Baier, K. (1962). Smart on Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, X, 57-68.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [3 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Boring, E. G. (1933). The Physical Dimension of Consciousness. Century.
[17 referring publications by Place]  

Borst, C. V. (1970a). Introduction. In C. V. Borst (Ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [2 referring publications by Place]  

Bradley, M. C. (1963). Sensations, Brain Processes and Colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 41, 385-393.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [2 referring publications by Place]  

Bradley, M. C. (1964). Critical Notice of Smart's Philosophy and Scientific Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XLII, 262-83.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Descartes, R. (1641/1954). Meditations on First Philosophy, 2nd Edition. In G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach (Trs. & Eds.), Descartes: Philosophical Writings. Nelson.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Feigl, H. (1958). The "Mental" and the "Physical", In H. Feigl, M. Scriven, & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Vol II, pp. 370-497). University of Minnesota Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [14 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Feyerabend, P. K. (1963). Materialism and the mind-body problem. The Review of Metaphysics, XVII, 49-66.
[Abstract]This paper has a twofold purpose. First, it defends materialism against a certain type of attack which seems to be based upon a truism but which is nevertheless completely off the mark. And secondly it intends to put philosophy in its proper place.
[6 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Galileo (1623). Il saggiatore.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Geach, P. T. (1972). Logic Matters. Blackwell
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Locke, J. (1690). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Bassett.
[9 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
[Abstract]The thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain is put forward as a reasonable scientific hypothesis, not to be dismissed on logical grounds alone. The conditions under which two sets of observations are treated as observations of the same process, rather than as observations of two independent correlated processes, are discussed. It is suggested that we can identify consciousness with a given pattern of brain activity, if we can explain the subject's introspective observations by reference to the brain processes with which they are correlated. It is argued that the problem of providing a physiological explanation of introspective observations is made to seem more difficult than it really is by the `phenomenological fallacy', the mistaken idea that descriptions of the appearances of things are descriptions of the actual state of affairs in a mysterious internal environment.
Keywords: consciousness, mind-brain identity theory, phenomenological fallacy
Note:
The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g). Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References]  [317 citing publications]  [57 referring publications by Place]  [15 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf  1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1960). Materialism as a scientific hypothesis. Philosophical Review, 69, 101-104.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [19 citing publications]  [8 referring publications by Place]  [2 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1960 Materialism as a Scientific Hypothesis.pdf

Place, U. T. (1967). Comments on H. Putnam 'Psychological predicates'. In W. H. Capitan, & D. D. Merrill (Eds.), Art, mind and religion: Proceedings of the 1965 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy (pp.55-68). Pittsburgh University Press.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [Talks]  [7 citing publications]  [7 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1967 Comments on H. Putnam's 'Psychological Predicates'.pdf

Rorty, R. (1965). Mind-brain identity, privacy, and categories. The Review of Metaphysics, xix, 24-54.
[5 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Russell, B. (1900). A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz Allen & Unwin.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson.
[83 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review, LXVIII, 141-156.
Note:
A revised version with new references appeared in V. C. Chappell (Ed.) (1962), The philosophy of mind. Prentice-Hall. Later reprints are of this version.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [24 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  [7 reprinting collections]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1962). Brain Processes and Incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XL, 68-70.
[2 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1967). Comments on the papers. In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The Identity Theory of Mind (pp. 84-93). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [6 referring publications by Place]