Publications citing U. T. Place.
223 publications found, showing 100 per page. This is page 1 .

Aaron, P. G., & Joshi, R. M. (2006). Written Language Is as Natural as Spoken language: A Biolinguistic Perspective. Reading Psychology, 27(4), 263-311. doi:10.1080/02702710600846803
[Abstract]A commonly held belief is that language is an aspect of the biological system since the capacity to acquire language is innate and evolved along Darwinian lines. Written language, on the other hand, is thought to be an artifact and a surrogate of speech; it is, therefore, neither natural nor biological. This disparaging view of written language, even though propounded by some renowned linguists and biologists, has not gained universal acceptance. Dissenters such as linguists from the Prague circle who claim that written language is an independent system that deserves a status equivalent to that of spoken language have developed their argument along linguistic parameters. The present article also endeavors to show that written language is as natural as spoken language but does so from a biolinguistic perspective. Biolinguistics defines language as a product of biological adaptation in the Darwinian sense (Givon, 2002) and considers language to be innate and species specific (Jenkins, 2000). The present article presents evidence to show that, similar to spoken language, written language has adaptive value, evolved over time, and is relatively independent of spoken language. The Egyptian hieroglyphic writing, which has a history of about 4,000 years, is used for examining the proposition that written language evolved along Darwinian lines as much as spoken language did. It is concluded that written language is yet another manifestation of the natural endowment of the human mind and may not be treated as a proxy for speech. The educational implication is that, in literacy instruction, written language should be given as much importance in today's schools as elements of spoken language, such as phoneme awareness and phonological awareness.
[Citing Place (2000c) in context]  

Aranyosi, I. (2011). A new argument for mind-brain identity. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62(3), 489-517, doi:10.1093/bjps/axr001
[Abstract]In this article, I undertake the tasks: (i) of reconsidering Feigl's notion of a ‘nomological dangler' in light of recent discussion about the viability of accommodating phenomenal properties, or qualia, within a physicalist picture of reality; and (ii) of constructing an argument to the effect that nomological danglers, including the way qualia are understood to be related to brain states by contemporary dualists, are extremely unlikely. I offer a probabilistic argument to the effect that merely nomological danglers are extremely unlikely, the only probabilistically coherent candidates being 'anomic danglers' (not even nomically correlated) and ‘necessary danglers' (more than merely nomically correlated). After I show, based on similar probabilistic reasoning, that the first disjunct (anomic danglers) is very unlikely, I conclude that the identity thesis is the only remaining candidate for the mental-physical connection. The novelty of the argument is that it brings probabilistic considerations in favor of physicalism, a move that has been neglected in the recent burgeoning literature on the subject.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Armstrong, D. M. (1968). A materialist theory of the mind. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [18 referring publications by Place]  [Reviews]  

Armstrong, D. M. (1983). Recent work on the relation of mind and brain. In G. Fløistad (Ed.), Philosophy of Mind/Philosophie de l’esprit (pp. 45–79). Contemporary philosophy/La philosophie contemporaine, vol 4. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6932-2_3
[Abstract]The decade 1966–1976 saw an immense amount of valuable philosophical discussion concerning the relation between mind and brain. As a result, it has seemed best to be selective, both with respect to topics and to authors. Many important books and papers have had to be passed over. This chronicle confines itself almost entirely to cases where new philosophical positions, or striking new lines of argument, have been developed about the relation of mind and brain.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Armstrong, D. M. (2022). Lewis and the identity theory. In P. R. Anstey, & D. Braddon-Mitchell (Eds.), Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind (pp. 24-28). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780192843722.001.0001
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Austin, C. J. (2018). Essence in the age of evolution: A new theory of natural kinds. Routledge.
[Abstract]This book offers a novel defence of a highly contested philosophical position: biological natural kind essentialism. This theory is routinely and explicitly rejected for its purported inability to be explicated in the context of contemporary biological science, and its supposed incompatibility with the process and progress of evolution by natural selection. Christopher J. Austin challenges these objections, and in conjunction with contemporary scientific advancements within the field of evolutionary-developmental biology, the book utilises a contemporary neo-Aristotelian metaphysics of "dispositional properties", or causal powers, to provide a theory of essentialism centred on the developmental architecture of organisms and its role in the evolutionary process. By defending a novel theory of Aristotelian biological natural kind essentialism, Essence in the Age of Evolution represents the fresh and exciting union of cutting-edge philosophical insight and scientific knowledge.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Awret, U. (2022). Holographic duality and the physics of consciousness. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 16. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2022.685699
[Abstract]This paper introduces a novel dual-aspect theory of consciousness that is based on the principle of holographic-duality in modern physics and explores the prospects of making philosophically significant empirical discoveries about the physical correlates of consciousness. The theory is motivated by an approach that identifies certain anti-physicalist problem intuitions associated with representational content and spatial location and attempts to provide these with a consciousness-independent explanation, while suspending questions about the hard problem of consciousness and the more problematic “phenomenal character”. Providing such topic neutral explanations is “hard” enough to make a philosophical difference and yet “easy” enough to be approached scientifically. I will argue that abstract algorithms are not enough to solve this problem and that a more radical “computation” that is inspired by physics and that can be realized in “strange metals” may be needed. While speculative, this approach has the potential to both establish necessary connections between structural aspects of conscious mental states and the physical substrate “generating” them and explain why this representational content is “nowhere to be found”. I will end with a reconsideration of the conceivability of zombies.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Azevedo Leite, D. (2018). The Twenty-First Century Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition: A Critical Appraisal [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Trento.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Azevedo Leite, D. (2021). Molecular and Cellular Theory of Human Cognition. In D. A. Leite, The Twenty-First Century Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition: A Critical Analysis (pp. 73-108). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-63680-7_4
[Abstract]In this chapter, the author compares the neo-mechanistic theory with one of its major contemporary competitors, the Molecular and Cellular Theory of Human Cognition (MCTHC). The aim of the author in this chapter is to evaluate to what extent the main arguments presented by the proponents of MCTHC against the neo-mechanistic theory, directed to particular aspects of it, represent great threats to the aspirations of the neo-mechanists. MCTHC supports a 'ruthless (strong) neuro-cognitive reductionism', as a form of scientific integration for cognitive and neural science, based on current neuroscientific work present in the field of molecular and cellular neuroscience. This theory presents a clear challenge to the neo-mechanistic theory, which is committed to causal and explanatory pluralism and a weak autonomy of higher-level sciences. After characterizing the neuroscientific reductionist position more precisely, the author discusses the neo-mechanists' answer to the challenge and their attempt to stand with pluralism, instead of reduction. A meticulous analysis of their replies shows, however, that the challenge of explanatory reduction cannot be overcome with the arguments the neo-mechanists provide, and their theory, therefore, needs to be understood ultimately as reductionist.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Azevedo Leite, D. (2021). The Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition. In D. A. Leite, The Twenty-First Century Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition: A Critical Analysis (Chapter 3, 39-70). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-63680-7_3
[Abstract]In the third chapter, the author provides a systematical and analytical exposition of the most central theoretical aspects of the Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition (MTHC). He shows that the theory is clearly committed to a form of physicalism, on the one hand, but it rejects certain kinds of traditional epistemological reductionist approaches, on the other hand. The framework attempts to offer a pluralist and integrative mechanistic view concerning the relationship between human brain and cognition; a view that is applied to phenomena and to theories overall in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience. This general pluralist integrative neuro-cognitive relation is the most important pillar grounding the theory's application to human cognition. Besides this, the author also investigates how the framework is applied in concrete to two paradigmatic cases of human cognitive phenomena: the first case is related to the perceptual system; and the second case, to the memory system. In this way, it is possible to evaluate the application of the theory to particular psychological phenomena.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Baier, K. (1962). Smart on Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, X, 57-68.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [3 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  

