Pereboom, D. (2011). Consciousness and the prospects of physicalism. Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]This book explores how physicalism might best defended and formulated. Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out. The first draws on the open possibility that introspective representations fail to represent mental states as they are in themselves. More specifically, introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, and it may be that these properties really lack such features. The seriousness of this open possibility is enhanced by an analogy with our perceptual representations of secondary qualities. Our vision represents colors as having certain qualitative natures, and it is an open possibility, widely regarded as actual, that colors actually lack them. If it’s possible that representing phenomenal properties introspectively attributes to them qualitative natures that they actually lack, then the force of the anti-physicalism arguments might well be blunted. The second response exploits the possibility that our ignorance of things in themselves consists in part in our lack of knowledge of the fundamental intrinsic properties of things. This idea has been developed by Bertrand Russell and more recently by David Chalmers into a framework for a unified account of the mental and the physical. Currently unknown or incompletely understood fundamental intrinsic properties provide the categorical bases for the known physical dispositional properties, and would also yield an account of consciousness. While there are non-physicalist versions of this position, some are amenable to physicalism. The book’s third theme is a defense of a nonreductive account of physicalism. The version of the nonreductive view endorsed departs from others in that it rejects the token identity of psychological and microphysical entities of any sort. The deepest relation between the psychological and the microphysical is constitution, where this relation is not to be explicated by the notion of identity.
[Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Chapter 8 MENTAL COMPOSITIONAL PROPERTIES
* In this chapter, I set out a model of the mental that is not functional in the standard sense, that is, a model in which the essences of types of mental properties do not consist in their causal relations to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and other mental states. Instead, mental properties — and this includes phenomenal properties — are identical to broadly physical compositional properties, properties things have solely by virtue of intrinsic features of their parts, either proper or improper, and relations these parts have to one another. This model would secure the causal efficacy of the mental qua mental in a way that the standard sort of functionalism cannot. It would preserve nonreductivism, since multiple realizability arguments indicate that mental compositional properties would not be essentially neural or microphysical. At the same time, given the identities that it affirms, in a signifi cant respect the position espoused amounts to a compromise with the type-type reductionist views of U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart. Footnote 1: [Place (1956)]; [Smart (1959)] I close by considering several objections that have been raised against nonreductive views generally, arguing that in each case the model yields an adequate response.