Place, U. T. (1988b). Skinner's distinction between rule-governed and contingency-shaped behaviour. Philosophical Psychology, 1, 225-234. doi:10.1080/09515088808572941
[Abstract]The distinction that Skinner draws in his 'An operant analysis of problem solving' (1966, 1969, 1984) between 'rule-governed' and 'contingency'shaped' behaviour is arguably the most important single contribution to the theory of behaviour that he has made in a long and uniquely distinguished career. The concept of a 'rule' as a 'contingency-specifying' verbal formula which exercises 'stimulus control' over other aspects of the behaviour of a linguistically competent human being presents a formidable challenge to contemporary cognitive psychology in that the 'Representation' and 'computation' of environmental contingencies is seen as confined to verbally controlled behaviour emitted by linguistically competent human subjects. It also suggests a way of filling a major gap in the account of language offered by Skinner in his earlier book Verbal Behavior (1957), namely the lack of any account of how the speaker is able to use instructions to evoke behaviour which the listener never previously emitted and declarative sentences to convey information about contingencies which the listener has never previously encountered.
[References]  [Talks]  [5 citing publications]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1988b Skinner's Distinction Between Rule Governed and Contingency Shaped Behaviour.pdf

Place, U. T. (1988c). What went wrong? - comments on B.F.Skinner's 'Whatever happened to psychology as the science of behavior?' Counselling Psychology Quarterly, 1, 307-309. doi:10.1080/09515078808254214
[References]  
Download: 1988c What Went Wrong.pdf

Place, U. T. (1988d). Consciousness as an information processing system. The British Psychological Society 1988 Abstracts, 58.
[Related]  [Talks]  

Place, U. T. (1988e). The problem of mental content from the standpoint of linguistic empiricism [Presentation prepared for the Course on Functionalism and Content, Inter-university Post-graduate Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia (since 1991 Croatia), 7-15 September 1988] Inter-university Post-graduate Centre.
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1988e The Problem of Mental Content from the Standpoint of Linguistic Empiricism .pdf

Place, U. T. (1988f). Consciousness as an information processing system. [Paper presented to the Inaugural Symposium of the Mind-Body Group, Second Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society, University of Leeds, April 1988].
[References]  [Talks]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1988f Consciousness as an Information Processing System.pdf

Place, U. T. (1988h). Pre-linguistic and post-linguistic concepts. [Presentation to the Generalisation Group, Department of Psychology, University College of North Wales, Bangor at 10 March 1988 and to the Department of Psychology, Trinity College, Dublin at 11 March 1988.]
Note:
After the presentation revised by the author. The last revision is from 24^th March 1999. The central argument of the paper has not been revised.
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1988h Pre-Linguistic and Post-Linguistic Concepts.pdf

Place, U. T. (1988i). Natsoulas v. Skinner on Feeling [Unpublished].
[Abstract]Natsoulas' critique of Skinner's account of feeling is a mixture of valid criticism, profound misunderstanding of Skinner's position and conceptual confusion.
Note:
It is unclear which publication of Natsoulas Place is reacting to in this unpublished comment. Natsoulas wrote several articles about Skinner’s views on consciousness with titles like Toward a model for consciousness in the light of B.F. Skinner’s contribution (1978), Perhaps the most difficult problem faced by behaviorism (1983), On the radical behaviorist conception of consciousness (1986), On the radical behaviorist conception of pain experience (1988). But no one is as explicit about feelings as suggested in this comment on Natsoulas. Perhaps Place is reacting to an unpublished paper of Natsoulas. The present comment is of interest because of the conceptual analysis of the verb to feel. The date of this comment is unclear. I have chosen 1988, but this is more or less an educated guess.
[References]  
Download: 1988i Natsoulas v. Skinner on Feeling.pdf

