Demeter, T., Parent, T., & Toon, A. (2022). What is mental fictionalism? In T. Demeter, T. Parent, & A. Toon (Eds.), Mental fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations (pp. 1-24). Routledge.
[Abstract]This chapter introduces several versions of mental fictionalism, along with the main lines of objection and reply. It begins by considering the debate between eliminative materialism (“eliminativism”) versus realism about mental states as conceived in “folk psychology” (i.e., beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.). Mental fictionalism offers a way to transcend the debate by allowing talk of mental states without a commitment to realism. The idea is to treat folk psychology as a “story” and three different elaborations of this are reviewed. First, prefix semantics paraphrases a sentence like ‘Biden believes that Trump lost’ as ‘According to folk psychology, Biden believes that Trump lost’, whereby ontological commitment to belief is avoided. Similarly, pretense theory suggests that we do not assert ‘Biden believes that Trump lost’, but only pretend to assert it. Third, affective theory proposes that such discourse is used in a metaphorical way to understand a person’s affective and dispositional states vis-a-vis the community. The main objections concern whether folk psychology has the features of storytelling, and whether mental fictionalism ends up being self-refuting. The chapter also recaps a less discussed fictionalist view about “qualia” or phenomenal states, and closes by summarizing the papers contained in the volume.
Note:
The "no location" argument is wrongly attributed to Place (1956) and Smart (1959).
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section 1 Background: is your mind real?
* Eliminativists [eliminative materialists] are often understood as denying the existence of propositional attitudes, mental states where some “attitude” is directed toward a “proposition” or thought. Examples include the belief that tomorrow is Monday, the desire that tomorrow is Monday, the fear that tomorrow is Monday, etc. However, some eliminativists instead focus their attacks on qualia or phenomenological mental states, e.g. the qualitative “raw feel” of pain or the mental state of “what it’s like” to see red. For now, we shall leave aside the latter sort of eliminativism (but see Section 4). Until further notice, the reader should assume that eliminativism is the rejection of “mentality” only in the sense of thoughts and attitudes toward thoughts. Fn 2: Even here, eliminativism comes in many varieties (a fact which sometimes goes unrecognized). This is because eliminativists have different reasons for rejecting propositional attitudes, and the different reasons shape what the resulting eliminative view looks like. See Wallace (2016) for further elaboration.
Take heed that eliminativism differs from reductionist views of the mind such as behaviorism, identity theory, and functionalism. Unlike behaviorism, eliminativism does not claim that (talk of) belief is reducible to (talk of ) behavior and behavioral dispositions (cf. Skinner 1938 and (on some readings) Ryle 1949). Nor does eliminativism say that a belief is reducible to a state of your brain, specified neurologically (identity theory) or by its causes and effects (functionalism). (See Place 1956 and Smart 1959 on identity theory; see Putnam 1960, Fodor 1968, Ch. 3, and Lycan 1984 on functionalism.) Such reductionisms still imply that folk psychological states exist, albeit in a reduced form. But eliminativism holds that these states do not exist. (Some philosophers have wondered whether there is ultimately a difference between reducing versus eliminating. Standardly, however, eliminativism at least alleges such a difference.)
Section 4. Fictionalism about qualia
* ... some stock examples of qualia: The peculiar salty taste of Vegemite, that specific shade of red experienced when looking at a stoplight, the distinctive smell of fresh-baked blueberry pie, etc.
Such qualitative properties of experience have been quite difficult to account for as part of the natural, scientific order of things. A vivid illustration of this is the "no location" argument from U.T. Place (1956) and Jack Smart (1959) ... The "no location" argument starts by supposing that you are now experiencing a green after image, perhaps as a result of flash photography. Then, one might be inclined to adopt the following premises:
    (1) There is a green thing.
    (2) The green thing is not located outside the skull.
The second premise seems correct, given that the green patch is a mere after image, not something extended in the external world. However, it also seems true that:
    (3) The green thing is not inside the skull.
After all, if surgeons were to open up your skull, they would not find anything green in there. It is now also plausible to add that:
    (4) If both (2) and (3) are true, then the green thing is not in physical space.
    (5) If the green thing is physical, it is in physical space.
But from (1) to (5), it follows that:
    (6) There is a nonphysical green thing.
Thus, the green quale in this case (the green after image) seems to be outside the physical order, which would mean that some kind of mind-body dualism would be true.
Fictionalism about qualia thus would be seem to deserve serious consideration here, and in fact it is underexplored in the existing literature. (The lead paper in Frankish 2017 is an important exception.)