LaRock, E. (2008). Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process? International Philosophical Quarterly, 48(2), 201-229. doi:10.5840/ipq20084827
[Abstract]I argue on the basis of recent findings in neuroscience that consciousness is not a brain process, and then explore some alternative, non-reductive options concerning the metaphysical relationship between consciousness and the brain, such as weak and strong accounts of the emergence of consciousness and the constitution view of consciousness. I propose an Aristotelian account of the strong emergence of consciousness. This account motivates a wider ontology than reductive physicalism and makes reference to formal causation as a way explaining the causal power of consciousness. What is meant by formal causation, in this context, is that consciousness has the causal power to organize or control neuronal activity. This notion of causation is elaborated and supported by recent findings in the neurosciences. An advantage of this empirically informed approach is that proponents of the irreducibility of consciousness no longer need to rely upon conceptually based arguments alone, but can build a case against reductive physicalism that has a significant empirical foundation.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Lassiter, C., & Vukov, J. (2021). In search of an ontology for 4E theories: from new mechanism to causal powers realism. Synthese, 199, 9785–9808. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03225-1
[Abstract]Embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended (4E) theorists do not typically focus on the ontological frameworks in which they develop their theories. One exception is 4E theories that embrace New Mechanism. In this paper, we endorse the New Mechanist’s general turn to ontology, but argue that their ontology is not the best on the market for 4E theories. Instead, we advocate for a different ontology: causal powers realism. Causal powers realism posits that psychological manifestations are the product of mental powers, and that mental powers are empirically-discoverable features of individuals that account for the causal work those individuals do. We contend that causal powers realism provides a unifying framework for the central commitments of 4E theories, as well as additional resources for theorizing in a 4E framework. And while New Mechanism offers some of these resources as well, we argue that causal powers realism is ultimately the better of the two.
[Citing Place (1996c)]  

Lau, H. (2022). In Consciousness we Trust: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Subjective Experience. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198856771.001.0001
[Abstract]This book puts forward a mechanistic account of subjective experience based on a review of the current cognitive neuroscience literature on conscious perception, attention, and metacognition. It is argued that current empirical studies are often misinterpreted. An undue focus has been placed on perceptual capacity rather than subjective experience per se. Null findings are often overemphasized despite the limited sensitivity of the methods used. A synthesis is proposed to combine the advantages and intuitions of both global and local theories of consciousness. This is discussed in the context of our understanding of the sense of agency, emotion, rationality, culture, philosophical theories, and clinical applications. Taking insights from both physiology and current research in artificial intelligence, the resulting view directly addresses the qualitative nature of subjective experience.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Lazzeri, F., & Zilio, D. (2023) Commitments with reductive and emergent relations in behavior. Behavior and Philosophy, 51, 102-124
[Abstract]The philosophical debate on reduction and emergence commonly springs from the division of domains (and subdomains) correlated with the sciences, such as biological domains (e.g., genetics and physiology) and psychological domains (e.g., learning, perception, emotions). These domains are interconnected, with some depending on or composed of elements from others. The debate revolves around whether certain domains are reducible or irreducible to those on which they depend or are composed. In this work, following an examination of common interpretations of the notions of reduction and emergence, we aim to identify and compare radical behaviorism and molar behaviorism as regards the reducibility or irreducibility between the following pairs of domains: (i) behavioral – physiological; (ii) psychological – behavioral; (iii) teleological – contingencies of natural or operant selection; and (iv) cultural – behavioral. This article contributes, among other things, to explaining several core similarities and differences between radical behaviorism (as worked out by B. F. Skinner) and molar behaviorism (as worked out by W. M. Baum and H. Rachlin); as well as some conceptual aspects pertaining to the identity of behavior analysis and its interfaces with related research areas both in natural and social sciences.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Lea, S. E., Wills, A. J., Leaver, L. A., Ryan, C. M., Bryant, C. M., & Millar, L. (2009). A comparative analysis of the categorization of multidimensional stimuli: II. Strategic information search in humans (Homo sapiens) but not in pigeons (Columba livia). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 123(4), 406. doi:10.1037/a0016851
[Abstract]Pigeons and undergraduates learned conditional discriminations involving multiple spatially separated stimulus dimensions. Under some conditions, the dimensions were made available sequentially. In 3 experiments, the dimensions were all perfectly valid predictors of the response that would be reinforced and mutually redundant; in 2 others, they varied in validity. In tests with stimuli in which 1 of the 3 dimensions took an anomalous value, most but not all individuals of both species categorized them in terms of single dimensions. When information was delivered as a function of the passage of time, some students, but no pigeons, waited for the most useful information, especially when the cues differed in objective validity. When the subjects could control information delivery, both species obtained information selectively. When cue validities varied, almost all students tended to choose the most valid cues, and when all cues were valid, some chose the cues by which they classified test stimuli. Only a few pigeons chose the most useful information in either situation. Despite their tendency to unidimensional categorization, the pigeons showed no evidence of rule-governed behavior, but students followed a simple “take-the-best” rule.
[Citing Place (1988b) in context]  

Leach, S. (2019). U. T. Place and the mystical origin of modern physicalism. Think, 18(53), 75-78. doi:10.1017/S1477175619000228
[Abstract]An introduction to the role of U. T. Place in the development of modern physicalism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (2004)]  

Leigland, S. (1996). An experimental analysis of ongoing verbal behavior: Reinforcement, verbal operants, and superstitious behavior. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 13(1), 79-104. doi:10.1007/BF03392908
[Abstract]Four adult humans were asked to asked to "find" and talk about a particular topic to a person in an adjoining room, and were instructed that they would hear a short beep (the only form of reply from the other person) when they were talking about the topic, or were "close" to the topic. In Session 1, the experimenter in the adjoining room presented the beeps in the manner of shaping, or the differential reinforcement of successive approximations, "toward" the designated topic. In Session 2, the same conditions were in effect but the experimenter was unable to hear the subject and the beeps were presented noncontingently in a way that roughly matched the frequency and distribution of presentations in Session 1. In Session 3, shaping conditions were again in effect but with a different topic than that designated for Session 1. Audio recordings were transcribed in a way that was designed to show the progress of shaping over time. These and additional forms of supporting data and accompanying rationale are presented and discussed in detail. Issues raised by the methodology and results of the experiment include the nature of the verbal operant, superstitious verbal behavior, and a variety of methodological issues relevant to the experimental analysis of ongoing or continuous verbal behavior.
[Citing Place (1991a) in context]  

Leigland, S. (1996). The functional analysis of psychological terms: In defense of a research program. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 13(1), 105-122. doi:10.1007/BF03392909
[Abstract]In 1945, B. F. Skinner outlined a proposal that psychological or mentalistic terms found in natural language might be analyzed empirically in terms of the variables, conditions, and contingencies of which they may be observed to be a function. Such an analysis would enable discriminations to be made between different classes of variables that enter into the control of the term. In this way, the analysis would clarify what is traditionally called the "meanings" of such terms as they occur as properties of verbal behavior. Despite his expressed confidence in the success of such a program, Skinner largely abandoned the functional analysis of psychological terms in favor of the development of a promising new field; the experimental analysis of behavior. The present paper argues that the original program is of great importance as well, and for the following reasons: (a) to make full, immediate, and (most importantly) effective contact with the range of issues and terms of central importance to the traditionally and culturally important concepts of "mind" and "mental life" (and thereby demonstrating the relevance of radical behaviorism to the full range of human and verbal behavior); and (b) to extend the methodology of the functional analysis of verbal behavior more generally. Such a research program would demonstrate, through an empirically-based scientific analysis, that the philosophical problems concerning "mental life" may be productively analyzed as problems of verbal behavior. Issues of methodology are discussed, and possible methodological strategies are proposed regarding the confirmation of behavior analytic interpretations of mentalistic terms.
[Citing Place (1993c) in context]  

Leigland, S. (1998). Current Status and Future Directions of the Analysis of Verbal Behavior - The Methodological Challenge of the Functional Analysis of Verbal Behavior The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 15(1),125-127. doi:10.1007/BF03392933
[Citing Place (1991a) in context]  [Citing Place (1997d) in context]  

Leigland, S. (2000). A contingency interpretation of Place’s contingency anomaly in ordinary conversation. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 161-165. www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2755454/pdf/anverbbehav00028-0161.pdf doi:10.1007/BF03392962
[Abstract]A verbal phenomenon often reported in the research literature of conversation analysis is reviewed. The phenomenon involves the observation that spoken sentences often receive consequences from listeners, and that the effect of these consequences appears to be variability in sentence emission, whereas the absence of such consequences appears to produce response persistence. If the speaker's sentences function as units of  verbal behavior and the listener's responses function as reinforcers, the effect seems to run  contrary to reinforcement contingency effects observed in the laboratory, where reinforcement produces response differentiation and extinction produces an increase in response variability and a decrease in the response class previously selected by reinforcement. An interpretation of the conversation phenomenon is presented, employing standard reinforcement contingencies for which the behavioral dynamics involved may be seen when speaker's sequence of sentences is construed as a behavior chain.
[Citing Place (1991a)]  [Citing Place (1997a)]  [Citing Place (1997d)]  
Download: Leigland (2000a) A Contingency Interpretation of Place's Contingency Anomaly in Ordinary Conversation.pdf