Place, U. T. (1989-03-16) Contingency analysis applied to the pragmatics and semantics of naturally occurring verbal interactions, Temple University's Tenth Annual Conference on Discourse Analysis, The Hershey Hotel, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 16-18 March 1989.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1989-03-21). Contingency analysis applied to the pragmatics and semantics of naturally occurring verbal interactions. Conference on Conversation, Discourse and Conflict, Trinity College, Dublin, 21-23 March 1989.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1989-03-28). Contingency analysis applied to the pragmatics and semantics of naturally occurring verbal interactions [Invited paper with peer commentary by L. V. Baker, J. Heritage, J. Schwieso and J. Rae]. Third Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society, Bishop Grosseteste College, Lincoln, 28-30 March 1989.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1989-04-11). Relational frames and the role of logic in rule governed behaviour. Symposium on Rule governed Behaviour, Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, Easter Conference, Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, 11-13 April 1989.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1989-05-23). Connectionism and the resurrection of behaviourism. Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada, 23 May 1989.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1989-05-25). A radical behaviorist methodology for the empirical investigation of private events. Fifteenth Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Hyatt Regency Hotel, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 25-28 May 1989.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1989-08-23) The role of the ethnomethodological experiment in the empirical investigation of social norms, and its application to conceptual analysis. First International Conference on Understanding Language Use in Everyday Life, University of Calgary, 23-26 August 1989.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1989-09-05). Intensionalism, connectionism and the picture theory of meaning. Course on 'Naturalized Epistemology and the Philosophy of Mind', Inter-university Post-graduate Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, 5-15 September 1989.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1989-10-11). Workshop on Conceptual analysis and behaviour analysis.. Verhaltensakademie, 67 Heilbronnerstraße, Stuttgart, West Germany, 11 October 1989.

Place, U. T. (1989-10-11). Workshop on Connectionism and the resurrection of behaviourism. Verhaltensakademie, 67 Heilbronnerstraße, Stuttgart, West Germany, 11 October 1989.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1989-10-12). Workshop on Rule-governed behaviour and psychiatric disorder. Verhaltensakademie, 67 Heilbronnerstraße, Stuttgart, West Germany, 12 October 1989.

Place, U. T. (1989-10-12). Workshop on The rehabilitation of an empiricist/behaviourist linguistics, Verhaltensakademie, 67 Heilbronnerstraße, Stuttgart, West Germany, 12 October 1989.

Place, U. T. (1989-10-18). Inside or outside? A debate on the nature of dispositions and their role in causation between Ullin Place and David Armstrong. Universität Graz, Institut der Philosophie, Graz, Austria, 18 October 1989.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1989-10-19). Inside or outside? A debate on the nature of dispositions and their role in causation between Ullin Place and David Armstrong. Universität Salzburg, Institut der Philosophie, Salzburg, Austria, 19 October 1989.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1989-11-02). Some thoughts on the work of the Würzburg group and the controversy it provoked, prompted by a visit to Würzburg 10- 16 October 1989. Departmental Seminar, Department of Psychology, University College of North Wales, Bangor, 2 November 1989.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1989-12-19). A radical behaviourist methodology for the empirical investigation of private events. Symposium 'Introspection revisited', The London Conference of the British Psychological Society, 19 December 1989.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1989a). Low claim assertions. In J. Heil (Ed.), Cause, mind and reality: Essays honoring C. B. Martin (pp. 121-135). Kluwer. doi:10.1007/978-94-011-9734-2_9
Keywords: colours, mind-brain identity theory, introspection, phenomenological fallacy, topic neutrality
[References]  [4 citing publications]  [4 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1989a Low claim assertions.pdf

Place, U. T. (1989b). Towards a connectionist version of the causal theory of reference. Acta Analytica, 4(5), 71-97.
[Abstract]The connectionist model of the brain as a parallel distributed processor (PDP) is invoked to provide a version of the the causal theory of the reference of natural kind terms and proper names which rejects Kripke's doctrine of rigid designation and retains the Port Royal-Hamilton thesis that the extension of a general term is determined by its comprehension or intension, together with Frege's thesis that the reference (Bedeutung) of a singular term is determined by its sense (Sinn).
[References]  [Talks]  [1 citing publications]  [3 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1989b Towards a Connectionist Version of the Causal Theory of Reference.pdf

Place, U. T. (1989c). Concept acquisition and ostensive learning: a response to Professor Stemmer. Behaviorism, 17, 141-145. www.jstor.org/stable/41236094
[Abstract]The alternative offered by Professor Stemmer to cognitivist theories of the process whereby general terms acquire their meaning is criticised in its turn on the grounds that it presents an oversimplified view of the complex processes involved in the acquisition of word meanings.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [2 citing publications]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 1989c Concept Acquisition and Ostensive Learning - A Response to Professor Stemmer.pdf

Place, U. T. (1989d). Thirty five years on - is consciousness still a brain process? In J. Brandl, & W. L. Gombocz (Eds.), The Mind of Donald Davidson. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 36(1), 17-29.
[References]  [Talks]  [1 citing publications]  
Download: 1989d Thirty Five Years On - Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process.pdf

