Anscombe, G. E. M. (1965). The intentionality of sensation: a grammatical feature. In R. J. Butler (Ed.), Analytical Philosophy (pp. 158-180). Blackwell.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Armstrong, D. M. (1968). A materialist theory of the mind. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [24 referring publications by Place]  [Reviews]  

Burnheim, J (c. 1968). Intentionality and materialism (Unpublished paper presented to the Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney).
[11 referring publications by Place]  

Chisholm, R. (1957). Perceiving: a Philosophical Study. Cornell University Press.
[9 referring publications by Place]  

Davidson, D. (1969). The Individuation of Events. In N. Rescher (Ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel pp. 216-234). Reidel.
[7 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Davidson, D. (1970). Mental events. In L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and theory. Duckworth.
[16 referring publications by Place]  [4 reprinting collections]  

Davidson, D. (1982). Rational animals. Dialectica, 36, 317-327.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Dennett, D. C. (1978). Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on the mind and psychology. Bradford.
[11 referring publications by Place]  

Feigl, H. (1958). The "Mental" and the "Physical", In H. Feigl, M. Scriven, & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Vol II, pp. 370-497). University of Minnesota Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [14 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Fodor, J. (1975). The language of thought. Crowell.
[22 referring publications by Place]  

Garrett, R. (1985). Elbow room in a functional analysis: Freedom and dignity regained. Behaviorism, 13, 21-36
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Geach, P. T. (1957) Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
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Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise on Human Nature (L.A. Selby-Bigge, Ed., 2nd Edition, P.H. Nidditch, Ed. - 1978. Clarendon Press).
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Lycan, W. G. (1969). On "Intentionality" and the Psychological. American Philosophical Quarterly, 6, 305-311.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Mackie, J. L. (1962). Counterfactuals and Causal Laws. In R. J. Buttler (Ed.), Analytical Philosophy (pp. 66-80), Blackwell.
[11 referring publications by Place]  

Martin, C. B., & Pfeifer, K. (1986). Intentionality and the non-psychological. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 46, 531-554.
[13 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
[Abstract]The thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain is put forward as a reasonable scientific hypothesis, not to be dismissed on logical grounds alone. The conditions under which two sets of observations are treated as observations of the same process, rather than as observations of two independent correlated processes, are discussed. It is suggested that we can identify consciousness with a given pattern of brain activity, if we can explain the subject's introspective observations by reference to the brain processes with which they are correlated. It is argued that the problem of providing a physiological explanation of introspective observations is made to seem more difficult than it really is by the `phenomenological fallacy', the mistaken idea that descriptions of the appearances of things are descriptions of the actual state of affairs in a mysterious internal environment.
Keywords: consciousness, mind-brain identity theory, phenomenological fallacy
Note:
The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g). Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References]  [335 citing publications]  [57 referring publications by Place]  [15 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf  1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1960). Materialism as a scientific hypothesis. Philosophical Review, 69, 101-104.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [21 citing publications]  [8 referring publications by Place]  [2 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1960 Materialism as a Scientific Hypothesis.pdf

Place, U. T. (1977a). Twenty years on - "Is consciousness still a brain process?" Open Mind, 6,3-10.
[References]  [1 citing publications]  [3 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1977a Twenty Years On - Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process.pdf

Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson.
[83 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (1979). What is an Intentional State? Mind, LXXXVIII, 74-92.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality: an essay on the philosophy of mind. Cambridge University Press.
[10 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (1984). Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures. British Broadcasting Corporation.
[4 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review, LXVIII, 141-156.
Note:
A revised version with new references appeared in V. C. Chappell (Ed.) (1962), The philosophy of mind. Prentice-Hall. Later reprints are of this version.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [24 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  [7 reprinting collections]