Page, B. (2025), Non-Reductive Approaches to the Metaphysics of Powers: An Introduction. Philosophy Compass, 20e70049.
[Abstract]Non‐reductive theories of powers/dispositions/capacities/potencies/potentialities are of much interest within contemporary metaphysics. There have been many discussions that attempt to explicate their nature as well as numerous others which suggest their application. Here, I focus on providing an introduction to the former, the metaphysics of non‐reductive powers, whilst briefly commenting on the latter, their applications. Therefore, the paper will offer a map of the debates and positions taken within present discussion.
[Citing Place (1999b)]  
Citing Place (1999b) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section 8 Are Powers Relational?
* Some take it that powers are relational entities, where a relation exists between a power and its manifestation (Bird 2007; Tugby 2013). However, there are others who think that the positing of a relation is unnecessary (Oderberg 2017, 2389–2404; Heil 2003, 80; Marmodoro 2017a, 65–67). One reason for positing a relation is that powers, contra Mumford (1999), 217), seem ‘in some sense’ inherently directed towards their manifestation (Place 1999, 227) and that we should think this directedness is relational. Thus, suppose you have x and y and a one‐way relation holding between x and y, we would then say x is directed towards y, where the directedness is explained in virtue of the relation. However, those who wish to resist the relational account of powers attempt to explain this aspect of powers in terms of nonrelational features, since they are concerned that thinking of directedness as relational opens the way up to various regresses.
Section 9 How Do We Explain the Directionality of Powers?
* Although this question no doubt can be related to the former, it does seem as though it is often taken to be independent, with this being evident from the fact that some disagree as to whether powers are relational, but not about what explains their directionality. Two options for answering this question have been the most popular. First is the physical or natural intentionality position (Molnar 2003, 60–81; Borghini 2009; Heil 2003, 221–222; Place 1999; W. A. Bauer 2023). This view holds that ‘the most typical characterization of intentionality … all fail to distinguish intentional mental states from non‐intentional dispositional physical states’ (Martin and Pfeifer 1986, 531). As a result, it is claimed that we can explain the directedness of powers in terms of intentionality. However, those who object to this view argue that there is not enough of a parallel to make this claim (Bird 2007, 114–126; Oderberg 2017; Barker 2013, 649). Although there has been some response to this (W. A. Bauer 2016), others have opted for a different way of thinking about the directionality of a power. On this, the second view, directionality is explained in terms of a very weak type of teleology (Kroll 2017; Feser 2014, 88–105; Oderberg 2017; Koons and Pruss 2017; Tugby 2024; Paoletti 2021), where the basic idea is that to be directed is to have an inherent end point. Some might also think that this view can encompass the intentional account of directedness, since teleology is sometimes thought of as prior to intentionality and employed in giving an account of it (Koons 2000; Okrent 2007). Further, as teleology is usually linked with normativity (M. Bauer 2009, 239–241), some have suggested that powers can provide us with an account of what it means to be normative, ‘An Aristotelian can give a straightforward account of normativity: a substance is supposed to produce E on occasions of C if and only if its nature includes a C–E power (one might also prefer more active terms like ‘tendency’ or ‘striving’)’ (Koons and Pruss 2017, 198; Koons 2017, 6–7). However, there have also been objections raised against this view, with some suggesting they can get more of a handle on what we mean by directionality than what we mean by teleology (Manley and Wasserman 2017, 48). If that is right then perhaps, there is no explanation for the directionality of powers; it is just a primitive aspect of them.