Barnes-Holmes, D., Hayes, S. C., Dymond, S. & O’Hora, D. (2001). Multiple stimulus relations and the transformations of stimulus functions. In S. C. Hayes, D. Barnes-Holmes, & B. Roche (Eds.), Relational frame theory: A post-Skinnerian account of human language and cognition (Chapter 3, pp. 51-71). Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
[Abstract]The key concept in Relational Frame Theory is the concept of stimulus relation (Hayes, 1991, 1994; Barnes and Holmes, 1991; Hayes and Hayes, 1989, 1992; Hayes and Wilson, 1996). Understanding the implications of an RFT approach requires clarity about this concept and its flexibility. In this chapter we will attempt to characterize multiple stimulus relations and to distinguish this approach from a traditional class based approach. We will point to ways in which increasingly elaborate relational networks are acquired, modified, and brought under various forms of contextual control. Finally we will describe in some detail the kinds of data that are generated in RFT research, and show how methodological advances are beginning to permit more complex questions to be asked and answered.
[Citing Place (1998b) in context]  

Bartlett, G. (2018). Functionalism and the problem of occurrent states. Philosophical Quarterly, 68(270), 1-20. doi:10.1093/pq/pqx043
[Abstract]In 1956 U. T. Place proposed that consciousness is a brain process. More attention should be paid to his word 'process'. There is near-universal agreement that experiences are processive--as witnessed in the platitude that experiences are occurrent states. The abandonment of talk of brain processes has benefited functionalism, because a functional state, as it is usually conceived, cannot be a process. This point is dimly recognized in a well-known but little-discussed argument that conscious experiences cannot be functional states because the former are occurrent, while the latter are dispositional. That argument fails, but it can be made sound if we reformulate it with the premise that occurrent states are processive. The only way for functionalists to meet the resulting challenge is to abandon the standard individuation of functional states in terms of purely abstract causal roles.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1967)]  
Download: Bartlett (2018) Functionalism and the Problem of Occurrent States.pdf

Bauer, W. A. (2019). Powers and the Pantheistic Problem of Unity. Sophia, 58(4), 563-580.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Bechtel, W. (2012). Identity, reduction, and conserved mechanisms: Perspectives from circadian rhythm research. In S. Gozzano, & C. S. Hill: New perspectives on type identity: The mental and the physical (pp. 43-65). Cambridge University Press. mechanism.ucsd.edu/research/bechtel.identityreductionconservationconvergence.pdf
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Beckermann A. (1992). Introduction - reductive and nonreductive physicalism. In A. Beckermann (Ed.), Emergence or reduction?: Essays on the prospects of nonreductive physicalism (pp. 1-21). De Gruyter.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Beckermann, A. (2007). Neue Überlegungen zum Eigenschaftsphysikalismus. In M. Pauen , M. Schütte , & A. Staudacher (Eds), Begriff, Erklärung, Bewusstsein. Neue Beiträge zum Qualia-Problem (pp. 143-170). Mentis. pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2555625
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Reprinting collections]  

Beckermann, A. (2012). Property Identity and Reductive Explanation. In S. Gozzano & C. Hill (Eds.), New Perspectives on Type-Identity (pp. 66-87). Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511687068.004
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Reprinting collections]  

Beloff, J. (1965). The identity hypothesis - A critique. In J. R. Smythies (Ed.), Brain and mind. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Beloff, J. (1996). Searle's fallacy versus Place's nonsense: John Beloff replies to his critics The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Section Newsletter, 22, 14-16.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Bird, A. (2007). Nature's metaphysics: Laws and properties. Oxford University Press
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Bird, A. (2016). Overpowering (How the Powers Ontology Has Overreached Itself). Mind, 125(498),341-383. doi:10.1093/mind/fzv207 kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/overpowering-how-the-powers-ontology-has-overreached-itself(277eec92-feb9-4e98-9741-8d9fd31e55c6).html
[Abstract]Many authors have argued in favour of an ontology of properties as powers and it has been widely argued that this ontology allows us to address certain philosophical problems in novel and illuminating ways, for example causation, representation, intentionality, free will, and liberty. I argue that the ontology of powers, even if successful as an account of fundamental natural properties, does not provide the insight claimed as regards the aforementioned nonfundamental phenomena. I focus on and criticise the powers theory of causation presented by Mumford and Anjum (2011), and argue that related criticisms can be directed at other abuses of (the ontology of ) powers.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Block, N., & Alston, W. P. (1984) Psychology and philosophy. In M. H. Bornstein (Ed.), Psychology and its allied disciplines (Volume 1: The humanities, ch. 5, pp. 195-). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Borst, C. V. (1970a). Introduction. In C. V. Borst (Ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [2 referring publications by Place]  

Bradley, M. C. (1963). Sensations, Brain Processes and Colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 41, 385-393.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [2 referring publications by Place]  

Brown, R. (2012). The brain and its states. In S. Edelman, T. Fekete, & N. Zach (Eds.), Being in time: Dynamical models of phenomenal experience. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Bunge M. (1977). Emergence and the mind. Neuroscience, 2(4), 501–509. doi:10.1016/0306-4522(77)90047-1
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Burt, C. (1968). Brain and consciousness. British Journal of Psychology, 59, 55-69.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Burt, C. (1969). Brain and consciousness. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 22, 29-36.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Is reply to]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Chalmers, D. (2018). The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 25(9-10), 6-61.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Champagne, M. (2018). Consciousness and the philosophy of signs: How Peircean semiotics combines phenomenal qualia and practical effects. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 19. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-73338-8
[Abstract]It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy. The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period – its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound. Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in philosophy forward.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Chappell, V. C. (Ed.). (1962). The Philosophy of Mind. Prentice-Hall.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Reprints in this collection]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Chernoff, F. (2022). ‘Truth’, ‘justice’, and the American wave… function: comments on Alexander Wendt's Quantum Mind and Social Science. International Theory, 14, 146 - 158. doi:10.1017/S1752971921000099
[Abstract]This paper examines several aspects of Alexander Wendt's Quantum Mind and Social Science. The paper questions the nature of the task, as ontologies are debated in a scientific field once there is a widely accepted substantive theory that stands in need of interpretation, as with Newtonian physics or quantum mechanics; doing this job for international relations (IR) is highly questionable give that there is no widely accepted substantive theory of IR that needs an interpretation. Second, the paper questions Wendt's view of the consequences for ontology of quantum theory being replaced in the future; Wendt the interpretation of the history of science maintains that in the physical sciences a new theory subsumes the older theory, including its ontology. But, this seems to misread history, while the empirical content of classical physics is subsumed by relativity theory, it is far from true that the former's ontology was subsumed. The ontologies are in sharp contrast. The paper raises questions also about the notion of ‘truth’ and of the meaningfulness of evaluative concepts like ‘justice’.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Coates, A. (2022). Unmanifested powers and universals. Synthese, 200. doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03476-6
[Abstract]According to a well-known argument against dispositional essentialism, the nature of unmanifested token powers leaves dispositional essentialists with an objectionable commitment to the reality of non-existent entities. The idea is that, because unmanifested token powers are directed at their non-existent token manifestations, they require the reality of those manifestations. Arguably the most promising response to this argument works by claiming that, if properties are universals, dispositional directedness need only entail the reality of actually existing manifestation types. I argue that this response fails, because no version of the response can adequately accommodate dispositions of the sort that follow from Coulomb’s law. This result both defeats an important argument that dispositional essentialists ought to be realists about universals and appears to leave dispositional essentialists with a problematic commitment to either non-relational connections or a Meinongian ontology.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Cobb, M. (2020). The idea of the brain. A history. Profile Books.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Cole, D. J., & Foelber, R. (1984). Contingent materialism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 65, 74-85. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1984.tb00214.x
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Corballis, M. C. (2009). The evolution of language, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1156(1), 19-43.
[Abstract]Language, whether spoken or signed, can be viewed as a gestural system, evolving from the so-called mirror system in the primate brain. In nonhuman primates the gestural system is well developed for the productions and perception of manual action, especially transitive acts involving the grasping of objects. The emergence of bipedalism in the hominins freed the hands for the adaptation of the mirror system for intransitive acts for communication, initially through the miming of events. With the emergence of the genus Homo from some 2 million years ago, pressures for more complex communication and increased vocabulary size led to the conventionalization of gestures, the loss of iconic representation, and a gradual shift to vocal gestures replacing manual ones—although signed languages are still composed of manual and facial gestures. In parallel with the conventionalization of symbols, languages gained grammatical complexity, perhaps driven by the evolution of episodic memory and mental time travel, which involve combinations of familiar elements—Who did what to whom, when, where, and why? Language is thus adapted to allow us to share episodic structures, whether past, planned, or fictional, and so increase survival fitness.
[Citing Place (2000c) in context]  

