judgment of the Child (Translated from the French by M.Gabain). Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Piaget, J. (1972). Piaget's Theory. In P.H. Mussen (Ed.), Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology (3rd Ed., Vol. I). Wiley.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Pika, S., Nicoladis, E., & Marentette, P. (2009). How to order a beer: Cultural differences in the use of conventional gestures for numbers. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 40(1), 70-80. doi:10.1177/0022022108326197
[Abstract]It is said that conventional gestures for numbers differ by culture. Conventional gestures are thought to imply consistency of form both across and within individuals. The present study tests the consistency of finger gestures of 60 participants of three different cultures and in three different mother tongues in nine different hypothetical scenarios. The first subject of analysis is whether participants differentiate between counting and signaling. The second subject is the consistency of gestures within and between groups. The third is how participants depict the number 1. Result show that most people use the same gestures for counting and signaling. In addition, Germans and English Canadians show relatively low degrees of individual differences whereas French Canadians show relatively high degrees of individual variability. Furthermore, only the Germans use the thumb to indicate the number 1, whereas the two North American cultures use the index finger. The present data suggest that finger gestures of some cultures clearly qualify as conventional gestures whereas others do not. It is suggested that the development of conventional gestures is influenced by cultural exposure, which can even result into the loosening of conventions.
[Citing Place (2000c) in context]
Pinker, S. (1989). Learnability and cognition. MIT Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Pinker, S., & Prince, A. (1988). On language and connectionism: Analysis of a parallel distributed model of language acquisition. Cognition, 28, 73-193.
[4 referring publications by Place]
Place, T. W. (2022). Understanding the types of language in behavioural science: Reply to Phil Reed on the work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 52-64. behavior.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/BP-v50-Place.pdf
[Abstract]Reed (2022) states that according to Ullin Place’s latest view, intensional statements are not necessarily connected with mentalist language and explanations, and intensionality is the mark of the conversational. This is false. Place’s view is that intensionality is the mark of a quotation. Quotations are sentences that express the content of propositional attitudes. They are characterised by what Frege called ‘indirect reference’ and Quine ‘referential opacity’. Intensionality is nothing more than this. Intensional statements stating propositional attitudes are at the heart of the mentalist language. Propositional attitudes are dispositions. Dispositions are the nature of things and are at the core of all sciences. The doings of a person are the active manifestations of dispositions. Place defines mentalism at the level of the
person, which is also the level of behaviourism. This contrasts with a standard definition of mentalism at the subpersonal level, also known as centrism. Doing or behaving is interacting with the environment. This is common to the scientific approaches at the level of the person. Articulating the same conceptual foundation and language and each approach having its dialect must be possible. This is “relevan[t] for understanding the types of language that
could be used in explanations given by behavioural science” (Reed, 2022).
[Citing Place (1954)] [Citing Place (1956)] [Citing Place (1978a)] [Citing Place (1981a)] [Citing Place (1983d)] [Citing Place (1984a)] [Citing Place (1984c)] [Citing Place (1985c)] [Citing Place (1987a)] [Citing Place (1991f)] [Citing Place (1996g)] [Citing Place (1996j)] [Citing Place (1996l)] [Citing Place (1998c)] [Citing Place (1998d)] [Citing Place (1999)] [Citing Place (1999a)] [Citing Place (1999f)] [Citing Place (1999g)] [Citing Place (2000a)] [Citing Place (2000d)] [Is reply to]
Download: Place (2022) Understanding the Types of Language in Behavioural Science - Reply to Phil Reed on the Work of Ullin T Place.pdf
Place, U. T. (1954-05). Conditioning and the treatment of enuresis: A theoretical discussion. The South Australian Group, British Psychological Society, May 1954.
[Text]
Place, U. T. (1954). The concept of heed. British Journal of Psychology, 45, 243-55. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1954.tb01252.x
[References] [18 citing publications] [29 referring publications by Place] [2 reprinting collections]
Download: 1954 The Concept of Heed.pdf 1954 1999 The Concept of Heed - revised version.pdf (with a new introduction; not published)
Place, U. T. (1954a). Conditioning and the treatment of enuresis: A theoretical discussion. Read to the South Australian Group, May 1954, British Psychological Society.
[Talks]
Place, U. T. (1956). Emotion concepts and learning theory. The Annual Conference of the British Psychological Society, Manchester, 1956.
[Text]
Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
Keywords: mind-brain identity theory, phenomenological fallacy
Note:
The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g).
Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References] [249 citing publications] [57 referring publications by Place] [15 reprinting collections]
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf 1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1956a). Emotion concepts and learning theory [Unpublished paper delivered to the Annual Conference of the British Psychological Society, Manchester, 1956].
[Talks] [1 referring publications by Place]
Place, U. T. (1959). The ‘phenomenological fallacy' - a reply to J. R.Smythies. British Journal of Psychology, 50,72-73. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1959.tb00684.x
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[References] [Is reply to] [1 citing publications] [2 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1959 The Phenomenological Fallacy - A Reply to J.R. Smythies.pdf
Place, U. T. (1960). Materialism as a scientific hypothesis. Philosophical Review, 69, 101-104.
[References] [Is reply to] [15 citing publications] [8 referring publications by Place] [2 reprinting collections]
Download: 1960 Materialism as a Scientific Hypothesis.pdf
Place, U. T. (1965-04-16) Comments on H. Putnam 'Psychological predicates'. The sixth Annual Oberlin Colloquium, Department of Philosophy, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio, US, April 16-18 1965.
[Text]
Place, U. T. (1966-07-10) Consciousness and perception in psychology II. Symposium Consciousness and Perception, Joint Session of the Aristiotelian Society and the Mind Asscociation, Bradford College, University of London, London, 10 July 1966.
[Text]
Place, U. T. (1966). Consciousness and perception in psychology II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. XL, 101-124. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/40.1.85 [this doi is for the Supplementary Volume consisting of part I by A.J. Watson and part II by U. T. Place]
[References] [Is reply to] [Talks] [9 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Download: 1966 Consciousness and Perception in Psychology II.pdf 1966 1999 Consciousness and Perception in Psychology II - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1967). Comments on H. Putnam 'Psychological predicates'. In W. H. Capitan, & D. D. Merrill (Eds.), Art, mind and religion: Proceedings of the 1965 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy (pp.55-68). Pittsburgh University Press.
[References] [Is reply to] [Talks] [4 citing publications] [7 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1967 Comments on H. Putnam's 'Psychological Predicates'.pdf
Place, U. T. (1968-04) The use of operant responding as a measure of mood fluctuations in periodic psychosis Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis Group, University of Nottingham, April 1968
[Text]
Place, U. T. (1969a). Burt on brain and consciousness. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 22, 285-292.
Keywords: consciousness, introspection
[References] [Is reply to] [1 citing publications] [6 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1969a Burt on Brain and Consciousness.pdf
Place, U. T. (1969b). Collected papers on brain, mind and consciousness [Doctoral thesis submitted 1969 for the degree of D.Litt, degree awarded in 1972]. University of Adelaide.
[References] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1969b Brain, Mind and Consciousness - Introduction DLitt Thesis.pdf [includes editorial changes by UTP]
Place, U. T. (1969c). The outline of a neurophysiological theory designed to account for the mental phenomena as described in ordinary language in which is as far as possible consistent with current physiological and psychological evidence [Unpublished paper, 3/11/69].
[References]
Download: 1969c The Outline of a Neurophysiological Theory Designed to Account for Mental Phenomena as Described in Ordinary Language.pdf
Place, U. T. (1971a). The infallibility of our knowledge of our own beliefs. Analysis, 31, 197-204. doi:10.1093/analys/31.6.197
[References] [7 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Download: 1971a The Infallibility of Our Knowledge about Our Own Beliefs.pdf
Place, U. T. (1971b). Understanding the language of sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49, 158-166
[References] [2 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1971b Understanding the Language of Sensations.pdf
Place, U. T. (1971c). The use of operant responding as a measure of mood fluctuation in periodic psychosis [Unpublished paper with an author's note added in 1999].
