Polger, T. W. (2009). Identity theories. Philosophy Compass, 4, 1–13. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00227.x
[Abstract]Identity theories are those that hold that ‘sensations are brain processes’. In particular, they hold that mental ⁄ psychological state kinds are identical to brain ⁄ neuroscientific state kinds. In this paper, I isolate and explain some of the key features of contemporary identity theories. They are then contrasted with the main live alternatives by means of considering the two most important lines of objection to identity theories.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section 1. The Mind–Brain Type Identity Theory
* [T]he contemporary identity theory has its origins in the works of Place (1956, 1960), Herbert Feigl (1958), and Smart (1959).
* The identity theory is usually advanced first and foremost as a theory of sensations, or conscious mental states more generally (Place 1956; Smart 1959). It appears to apply most naturally to those mental states that, like sensations or ‘raw feels’, are plausibly taken to locally supervene on the systems that have them, rather than those like belief whose individuation might depend on relations to actual or possible things in the world. Put in the usual terms: the identity theory is most plausible as an account of ‘narrow’ rather than ‘wide’ mental states (Wickforss 2007). That being said, the identity theorist may hold the view that all genuine mental states are narrow or have a narrow component. In that case, the identity theory will cover more than just a subset of mental state kinds.
* Current advocates of the identity theory take the identity claim quite seriously. Like their ancestors, Place and Smart, current identity theorists model the mind–brain identity claim on other scientific identity claims, such as ‘water is H₂O’ or ‘lightning is an electrical discharge’. Like Place and Smart, they take such scientific identities to be empirically discovered or theorized a posteriori, not analytic or a priori knowable. But whereas Place and Smart held that mind and brain were contingently identical, many philosophers have accepted Kripke’s (1972) claim that a posteriori identity statements may nonetheless be necessary. Most current identity theorists make use of this innovation, and suppose that the mind–brain identities are both necessary and only a posteriori knowable. Thus, the view is sometimes called ‘a posteriori physicalism,’ which is in fact an elliptical formulation of ‘a posteriori necessary physicalism.’
* [T]he identity theorists’ discussion of ‘brain states’ is just a placeholder for whatever the eventual working parts of brains – in fact, of nervous systems, perhaps embodied nervous systems – turn out to be.9 This is why Place’s (1956) example of C-fiber firing has survived, despite being empirically inadequate.
Section 3. Arguments in Favor of the Identity Theory
* The simplicity argument was used by Smart, in his landmark paper (1959). He rejected Place’s claim that the identity theory is an empirical hypothesis, suggesting instead that it is the principle of parsimony that supports the identity theory over rivals that claim that the mind and brain are correlated but not identical.
Citing Place (1960) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
see citation of Place (1956)