Publications citing U. T. Place.
398 publications found, showing 100 per page. This is page 1 .

Aaron, P. G., & Joshi, R. M. (2006). Written Language Is as Natural as Spoken language: A Biolinguistic Perspective. Reading Psychology, 27(4), 263-311. doi:10.1080/02702710600846803
[Abstract]A commonly held belief is that language is an aspect of the biological system since the capacity to acquire language is innate and evolved along Darwinian lines. Written language, on the other hand, is thought to be an artifact and a surrogate of speech; it is, therefore, neither natural nor biological. This disparaging view of written language, even though propounded by some renowned linguists and biologists, has not gained universal acceptance. Dissenters such as linguists from the Prague circle who claim that written language is an independent system that deserves a status equivalent to that of spoken language have developed their argument along linguistic parameters. The present article also endeavors to show that written language is as natural as spoken language but does so from a biolinguistic perspective. Biolinguistics defines language as a product of biological adaptation in the Darwinian sense (Givon, 2002) and considers language to be innate and species specific (Jenkins, 2000). The present article presents evidence to show that, similar to spoken language, written language has adaptive value, evolved over time, and is relatively independent of spoken language. The Egyptian hieroglyphic writing, which has a history of about 4,000 years, is used for examining the proposition that written language evolved along Darwinian lines as much as spoken language did. It is concluded that written language is yet another manifestation of the natural endowment of the human mind and may not be treated as a proxy for speech. The educational implication is that, in literacy instruction, written language should be given as much importance in today's schools as elements of spoken language, such as phoneme awareness and phonological awareness.
[Citing Place (2000c) in context]  

Alston, W. P. (1971). Dispositions and occurrences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1(2), 125–154.
[Citing Place (1954)]  

Alter, T. (2021). A defense of the supervenience requirement on physicalism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 10(4), 264–274. doi:10.1002/tht3.504
[Abstract]The supervenience requirement on physicalism says roughly that if physicalism is true then mental properties supervene on fundamental physical properties. After explaining the basis of the requirement, I defend it against objections presented by Lei Zhong (“Physicalism without supervenience,” Philosophical Studies 178 (5), 2021: 1529–44), Barbara Gail Montero (“Must physicalism imply supervenience of the mental on the physical?” Journal of Philosophy 110, 2013: 93–110), and Montero and Christopher Devlin Brown (“Making room for a this-worldly physicalism,” Topoi 37 (3), 2018: 523–32).
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Alter, T. (2023). The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism. Oxford University Press
[Abstract]Torin Alter presents a compelling defence of the 'knowledge argument' against physicalism, pioneered by Frank Jackson. According to physicalism, consciousness is a physical phenomenon. The knowledge argument stars Mary, who learns all objective, physical information through black-and-white media and yet acquires new information when she first sees colors for herself: information about what it is like to see in color. Based partly on that case, Jackson concludes that not all information is physical. Alter argues that the knowledge argument succeeds in refuting all standard versions of physicalism: versions on which consciousness is grounded by what objective science reveals. Alter also argues that given further, plausible assumptions, the knowledge argument leads to Russellian monism, according to which there are intrinsic properties that both constitute consciousness and underlie properties described by physics, such as mass and charge. Alter explains how the knowledge argument establishes those two conclusions and defend it against numerous objections.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Alter, T., & Howell, R.J. (2022). Physicalism, supervenience, and monism. Synthese, 200(6), 515 doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03965-8
[Abstract]Physicalism is standardly construed as a form of monism, on which all concrete phenomena fall under one fundamental type. It is natural to think that monism, and therefore physicalism, is committed to a supervenience claim. Monism is true only if all phenomena supervene on a certain fundamental type of phenomena. Physicalism, as a form of monism, specifies that these fundamental phenomena are physical. But some argue that physicalism might be true even if the world is disorderly, i.e., not ordered by supervenience relations in the way commonly supposed (Montero in J Philos 110:92–110, 2013; Leuenberger in Inquiry 57:151–174, 2014; Montero and Brown in Topoi 37(3):523–532, 2018; Zhong in Philos Stud 178(5):1529–1544, 2021). Unless these authors intend to challenge the claim that physicalism is a type of monism—a claim so central to the dialectic in philosophy of mind that rejecting it risks changing the subject—they are committed to challenging a supervenience requirement for monism. We argue that monism entails that there are substantial supervenience relations among concrete phenomena: relations that would not obtain in a disorderly world. Our argument thus has implications for debates about physicalism and supervenience, and sheds light on an under-discussed issue: what is implied by classifying a theory in the philosophy of mind as a form of monism? We also argue that physicalism’s commitment to monism creates problems for via negativa physicalism, on which the physical is characterized negatively.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Aranyosi, I. (2011). A new argument for mind-brain identity. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62(3), 489-517, doi:10.1093/bjps/axr001
[Abstract]In this article, I undertake the tasks: (i) of reconsidering Feigl's notion of a ‘nomological dangler' in light of recent discussion about the viability of accommodating phenomenal properties, or qualia, within a physicalist picture of reality; and (ii) of constructing an argument to the effect that nomological danglers, including the way qualia are understood to be related to brain states by contemporary dualists, are extremely unlikely. I offer a probabilistic argument to the effect that merely nomological danglers are extremely unlikely, the only probabilistically coherent candidates being 'anomic danglers' (not even nomically correlated) and ‘necessary danglers' (more than merely nomically correlated). After I show, based on similar probabilistic reasoning, that the first disjunct (anomic danglers) is very unlikely, I conclude that the identity thesis is the only remaining candidate for the mental-physical connection. The novelty of the argument is that it brings probabilistic considerations in favor of physicalism, a move that has been neglected in the recent burgeoning literature on the subject.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Armstrong, D. M. (1968). A materialist theory of the mind. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [24 referring publications by Place]  [Reviews]  

Armstrong, D. M. (1973). Epistemological foundations for a materialist theory of the mind. Philosophy of Science , 40(2), 178-193 doi:10.1086/288514
[Abstract]A philosophy might take its general inspiration from (1) commonsense; (2) careful observation; (3) philosophical argumentation; (4) the sciences; (5) “higher” sources of illumination. It is argued in this paper that it is bedrock commonsense, and the sciences, which are the most reliable foundations for a philosophy. This result is applied to the discussion and defense of a materialist theory of the mind.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Armstrong, D. M. (1983). Recent work on the relation of mind and brain. In G. Fløistad (Ed.), Philosophy of Mind/Philosophie de l’esprit (pp. 45–79). Contemporary philosophy/La philosophie contemporaine, vol 4. Springer.
[Abstract]The decade 1966–1976 saw an immense amount of valuable philosophical discussion concerning the relation between mind and brain. As a result, it has seemed best to be selective, both with respect to topics and to authors. Many important books and papers have had to be passed over. This chronicle confines itself almost entirely to cases where new philosophical positions, or striking new lines of argument, have been developed about the relation of mind and brain.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Armstrong, D. M. (1995). Postscript: “Naturalism, materialism, and first philosophy” reconsidered. In P. K. Moser, & J. D. Trout (Eds.), Contemporary materialism: a reader (pp. 35-47). Routledge.
[Citing Place (1988a)]  