Leigland, S. (2003). Private Events and the Language of the Mental : Comments on Moore Behavior and Philosophy, 31, 159-164
[Citing Place (1993c) in context]  

Leigland, S. (2014). Contingency horizon: On private events and the analysis of behavior. The Behavior analyst, 37(1), 13-24 doi:10.1007/s40614-014-0002-5
[Abstract]Skinner’s radical behaviorism incorporates private events as biologically based phenomena that may play a functional role with respect to other (overt) behavioral phenomena. Skinner proposed four types of contingencies, here collectively termed the contingency horizon, which enable certain functional relations between private events and verbal behavior. The adequacy and necessity of this position has met renewed challenges from Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism and Baum’s molar behaviorism, both of which argue that all “mental” phenomena and terminology may be explained by overt behavior and environment–behavior contingencies extended in time. A number of lines of evidence are presented in making a case for the functional characteristics of private events, including published research from behavior analysis and general experimental psychology, as well as verbal behavior from a participant in the debate. An integrated perspective is offered that involves a multiscaled analysis of interacting public behaviors and private events.
[Citing Place (1993c) in context]  

Leslie, J. C. (2001). Broad and deep, but always rigorous: Some appreciative reflections on Ullin Place's contributions to Behaviour Analysis. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 159-165. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759425
[Abstract]Ullin Place's contributions to the literature of behaviour analysis and behaviourism span the period from 1954 to 1999. In appreciation of his scholarship and breadth of vision, this paper reviews an early widely-cited contribution ("Is consciousness a brain process?" British Journal of Psychology, 1956, pp. 47-53) and a late one which should become widely cited ("Rescuing the science of human behavior from the ashes of socialism," Psychological Record, 1997, pp. 649-659). It is noted that the sweep of Place's work links behaviour analysis to its philosophical roots in the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and also looks forward to the further functional analysis of language-using behaviour.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [Citing Place (1982)]  [Citing Place (1983d)]  [Citing Place (1992f)]  [Citing Place (1997b)]  [Citing Place (1997d)]  [Citing Place (1998e)]  
Download: Leslie (2001) Broad and Deep but Always Rigorous - Some Appreciative Reflections on Ullin Place's Contributions to Behaviour Analysis.pdf

Levin, J. (2022). The metaphysics of mind. Cambridge University Press.
[Abstract]This book presents and discusses the major contemporary theories of the nature of mind, including Dualism, Physicalism, Role Functionalism, Russellian Monism, Panpsychism, and Eliminativism. Its primary goal is to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the theories in question, including their prospects for explaining the special qualitative character of sensations and perceptual experiences; the special outer-directedness of beliefs, desires, and other intentional states; and – more generally – the place of the mind in the world of nature, and the relation between mental states and the behaviors that they (seem to) cause. It also discusses, briefly, some further questions about the metaphysics of mind, namely, whether groups of individuals, or entire communities, can possess mental states that cannot be reduced to the mental states of the individuals in those communities and whether the boundaries between mind and world are as sharp as they may seem.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Levin, J. (2023). Functionalism. In E. N. Zalta, & U. Nodelman (Eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2023 Edition). plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/functionalism/
[Abstract]Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. This doctrine is rooted in Aristotle’s conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes’s conception of the mind as a “calculating machine”, but it has become fully articulated (and popularly endorsed) only in the last third of the 20th century. Though the term ‘functionalism’ is used to designate a variety of positions in a variety of other disciplines, including psychology, sociology, economics, and architecture, this entry focuses exclusively on functionalism as a philosophical thesis about the nature of mental states.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Levy Y. (2019). Is attending a mental process? Mind & Language, 34, 283–298. doi:10.1111/mila.12211
[Abstract]The nature of attention has been the topic of a lively research programme in psychology for over a century. But there is widespread agreement that none of the theories on offer manage to fully capture the nature of attention. Recently, philosophers have become interested in the debate again after a prolonged period of neglect. This paper contributes to the project of explaining the nature of attention. It starts off by critically examining Christopher Mole's prominent “adverbial” account of attention, which traces the failure of extant psychological theories to their assumption that attending is a kind of process. It then defends an alternative, process-based view of the metaphysics of attention, on which attention is understood as an activity and not, as psychologists seem to implicitly assume, an accomplishment. The entrenched distinction between accomplishments and activities is shown to shed new light on the metaphysics of attention. It also provides a novel diagnosis of the empirical state of play.
[Citing Place (1954)]  

Livanios, V. (2021). Manifestation and unrestricted dispositional monism. Acta Analytica. doi:10.1007/s12136-021-00476-y
[Abstract]Most metaphysicians agree that powers (at least the non-fundamental ones) can exist without being manifested. The main goal of this paper is to show that adherents of an unrestricted version of Dispositional Monism cannot provide a plausible metaphysical account of the difference between a situation in which a power-instance is not manifested and a situation in which a manifestation of that power-instance actually occurs unless they undermine their own view. To this end, two kinds of manifestation-relation (token-level and type-level, respectively) are introduced and it is argued that dispositional monists should appeal to the former in order to offer the required account. After defending the introduction of token-level-manifestation-relations against objections to their metaphysical robustness and explanatory non-redundancy, it is finally argued that their existence is incompatible with the core tenet of an unrestricted form of Dispositional Monism because they cannot be powers.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Livingston, P. (2002). Experience and structure: Philosophical history and the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(3), 15-33.
[Abstract]Investigation and analysis of the history of the concepts employed in contemporary philosophy of mind could significantly change the contemporary debate about the explainability of consciousness. Philosophical investigation of the history of the concept of qualia and the concept of scientific explanation most often presupposed in contemporary discussions of consciousness reveals  the origin of both concepts in some of the most interesting philosophical  debates of the twentieth century. In particular, a historical investigation of the inheritance of concepts of the elements of experience and the nature of scientific explanation from C. I. Lewis and Rudolf Carnap to contemporary theorists like David Chalmers shows the profound continuity of these concepts throughout the analytic tradition, despite important changes in the dimensions of philosophical relevance and significance that have characterized the emerging debate. I argue that, despite the significant methodological shift from the  foundationalist epistemology of the 1920s to today’s functionalist explanations of the mind, the problem of explaining consciousness has remained the problem of analysing or describing the logical and relational structure of immediate, given experience. Appreciation of this historical continuity of form recommends a more explicit discussion of the philosophical reasons for the underlying distinction between structure and content, reasons that trace to Lewis and Carnap’s influential but seldom-discussed understanding of the relationship between subjectivity, conceived as the realm of private, ineffable contents, and objectivity, understood as public, linguistic expressibility. With this historical background in mind, the contemporary debate about the explanation of consciousness can be reinterpreted as a debate about the relationship between ineffable experience and structurally conceived meaning.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Loaiza, J. R. (2024). Functionalism and the emotions. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 75(1), 233-251 doi:10.1086/715207
[Abstract]Functionalism as a philosophical position has been recently applied to the case of emotion research. However, a number of objections have been raised against applying such a view to scientific theorizing on emotions. In this article, I argue that functionalism is still a viable strategy for emotion research. To do this, I present functionalism in philosophy of mind and offer a sketch of its application to emotions. I then discuss three recent objections raised against it and respond to each of them. These objections claim that functionalism is intractable because (i) it does not support a scientifically interesting taxonomy of emotions for experimental settings, (ii) it is inherently teleological, and (iii) it cannot be falsified. I argue that these objections either rely on a simplified version of functionalism as a philosophical position or they pose challenges that functionalists can readily address. Lastly, I conclude by drawing some lessons these objections suggest for a tractable functionalist account of emotions.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Luce, D. R. (1966). Mind-body identity and psycho-physical correlation. Philosophical Studies, 17(1), 1-7. doi:10.1007/BF00452165
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Ludwig, K. (2003). The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview. In S. P. Stich, & T. A. Warfield, (Eds.),The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 1). Wiley, doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch1
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Lumsden, D. & Ulatowski, J. (2023). Virtue, Self-Narratives, and the Causes of Action. Acta Analytica 23 October 2023. doi:10.1007/s12136-023-00569-w
[Abstract]Virtues can be considered to play a causal role in the production of behaviour and so too can our self-narratives. We identify a point of connection between the two cases and draw a parallel between them. But, those folk psychological notions, virtues and self-narratives, fail to reduce smoothly to the underlying human physiology. As a first step towards handling that failure to connect with the scientific framework that is the familiar grounding for our understanding of causation, we consider the causal theory of action, a leading theory of action, which shows how reasons, understood as an appropriate pair of beliefs and desires, can be treated as causes of action. Davidson’s picture is based on cause as a relation between events, which can have both a description in scientific terms and in folk psychological terms. The character of both virtues and self-narratives is not that of events, even extended ones, so we need to refer to examples of scientific explanation that incorporate structural properties of objects. While we retain the spirit of the causal theory, we wish to guard against any unwarranted optimism that an explicitly scientific explanation for human action lies in our future, drawing on Chomsky’s view that a causal explanation of human actions is likely to remain beyond human science forming capacities. We take a mild-realist view of virtues and self-narratives, in the style of Dennett. We argue that, in spite of that limited form of realism, underlined by Chomsky’s mysterian position in this domain, we still need to frame our explanations of behaviour based on virtues and self-narratives in causal terms.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Lycan, W. G. (1981). Form, function, and feel. The Journal of Philosophy, 78, 24-50.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Lycan, W. G. (1994). Functionalism. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), A companion to the philosophy of mind (Pp. 317-323). Blackwell.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Lycan, W. G. (2003). The Mind-Body Problem. In S. P. Stich, & T. A. Warfield (Eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 2). doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch2
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Lycan, W. G. (2014). Functionalism. In G. Oppy & N. N. Trakakis (Eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Second Edition, pp. 203-209; first edition 2010). Monash University Publishing.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1967) in context]  

