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Ullin T. Place (1924-2000)

Related Publications

References of Place (1995d). A psychologist's response to Professor Dretske's ' What good is consciousness'. [Unpublished response to Fred Dretske's Saturday morning Presidential speaker's presentation "What Good is Consciousness?" Annual meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Virginia Beach, VA, April 15th , 1995].

Barwise, J., & Perry, J. (1983). Situations and attitudes. MIT Press.
[25 referring publications by Place]  

Dretske, F. (1997). What good is consciousness? Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 27(1), 1-15.
[1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Farah, M. J. (1990). Visual Agnosia: Disorders of Object Recognition and what they tell us about Normal Vision.. M.I.T. Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Humphrey, N. K. (1974). Vision in a monkey without striate cortex: a case study. Perception, 3, 241-255.
[9 referring publications by Place]  

James, W. (1890). Principles of Psychology (2 Volumes). Holt.
[10 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1954). The concept of heed. British Journal of Psychology, 45, 243-55. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1954.tb01252.x
[References]  [23 citing publications]  [29 referring publications by Place]  [2 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1954 The Concept of Heed.pdf  1954 1999 The Concept of Heed - revised version.pdf (with a new introduction; not published)

Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
[Abstract]The thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain is put forward as a reasonable scientific hypothesis, not to be dismissed on logical grounds alone. The conditions under which two sets of observations are treated as observations of the same process, rather than as observations of two independent correlated processes, are discussed. It is suggested that we can identify consciousness with a given pattern of brain activity, if we can explain the subject's introspective observations by reference to the brain processes with which they are correlated. It is argued that the problem of providing a physiological explanation of introspective observations is made to seem more difficult than it really is by the `phenomenological fallacy', the mistaken idea that descriptions of the appearances of things are descriptions of the actual state of affairs in a mysterious internal environment.
Keywords: consciousness, mind-brain identity theory, phenomenological fallacy
Note:
The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g). Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References]  [316 citing publications]  [57 referring publications by Place]  [15 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf  1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf

Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson.
[83 referring publications by Place]  

Titchener, E. B. (1896). An outline of Psychology. Macmillan.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Tye, M. (1993). Blindsight, the absent qualia hypothesis, and the mystery of consciousness. In C. Hookway and D. Peterson (Eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences (pp. 19-40) . A supplement to Philosophy. Cambridge University Press,
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Weiskrantz, L. (1986). Blindsight: A Case Study and Implications Clarendon Press.
[12 referring publications by Place]  

Wundt, W. (1897). Outlines of Psychology [English translation by C. H. Judd of the Grundriss der Psychologie.] Engelmann.
[4 referring publications by Place]