Austin, C. J. (2018). Essence in the age of evolution: A new theory of natural kinds. Routledge.
[Abstract]This book offers a novel defence of a highly contested philosophical position: biological natural kind essentialism. This theory is routinely and explicitly rejected for its purported inability to be explicated in the context of contemporary biological science, and its supposed incompatibility with the process and progress of evolution by natural selection. Christopher J. Austin challenges these objections, and in conjunction with contemporary scientific advancements within the field of evolutionary-developmental biology, the book utilises a contemporary neo-Aristotelian metaphysics of "dispositional properties", or causal powers, to provide a theory of essentialism centred on the developmental architecture of organisms and its role in the evolutionary process. By defending a novel theory of Aristotelian biological natural kind essentialism, Essence in the Age of Evolution represents the fresh and exciting union of cutting-edge philosophical insight and scientific knowledge.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Azzano, L. (2024). Dispositional Reality. A Novel Approach to Power Ontology and Metaphysics Springer.
[Abstract]Dispositionalism, perhaps the most popular variant of non-Humean metaphysics, submits that dispositions, powers, or capacities, are part of the furniture of the world. In this book I advance an original approach to dispositionalism revolving around the notion of Dispositional Reality; the novelty lies in the fact that the account, unlike most alternatives on the market, does not require the reification of objects, facts, properties, nor their dispositional essences – and is in fact compatible with a far more deflationary approach to dispositions, while still being true to the non-Humean spirit of the proposal. This power metaphysics without powers allows one to dispel several puzzles in recent literature, or recast them under a new light. Albeit with its own peculiarities, this proposal constitutes a variant of explanatory dispositionalism, according to which realism about dispositions ought not to be understood as an ontological inflation, but as an explanatory inversion within the nomic and modal family. Some of these explanations are hereby attempted, and a study of various types of non-causal explanation will be provided.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Azzano, L., & Raimondi, A. (2022). New foundations of dispositionalism - introduction. Synthese, 200, 384. doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03847-z
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Bauer, W. A. (2016). Physical Intentionality, Extrinsicness, and the Direction of Causation. Acta Analytica, 31, 397–417. doi:10.1007/s12136-016-0283-2
[Abstract]The Physical Intentionality Thesis claims that dispositions share the marks of psychological intentionality; therefore, intentionality is not exclusively a mental phenomenon. Beyond the standard five marks, Alexander Bird introduces two additional marks of intentionality that he argues dispositions do not satisfy: first, thoughts are extrinsic; second, the direction of causation is that objects cause thoughts, not vice versa. In response, this paper identifies two relevant conceptions of extrinsicness, arguing that dispositions show deep parallels to thoughts on both conceptions. Then, it shows that Bird’s discussion of direction of causation overlooks complexities of dispositionality and intentionality that problematize apparent differences between thoughts and dispositions. The paper ends with a discussion of why we find these parallels between thoughts and dispositions.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Bauer, W. A. (2019). Powers and the Pantheistic Problem of Unity. Sophia, 58(4), 563-580.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Bauer, W. A. (2022). Causal Powers and the Intentionality Continuum. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781009214858
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Bird, A. (2007). Nature's metaphysics: Laws and properties. Oxford University Press
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Bird, A. (2016). Overpowering (How the Powers Ontology Has Overreached Itself). Mind, 125(498),341-383. doi:10.1093/mind/fzv207 kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/overpowering-how-the-powers-ontology-has-overreached-itself(277eec92-feb9-4e98-9741-8d9fd31e55c6).html
