Heil, J. (2021). Appearance in Reality. Oxford University Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Chapter 6 Qualities Unbound
Section 6.5 Experiential Qualities
* Suppose that dreaming, hallucinating, and experiencing red after-images resemble, qualitatively, ordinary visual experiences of tomatoes. (The supposition is probably false, but to exclude it in this context might look suspiciously ad hoc.) In the veridical case, the tomato, not the experience, is red. This would seem to suggest that a detached, non-veridical experience of something red need not itself be red. And, were that so, making redness a quality of an experience of red would be a kind of category mistake, an instance of what Ullin Place called the phenomenological fallacy, a mistake that contributes in a significant way to the sense that consciousness is deeply mysterious (see Place 1956 and Smart 1959). The universe is suffused with qualities. Some of these qualities belong to objects we experience, some belong to us, but there is no unbridgeable mental–physical qualitative discontinuity.