[Abstract]Ryle (1949) has suggested that to be in a happy mood or frame of mind is to have (a) an increased capacity for enjoyment and (b) a reduced sensitivity to distress. It is a natural corollary of this view that to be in an unhappy or miserable mood or frame of mind is to have (a) a reduced capacity for enjoyment and (b) an enhanced sensitivity to distress. Assuming that an individual's capacity for enjoyment can be measured by the rate of operant responding under conditions of positive reinforcement and his or her sensitivity to distress by the rate of responding under conditions of negative reinforcement, it should follow, on Ryle's theory, that in elation the rate of response under conditions of positive reinforcement will be high with a correspondingly low rate of response when reinforcement is negative. In depression, on the other hand, a low rate of response is predicted for the positive reinforcement condition with a high rate of response for
the negative reinforcement condition. In this study, the rate of operant responding under conditions of positive reinforcement is compared with that under conditions of negative reinforcement in two manic depressive patients with regular and predictable mood cycles. Longitudinal studies extended over several months confirm a number of the predictions drawn from Ryle's theory and throw some new and unexpected light on the nature of pathological mood states.
[References] [Talks] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1971c The Use of Operant Responding as a Measure of Mood Fluctuation in Periodic Psychosis.pdf
Place, U. T. (1972-04-11) Inner life Northern Universities Philosophy Conference, Nottingham, April 11th-14th, 1972.
[Text]
Place, U. T. (1972a). Sensations and processes - a reply to Munsat. Mind, LXXXI, 106-112. www.jstor.org/stable/2252189
[References] [Is reply to] [1 citing publications] [9 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1972a Sensations and Processes - A Reply to Munsat.pdf
Place, U. T. (1972b). Inner life [Conference presentation]. Northern Universities Philosophy Conference, Nottingham, April 11th-14th, 1972.
[Talks] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1972b Inner Life.pdf
Place, U. T. (1973-07). Psychological paradigms and behaviour modification. Conference of the European Association for Behavioural Therapy, Central Hotel, London Heathrow Airport, July 1974
[Text]
Place, U. T. (1973-09-26). Lecture 1: Philosophy, philosophical psychology and its relevance for empirical psychology (26/9/1973). Section 1
[Abstract]The nature of philosophy and psychology. The distinction between the philosophy of psychology and philosophical psychology. The relevance of philosophical psychology for empirical psychology.
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 01.pdf
Place, U. T. (1973-10-03) Lecture 2: Metaphysics & Epistemology (3/10/1973). Section 1
[Abstract]Metaphysics as meta-science. The three divisions of metaphysics: Metaphysical Epistemology, Ontology and Cosmology.
Knowledge and belief as propositional attitudes. Sentences and propositions; words and concepts. Necessary and contingent truth. The correspondence and coherence theories of truth
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 02.pdf
Place, U. T. (1973-10-17). Lecture 3: Ontology (17/10/1973). Section 1
[Abstract]The nature of existence. Universalia in rebus and Aristotle's doctrine of substance. Metaphysical materialism and spatio-temporal extension. Ontological categories
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 03.pdf
Place, U. T. (1973-10-24). Lecture 4: Cosmology 1. Reductionism (24/10/1973) Section 1
[Abstract]The nature of explanation. Reduction and analysis - conceptual, material, substantial and theoretical. The Reductionist Myth.
[References] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 04 - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1973-10-31). Lecture 5: Cosmology 2. Causation (31/10/1973) Section 1
[Abstract]Causal Explanation. Hume's account of the causal relation: what is valid, what is obscure, what is mistaken. 24 causal principles that replace Hume's account
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 05 - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1973-11-07). Lecture 6.2: Introduction to the conceptual analysis of ordinary language (7/11/1973). Section 2
[Abstract]Conceptual analysis as a technique for revealing ontological commitment and explanatory function. Conceptual analysis as the empirical study of usage
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 06.2 - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1973-11-07). Lecture 6.1: Cosmology 3. Dispositions (7/11/1973) Section 1
[Abstract]Dispositional concepts and their explanatory functions
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 06.1 - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1973-11-14). Lecture 7: Linguistic Rules and their classification (14/11/1973). Section 2
[Abstract]The concept of a linguistic rule and the traditional classification into pragmatic, semantic and syntactic rules.
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 07 - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1973-11-21). Lecture 8: Sentence frame analysis (21/11/1973). Section 2
[Abstract]The study of sentence frames. Psychological concepts as personal predicates. The tense structure of psychological verbs and the ontological categories. The objects of psychological verbs and the problem of intentionality
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 08 - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1973-12-12). Lecture 10: Action & movement. (12/12/1973). Section 3
[Abstract]Common sense psychology and the explanation of behaviour. The concept of action.
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 10.pdf
Place, U. T. (1973-1974). The metaphysical foundations of empirical psychology [A series of twenty eight lectures presented to the Vakgroep Methodenleer, Sub-Fakulteit Psychologie, University of Amsterdam between September 1973 and May 1974]. See Amsterdam Lectures
Place, U. T. (1973). The mental and the physical - a reply to Dr. Meynell. The Heythrop Journal, XIV(4), 417-424. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2265.1973.tb00758.x
[References] [Is reply to] [8 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1973 The Mental and the Physical - A Reply to Dr Meynell.pdf
Place, U. T. (1974-01-16). Lecture 11: Purposive behaviour in animals and men - Intending, deciding & trying (16/1/1974). Section 3
[Abstract]The thesis that human actions are defined in terms of their intentions. Teleology. Intending. Involuntary and unconscious purposive behaviour. Voluntary action controlled by consciousness and attention
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 11.pdf
Place, U. T. (1974-02-13). Lecture 15: Mentalism and S-R behaviourism (13/2/1974). Section 4
[Abstract]The relationship between languages at the molar level: the mentalist language of ordinary discourse and the language of stimulus-response behaviourism.
[References]
Download: Amsterdam lecture 15
Place, U. T. (1974-02-20). Lecture 16: The Mind as a substance (20/2/1974). Section 5
[Abstract]Mental substance. The substantive 'mind' in ordinary language idiom. The reference of the first person pronoun - the Kantian argument. Aristotle's doctrine of substance and the Cartesian argument. Personal identity - the Lockean argument.
[References]
Download: Amsterdam lecture 16
Place, U. T. (1974-02-27). Lecture 17: The categories of mental life - mental states (27/2/1974) Section 5
[Abstract]Two arguments for the thesis that a person or human organism is a spatio-temporally extended and located substance which has both mental and non-mental, physical properties (continuation of lecture 16).
Ontological taxonomy of mental predicates. Mental processes, mental events and mental states. Logical behaviourism. Knowledge of our own mental states. Mental dispositions and continuous mental states
[References]
Download: Amsterdam lecture 17
Place, U. T. (1974-03-06). Lecture 18: Mental processes, experience and introspection (6/3/1974). Section 5
[Abstract]Mental activities and experiences. The privacy of mental processes. The control and interpretation of experience. Introspection
[References]
Download: Amsterdam lecture 18
Place, U. T. (1974-03-13). Lecture 19: Perception, topic neutrality and the properties of experience (13/3/1974). Section 5
[Abstract]Phenomenalism. Topic neutrality of phenomenal descriptions. Introspective reports. The expression of pain. Dream reports. Thesis: the language we use to describe our private experiences and sensations is a metaphorical extension of a language whose basic function is to describe material objects and their properties as they exist and occur in a three dimensionally extended spatial world.
