Schlicht, T. (2022}. Minds, Brains, and Deep Learning: The development of Cognitive Science through the lens of Kant’s approach to cognition. In H. Kim, & D. Schönecker (Eds.), Kant and Artificial Intelligence (Chapter 1, pp. 3-38). De Gruyter.
[Abstract]This paper reviews several ways in which Kant’s approach to cognition has been influential and relevant for the development of various paradigms in cognitive science, such as functionalism, enactivism, and the predictive processing model of the mind. In the second part, it discusses philosophical issues arising from recent developments in artificial intelligence in relation to Kant’s conception of cognition and understanding. More precisely, it investigates questions about perception, cognition, learning, understanding, and about the age-old debate between empiricists and rationalists in the context of so-called deep neural network architectures as well as the relevance of Kant’s conception of cognition and understanding for these issues.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Chapter 2 Cognitive Science Through the Lens of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy
Section 2.2 Kant and the Cartesian Theatre in the Brain
* Whether functionalism provides us with an accurate portrayal of the mind depends partly on the features of the biological implementation of mental functions in human (and animal) brains. Can cognition be conceived of as a set of causal functions in abstraction of the biological features of its realization, such that this set of functions could in principle be realized by a machine using a non-biological realization? Or is cognition a biological phenomenon whose realization depends on the presence of a complex dynamical biological system, namely, an organism (with a brain and nervous system), exhibiting crucially biochemical means of information processing? [...]
* Against the background of this controversy over functionalist and biological approaches to cognition, it is striking that on the one hand, Kant anticipated certain problems with the precursor to functionalism, namely the identity theory of mind and brain (Place 1956/Smart 1959), which later resurfaced as Dennett’s ‘Cartesian Theatre’ objection against materialism about consciousness, while on the other hand Kant was also impressed by the brain’s features that might explain certain cognitive phenomena.