Armstrong, D. M. (2010). Sketch for a systematic metaphysics. Oxcford Universtity Press
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Chapter 16 Mind
* As a physicalist I originally thought, when young, that Gilbert Ryle’s Concept of Mind, read as a sophisticated behaviourism, might do the trick for the mind. I was always troubled, though, by the apparent denial of introspection. Ayer’s clever remark that a behaviourist must pretend to be anaesthetized struck home. I gave up on the Rylean view after hearing Jack Smart read his later famous paper ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’ on a visit to Melbourne where I was a lecturer at the time. Smart himself graduated from a Rylean position under the influence of U.T. Place who, in his pioneering 1956 paper ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’, had answered yes to this great question.