[References]
Download: Amsterdam lecture 19
Place, U. T. (1974-03-20). Lecture 20: Mental events, mental acts and imageless thoughts.(20/3/1974). Section 5
[Abstract]Mental events as the interface between a process and a state. Imageless thoughts. Our knowledge of our own mental events. The symbolic nature of thought
[References]
Download: Amsterdam lecture 20
Place, U. T. (1974-03-27). Lecture 21: The Mind-Brain Identity Theory (27/3/1974). Section 6
[Abstract]The mind-body problem and its history. The Mind-Brain Identity Theory.
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 21.pdf
Place, U. T. (1974-04-24) Lecture 22: The materialist hypothesis and Leibniz's Law (24/4/1974). Section 6
[Abstract]Materialism as a scientific hypothesis. Logical crtieria for identy and Leibniz's Principle or Law. Experiences
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 22.pdf
Place, U. T. (1974-05-01). Lecture 23: Presumptive criteria of identity and Central State Materialism (1/5/1974). Section 6
[Abstract]Presumptive criteria of identity: spatio-temporal location, micro reductive explanation and the explanation of common observations. Central State Materialism
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 23.pdf
Place, U. T. (1974-05-08). Lecture 24: Towards a neurophysiological theory of conscious experience (8/5/1974). Section 6
[Abstract]The role and function of private experiences. The causes and effects of conscious experiences. Broadbent's Information Flow diagram. Mapping mental life into the brain
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 24.pdf
Place, U. T. (1974-05-15). Lecture 25: Theories of emotion and the nature of emotional reactions (15/5/1974). Section 7
[Abstract]Emotion as experience. Physiological theories of emotion, The vocabulary of feeling and emotion. Enjoying. Wanting. Dimensions of emotion. Measuring emotions
[References] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 25.pdf
Place, U. T. (1974-05-22). Lecture 26: The elicitation of emotional reactions and their biological functions (22/5/1974). Section 7
[Abstract]Biological emergencies: opportunities and threats. Errors in the elicitation of emotions. Emotion and motivation. Emotional conditioning. Conditioning versus innate releases in the elicitation of emotion.
[References] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 26 - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1974-05-29). Lecture 27: The experimental study of emotion (29/5/1974). Section 7
[Abstract]Place, U.T. (1971). The use of operant responding as a measure of mood fluctuation in periodic psychosis. [Unpublished paper]
Ryle (1949) has suggested that to be in a happy mood or frame of mind is to have (a) an increased capacity for enjoyment and (b) a reduced sensitivity to distress. It is a natural corollary of this view that to be in an unhappy or miserable mood or frame of mind is to have (a) a reduced capacity for enjoyment and (b) an enhanced sensitivity to distress. Assuming that an individual's capacity for enjoyment can be measured by the rate of operant responding under conditions of positive reinforcement and his or her sensitivity to distress by the rate of responding under conditions of negative reinforcement, it should follow, on Ryle's theory, that in elation the rate of response under conditions of positive reinforcement will be high with a correspondingly low rate of response when reinforcement is negative. In depression, on the other hand, a low rate of response is predicted for the positive reinforcement condition with a high rate of response for
the negative reinforcement condition.","In this study, the rate of operant responding under conditions of positive reinforcement is compared with that under conditions of negative reinforcement in two manic depressive patients with regular and predictable mood cycles. Longitudinal studies extended over several months confirm a number of the predictions drawn from Ryle's theory and throw some new and unexpected light on the nature of pathological mood states.
Download: 1971c The Use of Operant Responding as a Measure of Mood Fluctuation in Periodic Psychosis.pdf
Place, U. T. (1974-06-12). Lecture 28: The logical and functional aspects of language with special reference to moral discourse (12/6/1974). Section 8
[Abstract]The pragmatic or functional aspect of language. Skinner on language behaviour. Ethical utterances. Blaming as an aggressive act and an aversive event. The acceptance and avoidance of blame. Domestic and political quarrels.
[References]
Download: Amsterdam Lecture 28.pdf
Place, U. T. (1977a). Twenty years on - "Is consciousness still a brain process?" Open Mind, 6,3-10.
[References] [3 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1977a Twenty Years On - Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process.pdf
Place, U. T. (1977b). Filosofie, psychologie en filosofische psychologie. In K. Soudijn, & H. Bergman (Eds.), Ontwikkelingen in de psychologie (pp. 23-38). Boom/Intermediair.
Note:
Translated in Dutch and edited by Karel Soudijn.
[References]
Download: 1977b Philosophy, Psychology and Philosophical Psychology.pdf
Place, U. T. (1978-09-20). The problem of combining and/or choosing between different theoretical languages or paradigms, as it arises in the context of psychotherapy and behaviour modification. Kolloquium of the Psychological Laboratory of Tilburg University,Tilburg, NL, 20 September 1978.
Place, U. T. (1978-09-27). The problem of conceptual analysis of emotion concepts and their relationship to the concept of motivation. Kolloquium of the Psychological Laboratory of Tilburg University, Tilburg, NL, 27 September 1978.
Place, U. T. (1978a). Psychological paradigms and behaviour modification. De Psycholoog, 13, 611-621.
[Abstract]The application of Kuhn's concept of "incommensurable paradigms" to the science of psychology is discussed. Two such paradigms, the behaviorist or behavior analytic paradigm and the cognitive/mentalist paradigm, are distinguished. It is suggested that the choice of paradigm will depend on the method of behavior modification to be employed. If behavior is to be modified by stimulus control and contingency management, a version of the behaviorist paradigm will be selected. If behavior is to be modified by changing the individual's self-directed verbal behavior, the mentalist/cognitive paradigm is to be preferred.
Note:
An earlier version of this paper was presented to a conference of the European Association for Behavioural Therapy at the Central Hotel, London Heathrow Airport in July 1974 and was in 1978 published in De Psycholoog, in English The Psychologist, a journal of the Dutch Society of Psychology. The present revision is from 1986.
[References] [Talks] [2 citing publications] [2 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1978a 1986 Psychological Paradigms and Behavior Modification - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1978b). Natural kinds and psychophysical laws: Comments on the McGinn-Hopkins symposium (PAS 1978) [Unpublished paper].
[References] [Is reply to]
Download: 1978b Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws - Comments on the McGinn-Hopkins Symposium.pdf
Place, U. T. (1979a). Review of K. V. Wilkes, Physicalism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. Philosophy, 54(209), 423-425. doi:10.1017/s0031819100048877
[References] [Reviewed publication(s)]
Download: 1979a Review of K V Wilkes Physicalism.pdf
Place, U. T. (1979b). Essay Review of Karl R. Popper and J. C. Eccles, The Self and its Brain: An argument for Interactionism. Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1977. Annals of Science, 36, 403-408.
[References] [Reviewed publication(s)]
Download: 1979b Essay Review of Karl R. Popper and J. C. Eccles, The Self and its Brain.pdf
Place, U. T. (1981a). Skinner's Verbal Behavior I - why we need it. Behaviorism, 9, 1-24. www.jstor.org/stable/27758970
[Abstract]To explain behaviour in terms of intensional or mentalistic concepts is to explain the behaviour in question on the assumption of a consistent and rational connection between what the agent does and what he says or what is said to him and that therefore any general account of verbal or linguistic behaviour which employs such concepts is necessarily circular, since it explains the acquisition of linguistic skills on the assumption that the speaker already possesses such skills. It follows that this circularity can only be avoided by developing a theory of verbal or linguistic behaviour which is stated entirely in a nonintensional or extensional language. At the present time, the most developed conceptual system for description and explanation of the behaviour of organisms at the molar level in purely extensional terms is that provided by the so-called ‘Radical Behaviorism’ of B. F. Skinner and his followers. Furthermore, in his book Verbal Behavior Skinner (1957) has used this conceptual framework to develop a theory of verbal or linguistic behaviour which represents the most ambitious attempt made so far to formulate a theory of linguistic behaviour in nonintensional or extensional terms.