Lycan, W. G. (2024). Responses to the Papers. In: Green, M., Michel, J.G. (Eds.), William Lycan on Mind, Meaning, and Method. Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-55771-2_13
[Abstract]I am greatly honored to be the subject of this volume. In these Responses, I discuss points made by each of the contributors. The responses are organized by topic area: epistemology; philosophy of language; philosophy of mind and perception; meta-ethics; philosophy of religion; metaphilosophy.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Lyons, W. (2001). Matters of mind. Routledge
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  

Macdonald, C. (1989). Mind-body identity theories. Routledge.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Malatesti, L. (2012). The knowledge argument and phenomenal concepts. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Malatesti, L. (2013). Zombies, the uniformity of nature, and contingent physicalism: A sympathetic response to Boran Berčić. Prolegomena, 12(2), 245–259.
[Abstract]Boran Berčić, in the second volume of his recent book Filozofija (2012), offers two responses to David Chalmers’s conceivability or modal argument against physicalism. This latter argument aims at showing that zombies, our physical duplicates who lack consciousness, are metaphysically possible, given that they are conceivable. Berčić’s first response is based on the principle of the uniformity of nature that states that causes of a certain type will always cause effects of the same type. His second response is based on the assumption that the basic statements of physicalism in philosophy of mind are or should be contingently true. I argue that if Berčić’s first defence is aimed at the conceivability of zombies, it is unsatisfactory. Moreover, I argue that a quite similar argument, offered by John Perry in his book Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness (2001), is afflicted by a similar problem. Nevertheless, under a more plausible interpretation, Berčić’s argument might be taken to attack the metaphysical possibility of zombies. This version of the argument might be effective and has the merit to point out a so far overlooked link between the discussion of the Chalmers’s conceivability arguments against physicalism and the modal strength of causal links and natural laws. Then, I argue that Berčić’s second defence of physicalism, which cannot be combined consistently with his first one, in any case, should not be formulated in the terms of contingent physicalism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Malcolm, N. (1964). Scientific materialism and the identity theory. Dialogue, III, 115-125
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [2 reprinting collections]  

Malec, M., & Markič, O. (2025). Cognitive Science, the Explanatory Gap and Kripke Against the Mind-Brain Identity Theory. Ars & Humanitas, 19(1), 107-123. doi:10.4312/ars.19.1.107-123
[Abstract]Cognitive science, by its inherently interdisciplinary nature, faces the challenge of integration. This paper outlines the challenge and provides a short history of the proposed solutions. Yet another challenge comes from philosophers who believe that the mind is radically different from the body (the mind-body problem), often identifying consciousness as the most recalcitrant aspect of the mind (the problem of consciousness). We begin by examining Saul Kripke’s argument against the possibility of identifying mental states with physical states, as proposed in the mind-brain identity theory, and argue that it is not decisive. We then discuss the difficulty of investigating and explaining subjective experience with the standard scientific methods and conclude with two contemporary approaches that aim to bridge this explanatory gap.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Manzotti, R. (2006). Consciousness and existence as a process. Mind and Matter, 4(1), 7-43.
[Abstract]The problem of consciousness is traditionally conceived as the impossible task of justifying the emergence of an inner world of experiences, qualia and/or mental representations out of a substratum of physical things conceived as autonomously existing. I argue that an alternative approach is possible but it requires a conceptual reconstruction of consciousness and existence, the two being different perspectives on the same underlying process. On this basis, I present a view of direct (conscious) perception that supposes that there is a unity between the activity in the brain and the events in the external world. The outlined process is here referred to as onphene. I will use the example of the rainbow as an intuition pump to introduce the new perspective. Eventually, the same approach is used to explain other kinds of consciousness: illusions, memory, dreams, and phosphenes. The view presented here shares some elements with neo realism and can be considered as a form of radical externalism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Manzotti, R. (2006). An alternative view of conscious perception. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(6), 45-79.
[Abstract]I present a view of conscious perception that supposes a processual unity between the activity in the brain and the perceived event in the external world. I use the rainbow to provide a first example, and subsequently extend the same rationale to more complex examples such as perception of objects, faces and movements. I use a process-based approach as an explanation of ordinary perception and other variants, such as illusions, memory, dreams and mental imagery. This approach provides new insights into the problem of conscious representation in the brain and phenomenal consciousness. It is a form of anti-cranialism different from but related to other kinds of externalism.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Manzotti, R. (2016). Experiences are objects. Towards a mind-object identity theory. Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 7(1), 16-36. doi:10.4453/rifp.2016.0003
[Abstract]Traditional mind-body identity theories maintain that consciousness is identical with neural activity. Consider an alternative identity theory – namely, a mind-object identity theory of consciousness (OBJECTBOUND). I suggest to take into consideration whether one’s consciousness might be identical with the external object. The hypothesis is that, when I perceive a yellow banana, the thing that is one and the same with my consciousness of the yellow banana is the very yellow banana one can grab and eat, rather than the neural processes triggered by the banana. The bottom line is that one’s conscious experience of an object is the object one experiences. First, I outline the main hypothesis and the relation between mind, body, and object. Eventually, I address a series of traditional obstacles such as hallucinations, illusions, and commonsensical assumptions.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Manzotti, R. (2017). Consciousness and object: A mind-object identity physicalist theory. John Benjamins Publishing Company. doi:10.1075/aicr.95
[Abstract]What is the conscious mind? What is experience? In 1968, David Armstrong asked “What is a man?” and replied that a man is “a certain sort of material object”. This book starts from his question but proceeds along a different path. The traditional mind-brain identity theory is set aside, and a mind-object identity theory is proposed in its place: to be conscious of an object is simply to be made of that object. Consciousness is physical but not neural. This groundbreaking hypothesis is supported by recent empirical findings in both perception and neuroscience, and is herein tested against a series of objections of both conceptual and empirical nature: the traditional mind-brain identity arguments from illusion, hallucinations, dreams, and mental imagery. The theory is then compared with existing externalist approaches including disjunctivism, realism, embodied cognition, enactivism, and the extended mind. Can experience and objects be one and the same?
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  

Manzotti, R. (2021) The boundaries and location of consciousness as identity theories deem fit. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofica e Psicologia, 12(3), 225-241. doi:10.4453/rifp.2021.0022
[Abstract]In this paper I approach the problem of the boundaries and location of consciousness in a strictly physicalist way. I start with the debate on extended cognition, pointing to two unresolved issues: the ontological status of cognition and the fallacy of the center. I then propose using identity to single out the physical basis of consciousness. As a tentative solution, I consider Mind-Object Identity (MOI) and compare it with other identity theories of mind.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Manzotti, R., & Moderato, P. (2010). Is neuroscience adequate as the forhtcoming “mindscience”? Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 1-29.
[Abstract]The widespread use of brain imaging techniques encourages conceiving of neuroscience as the forthcoming "mindscience". Perhaps surprisingly for many, this conclusion is still largely unwarranted. The present paper surveys various shortcomings of neuroscience as a putative "mindscience". The analysis shows that the scope of mind (both cognitive and phenomenal) falls outside that of neuroscience. Of course, such a conclusion does not endorse any metaphysical or antiscientific stance as to the nature of the mind. Rather, it challenges a series of assumptions that the undeniable success of neuroscience has fostered. In fact, physicalism is here taken as the only viable ontological framework — an assumption that does not imply that the central nervous system exhausts the physical domain. There are other options like behavior, embodiment, situatedness, and externalism that are worth considering. Likewise, neuroscience is not the only available epistemic option as to the understanding of mind.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Marek, J. C. (1994). On the relation of the mental and the physical In R. Casati, B. Smith, & G. White (Eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium. 15-22 August 1993 Kirchberg am Wechsel (Austria) (pp. 139-145). Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Marmodoro, A. (2010). Do powers need powers to make them powerful? From pandispositionalism to Aristotle In A. Marmodoro (Ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations (pp. 337 - 352). Routledge.
[Abstract]Do powers have powers? More urgently, do powers need further powers to do what powers do? Stathis Psillos says they do. He finds this a fatal flaw in the nature of pure powers: pure powers have a regressive nature. Their nature is incoherent to us, and they should not be admitted into the ontology. I argue that pure powers do not need further powers; rather, they do what they do because they are powers. I show that at the heart of Psillos’ regress is a metaphysical division he assumes between a pure power to φ and its directedness towards the manifestation of φ-ing, i.e. between a pure power and its essence. But such an ontological division between an entity and its essence has already been shown by Aristotle to be detrimental, condemning the entity to a regressive nature. I show that Psillos’ regress is but an instance of Aristotle’s regress argument on the relation between an entity and its essence. I compare Aristotle’s, Bradley’s, and Psillos’ regresses, showing that Bradley’s and Psillos’ (different) conclusions from the regress arguments lead to impasses. I then build on Aristotle’s directive against regressive natures, arguing with him that an entity is not other than its nature (being divided from its nature by a relation between them). Rather, an entity is an instantiated nature itself. The Aristotelian position I put forward explains how the oneness of the entity is achieved by its being an instance of a type. Thus, the regress is blocked, and the nature of pure powers is shown to pose no threats of an ontological or epistemological kind, if physics gave us reasons to posit pure powers.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999b)]  

