Searle, J. R. (1992). The Rediscovery of Mind. M.I.T. Press.
[Abstract]The first chapters contain criticisms of the dominant views in the philosophy of mind. They are an attempt to overcome both dualism and materialism, with more attention devoted to materialism. The next five chapters, 4 to 8, are a series of attempts to give a characterization of consciousness. How do we locate consciousness in relation to the rest of the world (chapter 4)? How do we account for its apparent irreducibility according to the standard patterns of scientific reduction (chapter 5)? What are the structural features of consciousness (chapter 6)? How do we account for the unconsciousness and its relations to consciousness (chapter 7)? What are the  relations between consciousness, intentionality, and the background capacities that enable us to function as beings in the world (chapter 8)? Chapter 9 extends Searle's earlier (Searle, 1980, 'Minds, Brains, and Computers') criticism of the dominant paradigm in cognitive science, and the final chapter 10 makes some suggestions as to how study the mind without making so many obvious mistakes.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Chapter 2 The Recent History of Materialism: The Same Mistake Over and Over
Section I. The Mystery of Materialism
* If one reads the early works of our contemporaries who describe themselves as materialist - J. J. C. Smart ([1959]), U. T. Place (1956), and D. Armstrong (1968), for example - it seems clear that when they assert the identity of the mental with the physical, they are claiming something more than simply the denial of Cartesian substance dualism. It seems to me they wish to deny the existence of any irreducible mental phenomena in the world. They want to deny that there are any irreducible phenomenological properties, such as consciousness, or qualia. Now why are they so anxious to deny the existence of irreducible mental phenomena? Why don't they just concede that these properties are ordinary higher-level biological properties of neurophysiological systems such as human brains?
I think the answer to that is extremely complex, but at least part of the answer has to do with the fact that they accept the traditional Cartesian categories, and along with the categories the attendant vocabulary with its implications. I think from this point of view to grant the existence and the irreducibility of mental phenomena would be equivalent to granting some kind of Cartesianism. In their terms, it might be a "property dualism" rather than a "substance dualism". By now it will be obvious that I am opposed to the assumptions of their view. What I want to insist on, ceaselessly, is that one can accept the obvious facts of physics [...] without at the same time denying the obvious facts about our own experiences - for example, that we are all conscious and that our conscious states have quite specific irreducible phenomenological properties. My view is emphatically not a form of dualism. ... [P]recisely for the reasons that I reject dualism, I reject materialism and monism as well. The deep mistake is that one must choose between these views.
Section III. Type Identity Theories
* Logical behaviorism was supposed to be an analytic truth. It asserted a definitional connection between mental and behavioral concepts. In the recent history of materialist philosophies of mind it was replaced by the "identity theory," which claimed that as a matter of fact, mental states were identical with states in the brain and of the central nervous system (Place 1956; Smart [1959]). According to the identity theorists, there was no logical absurdity in supposing that there might be separate mental phenomena, independent of material reality; it just turned out as a matter of fact that our mental states, such as pains, were identical with states of our nervous system.
Citing Place (1988a) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Chapter 1 What's Wrong with the Philosophy of Mind
Section IV. Historical Origins of the Foundations
* [W]ith the Cartesian tradition we have inherited a vocabulary ... [that] is not innocent, because implicit in the vocabulary are a surprising number of theoretical claims that are almost certainly false. The vocabulary includes a series of apparent oppositions: "physical" versus "mental," "body" versus "mind," "materialism" versus "mentalism," "matter" versus "spirit." Implicit in these oppositions is the thesis that the same phenomenon under the same aspects cannot literally satisfy both terms. [...] Thus we are supposed to believe that if something is mental, it cannot be physical [etc.] But these views seem to me obviously false, given everything we know about neurobiology. The brain causes certain "mental" phenomena, such as conscious mental states, and these states are simply higher-level features of the brain. Consciousness is a higher-level or emergent property of the brain in the utterly harmless sense of "higher-level" or "emergent" in which solidity is a higher-level emergent property of H₂O molecules when they are in a lattice structure (ice), and liquidity is similarly a higher-level emergent property of H₂O molecules when they are, roughly speaking, rolling around on each other (water). Consciousness is a mental, and therefore physical, property of the brain in the sense in which liquidity is a property of systems of molecules. If there is one thesis I would like to get across in this discussion, it is simply this: The fact that a feature is mental does not imply that it is not physical; the fact that a feature is mental does not imply that it is not physical ...
* Along with the apparent oppositions are names that apparently exhaust the possible positions one can occupy: there is monism versus dualism, materialism and physicalism versus mentalism and idealism. The eagerness to stick with the traditional categories produces some odd terminology, such as "property dualism," "anomalous monism," "token identity," etc. My own views do not fit any of the traditional labels, but to many philosophers the idea that one might hold a view that does not fit these categories seems incomprehensible. Note 11: Oddly enough my views have been confidently characterized by some commentators as "materialist," by some others with equal confidence, as "dualist." Thus, for example, U. T. Place writes, Searle "presents the materialist position" (1988, p. 208), while Stephen P. Stich writes "Searle is a property dualist" (1987, p. 133).
Chapter 4 Consciousness and Its Place in Nature
Section I. Consciousness and the "Scientific" World View
* Basic to our world view is the idea that human beings and other higher animals are part of the biological order like any other organisms. Humans are continuous with the rest of nature. But if so, the biologically specific characteristics of these animals - such as their possession of a rich system of consciousness, as well as their greater intelligence, their capacity for language, their capacity for rational thought, etc. - are biological phenomena. Furthermore, these features are all phenotypes. They are as much the result of biological evolution as any other phenotype. Consciousness, in short, is a biological feature of human and certain animal brains. It is caused by neurobiological processes and is as much a part of the natural biological order as any other biological features such as photosynthesis, digestion, or mitosis. This principle is the first stage in understanding the place of consciousness within our world view. Note 4: Sometimes people resist my views because of a mistaken conception of the relations between causation and identity. U. T. Place (1988), for example, writes "According to Searle mental states are both identical with and causally dependent on the corresponding states of the brain. I say you can't have your cake and eat it. Either mental states are identical with brain states or one is causally dependent on the other. They can't be both." (p. 209).
Place is thinking of cases such as "These footprints can be causally dependent on the shoes of the burglar, but they can't also be identical with those shoes." But how about: "The liquid of this water can be causally dependent on the behavior of the molecules, and can also be a feature of the system made up of the molecules"? It seems to me just obvious that my present state of consciousness is caused by neuronal behaviour in my brain and that very state just is a higher level feature of the brain. If that amounts to having your cake and eating it too, let's eat. The thesis of this chapter so far has been that once you see that atomic and evolutionary theories are central to the contemporary scientific world view, then consciousness falls into place naturally as an evolved phenotypical trait of certain types of organisms with highly developed nervous systems.