Valentine, E. R. (1996). Folk psychology and its implications for cognitive science: Discussion. In W. O'Donohue, & R. Kitchener (Eds.) The Philosophy of Psychology (Chapter 17, pp. 275-278). Sage. doi:10.4135/9781446279168.n17
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1996l)]  
Citing Place (1954) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY
* Conceptual analysis may provide important insights, as in the analysis of mental activity verbs, e.g., Ryle's 'heed' concepts (Place, 1954); intensional statements such as those containing the words 'imagination' of 'see'; and the subtle language of emotion and feeling (Place [1996] p. 267).
Citing Place (1996l) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Section WHAT IS FOLK PSYCHOLOGY?
* ... Place [1996] p. 269, claims that phenomenological descriptions of private experiences do not provide either the data or concepts on the basis of which folk psychological explanations of behavior are constructed ...
Section STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY
* Conceptual analysis may provide important insights, as in the analysis of mental activity verbs, e.g., Ryle's 'heed' concepts (Place, 1954); intensional statements such as those containing the words 'imagination' of 'see'; and the subtle language of emotion and feeling (Place [1996] p. 267).
* ... folk psychology can be misleading. Place ([1996] pp. 267-269) carefully details six respects in which this may be so.
* ... we should be considering the sort of language(s) that scientific psychology requires. ... {Suggestions] might be inferred ... with the dangers exposed by Place ([1996] pp. 267-269). For example, the warning about reification ("nominalization") suggests that the focus should be on processes rather than entities (tough capacities and competences might be allowed).
Section RELATION OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY TO SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY
* Both folk psychology and scientific psychology primarily aim to give an account of other's behavior (a point that Place ([1996] p. 269) reminds us was originally made by Ryle, 1949), though by extension it applies also to one's own.
* Folk psychological statements are subjective ('egocentric'). value-laden (Place [1996] p.268), and vague (Fodor's "granny psychology"); whereas those of scientific psychology purport to be objective, value-free, and precise. I suspect that, contra Place ([1996] p. 264), folk psychology is subject to both individual and cultural differences ...