Armstrong, D. M. (2022). Lewis and the identity theory. In P. R. Anstey, & D. Braddon-Mitchell (Eds.), Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind (pp. 24-28). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780192843722.001.0001
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Austin, C. J. (2018). Essence in the age of evolution: A new theory of natural kinds. Routledge.
[Abstract]This book offers a novel defence of a highly contested philosophical position: biological natural kind essentialism. This theory is routinely and explicitly rejected for its purported inability to be explicated in the context of contemporary biological science, and its supposed incompatibility with the process and progress of evolution by natural selection. Christopher J. Austin challenges these objections, and in conjunction with contemporary scientific advancements within the field of evolutionary-developmental biology, the book utilises a contemporary neo-Aristotelian metaphysics of "dispositional properties", or causal powers, to provide a theory of essentialism centred on the developmental architecture of organisms and its role in the evolutionary process. By defending a novel theory of Aristotelian biological natural kind essentialism, Essence in the Age of Evolution represents the fresh and exciting union of cutting-edge philosophical insight and scientific knowledge.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Awret, U. (2022). Holographic duality and the physics of consciousness. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 16. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2022.685699
[Abstract]This paper introduces a novel dual-aspect theory of consciousness that is based on the principle of holographic-duality in modern physics and explores the prospects of making philosophically significant empirical discoveries about the physical correlates of consciousness. The theory is motivated by an approach that identifies certain anti-physicalist problem intuitions associated with representational content and spatial location and attempts to provide these with a consciousness-independent explanation, while suspending questions about the hard problem of consciousness and the more problematic “phenomenal character”. Providing such topic neutral explanations is “hard” enough to make a philosophical difference and yet “easy” enough to be approached scientifically. I will argue that abstract algorithms are not enough to solve this problem and that a more radical “computation” that is inspired by physics and that can be realized in “strange metals” may be needed. While speculative, this approach has the potential to both establish necessary connections between structural aspects of conscious mental states and the physical substrate “generating” them and explain why this representational content is “nowhere to be found”. I will end with a reconsideration of the conceivability of zombies.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Azevedo Leite, D. (2018). The Twenty-First Century Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition: A Critical Appraisal [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Trento.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Azevedo Leite, D. (2021). Molecular and Cellular Theory of Human Cognition. In D. A. Leite, The Twenty-First Century Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition: A Critical Analysis (pp. 73-108). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-63680-7_4
[Abstract]In this chapter, the author compares the neo-mechanistic theory with one of its major contemporary competitors, the Molecular and Cellular Theory of Human Cognition (MCTHC). The aim of the author in this chapter is to evaluate to what extent the main arguments presented by the proponents of MCTHC against the neo-mechanistic theory, directed to particular aspects of it, represent great threats to the aspirations of the neo-mechanists. MCTHC supports a 'ruthless (strong) neuro-cognitive reductionism', as a form of scientific integration for cognitive and neural science, based on current neuroscientific work present in the field of molecular and cellular neuroscience. This theory presents a clear challenge to the neo-mechanistic theory, which is committed to causal and explanatory pluralism and a weak autonomy of higher-level sciences. After characterizing the neuroscientific reductionist position more precisely, the author discusses the neo-mechanists' answer to the challenge and their attempt to stand with pluralism, instead of reduction. A meticulous analysis of their replies shows, however, that the challenge of explanatory reduction cannot be overcome with the arguments the neo-mechanists provide, and their theory, therefore, needs to be understood ultimately as reductionist.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Azevedo Leite, D. (2021). The Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition. In D. A. Leite, The Twenty-First Century Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition: A Critical Analysis (Chapter 3, 39-70). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-63680-7_3
[Abstract]In the third chapter, the author provides a systematical and analytical exposition of the most central theoretical aspects of the Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition (MTHC). He shows that the theory is clearly committed to a form of physicalism, on the one hand, but it rejects certain kinds of traditional epistemological reductionist approaches, on the other hand. The framework attempts to offer a pluralist and integrative mechanistic view concerning the relationship between human brain and cognition; a view that is applied to phenomena and to theories overall in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience. This general pluralist integrative neuro-cognitive relation is the most important pillar grounding the theory's application to human cognition. Besides this, the author also investigates how the framework is applied in concrete to two paradigmatic cases of human cognitive phenomena: the first case is related to the perceptual system; and the second case, to the memory system. In this way, it is possible to evaluate the application of the theory to particular psychological phenomena.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Azzano, L. (2024). Dispositional Reality. A Novel Approach to Power Ontology and Metaphysics Springer.
[Abstract]Dispositionalism, perhaps the most popular variant of non-Humean metaphysics, submits that dispositions, powers, or capacities, are part of the furniture of the world. In this book I advance an original approach to dispositionalism revolving around the notion of Dispositional Reality; the novelty lies in the fact that the account, unlike most alternatives on the market, does not require the reification of objects, facts, properties, nor their dispositional essences – and is in fact compatible with a far more deflationary approach to dispositions, while still being true to the non-Humean spirit of the proposal. This power metaphysics without powers allows one to dispel several puzzles in recent literature, or recast them under a new light. Albeit with its own peculiarities, this proposal constitutes a variant of explanatory dispositionalism, according to which realism about dispositions ought not to be understood as an ontological inflation, but as an explanatory inversion within the nomic and modal family. Some of these explanations are hereby attempted, and a study of various types of non-causal explanation will be provided.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Azzano, L., & Raimondi, A. (2022). New foundations of dispositionalism - introduction. Synthese, 200, 384. doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03847-z
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Baier, K. (1962). Smart on Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, X, 57-68.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [3 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Ball, D. (2016). No help on the hard problem: Commentary on Reber on Origins of Mind. Animal Sentience, 11(8) doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1177
[Abstract]The hard problem of consciousness is to explain why certain physical states are conscious: why do they feel the way they do, rather than some other way or no way at all? Arthur Reber (2016) claims to solve the hard problem. But he does not: even if we grant that amoebae are conscious, we can ask why such organisms feel the way they do, and Reber’s theory provides no answer. Still, Reber’s theory may be methodologically useful: we do not yet have a satisfactory theory of consciousness, but perhaps the study of simple minds is a way to go about finding one.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Balogun, O.A. (2023). A central state materialistic interpretation of the Yoruba concept of person: A critique. In A. D. Attoe, S. S. Temitope, V. Nweke, J. Umezurike, & J. O. Chimakonam, (Eds), Conversations on African Philosophy of Mind, Consciousness and Artificial Intelligence. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-36163-0_3
[Abstract]In recent times, there have been a series of unresisted temptations to argue that the Yoruba concept of the human person fits very well into the framework of central state materialism, which states that mental events are identifiable with physical events occurring in the brain and central nervous system. This is because ara (human body), which is purely physical, can be taken to perform both material and immaterial functions. The chapter argues that while this is true; nonetheless, it is totally incorrect to reduce the Yoruba to central state materialists. The chapter states unequivocally that the performance of other vital components of the human person like emi (life-giving entity), ori (the bearer of human destiny), and ese (symbol of physical legs and spiritual efforts), suggests that the Yoruba concept of person, falls within the purview of dualism. It is argued further that the dualism of the Yoruba, which encourages harmonious interaction in the performances of both organs (material and immaterial), is fundamentally different from Cartesian dualism, which operates on the watertight distinction between the functions of the body and mind. The chapter recommends that a proper understanding of the Yoruba concept of a person can serve as a philosophical defence of Yoruba beliefs in spiritual entities, resolution of the traditional mind-body problem, and decolonization of the concept of mind, in contemporary Yoruba thought.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Barnes-Holmes, D., Hayes, S. C., Dymond, S. & O’Hora, D. (2001). Multiple stimulus relations and the transformations of stimulus functions. In S. C. Hayes, D. Barnes-Holmes, & B. Roche (Eds.), Relational frame theory: A post-Skinnerian account of human language and cognition (Chapter 3, pp. 51-71). Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
[Abstract]The key concept in Relational Frame Theory is the concept of stimulus relation (Hayes, 1991, 1994; Barnes and Holmes, 1991; Hayes and Hayes, 1989, 1992; Hayes and Wilson, 1996). Understanding the implications of an RFT approach requires clarity about this concept and its flexibility. In this chapter we will attempt to characterize multiple stimulus relations and to distinguish this approach from a traditional class based approach. We will point to ways in which increasingly elaborate relational networks are acquired, modified, and brought under various forms of contextual control. Finally we will describe in some detail the kinds of data that are generated in RFT research, and show how methodological advances are beginning to permit more complex questions to be asked and answered.
[Citing Place (1998b) in context]  

