Leslie, J. C. (2001). Broad and deep, but always rigorous: Some appreciative reflections on Ullin Place's contributions to Behaviour Analysis. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 159-165. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759425
[Abstract]Ullin Place's contributions to the literature of behaviour analysis and behaviourism span the period from 1954 to 1999. In appreciation of his scholarship and breadth of vision, this paper reviews an early widely-cited contribution ("Is consciousness a brain process?" British Journal of Psychology, 1956, pp. 47-53) and a late one which should become widely cited ("Rescuing the science of human behavior from the ashes of socialism," Psychological Record, 1997, pp. 649-659). It is noted that the sweep of Place's work links behaviour analysis to its philosophical roots in the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and also looks forward to the further functional analysis of language-using behaviour.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [Citing Place (1982)]  [Citing Place (1983d)]  [Citing Place (1992f)]  [Citing Place (1997b)]  [Citing Place (1997d)]  [Citing Place (1998e)]  
Download: Leslie (2001) Broad and Deep but Always Rigorous - Some Appreciative Reflections on Ullin Place's Contributions to Behaviour Analysis.pdf

Moore, J. (2000). Words Are Not Things. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 17(1), 143-160. doi:10.1007/BF03392961
[Abstract]On a traditional view, words are the fundamental units of verbal behavior. They are independent, autonomous things that symbolically represent or refer to other independent, autonomous things, often in some other dimension. Ascertaining what those other things are constitutes determining the meaning of a word. On a behavior-analytic view, verbal behavior is ongoing, functional operant activity occasioned by antecedent factors and reinforced by its consequences, particularly consequences that are mediated by other members of the same verbal community. Functional relations rather than structure select the response unit. The behavior-analytic point of view clarifies such important contemporary issues in psychology as (a) the role of scientific theories and explanations, (b) educational practices, and (c) equivalence classes, so that there is no risk of strengthening the traditional view that words are things that symbolically represent other things.
[Citing Place (1981a) in context]  [Citing Place (1981b) in context]  [Citing Place (1982) in context]  [Citing Place (1983d) in context]  

Place, T. W. (2022). Understanding the types of language in behavioural science: Reply to Phil Reed on the work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 52-64. behavior.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/BP-v50-Place.pdf
[Abstract]Reed (2022) states that according to Ullin Place’s latest view, intensional statements are not necessarily connected with mentalist language and explanations, and intensionality is the mark of the conversational. This is false. Place’s view is that intensionality is the mark of a quotation. Quotations are sentences that express the content of propositional attitudes. They are characterised by what Frege called ‘indirect reference’ and Quine ‘referential opacity’. Intensionality is nothing more than this. Intensional statements stating propositional attitudes are at the heart of the mentalist language. Propositional attitudes are dispositions. Dispositions are the nature of things and are at the core of all sciences. The doings of a person are the active manifestations of dispositions. Place defines mentalism at the level of the person, which is also the level of behaviourism. This contrasts with a standard definition of mentalism at the subpersonal level, also known as centrism. Doing or behaving is interacting with the environment. This is common to the scientific approaches at the level of the person. Articulating the same conceptual foundation and language and each approach having its dialect must be possible. This is “relevan[t] for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science” (Reed, 2022).
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1978a)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1983d)]  [Citing Place (1984a)]  [Citing Place (1984c)]  [Citing Place (1985c)]  [Citing Place (1987a)]  [Citing Place (1991f)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1996j)]  [Citing Place (1996l)]  [Citing Place (1998c)]  [Citing Place (1998d)]  [Citing Place (1999)]  [Citing Place (1999a)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  [Citing Place (1999g)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  [Is reply to]  
Download: Place (2022) Understanding the Types of Language in Behavioural Science - Reply to Phil Reed on the Work of Ullin T Place.pdf