Pollock, J. L. (2008). What am I? Virtual machines and the mind/body problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76(2), 237–309.
[Abstract]When your word processor or email program is running on your computer, this creates a "virtual machine” that manipulates windows, files, text, etc. What is this virtual machine, and what are the virtual objects it manipulates? Many standard arguments in the philosophy of mind have exact analogues for virtual machines and virtual objects, but we do not want to draw the wild metaphysical conclusions that have sometimes tempted philosophers in the philosophy of mind. A computer file is not made of epiphenomenal ectoplasm. I argue instead that virtual objects are "supervenient objects". The stereotypical example of supervenient objects is the statue and the lump of clay. To this end I propose a theory of supervenient objects. Then I turn to persons and mental states. I argue that my mental states are virtual states of a cognitive virtual machine implemented on my body, and a person is a supervenient object supervening on his cognitive virtual machine.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section 3. Scientific Identifications
* Philosophers of mind ask “What are mental states, objects, events, properties, etc.?” This is not just an abstract metaphysical question. It can be viewed as an ordinary scientific question. Fn 3: This was perhaps first observed by Place (1956) We ask similar “What are …?” questions in science all the time. Compare “What are alpha-particles?” (objects), “What is it to be acidic?” (properties), “What is it for an object to be magnetized?” (states), “What is happening when there is a flash of lightning?” (events). These are straightforward scientific questions. We explain that alpha-particles are composite structures built out of protons and neutrons. We explain acidity by giving the chemical structure that makes something an acid and explaining how that causes the phenomena that we associate with acidity. We explain the state of being magnetized in terms of the alignment of iron molecules in a crystal lattice. We explain the phenomenon of lightning as an electrical discharge of a certain sort.
Section 4. Physicalism
Subsection 4.1 Two Kinds of Physicalism
* Physicalism in the philosophy of mind is the view that mental items of a given sort are also physical items. Fn 4: Place (1956), Smart (1959), Feigl (1967). Similarly, physicalism regarding virtual entities is the view that the virtual entities are physical items. Type physicalism proposes to give a general account of mental items of some type. It claims that mental items of that type are physical items of a corresponding physical type, and being that physical type is what makes them that mental type. This is analogous to saying that an alpha particle is a structure built out of a proton and a neutron, or that a flash of lightning is an electrical discharge of a certain sort. This is the kind of answer you would naturally expect science to give for these questions. However, many philosophers have forsaken type physicalism because of the multiple realizability of mental states. Instead they have endorsed some version of token physicalism according to which tokens of mental items are physical items, but mental types are not physical types.