Bartlett, G. (2018). Functionalism and the problem of occurrent states. Philosophical Quarterly, 68(270), 1-20. doi:10.1093/pq/pqx043
[Abstract]In 1956 U. T. Place proposed that consciousness is a brain process. More attention should be paid to his word 'process'. There is near-universal agreement that experiences are processive--as witnessed in the platitude that experiences are occurrent states. The abandonment of talk of brain processes has benefited functionalism, because a functional state, as it is usually conceived, cannot be a process. This point is dimly recognized in a well-known but little-discussed argument that conscious experiences cannot be functional states because the former are occurrent, while the latter are dispositional. That argument fails, but it can be made sound if we reformulate it with the premise that occurrent states are processive. The only way for functionalists to meet the resulting challenge is to abandon the standard individuation of functional states in terms of purely abstract causal roles.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1967)]  
Download: Bartlett (2018) Functionalism and the Problem of Occurrent States.pdf

Battista, J.R. (1978). The Science of Consciousness. In K. S. Pope, & J. L. Singer (Eds), The Stream of Consciousness. Emotions, Personality, and Psychotherapy. Springer. doi.:10.1007/978-1-4684-2466-9_4
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Bauer, W. A. (2016). Physical Intentionality, Extrinsicness, and the Direction of Causation. Acta Analytica, 31, 397–417. doi:10.1007/s12136-016-0283-2
[Abstract]The Physical Intentionality Thesis claims that dispositions share the marks of psychological intentionality; therefore, intentionality is not exclusively a mental phenomenon. Beyond the standard five marks, Alexander Bird introduces two additional marks of intentionality that he argues dispositions do not satisfy: first, thoughts are extrinsic; second, the direction of causation is that objects cause thoughts, not vice versa. In response, this paper identifies two relevant conceptions of extrinsicness, arguing that dispositions show deep parallels to thoughts on both conceptions. Then, it shows that Bird’s discussion of direction of causation overlooks complexities of dispositionality and intentionality that problematize apparent differences between thoughts and dispositions. The paper ends with a discussion of why we find these parallels between thoughts and dispositions.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Bauer, W. A. (2019). Powers and the Pantheistic Problem of Unity. Sophia, 58(4), 563-580.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Bauer, W. A. (2022). Causal Powers and the Intentionality Continuum. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781009214858
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Baum, W. M., & Heath, J. L. (1992). Behavioral explanations and intentional explanations in psychology. American Psychologist, 47(11), 1312-1317.
[Abstract]A recent criticism of behaviorism asserts that intentional explanations in psychology are acceptable and preferable to behavioral explanations. The philosopher Dennett justifies intentional explanations on the grounds that they are provisional and can be cashed out in principle. Skinner objected to such explanations on the grounds that they are never cashed out in practice. Their different views arise from their divergent goals for psychology: understanding intelligence and rationality versus understanding behavior.  In the context of a science of behavior, intentional explanations only give the semblance of explanation because they rely on immediate causes that are fictional. Nonintentional explanations acceptable for a science of behavior are historical, much as in evolutionary biology. When Dennett's argument is applied to evolutionary biology, it becomes a justification of creationism.
[Citing Place (1987a) in context]  

Bechtel, W. (2012). Identity, reduction, and conserved mechanisms: Perspectives from circadian rhythm research. In S. Gozzano, & C. S. Hill: New perspectives on type identity: The mental and the physical (pp. 43-65). Cambridge University Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Beckermann A. (1992). Introduction - reductive and nonreductive physicalism. In A. Beckermann (Ed.), Emergence or reduction?: Essays on the prospects of nonreductive physicalism (pp. 1-21). De Gruyter.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Beckermann, A. (2007). Neue Überlegungen zum Eigenschaftsphysikalismus. In M. Pauen , M. Schütte , & A. Staudacher (Eds), Begriff, Erklärung, Bewusstsein. Neue Beiträge zum Qualia-Problem (pp. 143-170). Mentis.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Beckermann, A. (2012). Property Identity and Reductive Explanation. In S. Gozzano & C. Hill (Eds.), New Perspectives on Type-Identity (pp. 66-87). Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511687068.004
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Beloff, J. (1965). The identity hypothesis - A critique. In J. R. Smythies (Ed.), Brain and mind. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Beloff, J. (1996). Searle's fallacy versus Place's nonsense: John Beloff replies to his critics The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Section Newsletter, 22, 14-16.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Beltrán-Gabrie, A., Lira, D., Quezada-Scholz, V.E., Arriaza, T. (2021). Theory and Interventions in Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Depression. In J.P. Jiménez, A. Botto, & P. Fonagy (Eds), Etiopathogenic Theories and Models in Depression. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-77329-8_6
[Abstract]The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how the cognitive-behavioral model understands the phenomenon of depression, and how this understanding translates into the development of clinically effective interventions. Cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) understands the psychological suffering of depression as part of an interactive process between behavior, thought, emotion, and context. Depending on the role that each of these dimensions plays in the expression of the problem, different techniques could be used, which can be focused on all or each of these components. We describe the etiopathogenesis of depression and its treatment. We review theories and basic research in the field of CBT and depression, as well as applied research that accounts for the efficacy of a wide range of CBT techniques in the treatment of depression, and an emerging field of research that is the search for mechanisms that explain change. The evidence is critically reviewed, advancing toward an integrative proposal of greater clinical utility.
[Citing Place (1988b)]  

Bertman, M.A. (1972). Basic particulars and the Identity Thesis. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, 3, 1–8. doi:10.1007/BF01800815
[Abstract]This paper begins with a discussion of the logical apparatus of Frege, where his use ofSinn suggests a modification of Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Then, it turns to Strawson's “basic particulars” with its essentially Kantian orientation. This brings forward the logical ground upon which the Identity Thesis rests. Finally, following Frege with some modifications, the paper suggests that an “ontological list” where concepts can be treated as objective (materially dependent) subsistent entities would be necessary in order to avoid errors of J. J. C. Smart and other analytic philosophers who hold the Identity Thesis.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Bird, A. (2007). Nature's metaphysics: Laws and properties. Oxford University Press
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Bird, A. (2016). Overpowering (How the Powers Ontology Has Overreached Itself). Mind, 125(498),341-383. doi:10.1093/mind/fzv207
[Abstract]Many authors have argued in favour of an ontology of properties as powers and it has been widely argued that this ontology allows us to address certain philosophical problems in novel and illuminating ways, for example causation, representation, intentionality, free will, and liberty. I argue that the ontology of powers, even if successful as an account of fundamental natural properties, does not provide the insight claimed as regards the aforementioned nonfundamental phenomena. I focus on and criticise the powers theory of causation presented by Mumford and Anjum (2011), and argue that related criticisms can be directed at other abuses of (the ontology of ) powers.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Block, N. (2009). Comparing the major theories of consciousness. In M. S. Gazzaniga, E. Bizzi, L. M. Chalupa, S. T. Grafton, T. F. Heatherton, C. Koch, J. E. LeDoux, S. J. Luck, G. R. Mangan, J. A. Movshon, H. Neville, E. A. Phelps, P. Rakic, D. L. Schacter, M. Sur, & B. A. Wandell (Eds.), The cognitive neurosciences (pp. 1111–1122). Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
[Abstract]This article compares the three frameworks for theories of consciousness that are taken most seriously by neuroscientists: the view that consciousness is a biological state of the brain, the global workspace perspective, and an account in terms of higher order states. The comparison features the "explanatory gap", the fact that we have no idea why the neural basis of an experience is the neural basis of that experience rather than another experience or no experience at all. It is argued that the biological framework handles the explanatory gap better than do the global workspace or higher order views. The article does not discuss quantum theories or "panpsychist" accounts according to which consciousness is a feature of the smallest particles of inorganic matter. Nor does it discuss the "representationist" proposals that are popular among philosophers but not neuroscientists.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Block, N., & Alston, W. P. (1984) Psychology and philosophy. In M. H. Bornstein (Ed.), Psychology and its allied disciplines (Volume 1: The humanities, ch. 5, pp. 195-). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Blumenfeld, J. B. (1979). Phenomenal properties and the identity theory, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 57(4), 309-323. doi:10.1080/00048407912341341
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Borghini, A. (2009). Dispositions and Their Intentions. In G. Damschen, R. Schnepf, & K. Stüber: Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind (pp. 204-220). De Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110211825.204
[Abstract]Dispositional Realism is the view according to which some denizens of reality – i.e., dispositions – are properties, may exist in the natural world, and have an irreducible modal character. Among Dispositional Realists, Charlie Martin, Ullin Place and George Molnar most notably argued that the modal character of dispositions should be understood in terms of their intentionality. Other Dispositional Realists, most notably Stephen Mumford, challenged this understanding of the modal character of dispositions. In this paper, I defend a fresh version of the intentional understanding of dispositions. I start by distinguishing between two questions about properties, respectively addressing their identity conditions and their individuation conditions. I, then, define categorical and dispositional properties in terms of their qualitative character, and examine their identity and individuation conditions. I conclude that the attribution of intentions is a conceptual tool introduced in order to alleviate the burdensome task of specifying the conditions of individuation of a disposition; however, such attribution does not affect the identity of a disposition.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999b)]  

