Li, R. (2026). In defense of biological naturalism. Mentis, 1, 3-17.
[Abstract]Philosophers have long grappled with the mind-body problem, seeking to elucidate the relationship between the mind and the brain. Traditionally, this discourse bifurcates into dualism, which views the mind and brain as distinct entities, and physicalism, which asserts their identity. Biological naturalism emerges as a hybrid theory, proposing a novel synthesis of dualist and physicalist elements to address this quandary. Detractors of biological naturalism often base their critiques on misconceptions, failing to grasp its distinctiveness. Unlike its predecessors, biological naturalism resists reduction to the established categories of dualism or physicalism. Misunderstandings of this theory frequently stem from the imprecise language prevalent in discussions of the mind-body problem. Biological naturalism posits that the mind possesses a unique, first-person ontology, aligning it more closely with social phenomena than with the traditionally objective realm of natural science. Consequently, biological naturalism provides a compelling resolution to the enduring mind-body problem.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL COUNTERARGUMENTS
* Critics might argue that my explanation implies the mind is both a mental and a physical property simultaneously, which seems ontologically paradoxical. ... [Consciousness] is physically grounded in the brain’s neurobiological processes, yet it possesses subjective qualities that are irreducible to purely physical descriptions.
To further address this, we can consider U.T. Place’s argument in “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” Place distinguishes between the ‘is’ of definition and the ‘is’ of composition. The ‘is’ of definition applies to statements that are necessarily true by virtue of their meanings, such as “a triangle is a three-sided polygon,” where the subject and predicate are inherently linked by their definitions. In contrast, the ‘is’ of composition applies to contingent statements that are verified through observation, such as “her bookshelf is an old crate,” where the subject and predicate describe the same object from different perspectives without implying a definitional link. Place (1956) posits that describing consciousness as a brain process falls under the ‘is’ of composition rather than the ‘is’ of definition. This distinction implies that while statements about consciousness and brain processes may appear logically independent, they can still refer to the same phenomenon from different perspectives. Just as one can describe an object as both a bookshelf and an old crate without contradiction, one can describe consciousness as both a subjective experience and a brain process. Critics who argue that consciousness cannot be a brain process often base their claim on the mistaken assumption that if the meanings of two statements are unconnected, they cannot both adequately characterize the same object or state of affairs. For instance, they might argue that if something is a state of consciousness, it cannot be a brain process, just as there is nothing self-contradictory in supposing that someone experiences pain when there is nothing happening in their brain. By the same flawed reasoning, one could erroneously conclude that a person could have a bookshelf and an old crate separately, suggesting they cannot be the same object. This line of reasoning is incorrect because it overlooks the ‘is’ of composition.