Note:
Revised version is from 1999.
[References] [7 citing publications] [11 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1981a 1999 Skinner's Verbal Behavior I - Why We Need It - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1981b). Skinner's Verbal Behavior II - what is wrong with it. Behaviorism, 9, 131-152. www.jstor.org/stable/27758982
[Abstract]Skinner's Verbal Behavior as it stands suffers from four major defects. (1) Skinner fails to do justice to the distinction between words which are the repeated and repeatable units of verbal behaviour, but which have a function only in so far as they contribute to the function of the sentences in which they occur, and the sentences themselves which are the functional units of verbal behaviour, but which are seldom repeated word for word either in the mouth of the speaker or in the hearing of the listener. (2) The account given by Skinner of the listener's response to the verbal operant and of the concept of "the discriminative stimulus" which he deploys in this connection is seriously inadequate. (3) Skinner's concept of "the tact" involves a confusion between tacts as words and tacts as sentences. Tacts as words, i.e. names and general terms, designate recurrent features of the common stimulus environment of speaker and listener, both general and particular and contrast with autoclitic words whose function is purely intra-sentential. Tacts as sentences on the other hand are functionally complete verbal operants corresponding to the grammatical concept of an assertion, which act for the benefit of the listener and contrast with mands, sentence utterances corresponding to the imperatives and interrogatives of grammar and logic, which typically act for the benefit of the speaker. (4) Skinner's account fails to do justice to the all-important logical distinction between those tact sentence utterances or assertions which are true and on which the listener can consequently rely and those which are false and therefore unreliable as a source of information from the standpoint of the listener.
[References] [9 citing publications] [10 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Download: 1981b Skinner’s Verbal Behavior II – what is wrong with it.pdf
Place, U. T. (1982). Skinner's Verbal Behavior III - how to improve Parts I and II. Behaviorism, 10, 117-136. www.jstor.org/stable/27759002
[References] [2 citing publications] [5 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1982 Skinner's Verbal Behavior III - How to Improve Parts I and II
Place, U. T. (1983-01-03) Behavioural Contingency Semantics and the Analysis of Behaviour. The Christmas Meeting of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College, London, 4th January 1983.
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Place, U. T. (1983-01) Behavioral Contingency Semantics. A number of departments of Philosophy and Psychology in North America and Australia, January-March 1983
Place, U. T. (1983-07-11) Behavioural contingency semantics. The 7th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science, Salzburg, July 11th-16th 1983,
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Place, U. T. (1983a). Comments on Mark Burton's theses. Behaviour Analysis, 4(1), 22-31.
Keywords: consciousness
[References] [Is reply to] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1983a Comments on Mark Burton's Theses.pdf
Place, U. T. (1983b). Behavioural contingency semantics [Conference presentation abstract]. In P. Simons (Ed.), Abstracts of the 7th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 2, Sections 5 and 12 (pp. 342-345). J. Huttegger OHG.
Keywords: behavioural contingency semantics
Note:
Presentation given at the 7th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science held in Salzburg, July 11th-16th 1983. In the downloads two documents are made available. One is an extended abstract, in actual fact a 4 pages summary as published in the proceedings of the conference and second is the text of the presentation.
In the abstract Place tried to show how a later strand in Skinner's thinking represented by his 1969 book Contingencies Reinforcement, particularly the operant analysis of problem solving can be developed in such a way as to make good all the important deficiencies in the account given by Skinner in Verbal Behavior and what are mercilessly exposed by Chomsky in his 1959 Review.
In the presentation Place discusses the reasons why a behavioural account of language acquisition and language use is to be preferred to the alternative theories belonging to the tradition that stems from Chomsky.
[References] [Talks]
Download: 1983b Behavioural Contingency Semantics. The Abstract.pdf 1983b Behavioural Contingency Semantics. The Presentation.pdf
Place, U. T. (1983c). Behavioural contingency semantics and the analysis of behaviour. [Conference presentation abstract, delivered at the Christmas Meeting of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College, London, January 1983]. Behaviour Analysis Letters, 3, 128-129.
Keywords: behavioural contingency semantics, verbal behaviour, behaviour analysis, discriminative stimulus, significant stimulus event, disinforcement
[References] [Talks]
Download: 1983c Behavioural Contingency Semantics and the Analysis of Behaviour - The Abstract.pdf 1983c Behavioural Contingency Semantics and the Analysis of Behaviour - The Presentation.pdf
Place, U. T. (1983d). Skinner's Verbal Behavior IV - how to improve Part IV, Skinner's account of syntax. Behaviorism, 11, 163-186. www.jstor.org/stable/27759026
Keywords: behavioural contingency semantics, Skinner, verbal behavior
[References] [3 citing publications] [15 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1983d Skinner's Verbal Behavior IV - How to Improve Part IV - Skinner's Account of Syntax.pdf
Place, U. T. (1983e). Disposicijska svojstva i argument virtus dormitiva (Dispositional properties and the virtus dormitiva argument). Filozofska Istrazivanja, 3(7), 77-84.
Place, U. T. (1984-04-09). Conversation Analysis and the empirical study of verbal behaviour. The Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University of Sussex, 9-11 April 1984.
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Place, U. T. (1984-04) Conversation Analysis and the empirical study of verbal behaviour. Conference on Interdisciplinary Approaches to Interpersonal Communication, University of York, April 1984
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Place, U. T. (1984-05) The analysis of verbal transactions: a neglected aspect of Skinner's Verbal Behavior. The 10th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Nashville, Tennessee, in May 1984.
Note:
Also presented under the title 'Towards a behavior analysis of naturally-occurring verbal interactions' at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University of Sussex, 9-11 April 1984 and at a Conference on Interdisciplinary Approaches to Interpersonal Communication, University of York, April 1984.
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Place, U. T. (1984a). Logic, reference and mentalism: a comment on B.F.Skinner, 'The operational analysis of psychological terms'. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7(4), 565-566. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00027321
Note:
The download also includes the response of Skinner.
[References] [Is reply to] [1 citing publications] [1 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Download: 1984a Logic, Reference, and Mentalism.pdf
Place, U. T. (1984b). Some comments on Professor Searle's Reith lectures. [Publication source unknown]
[References] [Is reply to]
Download: 1984b Some Comments on Professor Searle's Reith Lectures.pdf
Place, U. T. (1984c). On the relation between intenTional-with-a-t and mental phenomena and intenSional-with-an-s, mentalistic and Oratio Obliqua locutions [Unpublished paper presented to the Senior Seminar, Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds, on Tuesday March 20th 1984; revised in 1987 or 1988].
[References] [2 citing publications]
Download: 1984c 1987 On the Relation between Intentional-with-a-T and Mental Phenomena and Intensional-with-an-S, Mentalistic and Oratio Obliqua Locutions.pdf
Place, U. T. (1985-07). The application of behavioral contingency semantics to the analysis of a narrative text. First International Pragmatics Conference, Via Reggio, Italy, July 1985,
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Place, U. T. (1985a). A response to Sundberg and Michael. VB News, 3, 38-45. [Reprinted in The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 3, 41-47]
[References] [Is reply to] [1 citing publications] [5 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1985a A Response to Sundberg and Michael.pdf
Place, U. T. (1985b). Conversation analysis and the empirical study of verbal behaviour. [Conference presentation abstract, delivered at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University of Sussex, April 1984]. Behavioural Processes, 10, 196-197
[References] [Talks]
Download: 1985b Conversational Analysis and the Empirical Study of Verbal Behaviour (abstract).pdf 1985b Conversation Analysis and the Empirical Study of Verbal Behaviour (complete text).pdf
Place, U. T. (1985c). Semicovert behavior and the concept of pain: a comment on H. Rachlin 'Pain and behavior'. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8, 70-71. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00019695
[References] [1 citing publications] [3 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1985c Semicovert Behavior and the Concept of Pain.pdf
Place, U. T. (1985d). Three senses of the word "tact". Behaviorism, 13, 63-74. www.jstor.org/stable/27759058
[References] [2 citing publications] [14 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Download: 1985d Three Senses of the Word 'Tact'.pdf 1985d Supplement to Three Senses of the Word 'Tact'.pdf complete table with all occurrences of the word 'tact' in Skinner's Verbal Behavior
Place, U. T. (1985e). Three senses of the word "tact" - a reply to Professor Skinner. Behaviorism, 13, 155-156.