Borst, C. V. (1970a). Introduction. In C. V. Borst (Ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [2 referring publications by Place]  

Bradley, M. C. (1963). Sensations, Brain Processes and Colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 41, 385-393.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [2 referring publications by Place]  

Brown, C. D. (2024). The Hope and Horror of Physicalism: An Existential Treatise. Routledge.
[Abstract]This book assesses the existentially relevant consequences of physicalism. It argues that accepting physicalism is the healthiest stance we can take in the face of an account of the self and world which offers no metaphysical assurances. Why should we care about physicalism? On one hand, the view seems to be inconsistent with things that many people find valuable, such as the existence of free will, God, the immortal soul, ultimate purpose, and natural laws like karma. On the other hand, physicalism seems to have positive existential implications such as supporting the unlimited potential of scientific understanding or the attitude that we need not fear supernatural powers or forces because they don’t exist. This book argues that physicalism has several consequences that are of existential import. It begins by outlining the history of physicalism and explaining two popular ways of understanding it: the via negativa approach and the theory-based approach. The rest of Part 1 explores the existential consequences of these two versions of physicalism. Part 2 draws on Nietzsche to construct an argument about what attitude we ought to adopt toward physicalism. It argues that we ought to avoid nihilism and despair even when being confronted with a picture of the universe which offers no metaphysical assurances. Finally, Part 3 is dedicated to how well physicalism deals with the hard problem of consciousness, mental causation, and multiple realization.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Brown, C. D., & Papineau, D. (2024). Illusionism and a posteriori physicalism; No fact of the matter Journal of Consciousness Studies
[Abstract]Illusionists and a posteriori physicalists agree entirely on the metaphysical nature of reality—that all concrete entities are composed of fundamental physical entities. Despite this basic agreement on metaphysics, illusionists hold that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, whereas a posteriori physicalists hold that it does. One explanation of this disagreement would be that either the illusionists have too demanding a view about what consciousness requires, or the a posteriori physicalists have too tolerant a view. However, we will argue that this divergence of opinion is merely an upshot of the semantic indeterminacy of the term ‘conscious’ and its cognates. We shall back up this diagnosis by showing how semantic indeterminacy of the kind in question is a pervasive feature of language. By illustrating this pattern with a range of historical examples, we shall show how the dispute between the illusionists and their a posteriori physicality opponents is one instance of a common kind of terminological imprecision. The disagreement between the illusionists and the a posteriori physicalists is thus not substantial. In effect, the two sides differ only about how to make an indeterminate term precise. The moral is that they should stop looking for arguments designed to settle the dispute in their favour.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Brown, R. (2012). The brain and its states. In S. Edelman, T. Fekete, & N. Zach (Eds.), Being in time: Dynamical models of phenomenal experience. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Buckareff, A. A. (2023). Pantheism, omnisubjectivity, and the feeling of temporal passage. Religions, 14(6), 758. doi:10.3390/rel14060758
[Abstract]By “pantheism” I mean to pick out a model of God on which God is identical with the totality of existents constitutive of the universe. I assume that, on pantheism, God is an omnispatiotemporal mind who is identical with the universe. I assume that, given divine omnispatiotemporality, God knows everything that can be known in the universe. This includes having knowledge de se of the minds of every conscious creature. Hence, if God has knowledge de se of the minds of every conscious creature, then divine omniscience implies omnisubjectivity. Assuming that eternalism is true, robust temporal passage is an illusion. But, conscious creatures, such as human persons, experience robust temporal passage. If God has the attribute of omnisubjectivity, then God experiences temporal passage. However, God also has a unified experience of the entire spatiotemporal continuum. God’s having these two perspectives creates a tension for pantheism given that God would seem to experience both temporal passage and an absence of temporal passage. I compare non-personal pantheism and personal pantheism and consider which one has better resources to answer the foregoing puzzle. I argue that personal pantheism is better equipped to address this problem than non-personal pantheism.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Bunge M. (1977). Emergence and the mind. Neuroscience, 2(4), 501–509. doi:10.1016/0306-4522(77)90047-1
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Burgos, J. E. (2004). Realism about behavior. Behavior and Philosophy, 32, 69-95.
[Abstract]Behavior analysis emphasizes the study of overt animal (human and nonhuman) behavior as a subject matter in its own right. This paper provides a metaphysical foundation for such an emphasis via an elucidation of a thesis that I generically call “realism about behavior,” where by “realism” I mean an assertion of mind-independent existence. The elucidation takes the form of a conceptual framework that combines a property-exemplification account of events with modal realism in the context of three opposing philosophies of mind: property dualism, reductive physicalism, and type behaviorism. Each philosophy leads to the thesis that at least one possible world exists in which counterparts of all actual behavioral events occur and no counterpart of any actual “mental” (either nonphysical, neuro-mental, or behavioro-mental) event occurs. The third thesis is false because it violates the assumption that nothing can exist independently of itself, which leads to a rejection of type behaviorism. The other two theses provide the sought-after foundation through a counterfactual characterization of behavior qua behavior as a scientific subject matter. Its study thus becomes the study of behavior as if the nonphysical and the neural did not exist, even if they may factually exist and play a causal role in behavior. Some implications are discussed.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1997f)]  

Burgos, J. E. (2016). Antidualism and antimentalism in radical behaviorism. Behavior and Philosophy, 43 1-37.
[Abstract]Radical behaviorism (RB) is antidualistic and antimentalistic. Antidualism is the rejection of ontological dualism, the partition of reality into physical and nonphysical. Antimentalism is the rejection of the ontological theses that mind is causal, internal, subjective, and nonbehavioral in nature. Radical behaviorists conflate both rejections, based on depictions of mentalism as inherently dualistic. However, such depictions are fallacious. Mental causation and mind as internal are fundamentally incompatible with dualism and hence inherently materialistic. Mind as subjective and nonbehavioral in nature are compatible with dualism, but can be construed materialistically. I exemplify with the mind-brain identity theory. The same arguments apply to functionalism, which is also materialistic and provides a more plausible philosophical interpretation of cognitive psychology as a paradigmatic example of mentalism at work in psychology. I propose that radical behaviorists’ accusations of dualism against mentalism rely on an invalid redefinition of “dualism” in terms other than the physical-nonphysical partition. All of this only weakens RB’s antimentalism. Radical behaviorists are advised to stop making those accusations and adopt a behavioristic ontology of mind, such as mind-behavior identity, to reject alternative nondualistic ontologies.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Burgos, J. E. (2020). A Goldilocks approach to the philosophy-science relation. Behavior and Philosophy, 48, 47-68.
[Abstract]The Goldilocks Principle recommends sometimes seeking just the right amount of something. In this paper, I apply this principle to pursue a more judicious view of the relation between philosophy (P) and science (S). Extreme views contrary to GA depict the PS relation as one of destructive incompatibility, indifferent independence, or toxic asymmetric dependence. Contrary to both extremes, the Goldilocks Approach (GA) suggests more moderate depictions of P and S as sufficiently diverse to enjoy professional sovereignty and disagree, but also sufficiently compatible to enable meaningful interdisciplinary cooperation. GA also advises a greater emphasis on case-based investigation that gives equal importance to the context of justification (analytic normative considerations about the logic of linguistic products) and the context of discovery (descriptions of the biopsychosocial aspects of the processes that lead to such products). All this makes for a more balanced, potentially constructive and fruitful relation in selected matters. I exemplify with cases at the intersections between psychology and the Ps of language, mind, and S.
[Citing Place (1999a)]  

