References of Place (1989a). Low claim assertions.
Armstrong, D. M. (1968). A materialist theory of the mind. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[Citing Place (1956)] [24 referring publications by Place] [Reviews]
Austin, J. L. (1962a). Sense and sensibilia (Reconstructed by G. J. Warnock). Oxford University Press.
[15 referring publications by Place]
Braithwaite, R. B. (1932). The nature of believing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 33, 129-146.
[2 referring publications by Place]
Descartes, R. (1641/1954). Meditations on First Philosophy, 2nd Edition. In G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach (Trs. & Eds.), Descartes: Philosophical Writings. Nelson.
[7 referring publications by Place]
Feyerabend, P. K. (1963). Materialism and the mind-body problem. The Review of Metaphysics, XVII, 49-66.
[Abstract]This paper has a twofold purpose. First, it defends materialism against a certain type of attack which seems to be based upon a truism but which is nevertheless completely off the mark. And secondly it intends to put philosophy in its proper place.
[6 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Geach, P. T. (1957) Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[30 referring publications by Place]
Martin, C. B. (1954). Low Claim Assertions [Unpublished M.S. copy].
[3 referring publications by Place]
Martin, C. B. (1984). Anti-realism and the world's undoing. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 65, 3-20.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Place, U. T. (1954). The concept of heed. British Journal of Psychology, 45, 243-55. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1954.tb01252.x
[References] [22 citing publications] [29 referring publications by Place] [2 reprinting collections]
Download: 1954 The Concept of Heed.pdf 1954 1999 The Concept of Heed - revised version.pdf (with a new introduction; not published)
Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
[Abstract]The thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain is put forward as a reasonable scientific hypothesis, not to be dismissed on logical grounds alone. The conditions under which two sets of observations are treated as observations of the same process, rather than as observations of two independent correlated processes, are discussed. It is suggested that we can identify consciousness with a given pattern of brain activity, if we can explain the subject's introspective observations by reference to the brain processes with which they are correlated. It is argued that the problem of providing a physiological explanation of introspective observations is made to seem more difficult than it really is by the `phenomenological fallacy', the mistaken idea that descriptions of the appearances of things are descriptions of the actual state of affairs in a mysterious internal environment.
Keywords: consciousness, mind-brain identity theory, phenomenological fallacy
Note:
The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g).
Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References] [310 citing publications] [57 referring publications by Place] [15 reprinting collections]
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf 1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf
Place, U. T. (1969a). Burt on brain and consciousness. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 22, 285-292.
Keywords: consciousness, introspection
[References] [Is reply to] [1 citing publications] [6 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1969a Burt on Brain and Consciousness.pdf
Place, U. T. (1971a). The infallibility of our knowledge of our own beliefs. Analysis, 31, 197-204. doi:10.1093/analys/31.6.197
[References] [7 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Download: 1971a The Infallibility of Our Knowledge about Our Own Beliefs.pdf
Place, U. T. (1977a). Twenty years on - "Is consciousness still a brain process?" Open Mind, 6,3-10.
[References] [1 citing publications] [3 referring publications by Place]
Download: 1977a Twenty Years On - Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process.pdf
Putnam, H. (1960). Minds and machines. In S. Hook (Ed.), Dimensions of mind. Collier Books.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Putnam, H. (1962). Dreaming and 'depth grammar.' In R.J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy (First Series, pp. 211-235), Blackwell.
[3 referring publications by Place]
Rorty, R. (1965). Mind-brain identity, privacy, and categories. The Review of Metaphysics, xix, 24-54.
[5 referring publications by Place] [1 reprinting collections]
Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review, LXVIII, 141-156.
Note:
A revised version with new references appeared in V. C. Chappell (Ed.) (1962), The philosophy of mind. Prentice-Hall. Later reprints are of this version.
[Citing Place (1956) in context] [Citing Place (1960)] [24 referring publications by Place] [Is replied by] [7 reprinting collections]
Smart, J. J. C. (1972). Further thoughts on the identity theory. The Monist, 56(2), 149-162 doi:10.5840/monist19725621
[Citing Place (1956)] [1 referring publications by Place]
Smart, J. J. C. (1975). On some criticisms of a physicalist theory of colours. In C. Cheng, C. (1975), Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-body Problem [Proceedings of the Conference on the Philosophy of Mind and Psychology,
University of Hawaii, 1968.] (pp. 54-63). University of Hawaii Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Toulmin, S. (1961). Concept Formation in Philosophy and Psychology. In S. Hood (Ed.), Dimensions of Mind (pp. 191-203). Collier.
[5 referring publications by Place]
Williams, B. (1978). Descartes: The project of pure enquiry. Penguin Books.
[1 referring publications by Place]
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations (English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe). Basil Blackwell.
[55 referring publications by Place]
Wundt, W. (1897). Outlines of Psychology [English translation by C. H. Judd of the Grundriss der Psychologie.] Engelmann.
[4 referring publications by Place]