Crane, T. (1998). Intentionality as the mark of the mental. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 43, 229-251. doi:10.1017/S1358246100004380
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Crawford, S. (2013). The Myth of Logical Behaviourism and the Origins of the Identity Theory. In M. Beaney (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy (1 ed., pp. 621-655). Oxford University Press. www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/the-myth-of-logical-behaviourism-and-the-origins-of-the-identity-theory(cfcb411c-26f1-4c55-a275-1c4ed0eb949c).html
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (2000f)]  

Crawford, S. (2011) General Introduction. In S. Crawford, (Ed.), Philospohy of mind (4 volumes):  Critical concepts of philosophy www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/general-introduction(5f3fd60a-e056-4818-8777-8a4b4c33fa6d).html philarchive.org/archive/CRAPOM
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Crumley, J. S. (2022). Introduction to metaphysics. Broadview Press
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Curry, D. S. (2018). Beliefs as inner causes: The (lack of) evidence. Philosophical Psychology, 31(6), 850-877. doi:10.1080/09515089.2018.1452197
[Abstract]Many psychologists studying lay belief attribution and behavior explanation cite Donald Davidson in support of their assumption that people construe beliefs as inner causes. But Davidson’s influential argument is unsound; there are no objective grounds for the intuition that the folk construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior. Indeed, recent experimental work by Ian Apperly, Bertram Malle, Henry Wellman, and Tania Lombrozo provides an empirical framework that accords well with Gilbert Ryle’s alternative thesis that the folk construe beliefs as patterns of living that contextualize behavior.
[Citing Place (1996c) in context]  

Curry, D.S. (2021). How beliefs are like colors. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03144-1
[Abstract]Double dissociations between perceivable colors and physical properties of colored objects have led many philosophers to endorse relationalist accounts of color. I argue that there are analogous double dissociations between attitudes of belief—the beliefs that people attribute to each other in everyday life—and intrinsic cognitive states of belief—the beliefs that some cognitive scientists posit as cogs in cognitive systems—pitched at every level of psychological explanation. These dissociations provide good reason to refrain from conflating attitudes of belief with intrinsic cognitive states of belief. I suggest that interpretivism provides an attractive account of the former (insofar as they are not conflated with the latter). Like colors, attitudes of belief evolved to be ecological signifiers, not cogs in cognitive systems.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Danckert, J., & Rossetti, Y. (2005). Blindsight in action: what can the different sub-types of blindsight tell us about the control of visually guided actions? Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 29(7), 1035–1046 doi:10.1016/J.NEUBIOREV.2005.02.001 www.academia.edu/19599266/Blindsight_in_action_what_can_the_different_sub_types_of_blindsight_tell_us_about_the_control_of_visually_guided_actions
[Abstract]Blindsight broadly refers to the paradoxical neurological condition where patients with a visual field defect due to a cortical lesion nevertheless demonstrate implicit residual visual sensitivity within their field cut. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, through a selective review of the blindsight literature we propose a new taxonomy for the subtypes of residual abilities described in blindsight. Those patients able to accurately act upon blind field stimuli (e.g. by pointing or saccading towards them) are classified as having ‘action-blindsight’, those whose residual functions can be said to rely to some extent upon attentive processing of blind field stimuli are classified as demonstrating ‘attention-blindsight’, while finally, patients who have somewhat accurate perceptual judgements for blind field stimuli despite a complete lack of any conscious percept, are classified as having ‘agnosopsia’ — literally meaning ‘not knowing what one sees’. We also address the possible neurological substrates of these residual sensory processes. Our second aim was to investigate the most striking subtype of blindsight, action-blindsight. We review the data relevant to this subtype and the hypotheses proposed to account for it, before speculating on how action-blindsight may inform our normal models of visuomotor control.
[Citing Place (2000a)]  

Dennett, D. C. (1987). Skinner Placed (A commentary on Place's Skinner Re-skinned). In S. Modgil, & C. Modgil (Eds.), B. F. Skinner, Consensus and Controversy (Part XI, Skinner and the 'Virtus dormitiva' argument, pp. 245-248). Falmer Press.
[Citing Place (1987a)]  [Is reply to]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Dennett (1987) Skinner Placed.pdf

Dennett, D. C. (2016). Illusionism as the obvious default theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 65-72.
[Abstract]Using a parallel with stage magic, it is argued that far from being seen as an extreme alternative, illusionism as articulated by Frankish should be considered the front runner, a conservative theory to be developed in detail, and abandoned only if it demonstrably fails to account for phenomena, not prematurely dismissed as 'counter-intuitive'. We should explore the mundane possibilities thoroughly before investing in any magical hypotheses.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Deutscher, M. (1967). Mental and physical properties. In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The identity theory of mind (pp. 65-83). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Dickins D. W. (2001). Equivalence is to do with symbols, and it is cognitive, European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 2(1), 53-56. doi:10.1080/15021149.2001.11434171
[Citing Place (1995/6) in context]  