[Abstract]Many authors have argued in favour of an ontology of properties as powers and it has been widely argued that this ontology allows us to address certain philosophical problems in novel and illuminating ways, for example causation, representation, intentionality, free will, and liberty. I argue that the ontology of powers, even if successful as an account of fundamental natural properties, does not provide the insight claimed as regards the aforementioned nonfundamental phenomena. I focus on and criticise the powers theory of causation presented by Mumford and Anjum (2011), and argue that related criticisms can be directed at other abuses of (the ontology of ) powers.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Borghini, A. (2009). Dispositions and Their Intentions. In G. Damschen, R. Schnepf, & K. Stüber: Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind (pp. 204-220). De Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110211825.204
[Abstract]Dispositional Realism is the view according to which some denizens of reality – i.e., dispositions – are properties, may exist in the natural world, and have an irreducible modal character. Among Dispositional Realists, Charlie Martin, Ullin Place and George Molnar most notably argued that the modal character of dispositions should be understood in terms of their intentionality. Other Dispositional Realists, most notably Stephen Mumford, challenged this understanding of the modal character of dispositions. In this paper, I defend a fresh version of the intentional understanding of dispositions. I start by distinguishing between two questions about properties, respectively addressing their identity conditions and their individuation conditions. I, then, define categorical and dispositional properties in terms of their qualitative character, and examine their identity and individuation conditions. I conclude that the attribution of intentions is a conceptual tool introduced in order to alleviate the burdensome task of specifying the conditions of individuation of a disposition; however, such attribution does not affect the identity of a disposition.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999b)]  

Buckareff, A. A. (2023). Pantheism, omnisubjectivity, and the feeling of temporal passage. Religions, 14(6), 758. doi:10.3390/rel14060758
[Abstract]By “pantheism” I mean to pick out a model of God on which God is identical with the totality of existents constitutive of the universe. I assume that, on pantheism, God is an omnispatiotemporal mind who is identical with the universe. I assume that, given divine omnispatiotemporality, God knows everything that can be known in the universe. This includes having knowledge de se of the minds of every conscious creature. Hence, if God has knowledge de se of the minds of every conscious creature, then divine omniscience implies omnisubjectivity. Assuming that eternalism is true, robust temporal passage is an illusion. But, conscious creatures, such as human persons, experience robust temporal passage. If God has the attribute of omnisubjectivity, then God experiences temporal passage. However, God also has a unified experience of the entire spatiotemporal continuum. God’s having these two perspectives creates a tension for pantheism given that God would seem to experience both temporal passage and an absence of temporal passage. I compare non-personal pantheism and personal pantheism and consider which one has better resources to answer the foregoing puzzle. I argue that personal pantheism is better equipped to address this problem than non-personal pantheism.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Coates, A. (2022). Unmanifested powers and universals. Synthese, 200. doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03476-6
[Abstract]According to a well-known argument against dispositional essentialism, the nature of unmanifested token powers leaves dispositional essentialists with an objectionable commitment to the reality of non-existent entities. The idea is that, because unmanifested token powers are directed at their non-existent token manifestations, they require the reality of those manifestations. Arguably the most promising response to this argument works by claiming that, if properties are universals, dispositional directedness need only entail the reality of actually existing manifestation types. I argue that this response fails, because no version of the response can adequately accommodate dispositions of the sort that follow from Coulomb’s law. This result both defeats an important argument that dispositional essentialists ought to be realists about universals and appears to leave dispositional essentialists with a problematic commitment to either non-relational connections or a Meinongian ontology.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Crane, T. (1998). Intentionality as the mark of the mental. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 43, 229-251. doi:10.1017/S1358246100004380
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Crane, T. (1998). The efficacy of content: A functionalist theory. In J, Bransen, & S. E. Cuypers (Eds), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 77. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-94-011-5082-8_10
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Dilworth, J. (2005). The Reflexive Theory of Perception. Behavior and Philosophy, 33, 17-40.
