Heil, J. (2004). Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Part II Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Chapter Introduction
Section Identity
* In 1956, U. T. Place ('Is Consciousness a Brain Process?') defended the claim that mental goings-on could be identified with goings-on in the brain. It is worth noting that this revolutionary paper appeared, not in a philosophy journal (Ryle, the editor of Mind, had rejected it), but in the British Journal of Psychology. This provides an indication of the philosophical climate in which Place was writing, a climate decidedly hostile to what is now known as Australian materialism (in honor of Place, J. J. C. Smart, C. B. Martin, D. M. Armstrong, and others who held academic posts in Australia). At about the same time, in the United States, Herbert Feigl was developing his own distinctive variant of the identity theory at the University of Minnesota (see Feigl 1958).
Place contended that in identifying states of mind with brain states, he was not claiming that talk of thoughts or pains could be translated into talk of brains; he was advancing an empirical hypothesis. The assumption was that we could discover correlations between agents' reports of their states of mind and goings-on in the brain. How do we explain this correlation? If As are correlated with Bs, this might be because As cause Bs (or Bs, As), or because As and Bs have a common cause, C. So one possibility is that goings-on in the brain cause mental goings-on, and these, in turn, give rise to reports of mental goings on. Another, more radical possibility is that the As are really nothing but the Bs. Suppose mental states are brain states and these cause mental-state reports. This is the identity theory: states of mind are - that is, are identical with - brain states.
* As Place pointed out, it can happen that what we thought were two things in fact turn out to be identical: to be one thing. Think of the Morning Star, Hesperus, and the Evening Star, Phosphorus. These were discovered (originally by Chinese astronomers) to be one and the same heavenly body: Venus. Similarly, Holmes discovers that the butler is the murderer. Such discoveries are not ones you could make from the armchair. You can know a lot about the Evening Star without knowing that it is the Morning Star; and you can be intimately acquainted with the butler without knowing that the butler is the murderer. In just this way, Place contends, we could discover that states of mind are in fact brain states.
How could this be? If As are Bs is it that every property of an A must be a property of a B, and vice versa. Brains evidently have properties lacked by conscious mental states, and conscious states have properties not possessed by brains. Imagine that you have stooped to cut a red rose in the garden. You are conscious of the rose's redness, its sweet smell, and the feel of its petals. Your brain is a soggy gray mass of tissue. How could your vivid conscious experience be identical with something soggy and gray?
Place argues that this line of reasoning is defective, an instance of what he calls the phenomenological fallacy. This is the fallacy involved in supposing that, in describing a conscious experience, describing how something looks, or smells, or feels, you are describing properties of the experience. The rose is red, sweet-smelling, and soft to the touch; your experience of the rose is none of these. Indeed, it is entirely open what the qualities of your experience might be: if Place is right, then it is up to the neuroscientists to tell us.
Section Contingent identity
* Place and J. J. C. Smart, writing in defense of the identity theory, described the identification of states of mind with brain states as contingent identity. The fact that conscious states are brain states, if it is a fact, is a purely contingent fact about our world: a fact that could have been otherwise. Consciousness could have turned out to be housed in a Cartesian ego, for instance. If Descartes was wrong, he was factually wrong. The world could have turned out to be the way Descartes thought it was; but we have (the identity theorists insist) good scientific reasons to think it is otherwise.
Section Token identity
Place and Smart defend a version of the mind-body identity theory standardly called type-identity: mental properties or types are identical with material properties or types. Suppose that being in pain is a type of mental state. Then, if you accept type identity, you will suppose some material type - the firing of C-fibers, for instance-is identical with this mental type. More generally, every mental property or type is identical with some material property or type. The envisaged relation between mental properties and material properties is like the relation between water and H2O: a substance's being water is its being H2O.