[References] [Is reply to] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1985e Three Senses of the Word 'Tact' - A Reply to Professor Skinner.pdf
Place, U. T. (1985f). The application of behavioural contingency semantics to the analysis of a narrative text [Conference presentation]. First International Pragmatics Conference, Via Reggio, Italy, July 1985.
[Talks]
Download: not available yet
Place, U. T. (1986-04). The invisibility of extra-episodic reinforcement as a problem in presenting behavior analysis to conversation analysts. The Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, St. Andrew's, Scotland, April 1986.
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Place, U. T. (1986-09-15). Can a psychologist make sense of natural kind terms as rigid designators? Course on 'Meaning and Natural Kinds', Inter university Post graduate Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugo-slavia, 15-25 September 1986.
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Place, U. T. (1986-10-14) Contingency analysis applied to the pragmatics of conversation [Presentation]. Department of Psychology, University of York, 14 October 1986.
Place, U. T. (1986-11-06) Do we have intuitive knowledge of what is the case in all possible worlds? Department of Philosophy, University of York, 6 November, 1986.
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Place, U. T. (1986-12-20). Contingency analysis as applied to the pragmatics of naturally occurring verbal interactions. Christmas Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College , London, 20 December 1986.
Place, U. T. (1986a). Ethics as a system of behavior modification. In L. J. Parrott, & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Psychological Aspects of Language: The West Virginia Lectures (Chapter 6, pp.157-178). Charles C. Thomas.
[References] [1 citing publications] [2 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Download: 1986a Ethics as Behavior Modification - revised version.pdf revised and two footnotes added after publication of the book
Place, U. T. (1986b). Do we have intuitive knowledge of what is the case in all possible worlds [Presentation]. Department of Philosophy, University of York, 6th November 1986.
[References] [Talks]
Download: 1986b Do We Have Intuitive Knowledge of What is the Case in All Possible Worlds.pdf at the end is included an appendix which explicates the structure of the main argument of the paper
Place, U. T. (1986c). The invisibility of extra-episodic reinforcement as a problem in presenting behavior analysis to conversation analysts [Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, St. Andrew's, Scotland, April 1986].
[Talks] [1 referring publications by Place]
Place, U. T. (1986d). Can a psychologist make sense of natural kind terms as rigid designators? [Paper presented at the Course on 'Meaning and Natural Kinds', Inter university Post graduate Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugo-slavia, 15-25 September 1986].
Note:
Revised by the author in 1993.
[References] [Talks]
Place, U. T. (1987-03-10) Do we have intuitive knowledge of what is the case in all possible worlds? Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds, 10 March 1987.
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Place, U. T. (1987-04-11) Responses to a questionnaire on "Rules and Rule governed behaviour". Symposium on 'Rules and rule governed behaviour', Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University of Manchester, 14-16 April 1987.
Note:
Place was also the convenor of the symposium.
Place, U. T. (1987-04-14). Responses to a questionnaire on "Rules and Rule governed behaviour" Symposium on `Rules and rule governed behaviour' (convenor U. T. Place), Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University of Manchester, 14-16 April 1987.
Place, U. T. (1987-04-22). Skinner's distinction between rule governed and contingency shaped behaviour. First Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society, Ilkley College, 22-24 April 1987.
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Place, U. T. (1987-05-25). What some behavior analysts think about rules and rule governed behavior. Thirteenth Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Opryland Hotel, Nashville, Tennessee, 25-28 May 1987.
Place, U. T. (1987-06-15). A questionnaire on rules and rule governed behavior. Simposium, Segundo Instituto Internacional sobre Relaciones Verbales, Cuidad Universitaria, Mexico D.F., Mexico, 15 June 1987.
Place, U. T. (1987-06-16). Behavioral contingency semantics and the correspondence theory of truth. Second International Institute on Verbal Relations, Hacienda Vista Hermosa, Tequesquitengo, Morelos, Mexico, 16-20 June 1987.
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Place, U. T. (1987-08-17). Contingency analysis applied to naturally occurring verbal interactions. 1987 International Pragmatics Conference, University of Antwerp, 17-22 August 1987.
Place, U. T. (1987-09-12). Contingent identity. Course on 'Identity and Necessity', Inter university Post graduate Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugo slavia, 12-21 September 1987.
Place, U. T. (1987-10-27). Do we have intuitive knowledge of what is the case in all possible worlds? Department of Philosophy, University College of North Wales, Bangor, 27 October 1987.
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Place, U. T. (1987a). Skinner re-skinned. In S. Modgil, & C. Modgil (Eds.), B. F. Skinner, Consensus and Controversy (Part XI, Skinner and the 'Virtus dormitiva' argument, pp. 235-243). Falmer Press.
[Abstract]In 'Skinner Skinned' Dennett (1978, chapter 4) discusses two arguments, the virtus dormitiva and intentionality arguments, which he sees as the only solid ground underlying the various arguments which Skinner gives for repudiating the use of mentalistic explanations in a scientific psychology; and of these he endorses only the intentionality argument. I argue (a) that what Skinner finds objectionable in mentalistic idioms is their dispositional character, (b) that both the virtus dormitiva and intentionality argument are arguments against the use of dispositional property ascriptions in scientific explanation, and (c) that, since dispositional property ascriptions are essential to any causal explanation, Dennett has failed to provide any good reason for endorsing Skinner's repudiation of mentalism. It is suggested that mentalism is objectionable only insofar it involves the use of idioms which presuppose what Skinner (1969) calls 'rule-governed' behaviour to explain behaviour that is 'contingency-shaped'.
[References] [7 citing publications] [3 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by]
Download: 1987a Skinner Re-skinned.pdf
Place, U. T. (1987b). Skinner re-placed. In S. Modgil, & C. Modgil (Eds.), B. F. Skinner, Consensus and Controversy (Part XI, Skinner and the 'Virtus dormitiva' argument, pp. 249-251). Falmer Press.
[References] [Is reply to] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1987b Skinner Re-placed.pdf
Place, U. T. (1987c). Causal laws, dispositional properties and causal explanations. Synthesis Philosophica, 2(3), 149-160.
[Abstract]The role in causal explanation of sentences ascribing dispositional properties to the entities involved is discussed in the light of (a) the counterfactual theory of causal necessity originally proposed by Hume (1777) and more recently by Mackie (1962; 1974), (b) Ryle's (1949) hypothetical analysis of dispositional statements. and (c) Goodman's (1965) observation that counterfactuals are "sustained", not only by causal law statements universally quantified over entities of a given kind, but by dispositional statements which are restricted in their scope to a single individual. It is argued that what is required in order to support a causal counterfactual is universal quantification over a period of time which may be as short as you like, provided (a) that it covers the moment when the event hypothesised in the counterfactual is assumed to have occurred and (b) that its restriction to that period can be rationally justified.
[References] [11 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1987c Causal Laws, Dispositional Properties and Causal Explanations.pdf with corrections added after publication
Place, U. T. (1988-03-10). Pre linguistic and post linguistic concepts. Generalisation Group, Department of Psychology, University College of North Wales, Bangor, 10 March 1988.