Dickins D. W. (2005). On aims and methods in the neuroimaging of derived relations. Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior84(3), 453–483. doi:10.1901/jeab.2005.92-04
[Abstract]Ingenious and seemingly powerful technologies have been developed recently that enable the visualization in some detail of events in the brain concomitant upon the ongoing behavioral performance of a human participant. Measurement of such brain events offers at the very least a new set of dependent variables in relation to which the independent variables familiarly manipulated in the operant laboratory may be explored. Two related paradigms in which a start has been made in such research concern the derivation of novel or emergent relations from a baseline set of trained relations, and include the phenomenon of transitive inference (TI), observed in studies of stimulus equivalence (SE) and serial learning (SL) or seriation. This paper reviews some published and forthcoming neuroimaging studies of these and related phenomena, and considers how this line of research both demands and represents a welcome synthesis between types of question and levels of explanation in behavioral science that often have been seen as antithetical.
[Citing Place (1995/6) in context]  

Dickins, D. W. (2011). Transitive Inference in Stimulus Equivalence and Serial Learning. European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 12(2), 523–555.
[Abstract]The logical and behavioural properties of stimulus equivalence (SE) sets and serial learning (SL) sets are different, yet either can be derived from a randomly presented number of overlapping premise pairs, and both show transitive inference (TI). A within-participant experiment is reported which attempted to base both types of set on the same stimuli. To provide an ‘ecologically valid’ context the stimuli were photographs of 2 imaginary groups of 7 students ordered within each group by ‘exam grades’. Participants were given respondent-type training in ‘study phases’ in which the 12 premise pairs of photos were randomly presented without a response being required, alternating with ‘response phases’ in which the 10 participants in the ‘SE first’ group received matching-to-sample trials and the 10 in the ‘SL first’ group received trials with the study pairs of stimuli, in which they had to indicate whether these were in the same order as in the study phase or had been switched around. TI testing was then first conducted using the same requirement as in training, followed by similar tests using the other kind of response requirement. In a parallel sorting test participants were shown the 14 photos in random array on a screen and were asked to arrange them into 2 ordered groups. is sorting test was given 3 times, (1) after initial training on either SE or SL; (2) after TI testing with the same paradigm; (3) after TI testing with the opposite paradigm. Though the yield of accurate responding on the TI tests was poor, performance on initial TI testing was both more accurate and showed greater positive transfer to the other kind of TI test when SL preceded SE than vice versa. Results on the sorting task gave stronger indications of set formation than the TI tests, particularly in the SL first group. There were signs of the predicted increase in accuracy and decrease in RT as a function of increasing numbers of nodes in SL in the SL-first group, and some sign of the predicted inverse relation between accuracy and nodal number in SE for the SE-first group. When the groups switched to the opposite types of test to that on which they had been trained both showed an overall reduction in RTs and both showed decreasing RTs with increasing numbers of nodes. Unsurprisingly the experiment raised more questions than it could answer but suggested ways in which the similarities and differences between SL and SE, and how they interact, may be further explored.
[Citing Place (1995/6) in context]  

Dickins, D. W. (2015). A Simpler Route to Stimulus Equivalence? A Replication and Further Exploration of a “Simple Discrimination Training Procedure” (Canovas, Debert and Pilgrim 2014). The Psychological Record, 65, 637–647. doi:10.1007/s40732-015-0134-3
[Abstract]In a recent paper in this journal, Canovas, Debert and Pilgrim (The Psychological Record, 65(2), 337–346, 2015), in their second experiment, taught participants to make one key press to each of three simple visual stimuli and an alternative response to another three. They then trained two new key presses to one stimulus from each class, which then transferred to the other stimuli in each class. When subsequently presented with compounds of two stimuli, participants indicated “correct” to within-class compounds, but “incorrect” to between-class compounds. The present study starts with a successful replication of this seemingly new way of establishing stimulus equivalence classes, with an added matching-to-sample test at the end. In two further experiments, the visual stimuli were replaced by non-words, with two further non-words to be said aloud in place of key-presses. These showed that it was possible to establish two or three equivalence classes using such initial discrimination training, even when the prior demonstration of functional equivalence classes by transfer-of-training to a second set of responses was omitted. Other ways of conceptualizing these methods of training are considered, together with some implications for enlarging our understanding of equivalence class formation.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  

Dickins, D. W. (2015). Stimulus Equivalence: A Laboratory Artefact or the Heart of Language? [Doctoral thesis]. University of Huddersfield. eprints.hud.ac.uk/26942/
[Abstract]This thesis surveys some of the implications of the presented collection of publications, all of which address the phenomenon of stimulus equivalence. Stimulus equivalence SE is first operationally defined in terms of Sidmans trio of criteria: symmetry, transitivity, and reflexivity (Sidman & Tailby, 1982). Then some of its main features – the phenomenon of delayed emergence, the effects of nodes, and the influence of properties of the stimuli used, including nameability and meaningfulness - as exemplified in the empirical studies presented, are evaluated in the light of recent literature. The variety of ways in which SE classes may be formed are described, and the question of when SE relations take effect – during the training of the base relations, or subsequently, or only in the course of unreinforced testing for derived relations – is discussed. The effects of nodal number in multi-nodal linear classes are examined and contrasted with those in serial learning. Some methods of chronometric and protocol analysis, as developed in some of the collected studies, are described, and the outlines of a model of SE class formation they might help to form is presented. The role of naming and of language in general is discussed as a sufficient route to SE class formation, but not one that is perhaps necessary for its laboratory demonstration. The role of SE in the opposite direction, in the ontogeny and phylogeny of language, is considered. Here, besides learned speculation, more empirical studies are awaited, of children, and some new developments in comparative cognition. Highlights are described of the few brain imaging studies implicating SE, following the pioneering empirical study and the earlier review in the presented collection. The survey ends by again extolling the relevance of Tinbergen's (1963) four levels of explanation in behavioural biology to see the phenomena of SE in appropriate perspective.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  

Dickins, D. W., Singh, K., Roberts, N., Burns, P., Downes, J., Jimmieson, P., & Bentall, R. (2001). An fMRI study of stimulus equivalence. Neuroreport, 12(2), 405-411. www.academia.edu/download/43697924/An_fMRI_study_of_stimulus_equivalence20160313-1683-54en2k.pdf
[Abstract]In order to study brain activation during the formation of equivalence relations, 12 subjects (mean age 27.6 yrs) underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) during matching-to-sample (MTS) tests of (1) previously trained arbitrary relationships between iconic stimuli and the untrained, emergent relations of (2) symmetry, (3) transitivity, and (4) symmetry with transitivity, plus a test of verbal fluency (VF). Brain activation was similar in all MTS tasks and in the VF task. In particular, both types of task activated dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and posterior parietal cortex bilaterally. However VF, but not the MTS tasks, activated Broca's area. In three of the four MTS tasks, behavioural accuracy was significantly correlated with left lateralisation of DLPFC activity. Brain activation patterns during equivalence thus resembled those involved in semantic processing underlying language, without involving regions concerned with the simple sub-vocal articulation of stimulus names.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  

Dickins, T. E. (2001). On the origin of symbols. Connexions, (5), 2-18
Note:
About the journal: Connexions - An online journal of cognitive science. ISSN 1368-3233 In the period 1997 - 2003 there appeared 6 issues. The journal is archived at www.keithfrankish.com/connexions/
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  [Citing Place (2000c)]  [Citing Place (2000g)]  

