Lycan, W. G. (1981). Form, function, and feel. The Journal of Philosophy, 78, 24-50.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
* In the 1950's. U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart proposed to identify mental states and events with neurophysiological states and events. A main advantage claimed for this identification was its avoidance of certain troublesome objections to earlier, behaviorist versions of materialism, objections designed to enforce our recalcitrant feeling that at least some mental states are genuinely inner states of persons and have distinctive, introspectible phenomenal characters.
Section I. THE IDENTITY THEORY AND MACHINE FUNCTIONALISM
* In defiance of the behaviorists, it was insisted that there is an "intractable residue" (Place 1956) of conscious mental states which bear only slack and indefinitely defeasible relations to overt behavior of any sort.