Marmodoro, A. (2022). What’s Dynamic About Causal Powers? A Black Box!. In C. J. Austin, A. Marmodoro, A. Roselli (Eds): Powers, Time and Free Will (Chapter 1). Synthese Library, vol 451. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-92486-7_1
[Abstract]Modern science cannot do without Aristotelian powers – thus have argued Cartwright and Pemberton (2013) among many others. Aristotelian powers are essentially dynamic entities, which account for causal phenomena, and thus explain how change comes about in the world. In this chapter I argue that explaining causation in terms of interacting causal powers places causation … beyond the reach of our understanding(!) – because causal interaction shows us what powers do, and not what powers are. Metaphysicians by and large agree that the intrinsic nature of powers is to be dynamic entities. I contend here that their dynamism is irreducible, and crucially, unknowable, rendering what powers are ‘black boxes’ to us, despite multiple attempts of defining them in the literature. The sciences discover only how powers behave, and classify them teleologically to tell us what they do. Powers, however, are mysterious and unexplorable black boxes to us, even though they are indispensable in our scientific explanations of change in the world.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  [Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

Matos, M. A, & Passos, M. L. R. F. (2006). Linguistic Sources of Skinner's Verbal Behavior. The Behavioral Analyst, 29(1), 89–107. doi:10.1007/BF03392119
[Abstract]Formal and functional analyses of verbal behavior have been often considered to be divergent and incompatible. Yet, an examination of the history of part of the analytical approach used in Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957/1992) for the identification and conceptualization of verbal operant units discloses that it corresponds well with formal analyses of languages. Formal analyses have been carried out since the invention of writing and fall within the scope of traditional grammar and structural linguistics, particularly in analyses made by the linguist Leonard Bloomfield. The relevance of analytical instruments originated from linguistic studies (which examine and describe the practices of verbal communities) to the analysis of verbal behavior, as proposed by Skinner, relates to the conception of a verbal community as a prerequisite for the acquisition of verbal behavior. A deliberately interdisciplinary approach is advocated in this paper, with the systematic adoption of linguistic analyses and descriptions adding relevant knowledge to the design of experimental research in verbal behavior.
[Citing Place (1985d)]  

Matos, M. A., & Passos, M. L. (2010). Emergent Verbal Behavior and Analogy: Skinnerian and Linguistic Approaches. The Behavior Analyst, 33(1), 65–81
[Abstract]The production of verbal operants not previously taught is an important aspect of language productivity. For Skinner, new mands, tacts, and autoclitics result from the recombination of verbal operants. The relation between these mands, tacts, and autoclitics is what linguists call analogy, a grammatical pattern that serves as a foundation on which a speaker might emit new linguistic forms. Analogy appears in linguistics as a regularity principle that characterizes language and has been related to how languages change and also to creativity. The approaches of neogrammarians like Hermann Paul, as well as those of Jespersen and Bloomfield, appear to have influenced Skinner’s understanding of verbal creativity. Generalization and stimulus equivalence are behavioral processes related to the generative grammatical behavior described in the analogy model. Linguistic forms and grammatical patterns described in analogy are part of the contingencies of reinforcement that produce generalization and stimulus equivalence. The analysis of verbal behavior needs linguistic analyses of the constituents of linguistic forms and their combination patterns.
[Citing Place (1985a) in context]  

Matthews, S. (2014). Philosophy of mind (Analytic). In G. Oppy & N. N. Trakakis (Eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Second Edition, pp. 428-434; first edition 2010). Monash University Publishing.
[Citing Place (1954) in context]  [Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Maung, H. H. (2023) The paradox of phenomenal judgement and the case against illusionism. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences, 16(1), 1-13.
[Abstract]Illusionism is the view that conscious experience is some sort of introspective illusion. According to illusionism, there is no conscious experience, but it merely seems like there is conscious experience. This would suggest that much phenomenological enquiry, including work on phenomenological psychopathology, rests on a mistake. Some philosophers have argued that illusionism is obviously false, because seeming is itself an experiential state, and so necessarily presupposes the reality of conscious experience. In response, the illusionist could suggest that the relevant sort of seeming here is not an experiential state, but is a cognitive state, such as a judgement or a belief, which is fully amenable to a physical or functionalist analysis. Herein, I argue that this response is unsuccessful and fails to undermine the reality of conscious experience. Nonetheless, the response does raise the problem of how a judgement or belief about the character of a conscious experience, even if it is true, can be justified if the conscious experience has no causal role in the formation of the judgement or belief. This is not a new problem, but is a reiteration of an old problem that is known in the philosophy of mind literature as the paradox of phenomenal judgement. I consider how the paradox of phenomenal judgement can be resolved and how the judgement or belief about conscious experience can be justified with appeal to the notion of acquaintance.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Maung, H.H. (2019). Dualism and its place in a philosophical structure for psychiatry. Med Health Care and Philos, 22, 59-69. doi:10.1007/s11019-018-9841-2
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Maxwell, N. (1968). Understanding sensations, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 46(2,) 127-145. doi:10.1080/00048406812341111 philpapers.org/go.pl?id=MAXUS&aid=MAXUS.1
[Abstract]My aim in this paper is to defend a version of the brain process theory, or identity thesis, which differs in one important respect from the theory put forward by J.J.C. Smart. I shall argue that although the sensations which a person experiences are, as a matter of contingent fact, brain processes, nonetheless there are facts about sensations which cannot be described or understood in terms of any physical theory. These 'mental' facts cannot be described by physics for the simple reason that physical descriptions are designed specifically to avoid mentioning such facts. Thus in giving a physical explanation of a sensation we necessarily describe and render intelligible that sensation only as a physical process, and not also as a sensation. If we are to describe and render intelligible a person's sensations, or inner experiences, as sensations, and not as physical processes occurring in that person's brain, then we must employ a kind of description that connot be derived from any set of physical statements
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Maxwell, N. (2011). Three Philosophical Problems about Consciousness and their Possible Resolution. Open Journal of Philosophy, 1, 1-10. doi:10.4236/ojpp.2011.11001
[Abstract]Three big philosophical problems about consciousness are: Why does it exist? How do we explain and understand it? How can we explain brain-consciousness correlations? If functionalism were true, all three problems would be solved. But it is false, and that means all three problems remain unsolved (in that there is no other obvious candidate for a solution). Here, it is argued that the first problem cannot have a solution; this is inherent in the nature of explanation. The second problem is solved by recognizing that (a) there is an explanation as to why science cannot explain consciousness, and (b) consciousness can be explained by a different kind of explanation, empathic or “personalistic” explanation, compatible with, but not reducible to, scientific explanation. The third problem is solved by exploiting David Chalmers’ “principle of structural coherence”, and involves postulating that sensations experienced by us—visual, auditory, tactile, and so on—amount to minute scattered regions in a vast, multi-dimensional “space” of all possible sensations, which vary smoothly, and in a linear way, throughout the space. There is also the space of all possible sentient brain processes. There is just one, unique one-one mapping between these two spaces that preserves continuity and linearity. It is this which provides the explanation as to why brain processes and sensations are correlated as they are. I consider objections to this unique-matching theory, and consider how the theory might be empirically confirmed.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

McKitrick, J. A case for extrinsic dispositions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81(2), 155-174. doi:10.1080/713659629
[Abstract]Many philosophers think that dispositions are necessarily intrinsic. However, there are no good positive arguments for this view. Furthermore, many properties (such as weight, visibility, and vulnerability) are dispositional but are not necessarily shared by perfect duplicates. So, some dispositions are extrinsic. I consider three main objections to the possibility of extrinsic dispositions: the Objection from Relationally Specified Properties, the Objection from Underlying Intrinsic Properties, and the Objection from Natural Properties. These objections ultimately fail.
[Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

