Tugby, M. (2024). The property of goal-directedness: Lessons from the dispositions debate. Ratio, 00, 1–14. doi:10.1111/rati.12417
[Abstract]The system-property or ‘cybernetic’ theory of goals and goal-directedness became popular in the twentieth century. It is a theory that has reductionist and behaviourist roots. There are reasons to think that the system-property theory needs to be formulated in terms of counterfactuals. However, it proves to be difficult to formulate a counterfactual analysis of goal-directedness that is counterexample-free, non-circular, and non-trivial. These difficulties closely mirror those facing reductionists about dispositions, though the parallels  between the two debates have been overlooked in the literature. After outlining those parallels, the paper considers what goal theorists might learn from the dispositions debate. In particular, the paper discusses the need for a realist, non-reductionist account of goal-directedness, and explores the idea that properties of goal-directedness are themselves dispositions or ‘powers’ of a certain sort.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  
Citing Place (1996g) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section 5 A realist turn
* There are different ways in which the essential directedness of powers could be understood, and therefore different ways of spelling out the metaphysical nature of goal-directed powers. I will mention just three of the prominent variants here. Firstly, one of the early accounts in the contemporary powers movement is based on the idea that powers have all the hallmarks of intentionality (e.g., Bauer, 2022; Martin & Pfeifer, 1986; Molnar, 2003; Place, 1996). In the same way that intentional thoughts can be directed towards intentional objects that do not exist, so too powers can be directed towards manifestations that are never produced. Intentionality theorists take this analogy metaphysically seriously and regard physical powers as states of physical intentionality. In the case of goal-directed powers, the relevant goal would be determined by a state of physical intentionality that the directively organised system instantiates.