Burt, C. (1968). Brain and consciousness. British Journal of Psychology, 59, 55-69.
[Abstract]What light has been thrown on the problem of consciousness by recent researches on the brain, particularly those carried out by the many new techniques which have become available during the last fifteen years? It appears (i) that the nerve cell differs in no essential way, either in its basic structure or in its metabolic processes, from other gland-like cells, though, like all cells, it is differentiated for its specific function; (ii) that conduction in the nerve fibre is a relatively simple electro-chemical process; (iii) that the transmission of the nerve impulse across the synapse is chemical, and the transmitter substances are of a familiar hormonal character; and (iv) that, apart from the greater complexity and the greater instability of the synaptic thresholds, there are no essential differences between those parts of the neuronal network (n.g. the cortex) which are accompanied by consciousness and those parts (e.g. the spinal cord) which are not. A comparison of the specific micro-neural situations in which consciousness does and does not arise suggests that the brain functions, not as a generator of consciousness, but rather as a two-way transmitter and detector; i.e. although its activity is apparently a necessary condition, it cannot be a sufficient condition, of conscious experience.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Burt, C. (1969). Brain and consciousness. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 22, 29-36.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Is reply to]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Byrne, D. (2016) Do phenomenal concepts misrepresent? Philosophical Psychology, 29(5), 669-678, doi:10.1080/09515089.2015.1108398
[Abstract]Many contemporary physicalists concede to dualists that conscious subjects have distinctive “phenomenal concepts” of the phenomenal qualities of their experiences. Indeed, they contend that idiosyncratic characteristics of these concepts facilitate responses to influential anti-physicalist arguments. Like some some other critics of this approach, James Tartaglia (2013) maintains that phenomenal concepts express contents that conflict with physicalism, but as a physicalist, the moral he distinctively draws from this is that phenomenal concepts misrepresent. He contends further that the contemporary physicalists’ account cannot accommodate this feature, and that in consequence, physicalists should abandon phenomenal concepts and return to the identity theory championed by Place and Smart in the 1950s. I respond to Tartaglia by identifying lacunae in his interpretation of contemporary physicalism and arguing that phenomenal concepts as conceived by the contemporary physicalists do not express contents that support either dualist or physicalist metaphysics: they are “metaphysically neutral.”
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Catania, A.C. (2002). The verbal behavior of Ullin T. Place. European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 3(1), 1-5. doi:10.1080/15021149.2002.11434199
[Abstract]Ullin Place died on 2 January 2000. His contributions to philosophy and to behavior analysis have earned him an enduring place in our new century. This memorial uses text from his correspondence to illustrate the scope of his life's work and the perseverance and courage with which he faced its end.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  
Download: Catania (2002) The Verbal Behavior of Ullin T. Place.pdf

Catania, A.C. (2003). Ullin T. Place: A life in verbal behavior. Behavior and Philosophy, 31, 173-180.
[Abstract]Ullin T. Place died on 2 January 2000. His contributions to philosophy and to behavior analysis have earned him an enduring place in our new century. This memorial uses text from his correspondence to illustrate the scope of his life's work and the dignity, perseverance, and courage with which he faced its end.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  
Download: Catania (2003) Ullin T. Place - A Life in Verbal Behavior.pdf

Chalmers, D. (2018). The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 25(9-10), 6-61.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]The book is an extended study of the problem of consciousness. After setting up the problem, I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible and that if one takes consciousness seriously, one has to go beyond a strict materialist framework. In the second half of the book, I move toward a positive theory of consciousness with fundamental laws linking the physical and the experiential in a systematic way. Finally, I use the ideas and arguments developed earlier to defend a form of strong artificial intelligence and to analyze some problems in the foundations of quantum mechanics.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Chalmers, D. J. (2020). Idealism and the mind-body problem. In W. Seager (Ed.), The routledge handbook of panpsychism (pp. 353–373). Routledge.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Chambliss, B. (2018). The mind–body problem. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 9(4), e1463. doi:10.1002/wcs.1463
[Abstract]The mind–body problem is the problem of explaining how the happenings of our mental lives are related to physical states, events and processes. Proposed solutions to the problem vary by whether and how they endorse physicalism, the claim that mental states are ultimately “nothing over and above” physical states, and by how they understand the interactions between mental and physical states. Physicalist solutions to the mind–body problem have been dominant in the last century, with the variety of physicalism endorsed (reductive or nonreductive) depending upon both the outcome of philosophical arguments and methodological developments in the cognitive and neural sciences. After outlining the dominant contemporary approach to the mind–body problem, I examine the prospects for a solution in light of developments in the cognitive sciences, especially the scientific study of consciousness.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Champagne, M. (2018). Consciousness and the philosophy of signs: How Peircean semiotics combines phenomenal qualia and practical effects. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 19. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-73338-8
[Abstract]It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy. The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period – its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound. Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in philosophy forward.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Chappell, V. C. (Ed.). (1962). The Philosophy of Mind. Prentice-Hall.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Reprints in this collection]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Chernoff, F. (2022). ‘Truth’, ‘justice’, and the American wave… function: comments on Alexander Wendt's Quantum Mind and Social Science. International Theory, 14, 146 - 158. doi:10.1017/S1752971921000099
[Abstract]This paper examines several aspects of Alexander Wendt's Quantum Mind and Social Science. The paper questions the nature of the task, as ontologies are debated in a scientific field once there is a widely accepted substantive theory that stands in need of interpretation, as with Newtonian physics or quantum mechanics; doing this job for international relations (IR) is highly questionable give that there is no widely accepted substantive theory of IR that needs an interpretation. Second, the paper questions Wendt's view of the consequences for ontology of quantum theory being replaced in the future; Wendt the interpretation of the history of science maintains that in the physical sciences a new theory subsumes the older theory, including its ontology. But, this seems to misread history, while the empirical content of classical physics is subsumed by relativity theory, it is far from true that the former's ontology was subsumed. The ontologies are in sharp contrast. The paper raises questions also about the notion of ‘truth’ and of the meaningfulness of evaluative concepts like ‘justice’.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Christofidou, A. (2018) Descartes’ Dualism versus Behaviourism. Behavior and Philosophy, 46, 63-99.
[Abstract]My analysis straddles Descartes’ metaphysics and some parts of contemporary philosophy, especially regarding consciousness, and aims to show that once our understanding is freed from philosophical habits that affect current debates, Descartes’ views offer an opportunity to draw important insights. Primarily, I examine Descartes’ mind-body dualism and contrast it with behaviourism, particularly with philosophical behaviourism, focusing on Gilbert Ryle’s dispositional behaviourism and his attacks on Descartes’ dualism. The discussion takes the form of Objections and Replies, presenting the two thinkers in some sort of dialogue with one another. This brings out clearly who is distorting our ordinary language, violating the logical geography of concepts, committing a category mistake, and systematically misleading us. Ryle’s two well-known accusations – the category mistake, and the dogma of the ghost in the machine – are turned, by a reductio ad absurdum, against his own commitments, leading to an evaluation of his highly paradoxical view, and showing how it collapses in on itself. The closing parts touch upon, but do not pursue, some fundamental concerns about personhood and the self, the metaphysics of mind, freedom, and moral significance, and raise the question of what our deepest concerns and responsibility in the twenty-first century must be.
[Citing Place (1999a) in context]  

