Skokowski, P. (2018). Temperature, color and the brain: An externalist reply to the knowledge argument. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 9(2). 287–299
[Abstract]It is argued that the knowledge argument fails against externalist theories of mind. Enclosing Mary and cutting her off from some properties denies part of the physical world to Mary, which has the consequence of denying her certain kinds of physical knowledge. The externalist formulation of experience is shown to differ in vehicle, content, and causal role from the internalist version addressed by the knowledge argument, and is supported by results from neuroscience. This means that though the knowledge argument has some force against material internalists, it misses the mark entirely against externalist accounts.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
* By enclosing Mary physically, and cutting her off from direct experience of some physical properties of the world, Jackson denies some knowledge of the physical world to Mary. If one is a materialist of the internalist persuasion, fn 6: For an internalist, knowledge is contained entirely in the head. For example, for an Identity Theorist internalist, knowledge states are identical with brain states, and so all knowledge is contained within the brain. (Place, 1956; Smart 1959) this can pose a problem of the sort as Jackson envisions. For knowledge, although understood to be a physical thing for such a materialist, must be in the head. If Mary has all the physical knowledge, she must know about red before she exits the room, for all this knowledge is already in her head. But the intuition here is that Mary experiences something new, and so gains incremental, new, knowledge and information about colors when she exits the room. The internalist materialist is in a quandary: despite having all the physical knowledge of red inside her head within the room, she must now account for her new knowledge of red upon stepping outside.