Broadbent, D. E. (1958). Perception and Communication. Pergamon.
[17 referring publications by Place]  

Broadbent, D. E. (1971). Decision and Stress. Academic Press.
[14 referring publications by Place]  

Cowey, A. (1974). Atrophy of retinal ganglion cells after removal of striate cortex in a rhesus monkey. Perception, 3, 257-260.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Cowey, A., & Stoerig, P. (1995). Blindsight in monkeys. Nature, 373(6511), 247-249.
[12 referring publications by Place]  

Humphrey, N. K. (1974). Vision in a monkey without striate cortex: a case study. Perception, 3, 241-255.
[9 referring publications by Place]  

Llinás, R. R., & Grace, A.A. (1989). Intrinsic 40 Hz oscillatory properties of layer IV neurons in guinea pig cerebral cortex in vitro. Society of Neuroscience Abstracts, 15, 660.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1954). The concept of heed. British Journal of Psychology, 45, 243-55. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1954.tb01252.x
[References]  [23 citing publications]  [29 referring publications by Place]  [2 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1954 The Concept of Heed.pdf  1954 1999 The Concept of Heed - revised version.pdf (with a new introduction; not published)

Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
[Abstract]The thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain is put forward as a reasonable scientific hypothesis, not to be dismissed on logical grounds alone. The conditions under which two sets of observations are treated as observations of the same process, rather than as observations of two independent correlated processes, are discussed. It is suggested that we can identify consciousness with a given pattern of brain activity, if we can explain the subject's introspective observations by reference to the brain processes with which they are correlated. It is argued that the problem of providing a physiological explanation of introspective observations is made to seem more difficult than it really is by the `phenomenological fallacy', the mistaken idea that descriptions of the appearances of things are descriptions of the actual state of affairs in a mysterious internal environment.
Keywords: consciousness, mind-brain identity theory, phenomenological fallacy
Note:
The revised version from 1997, see download (below), is not published and incorporates revisions proposed in Place (1997g). Publications citing Place (1956): See publications citing 'Is conscious a brain process?'
[References]  [315 citing publications]  [57 referring publications by Place]  [15 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1956 Is Consciousness a Brain Process.pdf  1956 1997 Is Consciousness a Brain Process - revised version.pdf

Rorschach, H. (1932/1942). Psychodiagnostik Hans Huber. English translation as Psychodiagnostics by P. Lemkau & B. Kronenberg, ed. W. Morganthaler. Grune & Stratton.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of organisms: An experimental analysis of behavior. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[32 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1969). Contingencies of reinforcement. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[32 referring publications by Place]  

Steriade, M., CurróDossi, R., Paré, D., & Oakson, G. (1991). Fast oscillations (20-40 Hz) in thalamocortical systems and their potentiation by mesopontine cholinergic nuclei in the cat. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the U.S.A., 88, 4396-4400.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Weiskrantz, L. (1986). Blindsight: A Case Study and Implications Clarendon Press.
[12 referring publications by Place]