Churchland, P. M. (1988). Matter and Consciousness (Revised Edition). MIT Press.
First edition: 1984
[Citing Place (1956)]  [7 referring publications by Place]  

Coates, A. (2022). Unmanifested powers and universals. Synthese, 200. doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03476-6
[Abstract]According to a well-known argument against dispositional essentialism, the nature of unmanifested token powers leaves dispositional essentialists with an objectionable commitment to the reality of non-existent entities. The idea is that, because unmanifested token powers are directed at their non-existent token manifestations, they require the reality of those manifestations. Arguably the most promising response to this argument works by claiming that, if properties are universals, dispositional directedness need only entail the reality of actually existing manifestation types. I argue that this response fails, because no version of the response can adequately accommodate dispositions of the sort that follow from Coulomb’s law. This result both defeats an important argument that dispositional essentialists ought to be realists about universals and appears to leave dispositional essentialists with a problematic commitment to either non-relational connections or a Meinongian ontology.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Cobb, M. (2020). The idea of the brain. A history. Profile Books.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Cole, D. J., & Foelber, R. (1984). Contingent materialism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 65, 74-85. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1984.tb00214.x
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Corballis, M. C. (2009). The evolution of language, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1156(1), 19-43.
[Abstract]Language, whether spoken or signed, can be viewed as a gestural system, evolving from the so-called mirror system in the primate brain. In nonhuman primates the gestural system is well developed for the productions and perception of manual action, especially transitive acts involving the grasping of objects. The emergence of bipedalism in the hominins freed the hands for the adaptation of the mirror system for intransitive acts for communication, initially through the miming of events. With the emergence of the genus Homo from some 2 million years ago, pressures for more complex communication and increased vocabulary size led to the conventionalization of gestures, the loss of iconic representation, and a gradual shift to vocal gestures replacing manual ones—although signed languages are still composed of manual and facial gestures. In parallel with the conventionalization of symbols, languages gained grammatical complexity, perhaps driven by the evolution of episodic memory and mental time travel, which involve combinations of familiar elements—Who did what to whom, when, where, and why? Language is thus adapted to allow us to share episodic structures, whether past, planned, or fictional, and so increase survival fitness.
[Citing Place (2000c) in context]  

Cortesi, B. (2023). The Thesis of Revelation in the Philosophy of Mind: A Guide for the Perplexed. Argumenta, (2023), 1-20. doi:10.14275/2465-2334/20230.cor
[Abstract]The thesis of experiential revelation—Rev for brevity—in the philosophy of mind claims that to have an experience—i.e., to be acquainted with it—is to know its nature. It is widely agreed that although at least moderate versions of Rev might strike one as plausible and perhaps even appealing, at least up to a certain extent, most of them are nonetheless inconsistent with almost any coherent form of physicalism about the mind. Thus far, the issue of the alleged tension between Rev and physicalism has mostly been put in the relevant literature in terms of phenomenal concepts—those concepts which refer to phenomenal properties, or qualia, and characterize them in terms of the peculiar quality(ies) they exhibit—and some kind of “special feature” those concepts allegedly possess. I call this version of Rev C-Rev. This paper aims to suggest that while it is true that phenomenal concepts reveal the nature of their referent(s)—i.e., it is a priori, for a subject possessing the concept and just in virtue of possessing it, what it is for the referent(s) of the concept to be part of reality—this feature of them, in turn, rests on a non-conceptual non-propositional kind of knowledge, namely, sui generis introspective knowledge by acquaintance of one’s own phenomenally conscious states. I call this version of Rev A-Rev. §1 provides some introductory material. In §2 I discuss two arguments that have recently been put forth to undermine the cogency of C-Rev against physicalism. §3 elaborates on the historical roots of C-Rev. §4 presents some of the major arguments which have been offered for A-Rev. A few concluding remarks close the paper.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Costall, A. P. (2012). Against representationalism: James Gibson’s neglected intellectual debt to E. B. Holt. In E. P. Charles (Ed.), A new look at new realism: the psychology and philosophy of E. B. Holt (Vol. 1, pp. 243-262). (History and Theory of Psychology; Vol. 1). Transaction Publishers.
[Abstract]Representationalism has become identified with the new cognitivism, along with its computer analogies. Representationalism has also been subject to serious criticism over a similarly long period. The primary purpose of James Gibson's work was to challenge just one of the main justifications for representationalism, the supposed "poverty of the stimulus." Gibson's ambivalence about his "intellectual debts" also applied to E. B. Holt, who had taught Gibson at Princeton in the late 1920s. Gibson, like Holt, was a leading member of the twentieth-century psychology's "awkward squad." Holt could understand the attractions of dualism: Dualism is ever a compromise. Holt went on to point out that the apparent advantage of representationalism in explaining misperception is entirely spurious, simply because it is unable to explain anything else. Despite the combative tone of Gibson's writings, representationalism, as such, is seldom the target of his polemics.
[Citing Place (1999a)]  

Crane, T. (1995). The mental causation debate. Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 69(Supplementary), 211-236.
[Abstract]This paper is about a puzzle which lies at the heart of contemporary physicalist theories of mind. On the one hand, the original motivation for physicalism was the need to explain the place of mental causation in the physical world. On the other hand, physicalists have recently come to see the explanation of mental causation as one of their major problems. But how can this be? How can it be that physicalist theories still have a problem explaining something which their physicalism was intended to explain in the first place? If physicalism is meant to be an explanation of mental causation, then why should it still face the problem of mental causation?
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Crane, T. (1996). Introduction to "Dispositions: A Debate". In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin, U. T. Place & Tim Crane (Ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. Routledge
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Crane, T. (1998). The efficacy of content: A functionalist theory. In J, Bransen, & S. E. Cuypers (Eds), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 77. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-94-011-5082-8_10
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Crane, T. (1998). Intentionality as the mark of the mental. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 43, 229-251. doi:10.1017/S1358246100004380
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Crawford, S. (2013). The Myth of Logical Behaviourism and the Origins of the Identity Theory. In M. Beaney (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy (1 ed., pp. 621-655). Oxford University Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (2000f)]  

Crawford, S. (2011) General Introduction. In S. Crawford, (Ed.), Philospohy of mind (4 volumes):  Critical concepts of philosophy
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Croxford, J., Bayne, T. (2024). The case against organoid consciousness. Neuroethics, 17(13). doi:10.1007/s12152-024-09548-3
[Abstract]Neural organoids are laboratory-generated entities that replicate certain structural and functional features of the human brain. Most neural organoids are disembodied—completely decoupled from sensory input and motor output. As such, questions about their potential capacity for consciousness are exceptionally difficult to answer. While not disputing the need for caution regarding certain neural organoid types, this paper appeals to two broad constraints on any adequate theory of consciousness — the first involving the dependence of consciousness on embodiment; the second involving the dependence of consciousness on representations—to argue that disembodied neural organoids are not plausible candidates for consciousness.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Crumley, J. S. (2022). Introduction to metaphysics. Broadview Press
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Curry, D. S. (2018). Beliefs as inner causes: The (lack of) evidence. Philosophical Psychology, 31(6), 850-877. doi:10.1080/09515089.2018.1452197
[Abstract]Many psychologists studying lay belief attribution and behavior explanation cite Donald Davidson in support of their assumption that people construe beliefs as inner causes. But Davidson’s influential argument is unsound; there are no objective grounds for the intuition that the folk construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior. Indeed, recent experimental work by Ian Apperly, Bertram Malle, Henry Wellman, and Tania Lombrozo provides an empirical framework that accords well with Gilbert Ryle’s alternative thesis that the folk construe beliefs as patterns of living that contextualize behavior.
[Citing Place (1996c) in context]  