[Abstract]The Reflexive Theory of Perception (RTP) claims that perception of an object or property X by an organism Z consists in Z being caused by X to acquire some disposition D toward X itself. By using U. T. Place's intentional analysis of dispositions a dispositional analysis of perceptual representation is developed.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  
Download: Dilworth (2005) The Reflexive Theory of Perception.pdf

Ford, S. (2010). What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world? Powerful structure [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Queensland. philpapers.org/go.pl?aid=FORWFP
[Abstract]This Thesis engages with contemporary philosophical controversies about the nature of dispositional properties or powers and the relationship they have to their non-dispositional counterparts. The focus concerns fundamentality. In particular, I seek to answer the question, ‘What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world?’ The answer I defend is that fundamental categorical properties need not be invoked in order to derive a viable explanation for the manifest world. My stance is a field-theoretic view which describes the world as a single system comprised of pure power, and involves the further contention that ‘pure power’ should not be interpreted as ‘purely dispositional’, if dispositionality means potentiality, possibility or otherwise unmanifested power or ability bestowed upon some bearer. The theoretical positions examined include David Armstrong’s Categoricalism, Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties, Brian Ellis’s New Essentialism, Ullin Place’s Conceptualism, Charles Martin’s and John Heil’s Identity Theory of Properties and Rom Harré’s Theory of Causal Powers. The central concern of this Thesis is to examine reasons for holding a pure-power theory, and to defend such a stance. This involves two tasks. The first requires explaining what plays the substance role in a pure-power world. This Thesis argues that fundamental power, although not categorical, can be considered ontologically-robust and thus able to fulfil the substance role. A second task—answering the challenge put forward by Richard Swinburne and thereafter replicated in various neo-Swinburne arguments—concerns how the manifestly qualitative world can be explained starting from a pure-power base. The Light-like Network Account is put forward in an attempt to show how the manifest world can be derived from fundamental pure power.
Note:
CHAPTER 8 ULLIN PLACE: CONCEPTUALISM - OUTLINE 131 CHAPTER 9 ULLIN PLACE: CONCEPTUALISM - DISCUSSION 137 9.1 Truthmakers for Dispositional Properties 137 9.2 The Causal Role of the Microstructure 140 9.3 Summary and Conclusions 141
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996d)]  [Citing Place (1996e)]  [Citing Place (1996f)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999b)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  

Graham, G. (2000a). Ullin Thomas Place: 24 October 1924 - 2 January 2000. Brain and Mind, 1, 181-182. doi:10.1023/A:1010032528485
[Citing Armstrong & Place (1991)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [Citing Place (1991f)]  [Citing Place (1992d)]  [Citing Place (1992f)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  

Han, S. (2034) A new problem for Kripkean defenses of origin theses. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 3, 57. doi:10.1007/s44204-024-00185-4
[Abstract]According to Kripke’s thesis of the necessity of origin, if an object has an origin, it necessarily has that origin. Kripke’s thesis has special cases that we may refer to as “origin theses” when applied to certain types of objects, such as humans and tables. While origin theses have intuitive plausibility, why they are true remains unclear. This paper addresses a prominent line of defense for origin theses. In a celebrated note in Naming and Necessity, Kripke briefly presented an incomplete argument. Advocates of this line of defense attempt to establish origin theses by proposing additional principles with which to complete Kripke’s argument. I call these defenses “Kripkean defenses.” The usual debate in the literature regarding Kripkean defenses has focused on the justifiability of the proposed principles. In this paper, I highlight a neglected issue that arises for Kripkean defenders, even if the debate is assumed to be settled in their favor. I argue that, even if Kripke’s argument is sound, it falls short of establishing origin theses, leaving an inferential gap. How to close the gap is a new problem for Kripkean defenders. My goal in the paper is to offer a solution that I believe is their best hope. If I am right, Kripkean defenders should commit themselves to the Aristotelian view that individuals such as human beings and tables are, in a robust Aristotelian sense, substances with irreducible powers that emerge from the powers of their causal origin.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Hannegan, W. (2018). Dispositional essentialism, directedness, and inclination to an end. Journal of Philosophical Research, 43, 191-204. doi:10.5840/jpr2018828132