Place, U. T. (1989e). Contingency analysis of naturally occurring verbal interactions [Conference presentation abstract]. British Psychological Society 1989 Abstracts, 67.
[Abstract]The analysis of verbal behaviour in terms of Skinner's (1969)  concept of the three‑term contingency can be made at two different  levels (a) at the semantic level at which the content of an utterance  is analysed in terms of the contingency or contingencies it  "specifies" or "depicts" and (b) at the pragmatic level at which the  utterance is viewed as behaviour in relation to a preceding utterance  by another speaker as antecedent and to a subsequent utterance or  other behaviour emitted by the listener as consequence. A technique is proposed for generating a pragmatic analysis of  naturally occurring verbal interactions based partly on an  interpretation of Harlow's (1959) distinction between "win‑stay/fail‑ shift" and "win‑shift/fail‑stay" contingencies in terms of Michael's  (1982) concept of an "establishing condition" and its reversal, and  partly on a behaviour analytic interpretation of the concepts of  "turn", "sequence", "continuer", "adjacency pair" and "preference  organisation" derived from the vocabulary of conversation analysis  (Heritage 1985).
[References]  [Related]  [Talks]  

Place, U. T. (1989f). Two concepts of consciousness: The biological/private and the linguistic/social. Revista mexicana de análisis de la conducta= Mexican journal of behavior analysis, (Extra 3), 69-88.
[Abstract]How much of the mental life which we attribute to ourselves and our fellow human beings should we attribute to other creatures, particularly those mammals to which we are most closely related in evolutionary terms, given that such creatures do not communi­cate with one another by means of anything resembling human natural language? The paper approaches this question historically by consider­ing the positions taken by Aristotle, Descartes, the post-Darwinians such as Romanes, the behaviorists down to Skinner, and contemporary philosophers such as Davidson and Fodor. A distinction is drawn between two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private which I argue we should not hesitate to attribute to all warm-blooded vertebrates and the linguistic/social which is ex­clusively human. The concept of consciousness as biological and private is the 'consciousness' of traditional introspective psychology and of 'Is consciousness a brain process?' (Place 1956). It comprises the phenomena of selective attention, conceptualization, mental image formation, emotional reaction and motivation. The concept of consciousness as linguistic and social is the consciousness of Hegel, Marx, Vygotsky, Skinner and much contemporary philosophical psychology. It consists of an integrated system of propositional attitudes (beliefs) all of which are either formulated or sus­ceptible to formulation as sentences in natural language (Skinner's "contingency-specifying stimuli" or "rules").
Note:
The publication date, 1989, can't be correct, but it is the date used by the journal. After publication the author revised the paper, see Place 1992f
[References]  [Related]  
Download: 1989f Two Concepts of Consciousness (Revista Mexicana de Analisis de la Conducta).pdf

Place, U. T. (1989g). Some thought on the work of the Würzburg School and the controversy it provoked, prompted by a visit to Würzburg 10-16 October 1989 [Unpublished presentation at the Departmental Seminar, Departement of Psychology, University College of North Wales, Bangor, 2nd November 1989].
[Abstract]The debate between the Würzburg School and E. B. Titchener which took place during the first decade of this century was not, as it is often portrayed, a debate about the existence or non-existence of imageless thought. It is better described as a conceptual and terminological issue about the nature of consciousness, the place of meaning in consciousness and the role of introspection (Selbstbeobachtung) in its empirical investigation. Titchener's contention that in introspection the trained psychologist strips away meaning in order to provide a description of raw uninterpreted experience is shown to be the absurdity that it is by Wittgenstein's (1953) 'private language argument'. There is, nevertheless, a useful distinction to be drawn between two ways of acquiring mental self-knowledge: (a) introspection (Selbstbeobachtung) which yields observational knowledge of the qualia of ongoing experience, and (b) inner perception (innere Wahrnehmung) which yields intuitive knowledge of the onset and content of dispositional mental states. In terms of this distinction, the Würzburg protocols are based on an inner perception of the content of the reported thoughts rather than on introspective observation of the qualia of experience. The paper concludes with an assessment of the significance of the Würzburg-Titchener controversy for the subsequent history of psychology and for contemporary issues in psychology and the philosophy of mind.
Note:
Poshumously published as Place (2002/3)
[References]  [Related]  [Talks]  
Download: 1989g Some Thought on the Work of the Wurzburg School and the Controversy it Provoked.pdf