Dickins, T. E. (2003). General Symbol Machines: The First Stage in the Evolution of Symbolic Communication. Evolutionary Psychology, 1(1), 192-209. doi:10.1177/147470490300100116
[Abstract]Humans uniquely form stimulus equivalence (SE) classes of abstract and unrelated stimuli, i.e. if taught to match A with B and B with C, they will spontaneously match B with A, and C with B, (the relation of symmetry), and A with C (transitivity). Other species do not do this. The SE ability is possibly the consequence of a specific selection event in the Homo lineage. SE is of interest because it appears to demonstrate a facility that is core to symbolic behavior. Linguistic symbols, for example, are arbitrarily and symmetrically related to their referent such that the term banana has no resemblance to bananas but when processed can be used to discriminate bananas. Equally when bananas are perceived the term banana is readily produced. This relation is arguably the defining mark of symbolic representation. In this paper I shall detail the SE phenomenon and argue that it is evidence for a cognitive device that I term a General Symbol Machine (GSM). The GSM not only sets the background condition for subsequent linguistic evolution but also for other symbolic behaviors such as mathematical reasoning. In so doing the GSM is not particularly domain-specific. The apparent domain-specificity of, for example, natural language is a consequence of other computational developments. This introduces complexity to evolutionary arguments about cognitive architecture.
[Citing Place (1995/6) in context]  

Dickins, T. E. (2004). Social constructionism as cognitive science. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 34(4), 333-352. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.2004.00253.x eprints.mdx.ac.uk/9462/
[Abstract]Social constructionism is a broad position that emphasizes the importance of human social processes in psychology. These processes are generally associated with language and the ability to construct stories that conform to the emergent rules of 'language games'. This view allows one to espouse a variety of critical postures with regard to realist commitments within the social and behavioural sciences, ranging from outright relativism (language constructs all of our concepts) to a more moderate respect for the 'barrier' that linguistic descriptions can place between us and reality. This paper first outlines some possible social constructionist viewpoints and then goes on to show how each of them conforms to the basic principles of information theory. After establishing this relation the paper then argues that this leads to a deal of commonality between social constructionist positions and the baseline aims of cognitive science. Finally, the paper argues that if information theory is held in common this both suggests future research collaborations and helps to 'mop up' some of the arguments surrounding realist commitments.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Dickins, T. E., & Dickins, D. W. (2001). Symbols, stimulus equivalence and the origins of language. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 221-244. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759429
[Abstract]Recent interest in the origins of language, within the strongly cognitive field of Evolutionary Psychology, has predominantly focused upon the origins of syntax (cf. Hurford, Knight, & Studdert-Kennedy, 1998). However, Ullin Place's (2000a) theory of the gestural origins of language also addresses the more fundamental issue of the antecedents of symbols, and does so from a behaviorist perspective, stressing the importance of the peculiarly human ability to form stimulus equivalence classes. The rejection by many developmental psychologists of a behaviorist account of language acquisition has led to a modular and distinctly nativist psychology of language (cf. Pinker, 1994, 1997; Pinker & Bloom, 1990). Little has been said about the role or nature of learning mechanisms in the evolution of language. Although Place does not provide any defense of a behaviorist linguistic ontogeny, this is no reason to rule out his phylogenetic speculations. We aim to outline Place's evolutionarily parsimonious view of symbol origins and their relation to stimulus equivalence. We applaud Ullin Place for bringing symbols into focus within the broader discipline of language origins and suggest that he has raised an interesting set of questions to be discussed in future work.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  [Citing Place (2000c)]  [Citing Place (2000g )]  
Download: Dickins (2001) Symbols, Stimulus Equivalence and the Origins of Language.pdf

Dove, G. (2018). Redefining physicalism. Topoi, 37(3), 513-522 doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9405-0
[Abstract]Philosophers have traditionally treated physicalism as an empirically informed metaphysical thesis. This approach faces a well-known problem often referred to as Hempel’s dilemma: formulations of physicalism tend to be either false or indeterminate. The generally preferred strategy to address this problem involves an appeal to a hypothetical complete and ideal physical theory. After demonstrating that this strategy is not viable, I argue that we should redefine physicalism as an interdisciplinary research program seeking to explain the mental in terms of the physical that encompasses the physical sciences, the psychological and brain sciences, and philosophy. Redefining physicalism in this way improves upon previous reconstructive accounts while avoiding the indeterminacy associated with orthodox forms of futurist physicalism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Eilifsen, C. & Arntzen, E. (2017). Effects of Immediate Tests on the Long-Term Maintenance of Stimulus Equivalence Classes. The Psychological Record, 67(4), 447-461. doi:10.1007/s40732-017-0247-y
[Abstract]It has been suggested that stimulus equivalence is a central component of language and symbolic behavior. When teaching symbolic behavior, the goal is often to achieve a more or less permanent alteration of an individual's behavioral repertoire. As such, it seems important to assess not only variables affecting the establishment of stimulus equivalence but also variables affecting continued stimulus control exerted by stimulus equivalence class members over time. The current study investigated the role of the test for stimulus equivalence on the long-term maintenance of stimulus equivalence classes. Using one-to-many conditional discrimination training, 24 adult participants were taught to respond in line with three five-member stimulus classes. One group of 12 participants immediately completed a test for stimulus equivalence, and 12 other participants did not receive such a test. All 24 participants were subsequently tested for trained and derived relations under extinction conditions 2 and 4 weeks later without any further exposure to the contingencies of the conditional discrimination training. Results showed no differences between the two groups, with four participants in each group responding in accordance with both trained conditional discriminations and stimulus equivalence in the 4-week test. Six additional participants did, however, display systematic conditional performance during retention tests only partly consistent with the experimenter-defined classes.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  

Eilifsen, C., & Arntzen, E. (2021) Mediated Generalization and Stimulus Equivalence Perspectives on Behavior Science, 44, 1–27. doi:10.1007/S40614-021-00281-3
[Abstract]From the 1930s to the 1970s a large number of experimental studies on mediated generalization were published, and this research tradition provided an important context for early research on stimulus equivalence. Mediated generalization and stimulus equivalence have several characteristics in common, notably that both traditions seek to experimentally investigate derived responding among arbitrarily related stimuli in human participants. Although studies of stimulus equivalence are currently being regularly published, few studies investigate mediated generalization in humans today, and the research tradition is mainly of historical interest. The current article will give an account of the origin, the development, and the demise of research on mediated generalization, including a presentation of publication trends, experimental methodology, and the conceptual context research on mediated generalization took place within. Finally, some thoughts on the demise of mediated generalization and its relevance for modern research on stimulus equivalence and other types of derived responding are presented, including reflections on the observability of explanatory variables and the use of inferential statistics.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  

Ellia, F., & Chis-Ciure, R. (2022). Consciousness and complexity: Neurobiological naturalism and integrated information theory. Consciousness and Cognition, 100. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2022.103281
[Abstract]In this paper we take a meta-theoretical stance and aim to compare and assess two conceptual frameworks that endeavor to explain phenomenal experience. In particular, we compare Feinberg & Mallatt’s Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) and Tononi’s and colleagues Integrated Information Theory (IIT), given that the former pointed out some similarities between the two theories (Feinberg & Mallatt 2016c-d). To probe their similarity, we first give a general introduction into both frameworks. Next, we expound a ground-plan for carrying out our analysis. We move on to articulate a philosophical profile of NN and IIT, addressing their ontological commitments and epistemological foundations. Finally, we compare the two point-by-point, also discussing how they stand on the issue of artificial consciousness.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Farrell, B. A. (1965). Review of the book The Behavioral Basis of Perception by J. G. Taylor. Mind, 74, 259-280
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Feigl, H. (1958). The "Mental" and the "Physical", In H. Feigl, M. Scriven, & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Vol II, pp. 370-497). University of Minnesota Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [12 referring publications by Place]  [Reprinting collections]  