[Abstract]Dispositional essentialists U. T. Place, George Molnar, and C. B. Martin hold that dispositions are intrinsically directed to their manifestations. Thomists have noted that this directedness is similar to Thomistic directedness to an end. I argue that Place, Molnar, and Martin would benefit from conceiving of dispositional directedness as the sort of directedness associated with Thomistic inclinations. Such Thomistic directedness can help them to account for the production of manifestations; to justify their reliance on dispositional directedness; to show the causal relevance of dispositions; and to motivate their view that dispositions are not reducible to categorical bases. I argue, moreover, that Thomistic inclination to an end does not succumb to the most common objections to finality: it is not mentalistic or vitalistic, and it does not involve backwards causation. Place, Molnar, and Martin, therefore, can embrace the directedness associated with Thomistic inclination—and reap its benefits—without incurring any high metaphysical cost.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999b)]  

Ingthorsson, R. D. (2015). The Regress of Pure Powers Revisited. European Journal of Philosophy, 23(3), 529–41. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00548.x
[Abstract]The paper aims to elucidate in better detail than before the dispute about whether or not dispositional monism—the view that all basic properties are pure powers—entails a vicious infinite regress. Particular focus is on Alexander Bird’s and George Molnar’s attempts to show that the arguments professing to demonstrate a vicious regress are inconclusive because they presuppose what they aim to prove, notably that powers are for their nature dependent on something else. I argue that Bird and Molnar are mistaken. It is true that dispositional monism is popularly assumed to characterise powers as dependent entities, but this is not what the arguments aim to prove. They merely aim to demonstrate that it would be absurd to assume that all properties are dependent in this way. Finally, it is argued that there is an unresolved tension in Bird’s and Molnar’s account of powers. They characterise them as being for their nature dependent on the manifestations that they are for, and yet ontologically independent of those same manifestations. Until that tension is resolved, their accounts are not equipped to remove the threat of vicious regress.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Jaworski, W. (2014). Hylomorphism and the Metaphysics of Structure. Res Philosophica, 91(2), 179-201.
[Abstract]Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle; it accounts for what things are and what they can do. My goal is to articulate a metaphysic of hylomorphic structure different from those currently on offer. It is based on a substance-attribute ontology that takes properties to be powers and tropes. Hylomorphic structures emerge, on this account, as powers to configure the materials that compose individuals.
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  

Jaworski, W. (2017) Psychology without a mental-physical dichotomy. In W. M.R. Simpson, R. C. Koons, & N, J. Teh (Eds.), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science (Chapter 11, pp. 261-291). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315211626-14
[Abstract]Is there a mental-physical dichotomy? Philosophers, scientists, and many ordinary folk seem to think so. We often speak of the difference between mental health and physical health, or between the mental aspects of athletic performance and the physical ones. In addition, standard definitions of psychology typically imply that it is the science of mental phenomena, and that the latter comprise a subject matter that distinguishes the methods of psychology from those of biology, chemistry, or physics. But the mental-physical dichotomy generates mind-body problems: persistent philosophical problems understanding how mental phenomena are related to physical phenomena. These problems suggest that there is a conceptual instability at the very foundations of psychological science. A hylomorphic metaphysic provides an alternative. It implies that there is nothing canonical about the mental-physical dichotomy; any distinctions we draw between mental and nonmental subject-matters or physical and nonphysical ones are mere artifacts of our descriptive and explanatory interests. This suggests an understanding of psychological science that is not based on a mental-physical dichotomy.
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  

Livanios, V. (2021). Manifestation and unrestricted dispositional monism. Acta Analytica. doi:10.1007/s12136-021-00476-y
[Abstract]Most metaphysicians agree that powers (at least the non-fundamental ones) can exist without being manifested. The main goal of this paper is to show that adherents of an unrestricted version of Dispositional Monism cannot provide a plausible metaphysical account of the difference between a situation in which a power-instance is not manifested and a situation in which a manifestation of that power-instance actually occurs unless they undermine their own view. To this end, two kinds of manifestation-relation (token-level and type-level, respectively) are introduced and it is argued that dispositional monists should appeal to the former in order to offer the required account. After defending the introduction of token-level-manifestation-relations against objections to their metaphysical robustness and explanatory non-redundancy, it is finally argued that their existence is incompatible with the core tenet of an unrestricted form of Dispositional Monism because they cannot be powers.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Marmodoro, A. (2010). Do powers need powers to make them powerful? From pandispositionalism to Aristotle In A. Marmodoro (Ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations (pp. 337 - 352). Routledge.