Place, U. T. (1989h). Relational frames and the role of logic in rule-governed behaviour. [Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, Cambridge, 1989. Revised in 1997.]
[Abstract]The concept "relational frame" has been proposed by Steve Hayes (1991) as a higher order category in which Murray Sidman's concept of "equivalence class" is subsumed as a special case. Like equivalence, the relational frame concept was originally conceived as an interpretation of the behaviour of human subjects on a matching to sample task. While not denying the reality of relational frame abstraction in the case of intelligent human adults, it is suggested that this may be an over intellectual interpretation of the equivalence responding of children and less intelligent adults. It is proposed that the relational frame concept should instead be seen as an important contribution (a) to relational logic, and (b) to our understanding of the role of logic in rule governed behaviour, and that the ability to abstract relational frames is something that appears much later in the process whereby linguistic competence is acquired than equivalence class responding on the matching to sample task.
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1989h Relational Frames and the Role of Logic in Rule-Governed Behaviour.pdf

Place, U. T. (1990-01-18). Symbolic processes and stimulus equivalence. Departmental Seminar, Department of Psychology, University College of North Wales, Bangor, 18 January 1990.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1990-04-02). E. G. Boring and the mind-brain identity theory. Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology, Section of the British Psychological Society, Bishop Grosseteste College, Lincoln, 2nd-4th April 1990.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1990-04-04). How to combine social constructivism with scientific realism.. Course on the Philosophy of Science, Inter- university Centre, Dubrovnik, 2-13 April, 1990.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1990-04-18). Eliminative connectionism: its implications for a return to an empiricist/behaviourist linguistics. The Annual conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior Group, University of York, 18-21 April 1990.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1990-05-27). Eliminative connectionism: its implications for a return to an empiricist/behaviorist linguistics. Sixteenth Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Opryland Hotel, Nashville, Tennessee, 27-31 May 1990.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1990-09-10). Towards a connectionist version of the causal theory of reference. Course on 'Truth and Reference', Inter- university Post-graduate Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, 10 -14 September 1990.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1990-09-20). How to combine social constructivism with scientific realism. Philosophical discussion group, Rijeka, 20 September 1990.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1990-09-21). Holism and cognitive dissonance in the discrimination of correspondence between sentences and situations. The Third International France Veber Congress, Maribor, Slovenia, Yugoslavia and Bad Radkersburg, Styria, Austria, 21-23 September 1990.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1990-09-24). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. Slovenian Philosophical Society, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Ljubljana, 24 September 1990
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1990a). E. G. Boring and the mind-brain identity theory. The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 11, 20-31.
[References]  [Talks]  [8 citing publications]  [3 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1990a E.G. Boring and the Mind-Brain Identity Theory.pdf added to the end of the document are excerpts from Boring, 1933

Place, U. T. (1990b). Intensionalism, connectionism and the picture theory of meaning. Acta Analytica, 5(6), 47-63.
[Abstract]The connectionist model of the brain as a parallel distributed processor (PDP) is invoked in support of the view that the sense of singular terms and the intension of general terms and of more complex linguistic expressions determine (1) the reference of singular terms, (2) the extension of general terms, (3) the truth of propositions, (4) the validity of arguments, (5) the meaning of sentences.
Keywords: connectionism, conceptualism, correspondence theory of truth, extensionalism, intensionalism, ontology, philosophy of language, picture theory of meaning, universals
[References]  [Talks]  [5 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1990b Intensionalism, Connectionism and the Picture Theory of Meaning.pdf

Place, U. T. (1990c). A radical behaviourist methodology for the empirical investigation of private events [Conference paper abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society 1990 Abstracts, 38.
[Related]  

Place, U. T. (1990d). Can social constructivism be reconciled with scientific realism [Presentation to the Course on the Philosophy of Science at the Inter-university Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, April 11th 1990]. Inter-university Centre, Dubrovnik
Keywords: conceptualism, connectionism, universals
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1990d Can Social Constructivism Be Reconciled With Scientific Realism.pdf

Place, U. T. (1990e). Critical Notice [Unpublished book review of Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind Brain by Patricia Smith Churchland. MIT Press, l986].
Keywords: conceptual analysis, eliminative materialism, mind-brain identity theory, neurophilosophy
Note:
This critical notice was commissioned by the editor of the Quarterly Journal of Philosophy in 1986 when the book first appeared; but since it was not completed until four years later in 1990, it was never submitted. It was revised in 1999 in anticipation of a meeting with Pat Churchland in Siena, Italy, in October of that year - a meeting that because of the illness of Place never took place.
[References]  [Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: 1990e Critical Notice.pdf