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Place, U. T. (1988-03-11). Pre linguistic and post linguistic concepts. Department of Psychology, Trinity College, Dublin, 11 March 1988.
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Place, U. T. (1988-03-12). Behavioural contingency semantics and the correspondence theory of truth. Behaviour Analysis in Ireland, Spring Meeting, 12 March 1988
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Place, U. T. (1988-04-13). Consciousness as an information processing system. The Inaugural Symposium of the Mind-Body Group, Second Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society, Bodington Hall, University of Leeds, 13-15 April 1988.
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Place, U. T. (1988-04-19). Contingency analysis of naturally occurring verbal interactions, Experimental Analysis of Behaviour, Easter Conference, Department of Psychology, University of Leeds, 19-21 April 1988.
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Place, U. T. (1988-05-27). Contingency analysis of naturally occurring verbal interactions, Symposium on 'Problems and methods in recording, transcribing and analysing naturally occurring verbal interactions' (chaired and convened by U. T. Place), Fourteenth Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Wyndham Franklin Plaza Hotel, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 27-30 May 1988.
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Place, U. T. (1988-07-26). A radical behaviourist methodology for the empirical investigation of private events. Second European Meeting on the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour (EMEAB II), University of Liege, 26-29 July 1988.
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Place, U. T. (1988-09-07). The problem of mental content from the standpoint of linguistic empiricism. Course on 'Functionalism and Content', Inter university Post graduate Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, 7-15 September 1988.
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Place, U. T. (1988-11-12). Is consciousness still a brain process? Symposium on Donald Davidson's philosophy, Second International France Veber Colloquium, Gornja Radgona, Yugoslavia, 12th November 1988.
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Place, U. T. (1988-11-13). Intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. Second International France Veber Colloquium, Bad Radkersburg, Austria, 13 November 1988.
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Place, U. T. (1988-11-14). Towards a connectionist version of the causal theory of reference. Department of Philosophy, University of Zagreb, Yugoslavia, 14th November 1988
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Place, U. T. (1988-12-08). Towards a connectionist/behaviour analytic version of the causal theory of reference. Generalisation Group Meeting. Department of Psychology, University College of North Wales, Bangor, 8th December 1988
[Related]
Place, U. T. (1988-12-17). Connectionism and the resurrection of behaviourism. Christmas Meeting of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, Department of Psychology, University College, London, 17 December 1988.
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Place, U. T. (1988a). Thirty years on - is consciousness still a brain process? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66, 208-219.
[References] [12 citing publications] [5 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Download: 1988a Thirty Years On - Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process.pdf
Place, U. T. (1988b). Skinner's distinction between rule-governed and contingency-shaped behaviour. Philosophical Psychology, 1, 225-234. doi:10.1080/09515088808572941
[Abstract]The distinction that Skinner draws in his 'An operant analysis of problem solving' (1966, 1969, 1984) between 'rule-governed' and 'contingency'shaped' behaviour is arguably the most important single contribution to the theory of behaviour that he has made in a long and uniquely distinguished career. The concept of a 'rule' as a 'contingency-specifying' verbal formula which exercises 'stimulus control' over other aspects of the behaviour of a linguistically competent human being presents a formidable challenge to contemporary cognitive psychology in that the 'Representation' and 'computation' of environmental contingencies is seen as confined to verbally controlled behaviour emitted by linguistically competent human subjects. It also suggests a way of filling a major gap in the account of language offered by Skinner in his earlier book Verbal Behavior (1957), namely the lack of any account of how the speaker is able to use instructions to evoke behaviour which the listener never previously emitted and declarative sentences to convey information about contingencies which the listener has never previously encountered.
[References] [Talks] [5 citing publications] [2 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1988b Skinner's Distinction Between Rule Governed and Contingency Shaped Behaviour.pdf
Place, U. T. (1988c). What went wrong? - comments on B.F.Skinner's 'Whatever happened to psychology as the science of behavior?' Counselling Psychology Quarterly, 1, 307-309. doi:10.1080/09515078808254214
[References]
Download: 1988c What Went Wrong.pdf
Place, U. T. (1988d). Consciousness as an information processing system. The British Psychological Society 1988 Abstracts, 58.
[Related] [Talks]
Place, U. T. (1988e). The problem of mental content from the standpoint of linguistic empiricism [Presentation prepared for the Course on Functionalism and Content, Inter-university Post-graduate Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia (since 1991 Croatia), 7-15 September 1988] Inter-university Post-graduate Centre.
[References] [Talks]
Download: 1988e The Problem of Mental Content from the Standpoint of Linguistic Empiricism .pdf
Place, U. T. (1988f). Consciousness as an information processing system. [Paper presented to the Inaugural Symposium of the Mind-Body Group, Second Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society, University of Leeds, April 1988].
[References] [Talks] [1 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1988f Consciousness as an Information Processing System.pdf
Place, U. T. (1988h). Pre-linguistic and post-linguistic concepts. [Presentation to the Generalisation Group, Department of Psychology, University College of North Wales, Bangor at 10 March 1988 and to the Department of Psychology, Trinity College, Dublin at 11 March 1988.]
Note:
After the presentation revised by the author. The last revision is from 24th March 1999. The central argument of the paper has not been revised.
[References] [Talks]
Download: 1988h Pre-Linguistic and Post-Linguistic Concepts.pdf
Place, U. T. (1988i). Natsoulas v. Skinner on Feeling [Unpublished].
[Abstract]Natsoulas' critique of Skinner's account of feeling is a mixture of valid criticism, profound misunderstanding of Skinner's position and conceptual confusion.
Note:
It is unclear which publication of Natsoulas Place is reacting to in this unpublished comment. Natsoulas wrote several articles about Skinner’s views on consciousness with titles like Toward a model for consciousness in the light of B.F. Skinner’s contribution (1978), Perhaps the most difficult problem faced by behaviorism (1983), On the radical behaviorist conception of consciousness (1986), On the radical behaviorist conception of pain experience (1988). But no one is as explicit about feelings as suggested in this comment on Natsoulas. Perhaps Place is reacting to an unpublished paper of Natsoulas. The present comment is of interest because of the conceptual analysis of the verb to feel.
The date of this comment is unclear. I have chosen 1988, but this is more or less an educated guess.
[References]
Download: 1988i Natsoulas v. Skinner on Feeling.pdf
Place, U. T. (1989-03-16) Contingency analysis applied to the pragmatics and semantics of naturally occurring verbal interactions, Temple University's Tenth Annual Conference on Discourse Analysis, The Hershey Hotel, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 16-18 March 1989.
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Place, U. T. (1989-03-21). Contingency analysis applied to the pragmatics and semantics of naturally occurring verbal interactions. Conference on Conversation, Discourse and Conflict, Trinity College, Dublin, 21-23 March 1989.
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Place, U. T. (1989-03-28). Contingency analysis applied to the pragmatics and semantics of naturally occurring verbal interactions [Invited paper with peer commentary by L. V. Baker, J. Heritage, J. Schwieso and J. Rae]. Third Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society, Bishop Grosseteste College, Lincoln, 28-30 March 1989.
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Place, U. T. (1989-04-11). Relational frames and the role of logic in rule governed behaviour. Symposium on Rule governed Behaviour, Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, Easter Conference, Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, 11-13 April 1989.
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Place, U. T. (1989-05-23). Connectionism and the resurrection of behaviourism. Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada, 23 May 1989.
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Place, U. T. (1989-05-25). A radical behaviorist methodology for the empirical investigation of private events. Fifteenth Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Hyatt Regency Hotel, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 25-28 May 1989.
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Place, U. T. (1989-08-23) The role of the ethnomethodological experiment in the empirical investigation of social norms, and its application to conceptual analysis. First International Conference on Understanding Language Use in Everyday Life, University of Calgary, 23-26 August 1989.