Curry, D. S. (2024). On IQ and other sciencey descriptions of minds. Philosophers' Imprint. doi:10.3998/phimp.4939
[Abstract]Philosophers of mind (from eliminative materialists to psychofunctionalists to interpretivists) generally assume that a normative ideal delimits which mental phenomena exist (though they disagree about how to characterize the ideal in question). This assumption is dubious. A comprehensive ontology of mind includes some mental phenomena that are neither (a) explanatorily fecund posits in any branch of cognitive science that aims to unveil the mechanistic structure of cognitive systems nor (b) ideal (nor even progressively closer to ideal) posits in any given folk psychological practice. Indeed, one major function of scientific psychology has been (and will be) to introduce just such (normatively suboptimal but real) mental phenomena into folk psychological taxonomies. The development and public dissemination of IQ research over the course of the 20th Century is a case in point.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Curry, D.S. (2021). How beliefs are like colors. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03144-1
[Abstract]Double dissociations between perceivable colors and physical properties of colored objects have led many philosophers to endorse relationalist accounts of color. I argue that there are analogous double dissociations between attitudes of belief—the beliefs that people attribute to each other in everyday life—and intrinsic cognitive states of belief—the beliefs that some cognitive scientists posit as cogs in cognitive systems—pitched at every level of psychological explanation. These dissociations provide good reason to refrain from conflating attitudes of belief with intrinsic cognitive states of belief. I suggest that interpretivism provides an attractive account of the former (insofar as they are not conflated with the latter). Like colors, attitudes of belief evolved to be ecological signifiers, not cogs in cognitive systems.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

D'Oro, G. (2023). Why Collingwood Matters: A Defence of Humanistic Understanding. Bloomsbury Publishing.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Danckert, J., & Rossetti, Y. (2005). Blindsight in action: what can the different sub-types of blindsight tell us about the control of visually guided actions? Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 29(7), 1035–1046 doi:10.1016/J.NEUBIOREV.2005.02.001
[Abstract]Blindsight broadly refers to the paradoxical neurological condition where patients with a visual field defect due to a cortical lesion nevertheless demonstrate implicit residual visual sensitivity within their field cut. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, through a selective review of the blindsight literature we propose a new taxonomy for the subtypes of residual abilities described in blindsight. Those patients able to accurately act upon blind field stimuli (e.g. by pointing or saccading towards them) are classified as having ‘action-blindsight’, those whose residual functions can be said to rely to some extent upon attentive processing of blind field stimuli are classified as demonstrating ‘attention-blindsight’, while finally, patients who have somewhat accurate perceptual judgements for blind field stimuli despite a complete lack of any conscious percept, are classified as having ‘agnosopsia’ — literally meaning ‘not knowing what one sees’. We also address the possible neurological substrates of these residual sensory processes. Our second aim was to investigate the most striking subtype of blindsight, action-blindsight. We review the data relevant to this subtype and the hypotheses proposed to account for it, before speculating on how action-blindsight may inform our normal models of visuomotor control.
[Citing Place (2000a)]  

Dennett, D. C. (1978). Current issues in the philosophy of mind. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(4), 249-261.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Dennett, D. C. (1987). Skinner Placed (A commentary on Place's Skinner Re-skinned). In S. Modgil, & C. Modgil (Eds.), B. F. Skinner, Consensus and Controversy (Part XI, Skinner and the 'Virtus dormitiva' argument, pp. 245-248). Falmer Press.
[Citing Place (1987a)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Dennett (1987) Skinner Placed.pdf

Dennett, D. C. (2016). Illusionism as the obvious default theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 65-72.
[Abstract]Using a parallel with stage magic, it is argued that far from being seen as an extreme alternative, illusionism as articulated by Frankish should be considered the front runner, a conservative theory to be developed in detail, and abandoned only if it demonstrably fails to account for phenomena, not prematurely dismissed as 'counter-intuitive'. We should explore the mundane possibilities thoroughly before investing in any magical hypotheses.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Deutscher, M. (1967). Mental and physical properties. In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The identity theory of mind (pp. 65-83). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Deutscher, M. (2021). Towards Continental Philosophy. Reason and Imagination in the Thought of Max Deutscher. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
[Abstract]Through a curated selection of papers written over four decades by one of Australia’s leading philosophers, this collection demonstrates the impact of Continental philosophy on philosophical thought in Australia. The development of specific philosophical problems, over a period of more than forty years by a philosopher whose first training was ‘pre-continental’, shows that it is possible to achieve interaction between ‘continental’ and ‘pre-continental’ methods in philosophy, even while recognizing their distinctiveness. These essays ‘work towards’ continental philosophy in the ways they pay attention to language, to how we experience things and are experienced by others, and to the structures of language and power that frame what it is possible to say and to hear, to write and to read.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Diaper, D., & Huyck, C. (2022). Cell Assembly-based Task Analysis (CAbTA). In K. Arai (Ed.), Intelligent Computing. Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems, vol 283. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-80119-9_22
[Abstract]Based on an Artificial Neural Network model, Cell Assembly-based Task Analysis is a new method that outputs a task performance model composed of integrated mind-brain Cell Assemblies, which are currently believed to be the most plausible, general organisation of the brain and how it supports mental operations. A simplified model of Cell Assemblies and their cognitive architecture is described and then used in the method. A brief sub-task is analysed. The method’s utility to research in Artificial Intelligence, neuroscience and cognitive psychology is discussed and the possibility of a General Theory suggested.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Dickins D. W. (2001). Equivalence is to do with symbols, and it is cognitive, European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 2(1), 53-56. doi:10.1080/15021149.2001.11434171
[Citing Place (1995/6) in context]  

Dickins D. W. (2005). On aims and methods in the neuroimaging of derived relations. Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior84(3), 453–483. doi:10.1901/jeab.2005.92-04
[Abstract]Ingenious and seemingly powerful technologies have been developed recently that enable the visualization in some detail of events in the brain concomitant upon the ongoing behavioral performance of a human participant. Measurement of such brain events offers at the very least a new set of dependent variables in relation to which the independent variables familiarly manipulated in the operant laboratory may be explored. Two related paradigms in which a start has been made in such research concern the derivation of novel or emergent relations from a baseline set of trained relations, and include the phenomenon of transitive inference (TI), observed in studies of stimulus equivalence (SE) and serial learning (SL) or seriation. This paper reviews some published and forthcoming neuroimaging studies of these and related phenomena, and considers how this line of research both demands and represents a welcome synthesis between types of question and levels of explanation in behavioral science that often have been seen as antithetical.
[Citing Place (1995/6) in context]  

Dickins, D. W. (2011). Transitive Inference in Stimulus Equivalence and Serial Learning. European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 12(2), 523–555.
[Abstract]The logical and behavioural properties of stimulus equivalence (SE) sets and serial learning (SL) sets are different, yet either can be derived from a randomly presented number of overlapping premise pairs, and both show transitive inference (TI). A within-participant experiment is reported which attempted to base both types of set on the same stimuli. To provide an ‘ecologically valid’ context the stimuli were photographs of 2 imaginary groups of 7 students ordered within each group by ‘exam grades’. Participants were given respondent-type training in ‘study phases’ in which the 12 premise pairs of photos were randomly presented without a response being required, alternating with ‘response phases’ in which the 10 participants in the ‘SE first’ group received matching-to-sample trials and the 10 in the ‘SL first’ group received trials with the study pairs of stimuli, in which they had to indicate whether these were in the same order as in the study phase or had been switched around. TI testing was then first conducted using the same requirement as in training, followed by similar tests using the other kind of response requirement. In a parallel sorting test participants were shown the 14 photos in random array on a screen and were asked to arrange them into 2 ordered groups. is sorting test was given 3 times, (1) after initial training on either SE or SL; (2) after TI testing with the same paradigm; (3) after TI testing with the opposite paradigm. Though the yield of accurate responding on the TI tests was poor, performance on initial TI testing was both more accurate and showed greater positive transfer to the other kind of TI test when SL preceded SE than vice versa. Results on the sorting task gave stronger indications of set formation than the TI tests, particularly in the SL first group. There were signs of the predicted increase in accuracy and decrease in RT as a function of increasing numbers of nodes in SL in the SL-first group, and some sign of the predicted inverse relation between accuracy and nodal number in SE for the SE-first group. When the groups switched to the opposite types of test to that on which they had been trained both showed an overall reduction in RTs and both showed decreasing RTs with increasing numbers of nodes. Unsurprisingly the experiment raised more questions than it could answer but suggested ways in which the similarities and differences between SL and SE, and how they interact, may be further explored.
[Citing Place (1995/6) in context]  