[Abstract]Do powers have powers? More urgently, do powers need further powers to do what powers do? Stathis Psillos says they do. He finds this a fatal flaw in the nature of pure powers: pure powers have a regressive nature. Their nature is incoherent to us, and they should not be admitted into the ontology. I argue that pure powers do not need further powers; rather, they do what they do because they are powers. I show that at the heart of Psillos’ regress is a metaphysical division he assumes between a pure power to φ and its directedness towards the manifestation of φ-ing, i.e. between a pure power and its essence. But such an ontological division between an entity and its essence has already been shown by Aristotle to be detrimental, condemning the entity to a regressive nature. I show that Psillos’ regress is but an instance of Aristotle’s regress argument on the relation between an entity and its essence. I compare Aristotle’s, Bradley’s, and Psillos’ regresses, showing that Bradley’s and Psillos’ (different) conclusions from the regress arguments lead to impasses. I then build on Aristotle’s directive against regressive natures, arguing with him that an entity is not other than its nature (being divided from its nature by a relation between them). Rather, an entity is an instantiated nature itself. The Aristotelian position I put forward explains how the oneness of the entity is achieved by its being an instance of a type. Thus, the regress is blocked, and the nature of pure powers is shown to pose no threats of an ontological or epistemological kind, if physics gave us reasons to posit pure powers.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999b)]  

Marmodoro, A. (2022). What’s Dynamic About Causal Powers? A Black Box!. In C. J. Austin, A. Marmodoro, A. Roselli (Eds): Powers, Time and Free Will (Chapter 1). Synthese Library, vol 451. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-92486-7_1
[Abstract]Modern science cannot do without Aristotelian powers – thus have argued Cartwright and Pemberton (2013) among many others. Aristotelian powers are essentially dynamic entities, which account for causal phenomena, and thus explain how change comes about in the world. In this chapter I argue that explaining causation in terms of interacting causal powers places causation … beyond the reach of our understanding(!) – because causal interaction shows us what powers do, and not what powers are. Metaphysicians by and large agree that the intrinsic nature of powers is to be dynamic entities. I contend here that their dynamism is irreducible, and crucially, unknowable, rendering what powers are ‘black boxes’ to us, despite multiple attempts of defining them in the literature. The sciences discover only how powers behave, and classify them teleologically to tell us what they do. Powers, however, are mysterious and unexplorable black boxes to us, even though they are indispensable in our scientific explanations of change in the world.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  [Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

Mørch, H.H. (2020). Does dispositionalism entail panpsychism? Topoi, 39, 1073–1088. doi:10.1007/s11245-018-9604-y
[Abstract]According to recent arguments for panpsychism, all (or most) physical properties are dispositional, dispositions require categorical grounds, and the only categorical properties we know are phenomenal properties. Therefore, phenomenal properties can be posited as the categorical grounds of all (or most) physical properties—in order to solve the mind–body problem and/or in order avoid noumenalism about the grounds of the physical world. One challenge to this case comes from dispositionalism, which agrees that all physical properties are dispositional, but denies that dispositions require categorical grounds. In this paper, I propose that this challenge can be met by the claim that the only (fundamentally) dispositional properties we know are phenomenal properties, in particular, phenomenal properties associated with agency, intention and/or motivation. Versions of this claim have been common in the history of philosophy, and have also been supported by a number of contemporary dispositionalists (and other realists about causal powers). I will defend a new and updated version of it. Combined with other premises from the original case for panpsychism—which are not affected by the challenge from dispositionalism—it forms an argument that dispositionalism entails panpsychism.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Mumford, S. (1998). Dispositions. Routledge
Note:
Files added, see Download
1. Mumford's reply (in Chapter 5) to Place, U. T. (1996d). A conceptualist ontology. In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin. U. T. Place, & T. Crane (Ed.) Dispositions: A debate (Chapter 4, pp. 49-67). Routledge.
2. Preface to the Paperback Edition from 2003.
[Citing Armstrong, Martin, Place & Crane (1996)]  [Citing Place (1996d)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Mumford (1998) Place's Dualism.pdf  Mumford (2003) Preface to the Paperback Edition of Mumford (1998) Dispositions.pdf

Mumford, S. (1999). Intentionality and the physical: A New theory of disposition ascription. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(195), 215-225. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00138
[Abstract]This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we take disposition ascriptions to be functional characterizations of properties, then we can explain all that was appealing about the new alternative without the unacceptable consequences.
