Wright, E. (1992). The entity fallacy in epistemology. Philosophy, 67(259), 33-50. doi:10.1017/S0031819100039814
[Citing Place (1989b)]  
Citing Place (1989b) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Note 13: If a Connectionist account of neural architecture can be linked to the pleasure-pain/desire-fear system as providing a guide to success or failure, then it looks much more hopeful a theory than the serial-digital one. Most interesting is Ullin T. Place's recent advocacy of the Connectionist position, for in one part of his argument he champions PDF for being able to track the ‘continuous slow modification’ [my italics] of objects ‘as a result of the shaping of linguistic usage by the experience of success and failure in establishing reference’ (p. 81), which would dovetail well with the position being maintained here, but then later he cannot resist speaking of ‘the’ referent being either ‘an individual’ or ‘a natural kind’ (p. 86) (Place, Ullin T., ‘Towards a Connectionist Version of the Causal Theory of Reference’, Acta Analytica, 5 (1989), 71–97).