Ayer, A. J. (1959). Privacy. British Academy Lecture.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Boring, E. G. (1950). A history of experimental psychology (2nd edition; first edition: 1929). Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Farrell, B. A. (1950). Experience. Mind, LIX, 170-198
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Feyerabend, P. K. (1963). Materialism and the mind-body problem. The Review of Metaphysics, XVII, 49-66.
[Abstract]This paper has a twofold purpose. First, it defends materialism against a certain type of attack which seems to be based upon a truism but which is nevertheless completely off the mark. And secondly it intends to put philosophy in its proper place.
[6 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Kenny, A. (1963). Action, emotion and will Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Malcolm, N. (1959). Dreaming. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Martin, C. B. (1954). Low Claim Assertions [Unpublished M.S. copy].
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Mourik-van den Bergh, E. van, & T. W. Place (1972). Wat is dromen Psychologisch Laboratorium, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1954). The concept of heed. British Journal of Psychology, 45, 243-55. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1954.tb01252.x
[References]  [22 citing publications]  [29 referring publications by Place]  [2 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1954 The Concept of Heed.pdf  1954 1999 The Concept of Heed - revised version.pdf (with a new introduction; not published)

Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
[Abstract]The thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain is put forward as a reasonable scientific hypothesis, not to be dismissed on logical grounds alone. The conditions under which two sets of observations are treated as observations of the same process, rather than as observations of two independent correlated processes, are discussed. It is suggested that we can identify consciousness with a given pattern of brain activity, if we can explain the subject's introspective observations by reference to the brain processes with which they are correlated. It is argued that the problem of providing a physiological explanation of introspective observations is made to seem more difficult than it really is by the `phenomenological fallacy', the mistaken idea that descriptions of the appearances of things are descriptions of the actual state of affairs in a mysterious internal environment.
Keywords: consciousness, mind-brain identity theory, phenomenological fallacy
Note:
The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g). Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References]  [310 citing publications]  [57 referring publications by Place]  [15 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf  1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf

Place, U. T. (1971a). The infallibility of our knowledge of our own beliefs. Analysis, 31, 197-204. doi:10.1093/analys/31.6.197
[References]  [7 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1971a The Infallibility of Our Knowledge about Our Own Beliefs.pdf

Place, U. T. (1971b). Understanding the language of sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49, 158-166
[References]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1971b Understanding the Language of Sensations.pdf

Place, U. T. (1972a). Sensations and processes - a reply to Munsat. Mind, LXXXI, 106-112. www.jstor.org/stable/2252189
[References]  [Is reply to]  [1 citing publications]  [9 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1972a Sensations and Processes - A Reply to Munsat.pdf

Putnam, H. (1962). Dreaming and 'depth grammar.' In R.J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy (First Series, pp. 211-235), Blackwell.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1953). On mental entities. Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 80(3), 198-203.
[1 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Russell, B. (1914). The relation of sense-data to physics. Scientia, 16, 1-27. No.4 reprinted in Mysticism and Logic, Longmans and Green, 1917, Chap.VIII.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson.
[83 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review, LXVIII, 141-156.
Note:
A revised version with new references appeared in V. C. Chappell (Ed.) (1962), The philosophy of mind. Prentice-Hall. Later reprints are of this version.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [24 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  [7 reprinting collections]  

Titchener, E.B. (1909). Lectures on the experimental psychology of the thought processes Macmillan.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations (English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe). Basil Blackwell.
[55 referring publications by Place]