McLaughlin, B. P., & Planer, R. J. (2014). The contributions of U. T. Place, H. Feigl, and J. J. C. Smart to the identity theory of consciousness. In Andrew Bailey (Ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers (Chapter 6, pp. 103-128). Bloomsbury Academic.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Medlin, B. (1969). Mental states. Australian Humanist, March, 29.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Metzinger, T. (2003). Being no one: The self-model theory of subjectivity. MIT Press.
[Abstract]This book is about consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective. Its a main thesis is that no such things as selves exist in the world: Nobody ever was or had a self. All that ever existed were conscious self-models that could not be recognized as models. The author offers a representationalist and functionalist analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective is. This book is also, and in a number of ways, an experiment. The reader will find conceptual tool kits and new metaphors, case studies of unusual states of mind, as well as multilevel constraints for a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The author introduces two theoretical entities--the "phenomenal self-model" and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation"--that may form the decisive conceptual link between first-person and third-person approaches to the conscious mind and between consciousness research in the humanities and in the sciences.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Michel, M. (2019). The mismeasure of consciousness: A Problem of coordination for the Perceptual Awareness Scale. Philosophy of Science, 86(5), 1239–1249. doi:10.1086/705509
[Abstract]As for most measurement procedures in the course of their development, measures of consciousness face the problem of coordination, i.e., the problem of knowing whether a measurement procedure actually measures what it is intended to measure. I focus on the case of the Perceptual Awareness Scale to illustrate how ignoring this problem leads to ambiguous interpretations of subjective reports in consciousness science. In turn, I show that empirical results based on this measurement procedure might be systematically misinterpreted.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Miller, S. M. (2001). Binocular rivalry and the cerebral hemispheres with a note on the correlates and constitution of visual consciousness. Brain and Mind, 2(1), 119-149. www.researchgate.net/publication/45657840_Binocular_Rivalry_and_the_Cerebral_Hemispheres_With_a_Note_on_the_Correlates_and_Constitution_of_Visual_Consciousness
[Abstract]In addressing the scientific study of consciousness, Crick and Koch state, “It is probable that at any moment some active neuronal processes in your head correlate with consciousness, while others do not: what is the difference between them?” (1998, p. 97). Evidence from electrophysiological and brain-imaging studies of binocular rivalry supports the premise of this statement and answers to some extent, the question posed. I discuss these recent developments and outline the rationale and experimental evidence for the interhemispheric switch hypothesis of perceptual rivalry. According to this model, the perceptual alternations of rivalry reflect hemispheric alternations, suggesting that visual consciousness of rivalling stimuli may be unihemispheric at any one time (Miller et al., 2000). However, in this paper, I suggest that interhemispheric switching could involve alternating unihemispheric attentional selection of neuronal processes for access to visual consciousness. On this view, visual consciousness during rivalry could be bihemispheric because the processes constitutive of attentional selection may be distinct from those constitutive of visual consciousness. This is a special case of the important distinction between the neuronal correlates and constitution of visual consciousness.
[Citing Place (1990a) in context]  

Miller, S. M. (2007). On the correlation/constitution distinction problem (and other hard problems) in the scientific study of consciousness. Acta Neuropsychiatrica, 19(3), 159-176. doi:10.1111/j.1601-5215.2007.00207.x
[Abstract]Objective: In the past decade, much has been written about the hard problem of consciousness in the philosophy of mind. However, a separate hard problem faces the scientific study of consciousness. The problem arises when distinguishing the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and the neural constitution of consciousness. Here, I explain this correlation/constitution distinction and the problem it poses for a science of phenomenal consciousness. I also discuss potential objections to the problem, outline further hard problems in the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness and consider the ontological implications of these epistemological issues.
Methods: Scientific and philosophic analysis and discussion are presented.
Results: The correlation/constitution distinction does indeed present a hard problem in the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness. Refinement of the NCC acronym is proposed so that this distinction may at least be acknowledged in the literature. Furthermore, in addition to the problem posed by this distinction and to the hard problem, the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness also faces several other hard problems.
Conclusion: In light of the multiple hard problems, it is concluded that scientists and philosophers of consciousness ought to (i) address, analyze and discuss the problems in the hope of discovering their solution or dissolution and (ii) consider the implications of some or all of them being intractable. With respect to the latter, it is argued that ultimate epistemic limits in the study of phenomenal consciousness pose no threat to physicalist or materialist ontologies but do inform our understanding of consciousness and its place in nature.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  

Mills, J. (2022). A Critique of Materialism. In J. Mills (Ed.), Psychoanalysis and the Mind-Body Problem (Chapter 1). Routledge
[Abstract]In the boon of medical, scientific, and technological progress, materialism has gained increasing explanatory power in deciphering the enigma of mind. But with the proliferation and acceptance of cognitive science, psychic reality has been largely reduced to a physical ontology. In this chapter, the author explores the ground, scope, and limits to the materialist framework and shows that while bio-neurochemical-physiology is a necessary condition for mental functioning, it is far from being a sufficient condition for adequately explaining the human being. This becomes especially significant when examining the question of selfhood, freedom, personal autonomy, and the phenomenal quality of the lived experience.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Mitchell, P., & Riggs, K. (2000). A proposal for the development of a mental vocabulary, with special reference to pretence and false belief. In P. Mitchell, & K. Riggs (Eds.), Children's reasoning and the mind (pp. 51-80). Psychology Press.
[Citing Place (1954)]  

Moore, J. (1995). Radical Behaviorism and the Subjective-Objective Distinction. The Behavior Analyst, 18, 33–49. doi:10.1007/BF03392690
[Abstract]The distinction between subjective and objective domains is central to traditional psychology, including the various forms of mediational stimulus-organism-response neobehaviorism that treat the elements of a subjective domain as hypothetical constructs. Radical behaviorism has its own unique perspective on the subjective-objective distinction. For radical behaviorism, dichotomies between subjective and objective, knower and known, or observer and agent imply at most unique access to a part of the world, rather than dichotomous ontologies. This perspective leads to unique treatments of such important philosophical matters as (a) dispositions and (b) the difference between first- and third-person psychological sentences.
[Citing Place (1993c)]  

Moore, J. (2000). Words Are Not Things. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 143-160. doi:10.1007/BF03392961
[Abstract]On a traditional view, words are the fundamental units of verbal behavior. They are independent, autonomous things that symbolically represent or refer to other independent, autonomous things, often in some other dimension. Ascertaining what those other things are constitutes determining the meaning of a word. On a behavior-analytic view, verbal behavior is ongoing, functional operant activity occasioned by antecedent factors and reinforced by its consequences, particularly consequences that are mediated by other members of the same verbal community. Functional relations rather than structure select the response unit. The behavior-analytic point of view clarifies such important contemporary issues in psychology as (a) the role of scientific theories and explanations, (b) educational practices, and (c) equivalence classes, so that there is no risk of strengthening the traditional view that words are things that symbolically represent other things.
[Citing Place (1981a) in context]  [Citing Place (1981b) in context]  [Citing Place (1982) in context]  [Citing Place (1983d) in context]  

Moore, J. (2001). On Distinguishing Methodological from Radical Behaviorism, European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 2(2), 221-244, doi:10.1080/15021149.2001.11434196
[Abstract]Methodological behaviorism may be understood as an umbrella term that subsumes a broad range of intellectual positions in psychology. The positions arose because of influences from both outside and inside psychology. Two influences from outside psychology are from philosophy: logical behaviorism and analytic philosophy. An influence from inside psychology is the conventional interpretation of operationism. Four principal methodological behaviorist positions may be characterized in terms of a combination of ontological and methodological assumptions. Skinner?s radical behaviorism may be distinguished from methodological behaviorist positions on the basis of (a) its conception of verbal behavior as ongoing operant activity, rather than logical, symbolic, or referential activity; and (b) its conception of private events as behavioral in character, rather than mental.
[Citing Place (1993c)]  [Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000)]  

Moore, J. (2001). On psychological terms that appeal to the mental. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 167-186. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
[Abstract]A persistent challenge for nominally behavioral viewpoints in philosophical psychology is how to make sense of psychological terms that appeal to the mental. Two such viewpoints, logical behaviorism and conceptual analysis, hold that psychological terms appealing to the mental must be taken to mean (i.e., refer to) something that is publicly observable, such as underlying physiological states, publicly observable behavior, or dispositions to engage in publicly observable behavior, rather than mental events per se. However, they do so for slightly different reasons. A third viewpoint, behavior analysis, agrees that (a) some terms are functionally related to (i.e., occasioned by) the link between publicly observable behavior and publicly observable features of the environment, (b) some terms are dispositional, and (c) a purely private language could not arise. However, behavior analysis also recognizes that some psychological terms relate to private behavioral events, such as occur when speakers report internal sensations or engage in covert behavior.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1992f)]  [Citing Place (1993c)]  [Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000)]  
Download: Moore (2001) On Psychological Terms that Appeal to the Mental.pdf