[Citing Place (1996c)]  [Citing Place (1996d)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Is reply to]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Mumford, S. (2006). The ungrounded argument. Synthese, 149, 471–489. doi:10.1007/s11229-005-0570-8
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Oderberg, D.S. (2017). Finality revived: powers and intentionality. Synthese, 194, 2387–2425. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1057-5
[Abstract]Proponents of physical intentionality argue that the classic hallmarks of intentionality highlighted by Brentano are also found in purely physical powers. Critics worry that this idea is metaphysically obscure at best, and at worst leads to panpsychism or animism. I examine the debate in detail, finding both confusion and illumination in the physical intentionalist thesis. Analysing a number of the canonical features of intentionality, I show that they all point to one overarching phenomenon of which both the mental and the physical are kinds, namely finality. This is the finality of ‘final causes’, the long-discarded idea of universal action for an end to which recent proponents of physical intentionality are in fact pointing whether or not they realise it. I explain finality in terms of the concept of specific indifference, arguing that in the case of the mental, specific indifference is realised by the process of abstraction, which has no correlate in the case of physical powers. This analysis, I conclude, reveals both the strength and weakness of rational creatures such as us, as well as demystifying (albeit only partly) the way in which powers work.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  [Citing Place (1999b) in context]  

Pernu T. K. (2017). The five marks of the mental. Frontiers in Psychology, 8. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01084
[Abstract]The mental realm seems different to the physical realm; the mental is thought to be dependent on, yet distinct from the physical. But how, exactly, are the two realms supposed to be different, and what, exactly, creates the seemingly insurmountable juxtaposition between the mental and the physical? This review identifies and discusses five marks of the mental, features that set characteristically mental phenomena apart from the characteristically physical phenomena. These five marks (intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity) are not presented as a set of features that define mentality. Rather, each of them is something we seem to associate with phenomena we consider mental, and each of them seems to be in tension with the physical view of reality in its own particular way. It is thus suggested how there is no single mind-body problem, but a set of distinct but interconnected problems. Each of these separate problems is analyzed, and their differences, similarities and connections are identified. This provides a useful basis for future theoretical work on psychology and philosophy of mind, that until now has too often suffered from unclarities, inadequacies, and conflations.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Place, T. W. (2022). Understanding the types of language in behavioural science: Reply to Phil Reed on the work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 52-64. behavior.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/BP-v50-Place.pdf
[Abstract]Reed (2022) states that according to Ullin Place’s latest view, intensional statements are not necessarily connected with mentalist language and explanations, and intensionality is the mark of the conversational. This is false. Place’s view is that intensionality is the mark of a quotation. Quotations are sentences that express the content of propositional attitudes. They are characterised by what Frege called ‘indirect reference’ and Quine ‘referential opacity’. Intensionality is nothing more than this. Intensional statements stating propositional attitudes are at the heart of the mentalist language. Propositional attitudes are dispositions. Dispositions are the nature of things and are at the core of all sciences. The doings of a person are the active manifestations of dispositions. Place defines mentalism at the level of the person, which is also the level of behaviourism. This contrasts with a standard definition of mentalism at the subpersonal level, also known as centrism. Doing or behaving is interacting with the environment. This is common to the scientific approaches at the level of the person. Articulating the same conceptual foundation and language and each approach having its dialect must be possible. This is “relevan[t] for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science” (Reed, 2022).
