Heil, J. (2003). Mental Causation. In S. P. Stich and T. A. Warfield (Eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 9, pp. 214-234). doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch9
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section 9.6 Qualia
* Imagine that you are gazing at cherry trees in bloom around the Jefferson Memorial. You have a vivid visual experience you would find difficult to put into words. Imagine now that a scientist who believes that experiences are goings-on in the brain carefully inspects your brain while you are undergoing this experience. The scientist observes a dull gray mass. On closer inspection (and with the aid of expensive instruments), the scientist observes fine-grained neural activity: cells firing, chemical reactions along axons, and the like. These activities might correspond to your experience. Your experience has a definite qualitative character, but the scientist’s observation reveals nothing of this, only boring neurological qualities. Where are these qualities of your experience, if not in your brain? Perhaps they lie outside the physical world.
This line of reasoning betrays a confusion over qualities of experience. Note 13 The confusion is discussed by Smart (1959) and by Place (1956), who dubs it “the phenomenological fallacy.” [...] Your experience is of pink blossoms, white marble, and shimmering water. Pinkness, whiteness, and the shimmering character you perceive are qualities of the objects you perceive, not qualities of your experience. When you perceive a ball, the ball, but not your experience, is spherical. If you were to think, then, that on looking into your brain and observing your experiences a scientist ought to observe pink, white, shimmering, or spherical items, you would be in error. If neurological goings-on in your brain are your experiences, those goings-on need not have qualities ascribable to the objects you are experiencing. The scientist looking into your brain experiences occurrences of your experiences, let us suppose. But the scientist’s experiences need not resemble yours; your experiences are of cherry trees, the scientist’s experiences are of something quite different: your experiences of cherry trees.