Moore, J. (2008). Conceptual foundations of radical behaviorism. Sloan.
[Abstract]Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism is intended for advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate students in courses within behavior analytic curricula dealing with conceptual foundations and radical behaviorism as a philosophy. Each chapter of the text presents what radical behaviorism says about an important topic in a science of behavior, and then contrasts the radical behaviorist perspective with that of other forms of behaviorism, as well as other forms of psychology.
[Citing Place (1993c) in context]  [Citing Place (1999a) in context]  

Moore, J. (2011). A review of Baum’s review of Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 95(1), 127–140.
[Abstract]Baum expressed numerous concerns about my Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism in his review. If his review were an independent submission and I were an independent referee, I would recommend that his review be rejected and that he be encouraged to revise and resubmit, once he has studied the field a bit more and clarified for himself and journal readers several important matters. I outline two sets of concerns that he might usefully clarify in his revision: (a) the important contributions of B. F. Skinner to a book about radical behaviorism, and (b) the nature of private behavioral events. In particular, the methodological behaviorism inherent in Baum’s position needs to be resolved.
[Citing Place (1999a)]  

Moore, J. (2013). Mentalism as a Radical Behaviorist Views It — Part 2. The Journal of Mind and Behavior, 34(3), 205-232. doi:10.2307/43854394
[Abstract]Part 1 of this review suggested that mentalism consists in explanations of behavior in terms of causal mental states and processes. These causal mental states and processes are inferred to reside in an unobservable dimension beyond that in which behavior occurs, and to function differently from environmental events, variables, and relations. One of those functions is inferred to be mediation, in which environmental events trigger a mediating state or process, which in turn triggers a response. For mentalism, an explanation should properly focus on specifying the causal role of the mediator, rather than talking about observable relations. Part 1 further suggested that mentalism is actually as integral to mediational neobehaviorism as it is to cognitive psychology, even though each claims to differ from the other. Part 2 continues the review of mentalism by addressing the relations among mentalism, operationism, and the meaning of scientific verbal behavior, especially when the verbal behavior involves private behavioral events. The review then considers some sources of mentalism, along with examples of how mentalism is supported in philosophy. Finally, the review summarizes the radical behaviorist opposition to mentalism. Overall, the review concludes that radical behaviorism differs from both cognitive psychology and mediational neobehaviorism, which radical behaviorism regards as comparably mentalistic.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Moran, A, (2025). Contingent grounding physicalism. Analytic Philosophy
[Abstract]It is widely held that physicalism is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of zombies, i.e. beings physically just like us yet lacking in phenomenal consciousness. The present paper argues that this orthodoxy is mistaken. As against the received wisdom, physicalism is perfectly compatible with the possibility of zombies and zombie-worlds. Arguments from the possibility of zombies to the falsity of physicalism do not, therefore, succeed. To establish this, the paper develops a form of physicalism on which the phenomenal facts are metaphysically grounded in the basic physical facts in accordance with metaphysically contingent grounding laws. It also draws out some important morals for the contemporary mind-body debate.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Morris, E. K. (1997). Some reflections on contextualism, mechanism, and behavior analysis. The Psychological Record, 47, 529-542. doi:10.1007/BF03395245 core.ac.uk/download/pdf/60541821.pdf
[Abstract]Recent conceptual work in behavior analysis has argued that the discipline is not mechanistic, but contextualistic, in world view. This argument has been contested, however, and a mechanism-contextualism debate has ensued. In taking the side of contextualism, I offer four reflections on the controversy. These concern (a) confusions concerning Pepper’s purpose in writing his book and its place in the debate, (b) misunderstandings about the meanings of context and contextualism, (c) the pragmatic implications of theories of truth in world views other than contextualism, and (d) the evolution of ontology from mechanism to contextualism. In the end, behavior analysis may benefit from this debate by evolving as a world view unto its own for its science of behavior. The two-the world view and the science-are inexorably interrelated.
[Citing Place (1994c)]  [Citing Place (1996q)]  [Citing Place (1996j)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Reviews]  

Morris, K. (2019). Physicalism deconstructed: Levels of reality and the mind–body problem. Cambridge University Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Morris, K. (2025). The Hope and Horror of Physicalism: Comments and Critique. Philosophia. doi:10.1007/s11406-025-00899-6
[Abstract]Christopher Devlin Brown’s The Hope and Horror of Physicalism works through different ways of understanding the content of physicalism, evaluates the “existential consequences” of physicalism so understood, and attempts to defend one form of physicalism – “Russellian physicalism” – from consciousness-based objections. I first raise some minor-but-not-too-minor concerns about Brown’s historical account of physicalism. Second, I discuss one version of physicalism (the “theory-based version”) that Brown works with in assessing physicalism’s existential consequences. Third, I raise some questions about Brown’s preferred way of understanding physicalism, which he labels “Russellian physicalism”, and which is a version of “via negativa physicalism”. My discussions are offered in a constructive spirit.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Mørch, H. H. (2023). Non-Physicalist Theories of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781009317344
[Abstract]Is consciousness a purely physical phenomenon? Most contemporary philosophers and theorists hold that it is, and take this to be supported by modern science. But a significant minority endorse non-physicalist theories such as dualism, idealism and panpsychism, among other reasons because it may seem impossible to fully explain consciousness, or capture what it's like to be in conscious states (such as seeing red, or being in pain), in physical terms. The main non-physicalist theories of consciousness are introduced and the most important arguments for them, are explained and considered how they each respond to the scientific and other arguments in support of physicalism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Mørch, H.H. (2020). Does dispositionalism entail panpsychism? Topoi, 39, 1073–1088. doi:10.1007/s11245-018-9604-y
[Abstract]According to recent arguments for panpsychism, all (or most) physical properties are dispositional, dispositions require categorical grounds, and the only categorical properties we know are phenomenal properties. Therefore, phenomenal properties can be posited as the categorical grounds of all (or most) physical properties—in order to solve the mind–body problem and/or in order avoid noumenalism about the grounds of the physical world. One challenge to this case comes from dispositionalism, which agrees that all physical properties are dispositional, but denies that dispositions require categorical grounds. In this paper, I propose that this challenge can be met by the claim that the only (fundamentally) dispositional properties we know are phenomenal properties, in particular, phenomenal properties associated with agency, intention and/or motivation. Versions of this claim have been common in the history of philosophy, and have also been supported by a number of contemporary dispositionalists (and other realists about causal powers). I will defend a new and updated version of it. Combined with other premises from the original case for panpsychism—which are not affected by the challenge from dispositionalism—it forms an argument that dispositionalism entails panpsychism.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Mumford, S. (1995). Dispositions, bases, overdetermination and identities. Ratio, 8, 42-62.
[Abstract]In this paper I aim to make sense of our pre-theoretic intuitions about dispositions by presenting an argument for the identity of a disposition with its putative categorical base. The various possible ontologies for dispositions are outlined. The possibility of an empirical proof of identity is dismissed. Instead an a priori argument for identity is adapted from arguments in the philosophy of mind. I argue that dispositions occupy, by analytic necessity, the same causal roles that categorical bases occupy contingently and that properties with identical causal roles are identical. The validity of the argument depends upon the possibility of overdetermination of disposition manifestations being rejected. ‘Ungrounded dispositions’ are dismissed as not genuine dispositions. Identity conditions for dispositions and categorical bases are outlined.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Mumford, S. (1998). Dispositions. Routledge
Note:
Files added, see Download
1. Mumford's reply (in Chapter 5) to Place, U. T. (1996d). A conceptualist ontology. In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin. U. T. Place, & T. Crane (Ed.) Dispositions: A debate (Chapter 4, pp. 49-67). Routledge.
2. Preface to the Paperback Edition from 2003.
[Citing Armstrong, Martin, Place & Crane (1996)]  [Citing Place (1996d)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Mumford (1998) Place's Dualism.pdf  Mumford (2003) Preface to the Paperback Edition of Mumford (1998) Dispositions.pdf

