Smart, J. J. C. (2014). Australasian Analytic Philosophy (1950s). In G. Oppy & N. N. Trakakis (Eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Second Edition, pp. 40-42; first edition 2010). Monash University Publishing.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  
Citing Place (1954) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
see citation of Place (1956)
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
* [I]n August 1950, Smart had arrived at the University of Adelaide. What passed as ‘psychology’ was still thought to be the basis of philosophy and was taught in the philosophy department in its first year course. Smart soon changed that and very importantly succeeded in having U. T. Place hired as a lecturer. With Smart’s encouragement, Place became de facto independent and soon set up an experimental laboratory and acquired an excellent colleague, Syd Lovibond, who later became professor at the University of New South Wales. Place always thought of himself as a psychologist, but in fact became much more widely known as a philosopher. Unfortunately he did not stay long, returning to England for private reasons, one of which was an amateur interest in Roman British archaeology.
Psychology soon became a de jure and not merely a de facto independent department, and also very much bigger than the philosophy one. It was in Adelaide that U. T. Place wrote his seminal paper, ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’ (1956), and an earlier one, ‘The Concept of Heed’ (1954). These converted Smart from his Rylean dispositional account of the mind, and after all a Rylean disposition surely requires a categorical basis. Place did not give up the Rylean account for such things as beliefs and desires, but it soon became evident (as was suggested by D. M. Armstrong) that these could be contingently identified with brain states.