Dickins, D. W. (2015). A Simpler Route to Stimulus Equivalence? A Replication and Further Exploration of a “Simple Discrimination Training Procedure” (Canovas, Debert and Pilgrim 2014). The Psychological Record, 65, 637–647. doi:10.1007/s40732-015-0134-3
[Abstract]In a recent paper in this journal, Canovas, Debert and Pilgrim (The Psychological Record, 65(2), 337–346, 2015), in their second experiment, taught participants to make one key press to each of three simple visual stimuli and an alternative response to another three. They then trained two new key presses to one stimulus from each class, which then transferred to the other stimuli in each class. When subsequently presented with compounds of two stimuli, participants indicated “correct” to within-class compounds, but “incorrect” to between-class compounds. The present study starts with a successful replication of this seemingly new way of establishing stimulus equivalence classes, with an added matching-to-sample test at the end. In two further experiments, the visual stimuli were replaced by non-words, with two further non-words to be said aloud in place of key-presses. These showed that it was possible to establish two or three equivalence classes using such initial discrimination training, even when the prior demonstration of functional equivalence classes by transfer-of-training to a second set of responses was omitted. Other ways of conceptualizing these methods of training are considered, together with some implications for enlarging our understanding of equivalence class formation.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  

Dickins, D. W. (2015). Stimulus Equivalence: A Laboratory Artefact or the Heart of Language? [Doctoral thesis]. University of Huddersfield.
[Abstract]This thesis surveys some of the implications of the presented collection of publications, all of which address the phenomenon of stimulus equivalence. Stimulus equivalence SE is first operationally defined in terms of Sidmans trio of criteria: symmetry, transitivity, and reflexivity (Sidman & Tailby, 1982). Then some of its main features – the phenomenon of delayed emergence, the effects of nodes, and the influence of properties of the stimuli used, including nameability and meaningfulness - as exemplified in the empirical studies presented, are evaluated in the light of recent literature. The variety of ways in which SE classes may be formed are described, and the question of when SE relations take effect – during the training of the base relations, or subsequently, or only in the course of unreinforced testing for derived relations – is discussed. The effects of nodal number in multi-nodal linear classes are examined and contrasted with those in serial learning. Some methods of chronometric and protocol analysis, as developed in some of the collected studies, are described, and the outlines of a model of SE class formation they might help to form is presented. The role of naming and of language in general is discussed as a sufficient route to SE class formation, but not one that is perhaps necessary for its laboratory demonstration. The role of SE in the opposite direction, in the ontogeny and phylogeny of language, is considered. Here, besides learned speculation, more empirical studies are awaited, of children, and some new developments in comparative cognition. Highlights are described of the few brain imaging studies implicating SE, following the pioneering empirical study and the earlier review in the presented collection. The survey ends by again extolling the relevance of Tinbergen's (1963) four levels of explanation in behavioural biology to see the phenomena of SE in appropriate perspective.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  

Dickins, D. W. (2022). Bliss in that dawn: The beginnings of operant psychology in the UK History & Philosophy of Psychology, 23(1), 33-49. doi:10.53841/bpshpp.2022.23.1.33
[Abstract]Although the first research in the UK to achieve what amounted to operant conditioning (Grindley, 1932) was published in the same year as Skinner’s pioneer publication no similar procedure seems to have been carried out in Britain until Hurwitz founded an operant laboratory at Birkbeck, (then Birkbeck College), University of London, in the early 1950s, presumably inspired by his meeting with Skinner in 1951, and their subsequent friendship. It certainly was an import from America, fortified by local solutions for providing suitable control equipment. The author was a student of Hurwitz at Birkbeck (1957–1961) and was researching (1961–1964) close by at University College (UCL). There follows a largely biographical account of how operant conditioning, initially mostly in rats, spread around universities in the UK. Many of the people concerned, and others not mentioned, shared their ideas at meetings of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group (EABG) that informally sprang up in the early 1960s, initially without funding or its own journal. In coordination with the later emergence of the European Association for Behaviour Analysis (EABA) and its associated journal (European Journal of Behaviour Analysis) the organisation of the EABG has become established in Bangor, and holds regular biennial meetings at University College, London, alternating with those of the EABA in other parts of Europe. The EABG continues to attract many foreign attendees, including from the US, but some of its earlier enthusiasts no longer attend, whilst those attending mostly see themselves as Behaviour Analysts, reflecting changes both in the theory and practice of operant psychology. While operant technology remains a useful tool for those seeking a broad biological and authentic evolutionary understanding of behaviour, the philosophy of operant psychology as an all-encompassing approach to behavioural science has proved divisive.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1995/6)]  [Citing Place (1996a)]  [Citing Place (1998d)]  [Citing Place (1998e)]  

Dickins, D. W., Singh, K., Roberts, N., Burns, P., Downes, J., Jimmieson, P., & Bentall, R. (2001). An fMRI study of stimulus equivalence. Neuroreport, 12(2), 405-411.
[Abstract]In order to study brain activation during the formation of equivalence relations, 12 subjects (mean age 27.6 yrs) underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) during matching-to-sample (MTS) tests of (1) previously trained arbitrary relationships between iconic stimuli and the untrained, emergent relations of (2) symmetry, (3) transitivity, and (4) symmetry with transitivity, plus a test of verbal fluency (VF). Brain activation was similar in all MTS tasks and in the VF task. In particular, both types of task activated dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and posterior parietal cortex bilaterally. However VF, but not the MTS tasks, activated Broca's area. In three of the four MTS tasks, behavioural accuracy was significantly correlated with left lateralisation of DLPFC activity. Brain activation patterns during equivalence thus resembled those involved in semantic processing underlying language, without involving regions concerned with the simple sub-vocal articulation of stimulus names.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  

Dickins, T. E. (2001). On the origin of symbols. Connexions, (5), 2-18
About the journal: Connexions - An online journal of cognitive science. ISSN 1368-3233 In the period 1997 - 2003 there appeared 6 issues. The journal is archived at
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  [Citing Place (2000c)]  [Citing Place (2000g)]  

Dickins, T. E. (2003). General Symbol Machines: The First Stage in the Evolution of Symbolic Communication. Evolutionary Psychology, 1(1), 192-209. doi:10.1177/147470490300100116
[Abstract]Humans uniquely form stimulus equivalence (SE) classes of abstract and unrelated stimuli, i.e. if taught to match A with B and B with C, they will spontaneously match B with A, and C with B, (the relation of symmetry), and A with C (transitivity). Other species do not do this. The SE ability is possibly the consequence of a specific selection event in the Homo lineage. SE is of interest because it appears to demonstrate a facility that is core to symbolic behavior. Linguistic symbols, for example, are arbitrarily and symmetrically related to their referent such that the term banana has no resemblance to bananas but when processed can be used to discriminate bananas. Equally when bananas are perceived the term banana is readily produced. This relation is arguably the defining mark of symbolic representation. In this paper I shall detail the SE phenomenon and argue that it is evidence for a cognitive device that I term a General Symbol Machine (GSM). The GSM not only sets the background condition for subsequent linguistic evolution but also for other symbolic behaviors such as mathematical reasoning. In so doing the GSM is not particularly domain-specific. The apparent domain-specificity of, for example, natural language is a consequence of other computational developments. This introduces complexity to evolutionary arguments about cognitive architecture.
[Citing Place (1995/6) in context]