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Place, U. T. (1989-09-05). Intensionalism, connectionism and the picture theory of meaning. Course on 'Naturalized Epistemology and the Philosophy of Mind', Inter-university Post-graduate Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, 5-15 September 1989.
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Place, U. T. (1989-10-11). Workshop on Conceptual analysis and behaviour analysis.. Verhaltensakademie, 67 Heilbronnerstraße, Stuttgart, West Germany, 11 October 1989.
Place, U. T. (1989-10-11). Workshop on Connectionism and the resurrection of behaviourism.
Verhaltensakademie, 67 Heilbronnerstraße, Stuttgart, West Germany, 11 October 1989.
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Place, U. T. (1989-10-12). Workshop on Rule-governed behaviour and psychiatric disorder. Verhaltensakademie, 67 Heilbronnerstraße, Stuttgart, West Germany, 12 October 1989.
Place, U. T. (1989-10-12). Workshop on The rehabilitation of an empiricist/behaviourist linguistics, Verhaltensakademie, 67 Heilbronnerstraße, Stuttgart, West Germany, 12 October 1989.
Place, U. T. (1989-10-18). Inside or outside? A debate on the nature of dispositions and their role in causation between Ullin Place and David Armstrong. Universität Graz, Institut der Philosophie, Graz, Austria, 18 October 1989.
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Place, U. T. (1989-10-19). Inside or outside? A debate on the nature of dispositions and their role in causation between Ullin Place and David Armstrong. Universität Salzburg, Institut der Philosophie, Salzburg, Austria, 19 October 1989.
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Place, U. T. (1989-11-02). Some thoughts on the work of the Würzburg group and the controversy it provoked, prompted by a visit to Würzburg 10- 16 October 1989. Departmental Seminar, Department of Psychology, University College of North Wales, Bangor, 2 November 1989.
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Place, U. T. (1989-12-19). A radical behaviourist methodology for the empirical investigation of private events. Symposium 'Introspection revisited', The London Conference of the British Psychological Society, 19 December 1989.
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Place, U. T. (1989a). Low claim assertions. In J. Heil (Ed.), Cause, mind and reality: Essays honoring C. B. Martin (pp. 121-135). Kluwer. doi:10.1007/978-94-011-9734-2_9
Keywords: colours, mind-brain identity theory, introspection, phenomenological fallacy, topic neutrality
[References] [2 citing publications] [4 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1989a Low claim assertions.pdf
Place, U. T. (1989b). Towards a connectionist version of the causal theory of reference. Acta Analytica, 4(5), 71-97.
[Abstract]The connectionist model of the brain as a parallel distributed processor (PDP) is invoked to provide a version of the the causal theory of the reference of natural kind terms and proper names which rejects Kripke's doctrine of rigid designation and retains the Port Royal-Hamilton thesis that the extension of a general term is determined by its comprehension or intension, together with Frege's thesis that the reference (Bedeutung) of a singular term is determined by its sense (Sinn).
[References] [Talks] [1 citing publications] [3 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1989b Towards a Connectionist Version of the Causal Theory of Reference.pdf
Place, U. T. (1989c). Concept acquisition and ostensive learning: a response to Professor Stemmer. Behaviorism, 17, 141-145. www.jstor.org/stable/41236094
[Abstract]The alternative offered by Professor Stemmer to cognitivist theories of the process whereby general terms acquire their meaning is criticised in its turn on the grounds that it presents an oversimplified view of the complex processes involved in the acquisition of word meanings.
[References] [Is reply to] [2 citing publications] [Is replied by]
Download: 1989c Concept Acquisition and Ostensive Learning - A Response to Professor Stemmer.pdf
Place, U. T. (1989d). Thirty five years on - is consciousness still a brain process? In J. Brandl, & W. L. Gombocz (Eds.), The Mind of Donald Davidson. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 36(1), 17-29.
[References] [Talks]
Download: 1989d Thirty Five Years On - Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process.pdf
Place, U. T. (1989e). Contingency analysis of naturally occurring verbal interactions [Conference presentation abstract]. British Psychological Society 1989 Abstracts, 67.
[Abstract]The analysis of verbal behaviour in terms of Skinner's (1969) concept of the three‑term contingency can be made at two different levels (a) at the semantic level at which the content of an utterance is analysed in terms of the contingency or contingencies it "specifies" or "depicts" and (b) at the pragmatic level at which the utterance is viewed as behaviour in relation to a preceding utterance by another speaker as antecedent and to a subsequent utterance or other behaviour emitted by the listener as consequence.
A technique is proposed for generating a pragmatic analysis of naturally occurring verbal interactions based partly on an interpretation of Harlow's (1959) distinction between "win‑stay/fail‑ shift" and "win‑shift/fail‑stay" contingencies in terms of Michael's (1982) concept of an "establishing condition" and its reversal, and partly on a behaviour analytic interpretation of the concepts of "turn", "sequence", "continuer", "adjacency pair" and "preference organisation" derived from the vocabulary of conversation analysis (Heritage 1985).
[References] [Related] [Talks]
Place, U. T. (1989f). Two concepts of consciousness: The biological/private and the linguistic/social. Revista mexicana de análisis de la conducta= Mexican journal of behavior analysis, (Extra 3), 69-88.
[Abstract]How much of the mental life which we attribute to ourselves and our fellow human beings should we attribute to other creatures, particularly those mammals to which we are most closely related in evolutionary terms, given that such creatures do not communicate with one another by means of anything resembling human natural language?
The paper approaches this question historically by considering the positions taken by Aristotle, Descartes, the post-Darwinians such as Romanes, the behaviorists down to Skinner, and contemporary philosophers such as Davidson and Fodor. A distinction is drawn between two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private which I argue we should not hesitate to attribute to all warm-blooded vertebrates and the linguistic/social which is exclusively human.
The concept of consciousness as biological and private is the 'consciousness' of traditional introspective psychology and of 'Is consciousness a brain process?' (Place 1956). It comprises the phenomena of selective attention, conceptualization, mental image formation, emotional reaction and motivation. The concept of consciousness as linguistic and social is the consciousness of Hegel, Marx, Vygotsky, Skinner and much contemporary philosophical psychology. It consists of an integrated system of propositional attitudes (beliefs) all of which are either formulated or susceptible to formulation as sentences in natural language (Skinner's "contingency-specifying stimuli" or "rules").
Note:
The publication date, 1989, can't be correct, but it is the date used by the journal. After publication the author revised the paper, see Place 1992f
[References] [Related]
Download: 1989f Two Concepts of Consciousness (Revista Mexicana de Analisis de la Conducta).pdf
Place, U. T. (1989g). Some thought on the work of the Würzburg School and the controversy it provoked, prompted by a visit to Würzburg 10-16 October 1989 [Unpublished presentation at the Departmental Seminar, Departement of Psychology, University College of North Wales, Bangor, 2nd November 1989].
[Abstract]The debate between the Würzburg School and E. B. Titchener which took place during the first decade of this century was not, as it is often portrayed, a debate about the existence or non-existence of imageless thought. It is better described as a conceptual and terminological issue about the nature of consciousness, the place of meaning in consciousness and the role of introspection (Selbstbeobachtung) in its empirical investigation.
Titchener's contention that in introspection the trained psychologist strips away meaning in order to provide a description of raw uninterpreted experience is shown to be the absurdity that it is by Wittgenstein's (1953) 'private language argument'. There is, nevertheless, a useful distinction to be drawn between two ways of acquiring mental self-knowledge:
(a) introspection (Selbstbeobachtung) which yields observational knowledge of the qualia of ongoing experience, and
(b) inner perception (innere Wahrnehmung) which yields intuitive knowledge of the onset and content of dispositional mental states.
In terms of this distinction, the Würzburg protocols are based on an inner perception of the content of the reported thoughts rather than on introspective observation of the qualia of experience.