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1978a)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1983d)]  [Citing Place (1984a)]  [Citing Place (1984c)]  [Citing Place (1985c)]  [Citing Place (1987a)]  [Citing Place (1991f)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1996j)]  [Citing Place (1996l)]  [Citing Place (1998c)]  [Citing Place (1998d)]  [Citing Place (1999)]  [Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  [Citing Place (1999g)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Place (2022) Understanding the Types of Language in Behavioural Science - Reply to Phil Reed on the Work of Ullin T Place.pdf

Raimondi, A. (2021). Crane and the mark of the mental. Analysis, 81(4), 683–693. doi.:10.1093/analys/anab035
[Abstract]Brentano’s (1874) suggestion that intentionality is the mark of the mental is typically spelled out in terms of the thesis that all and only mental states are intentional. An influential objection is that intentionality is not necessary for mentality (McGinn 1982; Dretske 1995; Deonna and Teroni 2012; Bordini 2017). What about the idea that only mental states are intentional? In his 2008 paper published in Analysis, Nes shows that on a popular characterization of intentionality, notably defended by Crane (2014 [1998], 2001), some non-mental states come out as intentional. Crane (2008) replies that the concept of representation solves the problem. In this paper, I argue that no representational account of intentionality meets Nes’s challenge. After distinguishing between two notions of representation, I contend that there are two versions of Crane’s representational account, but neither of them is able to solve the problem posed by Nes.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Reed, P. (2022). The concept of intensionality in the work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 20-38. behavior.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/BPv50-Reed.pdf
[Abstract]The current paper overviews of the notion of intensionality as it is presented in the work of Ullin Place, with the aim of characterising Place’s somewhat neglected thinking about this topic. Ullin Place’s work showed a development regarding his views concerning this topic, which, in themselves, illustrate a variety of possible stances that can be taken towards the concept of intensionality. Ultimately, Place suggested that ‘intensional’ statements are not necessarily connected with ‘mentalistic’ language, nor with ‘mentalistic’ explanations. Rather, Place came to the view that intensionality should be taken to be the mark of the ‘conversational’ – that is, it is a property of verbal behaviour that characterises nonscientific everyday discourse. This view has relevance to furthering the understanding of Place’s work regarding intensionality, and also relevance for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science.
Note:
Place (2022) argues that this article is a rather misleading exposition of Ullin T. Place's work on intensionality and the types of language in behavioural science.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1978a)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1984c)]  [Citing Place (1987a)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Reed (2022) The Concept of Intensionality in the Work of Ullin T Place.pdf

Renz, G. (2021). What is God’s Power?. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 13(3). doi:10.24204/ejpr.2021.3295
[Abstract]Theists claim that God can make a causal difference in the world. That is, theists believe that God is causally efficacious, has power. Discussion of divine power has centered on understanding better the metaphysics of creation and sustenance, special intervention, governance, and providing an account of omnipotence consistent with other divine attributes, such as omnibenevolence. But little discussion has centered on what, deep down ontologically, God’s power is. I show that a number of prominent accounts of power fail to model what divine power could be, and then develop an account based on teleological and primitivist accounts of power.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Renz, G. (2025). Whence The Form? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1–18. doi:10.1080/00048402.2025.2465668
[Abstract]Hylomorphists claim that substances—human beings, oak trees, chemical compounds—are compounds of matter and form. If a house is a substance, then its matter would be some bricks and timbers and its form the structure those bricks and timbers take on. While hylomorphism is traditionally presented as a theory of change, it only treats the coming-to-be and passing-away of matter-form compounds. But many hylomorphists understand forms to be entities in their own right, as parts or constituents of substances. So, a neglected question arises: how, when, and from where do forms come to be? I take up the view of one prominent and representative hylomorphist, Kathrin Koslicki, and argue that she cannot answer these questions satisfactorily. I close with a proposal for an account of the generation of forms based on machinery many hylomorphists already accept, namely, causal powers, that points to a deflationary metaphysics of form.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Roselli, A., & Austin, C. (2021). The dynamical essence of powers. Synthese, 199, 14951–14973. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03450-8
[Abstract]Powers are properties defined by what they do. The focus of the large majority of the powers literature has been mainly put on explicating the (multifaceted) results of the production of a power in certain (multifaceted) initial conditions: but all this causal complexity is bound to be—and, in fact, it has proved to be—quite difficult to handle. In this paper we take a different approach by focusing on the very activity of producing those multifaceted manifestations themselves. In this paper, we propose an original account of what the essence of a power consists in which stems from a radical reconceptualisation of power-causation according to which counterfactuals are to be explained away by powers, and not vice-versa. We call this approach the dynamical operator account of powers. According to this account, the causal role of powers consists in their ensuring that the ontological transition from a stimulus S to a manifestation M happens. Powers thus have a dynamical essence which consists in the fundamental activity of generating the counterfactuals typically associated with them. We show that if one conceptualises this functional activity as the metaphysical fulcrum around which counterfactual-based causation revolves, one is granted not only an improved methodology to individuate powers but also a better understanding of their knowability, modality and directedness.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Voltolini, A. (2005). How to Get Intentionality by Language. In G. Forrai, & G. Kampis (Eds), Intentionality. Past and Future (pp. 127-41). Rodopi, . HOW-TO-GET-INTENTIONALITY-BY-LANGUAGE.pdf