Fisher, A. R. J. (2022). The two Davids and Australian Materialism. In P. R. Anstey, & D. Braddon-Mitschell (Eds.), Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind (pp. 29-51). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780192843722.003.0004
[Citing Place (1954) in context]  [Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Frankish, K. (2016). Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 23(11-12), 11-39. https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/imp/jcs/2016/00000023/f0020011/art00002
[Abstract]This article presents the case for an approach to consciousness that I call illusionism. This is the view that phenomenal consciousness, as usually conceived, is illusory. According to illusionists, our sense that it is like something to undergo conscious experiences is due to the fact that we systematically misrepresent them (or, on some versions, their objects) as having phenomenal properties. Thus, the task for a theory of consciousness is to explain our illusory representations of phenomenality, not phenomenality itself, and the hard problem is replaced by the illusion problem. Although it has had powerful defenders, illusionism remains a minority position, and it is often dismissed as failing to take consciousness seriously. This article seeks to rebut this accusation. It defines the illusionist programme, outlines its attractions, and defends it against some common objections. It concludes that illusionism is a coherent and attractive approach, which deserves serious consideration.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Fried, M. (2020). Kuhn's challenge: conceptual continuity and natural kinds [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. Birkbeck, University of London. eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/40475
[Abstract]Thomas Kuhn poses a fundamental worry about explaining scientific progress, which I call Kuhn's Challenge. The Challenge consists of two related questions: (A) If the meanings of key terms change between theories on either side of a paradigm shift, how can we still say that these theories are about the same thing? (B) Even if we assume that two theories address the same subject matter, how can we determine which one is better? A popular reply to Kuhn is to adopt a semantics for natural kind terms influenced by Kripke in Naming and Necessity and Putnam in "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", according to which such terms rigidly refer - independently of theory changes - to the same kinds across possible worlds and through time. I argue that this approach can explain extra-theoretical conceptual continuity only if we assume that all natural kinds have the same essence type. Though Kripke and Putnam take for granted that this essence type is microstructural, I argue that in practice, many sciences postulate natural kinds with other essence types, such as historical or functional essences; and that when new discoveries are made, prompting paradigm shifts, the relevant essence type may change. Moreover, which type is relevant to which science is as much a matter of decision as of discovery. Such a claim may seem to threaten realism about natural kinds. I argue, however, that we can be both pluralists and realists, if we recognise that conceptual continuity is secured ex post. Contrary to those who have argued for similar positions, I claim that we need not give up the rigidity of natural kind terms or the global ambitions of realism. In the end I show how the framework I have developed illuminates the debate over Kripke's argument against Physicalism in the philosophy of mind.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Goldstick, D. (2021). In Defence of David Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Perception. Dialogue, 1-16. doi:10.1017/S0012217320000438
[Abstract]There are no qualia. The phenomenological difference between seeing and visualizing something is that the propositions which the experient begins to believe in the first case are only entertained in the second. We can know what it's like to be a bat by knowing that their echolocation informs them non-inferentially of the shapes, sizes, and directional distances away of nearby surfaces. The terms for secondary qualities like colours, though, are names of the type-properties they designate, tracing back causally to a verbal 'baptism,' and so experients don't know the character of colour experiences until they study brain physiology.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Gouveia, S.S. (2022). Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Methodological Analysis. Springer Nature. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-95369-0
[Citing Place (1956 )]  

Gozzano, S., & Hill, S. C. (2012). Introduction. In S. Gozzano, & C. S. Hill, New perspectives on type identity: The mental and the physical (pp. 1-15).
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Graham, G, (2019). Behaviorism. In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition). plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/behaviorism/
[Abstract]It has sometimes been said that “behave is what organisms do.” Behaviorism is built on this assumption, and its goal is to promote the scientific study of behavior. The behavior, in particular, of individual organisms. Not of social groups. Not of cultures. But of persons and animals. In this entry I consider different types of behaviorism. I outline reasons for and against being a behaviorist. I consider contributions of behaviorism to the study of behavior. Special attention is given to the so-called “radical behaviorism” of B. F. Skinner (1904–90). Skinner is given special (not exclusive) attention because he is the behaviorist who has received the most attention from philosophers, fellow scientists and the public at large. General lessons can also be learned from Skinner about the conduct of behavioral science in general. The entry describes those lessons.
[Citing Place (2000b) in context]  

Graham, G. (2004). Self-Ascription: Thought Insertion. In J. Radden (Ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion (pp. 89-105). Oxford University Press.
[Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  

Greenberg, G. (1983). Psychology Without the Brain. Psychological Record, 33, 49–58. doi:10.1007/BF03394821
[Abstract]This paper presents a critique of the currently dominant neurological reductionism that pervades contemporary psychology. The argument is made that while the brain is certainly involved in behavior it is not the source of it. Rather, a more parsimonious approach to understanding the behavior of organisms can be found in an epigenetic orientation. It is suggested that the concept of evolution holds much promise for theoretical advance within psychology.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Gudmundsson, K. (2018). The Skinner-Chomsky debate: The centrality of the dilemma argument. Behavior and Philosophy, 46, 1-24.
[Abstract]The Skinner-Chomsky debate has been with us for a long time but has never been fully resolved. Outside behaviorism, Chomsky’s review is generally highly praised. Behaviorists have, however, countered by demonstrating many inaccuracies, misquotes, and basic errors couched in Chomsky’s emotional language. The purpose of this paper is to show that both parties are right. Although much of Chomsky’s criticisms miss the mark, one very basic point that Chomsky himself endlessly repeats is yet unresolved. This part of Chomsky’s is called the dilemma argument and is shown to be a valid constructive critique that behaviorists would do well to address. Therefore, it is necessary to go in some detail into this criticism. It is about time to flesh out its basic structure in order to add clarity to its examination. It is however, not the purpose of this paper to answer this criticism but only to highlight it. This will be a determined attempt at clarity, never giving up even when wading through Chomsky’s general emotional attitude – to say the least.
[Citing Chomsky, Place & Schoneberger (2000)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  

Gunner, D. L. (1967). Professor Smart's "Sensations and brain processes". In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The identity theory of mind (pp. 1-20). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Hamlyn, D. W. (1964). Causality and human behaviour. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 38, 125-142. www.jstor.org/stable/4106605
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Heil, J. (2022). Armstrong's revenge. In P. R. Anstey, & D. Braddon-Mitchell (Eds.), Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780192843722.001.0001
[Citing Place (1956 )]  

Heil, J. (2022). The incremental chain of being. In S. Wuppuluri, & I. Stewart (Eds), From Electrons to Elephants and Elections. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-92192-7_2
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Hinton, J. M. (1967). Illusions and identity. Analysis, 27, 65-76. doi:10.2307/3326799
Note:
A revised version from February 1969 is reprinted in C. V. Borst (Ed.) (1970), The mind-brain identity theory. Macmillan.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Reprinting collections]  