Mumford, S. (1999). Intentionality and the physical: A New theory of disposition ascription. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(195), 215-225. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00138
[Abstract]This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we take disposition ascriptions to be functional characterizations of properties, then we can explain all that was appealing about the new alternative without the unacceptable consequences.
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996d)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Is reply to]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Mumford, S. (2006). The ungrounded argument. Synthese, 149, 471–489. doi:10.1007/s11229-005-0570-8
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Mun, C. (2021). We are living in a material world. In C. Mun, Interdisciplinary Foundations for the Science of Emotion (Chapter 5). Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-71194-8_5
[Abstract]In this chapter, I begin by providing a brief history of the mind-body problem, and I argue that the philosophical commitment to dualism stands as a barrier to a thoroughly unified interdisciplinary approach to research and theorizing in the science of emotion. I then explain the significance of David J. Chalmers’ (The Conscious Mind: In Search of A Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) hard problem of consciousness and meta-problem of consciousness (Chalmers Journal of Consciousness Studies 25: 6–61, http://consc.net/papers/metaproblem.pdf, 2018; Journal of Consciousness Studies 27: 201–226, 2020) for interdisciplinary research and theorizing in the science of emotion. Finally, I present and argue in favor of a materialistic solution to Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness, which will also include a solution to the meta-problem of consciousness, over eliminative materialism, eliminativism, and interactionist dualism. In doing so, I provide an additional foundation—semantic dualism—for my proposed framework for interdisciplinary research and theorizing in the science of emotion (meta-semantic pluralism about emotion), as well as the first foundation for my theory of emotion as a sui generis kind of embodied cognition, which I refer to as semantic dualism about emotion (semantic dualism^e).
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Muñoz-Suárez, C. (2015). Introduction: Bringing Together Mind, Behavior, and Evolution. In C. Muñoz-Suárez, & F. De Brigard (Eds), Content and Consciousness Revisited (Chapter 1, pp. 1-27). Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-17374-0_1
[Abstract]In Sect. 1.1 I discuss the main concepts and hypotheses introduced in Content and Consciousness . In Sect. 1.2 I sketch the context of interdisciplinary research surrounding Content and Consciousness’s birth. Finally, in Sect. 1.3, I introduce the chapters of this volume.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Munsat, S. (1969). Could Sensations be Processes? Mind, lxxvii, 24-251.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Myin E., & Zahnoun, F. (2018). Reincarnating the identity theory. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 2044. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02044 www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02044
[Abstract]The mind/brain identity theory is often thought to be of historical interest only, as it has allegedly been swept away by functionalism. After clarifying why and how the notion of identity implies that there is no genuine problem of explaining how the mental derives from something else, we point out that the identity theory is not necessarily a mind/brain identity theory. In fact, we propose an updated form of identity theory, or embodied identity theory, in which the identities concern not experiences and brain phenomena, but experiences and organism-environment interactions. Such an embodied identity theory retains the main ontological insight of its parent theory, and by invoking organism-environment interactions, it has powerful resources to motivate why the relevant identities hold, without posing further unsolvable problems. We argue that the classical multiple realization argument against identity theory is built on not recognizing that the main claim of the identity theory concerns the relation between experience and descriptions of experience, instead of being about relations between different descriptions of experience and we show how an embodied identity theory provides an appropriate platform for making this argument. We emphasize that the embodied identity theory we propose is not ontologically reductive, and does not disregard experience.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Myin, E. (2016). Perception as something we do. Journal of consciousness studies, 23(5-6), 80-104. https://www.academia.edu/download/43094596/PASWD_JCS_resubmission_clean.pdf penultimate draft
[Abstract]In this paper, I want to focus on the claim, prominently made by sensorimotor theorists, that perception is something we do. I will argue that understanding perceiving as a bodily doing allows for a strong non-dualistic position on the relation between experience and objective physical events, one which provides insight into why such relation seems problematic while at the same time providing means to relieve the tension. Next I will show how the claim that perception is something we do does not stand in opposition to, and is not refuted by, the fact that we often have perceptual experience without moving. In arguing that cases of motionless perception and perception-like experience are still doings it will be pointed out that the same interactive regularities which are engaged in in active perception still apply to them. Explaining how past interactive regularities can influence current perception or perception-like experience in a way which remains true to the idea that perception is a doing, so I will argue, can be done by invoking the past -- the past itself, however, not its representation. The resulting historical, non-representational sensorimotor approach can join forces with Gibsonian ecological psychology -- provided that such is also understood along lines that don't invoke externalist remnants of contents.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Myin, E., & Loughlin, V. (2018). Sensorimotor and Enactive Approaches to Consciousness. In R. J. Gennaro (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook Of Consciousness (pp. 202-215). Routledge.
[Abstract]According to the sensorimotor approach, perceptual experience is something we do, not something that happens in us. That is, having perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of engaging with our environments in particular ways. We will argue that the sensorimotor position should best be seen as a form of identity theory. Unlike in the classical identity position however, the sensorimotor approach identifies conscious experience, not with internal or neural processes, but with bodily processes in spatially and temporally  extended interactions with environments. After having considered some of the most common objections to the sensorimotor view of perception and perceptual awareness as something we do, we will compare the sensorimotor approach with other enactivist positions, namely Mind/Life Continuity Enactivism, and Radical Enactivism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Nagel, T. (1965). Physicalism. The Philosophical Review, 74(3), 339–356. doi:10.2307/2183358
[Citing Place (1956)]  [2 reprinting collections]  

Nanay, B. (2000). Philosophical Questions in the Evolution of Language. Commentary on Place on Language-Gesture. Psycoloquy, 11(29). www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.029
[Abstract]This commentary is an analysis of how Ullin Place's target article relates to the most important questions in the evolution of language, such as: (1) the relation between the evolution of language and that of "theory of mind"; (2) the question of the role of group structure in human evolution; (3) the evolution of representational capacities needed for language; (4) the selective force of the evolution of language. I argue that not only does Place ignore the problems underlying these issues, but in most cases he also assumes different and sometimes contradictory answers to the questions, weakening his otherwise convincing conclusion.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Nanay (2000) Philosophical Questions in the Evolution of Language.pdf

Nannini, S. (2023) The mind-body problem in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 14(1-2), 118-134. doi:10.4453/rifp.2023.0009
[Abstract]Here, I examine the main philosophical solutions to the mind-body problem distinguishing between “historicist” solutions that (more or less clearly) separate philosophy from science and solutions that instead result from a double “cognitive turn”, and see “continuity” between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. The “historicist” solutions include ontological dualism (together with “skepticism” and “new mysterianism”), epistemological dualism, subjective idealism, and absolute idealism. In this group, transcendental idealism, phenomenology, and neutral monism are the solutions most open to a dialogue between philosophy and science. The “naturalistic” solutions can be divided into four groups: (1) behaviorism (psychological, logical, philosophical-analytical behaviorism); (2) materialism (identity theory, physicalism); (3) “weak naturalism” (functionalism, anomalous monism, “biological naturalism”, liberal naturalism, emergentism); (4) “strong naturalism” (“cognitive neo-evolutionism”, eliminativism). These offer a physicalist-eliminative solution to the mind-body problem (here called “soft physicalistic eliminativism”) that allows for more continuity between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences.
[Citing Place (1954) in context]  [Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1988a) in context]  [Citing Place (1998a) in context]  

Nath, S. (2013). U. T. Place as a Behaviourist. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 3(9), 183-185. www.ijsrp.org/research-paper-0913/ijsrp-p2125.pdf
[Abstract]U. T. Place is rightly called the forerunners of Physicalism or Identity Theory of Mind. But he also claims himself to be a behaviourist. Like the behaviourist he believed that mental events can be elucidated purely in terms of hypothetical propositions about behaviour. These can also be elucidated by the reports of the first person’s experiences. He has many arguments in favour of behaviourism for which he is called a behaviourist. In this article I shall give a glimpse of behaviourism, particularly of logical behaviourism and then explain the circumstances under which Place is called a behaviourist.
[Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  [Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1967)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1989a)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (1999d)]  
Download: Nath (2013) UT Place as a Behaviourist.pdf

Nath, S. (2013). Resolution of some problems in the identity theory of mind. IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, 10(5), 51-57.
[Abstract]The identity theory of mind came into existence as a reaction to the theory of Behaviourism. This theory is advocated and developed by different  philosophers beginning with Place, Feigl and Smart. According to this theory, certain physical states of brain are identical to mental states. In others words, this theory holds that the so-called mental phenomena like thoughts, feelings, wishes and the rest are identical with the bodily states and processes. Thus to have some specific kind of thought is to have some kind of specific states and processes of bodily cells, typically brain cells. When we say that someone is in a certain mental state, it implies that in the cerebral cortex of the brain of that person, certain physical event is going on. The person concerned may not be aware of the happenings of the brain but these two states are not merely correlated with each other rather these two are one and the same event in the literal sense. Thus this theory asserts that everything mental is physical. But though it speaks of mental states it does not assert that these are not physical. Although this theory is better than dualism and Behaviourism, still it has its own problems. These problems are the problem of identity, the problem of co-existence and the problem of consciousness. But in this paper I will discuss the problem of identity and the problem of co-existence and subsequently efforts will be made to solve these problems from materialist point of view.
[Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  
Download: Nath (2013) Resolution of Some Problems in the Identity Theory of Mind.pdf

Nath, S. (2014). J. J. C. Smart in defence of Place's identity theory of mind. IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, 19(2), 26-29.
[Abstract]In the history of philosophy different philosophers have extended their efforts to give a solution of mind body problem. In modern period Rene Descartes explained the mind –body problem from the dualistic point of view. Behaviourism, on the other hand, does not believe [in] the existence of [the] mind. This theory emphasises only on behaviour. But none could give a satisfactory solution of the problem. Identity theory of mind also attempted to give a solution from the materialistic point of view. This theory is developed by U.T.Place, J.J.C. Smart,H. Feigl and some other thinkers. This theory came into existence as a reaction to the behaviourism. The main thesis of the theory is - the mental states and processes and the brain states and processes are  identical. Before the establishment of his own theory Smart tries to answer some of the possible objections that might be raised by the critics against Place‟s theory. But this does not mean that Smart accepts Place‟s theory to the full extent. Rather he claims that his arguments for identity theory is very much different from that of Place and this he very sharply stated in his article “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959). In this paper I shall try to explore some possible objections that might be raised by the critics against Place‟s theory as well as answers given by Smart and subsequently tries to show the issues on which Smart agrees with Place. Finally, efforts will be made to highlight Smart‟s difference from that of Place and his own view on the Identity Theory.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1967)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1989a)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (1999d)]  [Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  
Download: Nath (2014) JJC Smart in Defence of Place's Identity Theory of Mind.pdf