[Abstract]One is often told that sentences expressing or reporting mental states endowed with intentionality — the feature of being “directed upon” an object that some mental states possess — contain contexts that both prevent those sentences to be existentially generalized and are filled by referentially opaque occurrences of singular terms. Failure of existential generalization and referential opacity have been traditionally said to be the basic characterizations of intentionality from a linguistic point of view. I will call those contexts directional contexts. In what follows, I will argue that this traditional conception is incorrect. First, the above characterizations do not provide both necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for directional contexts. Appearances notwithstanding, these characterizations are not the adequate linguistic counterparts of two elements folk-psychologically featuring intentionality, namely existence-independence and the possible apparent aspectual character of the intentional object, the target of a mental state endowed with intentionality. Indeed, they do not retain the prima facie ontological commitment to intentional objects the above elements contain. I will replace failure of existential generalization and referential opacity with other linguistic factors, namely success of mere existentially unloaded particular quantification and pseudo-opacity. I will contend that they provide both necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for directional contexts, and claim that these factors are the adequate counterparts of the above folk-psychological elements, precisely because they retain the prima facie ontological commitment to intentionalia those elements possess.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Voltolini, A. (2020). Why the Mark of the Dispositional is not the Mark of the Intentional. The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts, 1(1), 19-32.
[Abstract]In this paper, first of all, I will try to show that Crane’s attempt at facing Nes’ criticism of his two original criteria for intentionality (of reference), directedness and aspectual shape, does not work. Hence, in order to dispense with Nes’ counterexample given in terms of dispositions, there is no need to strengthen such criteria by appealing to representationality, Moreover, I will stress that such criteria are perfectly fine when properly meant in mental viz phenomenological terms that appeal to the possible nonexistence and the possible apparent aspectuality of the object of a thought, its intentional object. For once they are so meant, dispositions clearly lack them.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Voltolini, A. (2024). Intentionality as constitution. Routledge.
[Abstract]This book develops a novel theory of intentionality. It argues that intentionality is an internal essential relation of constitution between an intentional state and an object, or between such a state and a possible state of affairs as subsisting.
The author’s main claim is that intentionality is a fundamentally modal property, hence a non (scientifically) natural property in that it does not supervene, either locally or globally, on its nonmodal physical basis. This is the property, primarily for an intentional mental state, to be constituted by the entities it is about. In the case of intentionality of reference, such constituents are objects, in the sense of individuals; in the case of intentionality of content, such constituents are possible states of affairs as subsisting. Constitution is meant in a mereologically literal sense: those constituents are essential parts of the relevant states. As a result, the theory claims not only that intentionality is relational but also that it is an internal, essential relation holding between an intentional state and its object or proposition-like content.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Williams, N. E. (2019). The powers metaphysic. Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]Systematic metaphysics is defined by its task of solving metaphysical problems through the repeated application of single, fundamental ontology. The dominant contemporary metaphysic is that of neo-Humeanism, built on a static ontology typified by its rejection of basic causal and modal features. This book offers a radically distinct metaphysic, one that turns the status quo on its head. Starting with a foundational ontology of inherently causal properties known as "powers", Neil E. Williams develops a metaphysic that appeals to powers in explanations of causation, persistence, laws, and modality. Powers are properties that have their causal natures internal to them: they are responsible for the effects in the world. A unique account of powers is advanced, one that understands this internal nature in terms of blueprint of potential interaction types. After the presentation of the powers ontology, Williams offers solutions to broad metaphysical puzzles, some of which take on different forms in light of the new tools that are available. The defence of the ontology comes from the virtues of metaphysic it can be used to develop. Particular attention is paid to the problems of causation and persistence, simultaneously solving them as is casts them in a new light. The resultant powers metaphysic is offered as a systematic alternative to neo-Humeanism.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999b)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]