Hocutt, M. (1967). In defence of materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 27(3), 366-385. doi:10.2307/2106063 www.jstor.org/stable/2106063
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Holth, P. (2001). The persistence of category mistakes in psychology. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 203-219. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759428
[Abstract]Gilbert Ryle's book The Concept of Mind was published in 1949. According to Ryle, his "destructive purpose" was to show that "a family of radical category mistakes" is the source of the "official doctrine," that is, a "double-life theory," according to which "with the doubtful exception of idiots and infants in arms every human being has both a body and a mind." By numerous examples, Ryle showed quite forcefully how psychology and philosophy at the time were misled into asking the wrong kinds of questions. More than 50 years have elapsed since the original publication of Gilbert Ryle's book and, as Ullin T. Place wrote shortly before passing away, Ryle's conceptual analysis is now due, if not overdue, for a comeback. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the persistent relevance of category mistakes to current problems in the analysis of behavior.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (2000f)]  
Download: Holth (2001) The Persistence of Category Mistakes in Psychology.pdf

Ingthorsson, R. D. (2015). The Regress of Pure Powers Revisited. European Journal of Philosophy, 23(3), 529–41. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00548.x
[Abstract]The paper aims to elucidate in better detail than before the dispute about whether or not dispositional monism—the view that all basic properties are pure powers—entails a vicious infinite regress. Particular focus is on Alexander Bird’s and George Molnar’s attempts to show that the arguments professing to demonstrate a vicious regress are inconclusive because they presuppose what they aim to prove, notably that powers are for their nature dependent on something else. I argue that Bird and Molnar are mistaken. It is true that dispositional monism is popularly assumed to characterise powers as dependent entities, but this is not what the arguments aim to prove. They merely aim to demonstrate that it would be absurd to assume that all properties are dependent in this way. Finally, it is argued that there is an unresolved tension in Bird’s and Molnar’s account of powers. They characterise them as being for their nature dependent on the manifestations that they are for, and yet ontologically independent of those same manifestations. Until that tension is resolved, their accounts are not equipped to remove the threat of vicious regress.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

James, E., Keppler, J., L Robertshaw, T., & Sessa, B. (2022). N,N-dimethyltryptamine and Amazonian ayahuasca plant medicine. Human psychopharmacology,, e2835 . doi:10.1002/hup.2835
[Abstract]Objective: Reports have indicated possible uses of ayahuasca for the treatment of conditions including depression, addictions, post‐traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and specific psychoneuroendocrine immune system pathologies. The article assesses potential ayahuasca and N,N‐dimethyltryptamine (DMT) integration with contemporary healthcare. The review also seeks to provide a summary of selected literature regarding the mechanisms of action of DMT and ayahuasca; and assess to what extent the state of research can explain reports of unusual phenomenology.
Design: A narrative review.
Results: Compounds in ayahuasca have been found to bind to serotonergic receptors, glutaminergic receptors, sigma‐1 receptors, trace amine‐associated receptors, and modulate BDNF expression and the dopaminergic system. Subjective effects are associated with increased delta and theta oscillations in amygdala and hippocampal regions, decreased alpha wave activity in the default mode network, and stimulations of vision‐related brain regions particularly in the visual association cortex. Both biological processes and field of consciousness models have been proposed to explain subjective effects of DMT and ayahuasca, however, the evidence supporting the proposed models is not sufficient to make confident conclusions. Ayahuasca plant medicine and DMT represent potentially novel treatment modalities.
Conclusions: Further research is required to clarify the mechanisms of action and develop treatments which can be made available to the general public. Integration between healthcare research institutions and reputable practitioners in the Amazon is recommended.

[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Jaworski, W. (2014). Hylomorphism and the Metaphysics of Structure. Res Philosophica, 91(2), 179-201.
[Abstract]Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle; it accounts for what things are and what they can do. My goal is to articulate a metaphysic of hylomorphic structure different from those currently on offer. It is based on a substance-attribute ontology that takes properties to be powers and tropes. Hylomorphic structures emerge, on this account, as powers to configure the materials that compose individuals.
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  

Jaworski, W. (2017) Psychology without a mental-physical dichotomy. In W. M.R. Simpson, R. C. Koons, & N, J. Teh (Eds.), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science (Chapter 11, pp. 261-291). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315211626-14
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  

Kammerer, F. (2021). The illusion of conscious experience. Synthese, 198, 845–866. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-02071-y philpapers.org/archive/KAMTIO-4.pdf
[Abstract]Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely counterintuitive: the idea that consciousness is an illusion strikes most people as absurd, and seems almost impossible to contemplate in earnest. Defenders of illusionism should be able to explain the apparent absurdity of their own thesis, within their own framework. However, this is no trivial task: arguably, none of the illusionist theories currently on the market is able to do this. I present a new theory of phenomenal introspection and argue that it might deal with the task at hand.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Key, B., Zalucki, O.H., & Brown, D.J. (2022). A first principles approach to subjective experience. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 16. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2022.756224
[Abstract]Understanding the neural bases of subjective experience remains one of the great challenges of the natural sciences. Higher-order theories of consciousness are typically defended by assessments of neural activity in higher cortical regions during perception, often with disregard to the nature of the neural computations that these regions execute. We have sought to refocus the problem toward identification of those neural computations that are necessary for subjective experience with the goal of defining the sorts of neural architectures that can perform these operations. This approach removes reliance on behaviour and brain homologies for appraising whether non-human animals have the potential to subjectively experience sensory stimuli. Using two basic principles—first, subjective experience is dependent on complex processing executing specific neural functions and second, the structure-determines-function principle—we have reasoned that subjective experience requires a neural architecture consisting of stacked forward models that predict the output of neural processing from inputs. Given that forward models are dependent on appropriately connected processing modules that generate prediction, error detection and feedback control, we define a minimal neural architecture that is necessary (but not sufficient) for subjective experience. We refer to this framework as the hierarchical forward models algorithm. Accordingly, we postulate that any animal lacking this neural architecture will be incapable of subjective experience.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Killeen, P. R., & Jacobs, K. W. (2017) Coal Is Not Black, Snow Is Not White, Food Is Not a Reinforcer: The Roles of Affordances and Dispositions in the Analysis of Behavior. The Behavior Analyst, 40(1), 17-38. doi:10.1007/s40614-016-0080-7
[Abstract]Reinforcers comprise sequences of actions in context. Just as the white of snow and black of coal depend on the interaction of an organism’s visual system and the reflectances in its surrounds, reinforcers depend on an organism’s motivational state and the affordances — possibilities for perception and action — in its surrounds. Reinforcers are not intrinsic to things but are a relation between what the thing affords, its context, the organism, and his or her history as capitulated in their current state. Reinforcers and other affordances are potentialities rather than intrinsic features. Realizing those potentialities requires motivational operations and stimulus contexts that change the state of the organism — they change its disposition to make the desired response. An expansion of the three-term contingency is suggested in order to help keep us mindful of the importance of behavioral systems, states, emotions, and dispositions in our research programs.
[Citing Place (1987a)]  

Kim, J. (1971). Materialism and the criteria of the mental. Synthese22, 323–345 doi:10.1007/BF00413431 http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43820/1/11229_2004_Article_BF00413431.pdf
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Kim, J. (1998). The mind–body problem after fifty years. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 43, 3-21.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Kneale, W. (1969). [Review of A Materialist Theory of Mind by D. M. Armstrong.] Mind, 78(310), 292-301. www.jstor.org/stable/2252380
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Koksvik, O. (2010). Metaphysics of consciousness. In G. Oppy, & N. Trakakis (Eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australasia. Monash University Publishing.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