The paper concludes with an assessment of the significance of the Würzburg-Titchener controversy for the subsequent history of psychology and for contemporary issues in psychology and the philosophy of mind.
Note:
Poshumously published as Place (2002/3)
[References] [Related] [Talks]
Download: 1989g Some Thought on the Work of the Wurzburg School and the Controversy it Provoked.pdf
Place, U. T. (1989h). Relational frames and the role of logic in rule-governed behaviour. [Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, Cambridge, 1989. Revised in 1997.]
[Abstract]The concept "relational frame" has been proposed by Steve Hayes (1991) as a higher order category in which Murray Sidman's concept of "equivalence class" is subsumed as a special case. Like equivalence, the relational frame concept was originally conceived as an interpretation of the behaviour of human subjects on a matching to sample task. While not denying the reality of relational frame abstraction in the case of intelligent human adults, it is suggested that this may be an over intellectual interpretation of the equivalence responding of children and less intelligent adults. It is proposed that the relational frame concept should instead be seen as an important contribution
(a) to relational logic, and
(b) to our understanding of the role of logic in rule governed behaviour,
and that the ability to abstract relational frames is something that appears much later in the process whereby linguistic competence is acquired than equivalence class responding on the matching to sample task.
[References] [Talks]
Download: 1989h Relational Frames and the Role of Logic in Rule-Governed Behaviour.pdf
Place, U. T. (1990-01-18). Symbolic processes and stimulus equivalence. Departmental Seminar, Department of Psychology, University College of North Wales, Bangor, 18 January 1990.
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Place, U. T. (1990-04-02). E. G. Boring and the mind-brain identity theory. Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology, Section of the British Psychological Society, Bishop Grosseteste College, Lincoln, 2nd-4th April 1990.
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Place, U. T. (1990-04-04). How to combine social constructivism with scientific realism.. Course on the Philosophy of Science, Inter- university Centre, Dubrovnik, 2-13 April, 1990.
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Place, U. T. (1990-04-18). Eliminative connectionism: its implications for a return to an empiricist/behaviourist linguistics. The Annual conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior Group, University of York, 18-21 April 1990.
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Place, U. T. (1990-05-27). Eliminative connectionism: its implications for a return to an empiricist/behaviorist linguistics. Sixteenth Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Opryland Hotel, Nashville, Tennessee, 27-31 May 1990.
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Place, U. T. (1990-09-10). Towards a connectionist version of the causal theory of reference. Course on 'Truth and Reference', Inter- university Post-graduate Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, 10 -14 September 1990.
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Place, U. T. (1990-09-20). How to combine social constructivism with scientific realism. Philosophical discussion group, Rijeka, 20 September 1990.
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Place, U. T. (1990-09-21). Holism and cognitive dissonance in the discrimination of correspondence between sentences and situations. The Third International France Veber Congress, Maribor, Slovenia, Yugoslavia and Bad Radkersburg, Styria, Austria, 21-23 September 1990.
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Place, U. T. (1990-09-24). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. Slovenian Philosophical Society, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Ljubljana, 24 September 1990
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Place, U. T. (1990a). E. G. Boring and the mind-brain identity theory. The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 11, 20-31.
[References] [Talks] [5 citing publications] [3 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1990a E.G. Boring and the Mind-Brain Identity Theory.pdf added to the end of the document are excerpts from Boring, 1933
Place, U. T. (1990b). Intensionalism, connectionism and the picture theory of meaning. Acta Analytica, 5(6), 47-63.
[Abstract]The connectionist model of the brain as a parallel distributed processor (PDP) is invoked in support of the view that the sense of singular terms and the intension of general terms and of more complex linguistic expressions determine
(1) the reference of singular terms,
(2) the extension of general terms,
(3) the truth of propositions,
(4) the validity of arguments,
(5) the meaning of sentences.
Keywords: connectionism, conceptualism, correspondence theory of truth, extensionalism, intensionalism, ontology, philosophy of language, picture theory of meaning, universals
[References] [Talks] [5 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1990b Intensionalism, Connectionism and the Picture Theory of Meaning.pdf
Place, U. T. (1990c). A radical behaviourist methodology for the empirical investigation of private events [Conference paper abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society 1990 Abstracts, 38.
[Related]
Place, U. T. (1990d). Can social constructivism be reconciled with scientific realism [Presentation to the Course on the Philosophy of Science at the Inter-university Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, April 11th 1990]. Inter-university Centre, Dubrovnik
Keywords: conceptualism, connectionism, universals
[References] [Talks]
Download: 1990d Can Social Constructivism Be Reconciled With Scientific Realism.pdf
Place, U. T. (1990e). Critical Notice [Unpublished book review of Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind Brain by Patricia Smith Churchland. MIT Press, l986].
Keywords: conceptual analysis, eliminative materialism, mind-brain identity theory, neurophilosophy
Note:
This critical notice was commissioned by the editor of the Quarterly Journal of Philosophy in 1986 when the book first appeared; but since it was not completed until four years later in 1990, it was never submitted. It was revised in 1999 in anticipation of a meeting with Pat Churchland in Siena, Italy, in October of that year - a meeting that because of the illness of Place never took place.
[References] [Reviewed publication(s)]
Download: 1990e Critical Notice.pdf
Place, U. T. (1991-02-19). Eliminative connectionism and its implications for a return to an empiricist/behaviorist linguistics. Footsteps of the Brain in the Syntax of Natural Language. Three-day Conference assembled to discuss five papers presented by Dr. U. T. Place. Neurosciences Institute, New York, 19th-21st February 1991.
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Place, U. T. (1991-02-19). The role of the ethnomethodological experiment in the empirical investigation of social norms, and its application to conceptual analysis. Footsteps of the Brain in the Syntax of Natural Language. Three-day Conference assembled to discuss five papers presented by Dr. U. T. Place. Neurosciences Institute, New York, 19th-21st February 1991.
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Place, U. T. (1991-02-20a). From syntax to reality: the picture theory of meaning. Footsteps of the Brain in the Syntax of Natural Language. Three-day Conference assembled to discuss five papers presented by Dr. U. T. Place. Neurosciences Institute, New York, 19th-21st February 1991.
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Place, U. T. (1991-02-20b). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. Footsteps of the Brain in the Syntax of Natural Language. Three-day Conference assembled to discuss five papers presented by Dr. U. T. Place. Neurosciences Institute, New York, 19th-21st February 1991.
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Place, U. T. (1991-02-20c). Consciousness as an information-prcessing system. Footsteps of the Brain in the Syntax of Natural Language. Three-day Conference assembled to discuss five papers presented by Dr. U. T. Place. Neurosciences Institute, New York, 19th-21st February 1991.
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Place, U. T. (1991-02-25). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 25 February 1991.
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Place, U. T. (1991-03-01). Eliminative connectionism: its implications for a return to an empiricist-behaviorist linguistics. Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, 1 March 1991.
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Place, U. T. (1991-03-07). Eliminative connectionism: its implications for a return to an empiricist-behaviorist linguistics. Department of Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts, 7 March 1991.
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Place, U. T. (1991-03-08). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. Department of Philosophy and Business Ethics, Bentley College, Waltham, Massachusetts, 8 March 1991.
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Place, U. T. (1991-03-18). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. The Psychology and Linguistic Sections of the New York Academy of Sciences, 18 March 1991
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Place, U. T. (1991-03-25) Contingency analysis as applied to the pragmatics and semantics of naturally occurring verbal interactions. Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 25 March 1991.
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Place, U. T. (1991-03-29). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. Annual Meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Atlanta, Georgia, 29 March 1991.
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Place, U. T. (1991-04-05). Symbolic processes and stimulus equivalence. Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior Group, Department of Psychology, University College, London, 5 April 1991.
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