Skokowski, P. (2018). Temperature, color and the brain: An externalist reply to the knowledge argument. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 9(2). 287–299
[Abstract]It is argued that the knowledge argument fails against externalist theories of mind. Enclosing Mary and cutting her off from some properties denies part of the physical world to Mary, which has the consequence of denying her certain kinds of physical knowledge. The externalist formulation of experience is shown to differ in vehicle, content, and causal role from the internalist version addressed by the knowledge argument, and is supported by results from neuroscience. This means that though the knowledge argument has some force against material internalists, it misses the mark entirely against externalist accounts.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
* fn 6: For an internalist, knowledge is contained entirely in the head. For example, for an Identity Theorist internalist, knowledge states are identical with brain states, and so all knowledge is contained within the brain. (Place, 1956; Smart 1959)