Nath, S. (2014). Type-token dichotomy in the identity theory of mind. Journal of Business Management & Social Sciences Research, 3(4), 1-5
[Abstract]Identity theory of mind occupies an important place in the history of philosophy of mind. According to his theory mental events are nothing but physical events in the brain. This theory came into existence as a reaction of behaviourism and developed by U. T. Place, J. J. C. Smart, H. Feigl and others. But there is a debate among the profounder of the theory and this is- whether it is said about concrete particulars, (e.g., individual instances of occurring in particular subject at particular times), or about a kind to which such concrete particulars belong. With this question two answers are found and they are called Type identity and Token identity. According to token identity theory, every concrete particular that falls under a mental kind can be identified with some physical happenings. Type identity theory, on the other hand, holds that mental kinds themselves are physical kinds. Thus in this article I shall try to delineate the different arguments given by the profounder of this theory in favour of both the theories and finally show that which one is stronger than the others.
[Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  
Download: Nath (2014) Type-Token Dichotomy in the Identity Theory of Mind.pdf

Nathan M. J. (2021). The Mind-Body Problem 3.0. In F. Calzavarini, & M. Viola (Eds.), Neural Mechanisms (Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 17). doi:10.1007/978-3-030-54092-0_12
[Abstract]This essay identifies two shifts in the conceptual evolution of the mind-body problem since it was molded into its modern form. The “mind-body problem 1.0” corresponds to Descartes' ontological question: what are minds and how are they related to bodies? The "mind-body problem 2.0" reflects the core issue underlying much discussion of brains and minds in the twentieth century: can mental states be reduced to neural states? While both issues are no longer central to scientific research, the philosophy of mind ain't quite done yet. In an attempt to recast a classic discussion in a more contemporary guise, I present a "mind-body problem 3.0." In a slogan, this can be expressed as the question: how should we pursue psychology in the age of neuroscience?
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Natsoulas T. (1967). What are perceptual reports about? Psychological bulletin, 67(4), 249–272. doi:10.1037/h0024320
[Abstract]This article presents a discussion of some methodological and substantive issues associated with the use of reports in perceptual experiments. The distinction between "report" and "response" is first clarified and a definition of report behavior is proposed. The relation of reference (aboutness) is next considered in the context of phenomenal vs. cognitive reports. At a less level, two pairs of contrasting proposals on the referents of perceptual reports are used to bring earlier questions to focus. One pair stems from philosophical approaches to the question of this article. The other arises in a current controversy concerning what psychophysical scales measure. A brief discussion of the role of e's own perceptual experience is followed by a review of methods for establishing report validity.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Natsoulas T. (1983). What are the objects of perceptual consciousness? American Journal of Psychology, 96(4), 435-67. doi:10.2307/1422567
[Abstract]Four answers to the title question are critically reviewed. (a) The first answer proposes that we perceive our brain events, certain occurrences in our brain that appear to us as parts of the environment. (b) Gestalt psychology distinguishes the phenomenal from the physical and proposes that we always perceive some aspect of our own phenomenal world--which is isomorphic but not identical to certain of our brain events. (c) J. J. Gibson held that our perceptual experiences are registrations of properties of the external environment--which is, therefore, perceived directly (i.e., without experiencing anything else). (d) The fourth answer comprehends perceptual experience to be a qualitative form of noninferential awareness of the apparent properties of specific environmental things. It differs from Gibson's answer in several respects, including the claim that some aspect of the external world appears to us whenever we have perceptual experience.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Natsoulas, T. (1977). On Perceptual Aboutness. Behaviorism, 5(1), 75–97. www.jstor.org/stable/27758886
[Citing Place (1972a)]  

Neisser, J. (2017). What subjectivity is not. Topoi, 36, 41-53. doi:10.1007/s11245-014-9256-5
[Abstract]An influential thesis in contemporary philosophy of mind is that subjectivity is best conceived as inner awareness of qualia. (Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Oxford University Press, London, 2001) has argued that this unique subjective awareness generates a paradox which resists empirical explanation. On account of this "paradox of subjective duality," Levine concludes that the hardest part of the hard problem of consciousness is to explain how anything like a subjective point of view could arise in the world. Against this, I argue that the nature of subjective thought is not correctly characterized as inner awareness, that a non-paradoxical approach to the first-person perspective is available, and that the problem about subjectivity should be distinguished from the perennial problem of qualia or phenomenal properties.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Nichols, C. (1983) Neurobiology and Social Theory: Some Common and Persistent Problems. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 13(2), 207-234. doi:10.1177/004839318301300207
[Citing Place (1956 )]  

Noren, S. J. (1972). Smart's identity theory, translation, and incorrigibility. Mind, 81, 116-120..
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Noren, S. J. (1972). Logical Types and the Identity Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 32(4), 559-564.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Oderberg, D.S. (2017). Finality revived: powers and intentionality. Synthese, 194, 2387–2425. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1057-5
[Abstract]Proponents of physical intentionality argue that the classic hallmarks of intentionality highlighted by Brentano are also found in purely physical powers. Critics worry that this idea is metaphysically obscure at best, and at worst leads to panpsychism or animism. I examine the debate in detail, finding both confusion and illumination in the physical intentionalist thesis. Analysing a number of the canonical features of intentionality, I show that they all point to one overarching phenomenon of which both the mental and the physical are kinds, namely finality. This is the finality of ‘final causes’, the long-discarded idea of universal action for an end to which recent proponents of physical intentionality are in fact pointing whether or not they realise it. I explain finality in terms of the concept of specific indifference, arguing that in the case of the mental, specific indifference is realised by the process of abstraction, which has no correlate in the case of physical powers. This analysis, I conclude, reveals both the strength and weakness of rational creatures such as us, as well as demystifying (albeit only partly) the way in which powers work.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  [Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

Opie, J. (2010). Consciousness. In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (Eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia & New Zealand. Monash University Publishing. philarchive.org/archive/OPIC
[Abstract]Understanding consciousness and its place in the natural world is one of the principal targets of contemporary philosophy of mind. Australian philosophers made seminal contributions to this project during the twentieth century which continue to shape the way philosophers and scientists think about the conceptual, metaphysical and empirical aspects of the problem. After some scene setting, I will discuss the main players and their work in the context of broader developments in the philosophy of mind.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1989a) in context]  

Ott W. (2021). The case against powers. In B. Hill, H. Lagerlund, & S. Psillos (Eds.), Reconsidering causal powers: Historical and conceptual perspectives (pp. 149-167). Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]Powers ontologies are currently enjoying a resurgence. This would be dispiriting news for the moderns; in their eyes, to imbue bodies with powers is to slide back into the scholastic slime from which they helped philosophy crawl. I focus on Descartes’s ‘little souls’ argument, which points to a genuine and, I think persisting, defect in powers theories. The problem is that an Aristotelian power is intrinsic to whatever has it. Once this move is accepted, it becomes very hard to see how humble matter could have such a thing. It is as if each empowered object were possessed of a little soul that directs it and governs its behavior. Instead of attempting to resurrect the Aristotelian power theory, contemporary philosophers would be best served by taking their inspiration from its early modern replacement, devised by John Locke and Robert Boyle. On this view, powers are internal relations, not monadic properties intrinsic to their bearers. This move at once drains away the mysterious directedness of Aristotelian powers and solves the contemporary version of the little souls argument, Neil Williams’s ‘problem of fit.’
[Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

Owen, J. L. (2002). A retrospective on behavioral approaches to human language: And some promising new developments. American Communication Journal, 5(3).
[Abstract]Early schools of behaviorism, namely, "classical" and "methodological," hold only limited implications for studies in human language behavior. In contrast, contemporary radical behaviorism is not only relevant, but it is dramatically more so due to its recent breakthroughs in the area of relational frame theory. Unfortunately, the few articles on behaviorism found in communication journals deal primarily with classical and methodological behaviorisms. References to radical behaviorism are rare, superficial, and out of touch with recent developments. A major purpose of this article is to draw some sharp distinctions among the three major behaviorisms: "classical," "methodological," and "radical"; and, to capture each of their unique perspectives on human language behavior. A second purpose is to show how radical behaviorism-especially in light of its recent progress in relational frame theory-provides the basis for a comprehensive behavioral theory of complex human language behavior. In doing so, it also provides a viable alternative to the cognitive theories that continue to dominate the field of communication studies.
[Citing Place (1997a) in context]