LaRock, E. (2006). Why neural synchrony fails to explain the unity of visual consciousness. Behavior and philosophy, 34, 39-58.
[Abstract]A central issue in philosophy and neuroscience is the problem of unified visual consciousness. This problem has arisen because we now know that an object's stimulus features (e.g., its color, texture, shape, etc.) generate activity in separate areas of the visual cortex (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). For example, recent evidence indicates that there are very few, if any, neural connections between specific visual areas, such as those that correlate with color and motion (Bartels & Zeki, 2006; Zeki, 2003). So how do unified objects arise in visual consciousness? Some neuroscientists propose that neural synchrony is the mechanism that binds an object's features into a unity (e.g., see Crick, 1994; Crick & Koch, 1990; Engel, 2003; Roelfsema, 1998; Singer, 1996; von der Malsburg, 1996, 1999). I argue, on both empirical and philosophical grounds, that neural synchrony fails to explain the unity of visual consciousness
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

LaRock, E. (2008). Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process? International Philosophical Quarterly, 48(2), 201-229. doi:10.5840/ipq20084827
[Abstract]I argue on the basis of recent findings in neuroscience that consciousness is not a brain process, and then explore some alternative, non-reductive options concerning the metaphysical relationship between consciousness and the brain, such as weak and strong accounts of the emergence of consciousness and the constitution view of consciousness. I propose an Aristotelian account of the strong emergence of consciousness. This account motivates a wider ontology than reductive physicalism and makes reference to formal causation as a way explaining the causal power of consciousness. What is meant by formal causation, in this context, is that consciousness has the causal power to organize or control neuronal activity. This notion of causation is elaborated and supported by recent findings in the neurosciences. An advantage of this empirically informed approach is that proponents of the irreducibility of consciousness no longer need to rely upon conceptually based arguments alone, but can build a case against reductive physicalism that has a significant empirical foundation.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Leach, S. (2019). U. T. Place and the mystical origin of modern physicalism. Think, 18(53), 75-78. doi:10.1017/S1477175619000228
[Abstract]An introduction to the role of U. T. Place in the development of modern physicalism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (2004)]  

Leigland, S. (1996). An experimental analysis of ongoing verbal behavior: Reinforcement, verbal operants, and superstitious behavior. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 13(1), 79-104. doi:10.1007/BF03392908
[Abstract]Four adult humans were asked to asked to "find" and talk about a particular topic to a person in an adjoining room, and were instructed that they would hear a short beep (the only form of reply from the other person) when they were talking about the topic, or were "close" to the topic. In Session 1, the experimenter in the adjoining room presented the beeps in the manner of shaping, or the differential reinforcement of successive approximations, "toward" the designated topic. In Session 2, the same conditions were in effect but the experimenter was unable to hear the subject and the beeps were presented noncontingently in a way that roughly matched the frequency and distribution of presentations in Session 1. In Session 3, shaping conditions were again in effect but with a different topic than that designated for Session 1. Audio recordings were transcribed in a way that was designed to show the progress of shaping over time. These and additional forms of supporting data and accompanying rationale are presented and discussed in detail. Issues raised by the methodology and results of the experiment include the nature of the verbal operant, superstitious verbal behavior, and a variety of methodological issues relevant to the experimental analysis of ongoing or continuous verbal behavior.
[Citing Place (1991a) in context]  

Leigland, S. (1996). The functional analysis of psychological terms: In defense of a research program. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 13(1), 105-122. doi:10.1007/BF03392909
[Abstract]In 1945, B. F. Skinner outlined a proposal that psychological or mentalistic terms found in natural language might be analyzed empirically in terms of the variables, conditions, and contingencies of which they may be observed to be a function. Such an analysis would enable discriminations to be made between different classes of variables that enter into the control of the term. In this way, the analysis would clarify what is traditionally called the "meanings" of such terms as they occur as properties of verbal behavior. Despite his expressed confidence in the success of such a program, Skinner largely abandoned the functional analysis of psychological terms in favor of the development of a promising new field; the experimental analysis of behavior. The present paper argues that the original program is of great importance as well, and for the following reasons: (a) to make full, immediate, and (most importantly) effective contact with the range of issues and terms of central importance to the traditionally and culturally important concepts of "mind" and "mental life" (and thereby demonstrating the relevance of radical behaviorism to the full range of human and verbal behavior); and (b) to extend the methodology of the functional analysis of verbal behavior more generally. Such a research program would demonstrate, through an empirically-based scientific analysis, that the philosophical problems concerning "mental life" may be productively analyzed as problems of verbal behavior. Issues of methodology are discussed, and possible methodological strategies are proposed regarding the confirmation of behavior analytic interpretations of mentalistic terms.
[Citing Place (1993c) in context]  

Leigland, S. (1998). Current Status and Future Directions of the Analysis of Verbal Behavior - The Methodological Challenge of the Functional Analysis of Verbal Behavior The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 15(1),125-127. doi:10.1007/BF03392933
[Citing Place (1991a) in context]  [Citing Place (1997d) in context]  

Leigland, S. (2000). A contingency interpretation of Place’s contingency anomaly in ordinary conversation. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 161-165. www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2755454/pdf/anverbbehav00028-0161.pdf doi:10.1007/BF03392962
[Abstract]A verbal phenomenon often reported in the research literature of conversation analysis is reviewed. The phenomenon involves the observation that spoken sentences often receive consequences from listeners, and that the effect of these consequences appears to be variability in sentence emission, whereas the absence of such consequences appears to produce response persistence. If the speaker's sentences function as units of  verbal behavior and the listener's responses function as reinforcers, the effect seems to run  contrary to reinforcement contingency effects observed in the laboratory, where reinforcement produces response differentiation and extinction produces an increase in response variability and a decrease in the response class previously selected by reinforcement. An interpretation of the conversation phenomenon is presented, employing standard reinforcement contingencies for which the behavioral dynamics involved may be seen when speaker's sequence of sentences is construed as a behavior chain.
[Citing Place (1991a)]  [Citing Place (1997a)]  [Citing Place (1997d)]  
Download: Leigland (2000a) A Contingency Interpretation of Place's Contingency Anomaly in Ordinary Conversation.pdf

Leigland, S. (2003). Private Events and the Language of the Mental : Comments on Moore Behavior and Philosophy, 31, 159-164
[Citing Place (1993c) in context]  

Leigland, S. (2014). Contingency horizon: On private events and the analysis of behavior. The Behavior analyst, 37(1), 13-24 doi:10.1007/s40614-014-0002-5
[Abstract]Skinner’s radical behaviorism incorporates private events as biologically based phenomena that may play a functional role with respect to other (overt) behavioral phenomena. Skinner proposed four types of contingencies, here collectively termed the contingency horizon, which enable certain functional relations between private events and verbal behavior. The adequacy and necessity of this position has met renewed challenges from Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism and Baum’s molar behaviorism, both of which argue that all “mental” phenomena and terminology may be explained by overt behavior and environment–behavior contingencies extended in time. A number of lines of evidence are presented in making a case for the functional characteristics of private events, including published research from behavior analysis and general experimental psychology, as well as verbal behavior from a participant in the debate. An integrated perspective is offered that involves a multiscaled analysis of interacting public behaviors and private events.
[Citing Place (1993c) in context]