Levin, J. (2022). The metaphysics of mind. Cambridge University Press.
[Abstract]This book presents and discusses the major contemporary theories of the nature of mind, including Dualism, Physicalism, Role Functionalism, Russellian Monism, Panpsychism, and Eliminativism. Its primary goal is to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the theories in question, including their prospects for explaining the special qualitative character of sensations and perceptual experiences; the special outer-directedness of beliefs, desires, and other intentional states; and – more generally – the place of the mind in the world of nature, and the relation between mental states and the behaviors that they (seem to) cause. It also discusses, briefly, some further questions about the metaphysics of mind, namely, whether groups of individuals, or entire communities, can possess mental states that cannot be reduced to the mental states of the individuals in those communities and whether the boundaries between mind and world are as sharp as they may seem.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Chapter 3 The Type Identity Theory
* This section [chapter] focuses on the (contemporary) Type Identity Theory, first articulated by Place (1956/2002), Feigl (1958/2002), and Smart (1959/2002), namely, that for each type of mental state or process M, there is a type of brain state or process B such that M is identical with B (e.g. pain is the stimulation of C-fibers). Footnote 13 Granted, the neural correlate of pain is more complicated than C-fiber stimulation, but “C-fiber stimulation” has become a stand-in in the philosophical literature for whatever the relevant state turns out to be. Since these claims are property identities, they entail that every instance of an M is a B, and vice versa. This view is more demanding than the (so-called) Token Identity Theory, which requires only that every token (instance) of a mental state be identical with a token of some physical state or other. However, if mental types cannot be identified with physical types, then Token Identity theorists who are Physicalists must hold either that there is another property shared by all mental states of a certain type that is not irreducibly mental – or that there are no mental types at all. The first alternative is endorsed by Nonreductive Physicalists; the second by Eliminativists. Both will be discussed in subsequent sections [chapters].
Early Type Identity theorists such as Place, Feigl, and Smart were particularly concerned to show that sensations and perceptual experiences, states with qualitative character or “feel,” could be identical with types of brain processes, and this will also be the focus here. They recognized that the science of the time was far from establishing even a correlation between individuals’ introspective reports of what they are feeling or thinking at some time and third-person reports (via instruments such as brain scans) of what is going on in their brains and bodies. Their goal was to show, against intuitions (and arguments) to the contrary, that mental state–brain state identities are possible and that there are no logical or conceptual reasons to think that they could not be true. If these identities are possible and if there are in fact correlations between subjects’ introspective reports and the results of simultaneous brain scans, then Type Identity theorists could argue that the simplest and most economical explanation of these correlations – and the one that avoids the other difficulties of Dualism – is that they are reporting on the same things.