Friend, T. (2021). Megarian Variable Actualism. Synthese, 199, 10521–10541. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03257-7
[Abstract]Megarian Actualism is the denial of unmanifesting powers. Aristotle called such a view ‘buffoonery’ and dispositionalists have provided compelling reasons for the contrary platitude that powers need not manifest. Even so, drawing on extant treatments of quantitative powers I’ll suggest that many of the powers which feature in quantitative lawlike equations are plausibly interpreted as Megarian. This is because the powers described by such equations are best understood as being directed towards all the values of exhaustive manifestation variables. I’ll discuss the prospects for generalising these Megarian characteristics to powers not typically represented in strict quantitative terms. The result will be a strong basis for a scientifically informed and plausible dispositionalist account: Megarian Variable Actualism.
[Citing Place (1999b)]  
Citing Place (1999b) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section: 1 Introduction
* Dispositionalism is the view that there exist ‘powers’, properties which essentially confer dispositions on their bearers. Powers confer dispositions by virtue of being ‘directed’ (Martin 2008; Molnar 2003; Tugby 2013), ‘for’ (Martin and Pfeifer 1986), ‘pointing beyond’ (Heil 2003), ‘oriented towards’ (Tugby 2013), ‘pointing’ to (Handfield 2010) or simply being ‘related with’ (Place 1999) some outcome.