Place, U. T. (1991-02-19). Eliminative connectionism and its implications for a return to an empiricist/behaviorist linguistics. Footsteps of the Brain in the Syntax of Natural Language. Three-day Conference assembled to discuss five papers presented by Dr. U. T. Place. Neurosciences Institute, New York, 19th-21st February 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-02-19). The role of the ethnomethodological experiment in the empirical investigation of social norms, and its application to conceptual analysis. Footsteps of the Brain in the Syntax of Natural Language. Three-day Conference assembled to discuss five papers presented by Dr. U. T. Place. Neurosciences Institute, New York, 19th-21st February 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-02-20a). From syntax to reality: the picture theory of meaning. Footsteps of the Brain in the Syntax of Natural Language. Three-day Conference assembled to discuss five papers presented by Dr. U. T. Place. Neurosciences Institute, New York, 19th-21st February 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-02-20b). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. Footsteps of the Brain in the Syntax of Natural Language. Three-day Conference assembled to discuss five papers presented by Dr. U. T. Place. Neurosciences Institute, New York, 19th-21st February 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-02-20c). Consciousness as an information-prcessing system. Footsteps of the Brain in the Syntax of Natural Language. Three-day Conference assembled to discuss five papers presented by Dr. U. T. Place. Neurosciences Institute, New York, 19th-21st February 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-02-25). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 25 February 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-03-01). Eliminative connectionism: its implications for a return to an empiricist-behaviorist linguistics. Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, 1 March 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-03-07). Eliminative connectionism: its implications for a return to an empiricist-behaviorist linguistics. Department of Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts, 7 March 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-03-08). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. Department of Philosophy and Business Ethics, Bentley College, Waltham, Massachusetts, 8 March 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-03-18). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. The Psychology and Linguistic Sections of the New York Academy of Sciences, 18 March 1991
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-03-25) Contingency analysis as applied to the pragmatics and semantics of naturally occurring verbal interactions. Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 25 March 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-03-29). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. Annual Meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Atlanta, Georgia, 29 March 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-04-05). Symbolic processes and stimulus equivalence. Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior Group, Department of Psychology, University College, London, 5 April 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-04-12). Error-correction in connectionist networks: a new perspective on the law of effect, Symposium on `Learning Rules in Connectionist Networks' (convenor U. T. Place), Annual Conference of the British Psychological Society, Bournemouth, 12 April 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-04-13). Holism and cognitive dissonance in the discrimination of correspondence between sentences and situations. Conference on Epistemology and the Philosophy of Mind, Inter-University Graduate Centre, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, 13-17 April 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-05-26a). Symbolic processes and stimulus equivalence. Session on 'Current Issues in Stimulus Equivalence', 17th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Atlanta, Georgia, 26 May 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-05-26b). Error-correction in connectionist networks: a new perspective on the law of effect. Session on 'Behavioristic Perspectives on Cognitive Psychology', 17th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Atlanta, Georgia, 26 May 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-05-28). Teaching in the context of research: an epistemological perspective. Symposium on 'International Perspectives on Higher Education: Contributions from Psychology', Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama, 28 May 1991.

Place, U. T. (1991-09-23). Contingency analysis applied the pragmatics and semantics of naturally-occurring verbal interactions. International Society for Ecological Psychology, Workshop on Situated Action, Ashburne Hall, University of Manchester, 23-24 September 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991-11-07). Learning-rules and priniples of selection in neural networks. Senior Seminar, Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds, 7 November 1991.

Place, U. T. (1991-11-22). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. Philosophy Society, University of Sussex, 22 November 1991.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1991a). Conversation analysis and the analysis of verbal behavior. In L. J. Hayes, & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Dialogues on verbal behavior: The First International Institute on Verbal Relations (Chapter 5, pp. 85-109). Context Press.
[References]  [4 citing publications]  [5 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 1991a Conversation Analysis and Analysis of Verbal Behavior.pdf

Place, U. T. (1991b). Error-correction in connectionist networks: A new perspective on the law of effect [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society 1991 Abstracts, 67.
[Related]  [Talks]  

Place, U. T. (1991c). Konekcionizem in o_ivljenje behaviorizma (Slovenian translation of 'Connectionism and the resurrection of behaviourism'). Anthropos, 1(3), 327-335.
[Related]  

Place, U. T. (1991d). The problem of error-correction in connectionist networks: a new perspective on the law of effect [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of 17th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis - May 24-27 1991 - Atlanta, Georgia (p. 148). Society for the Advancement of Behavior Analysis.
[Abstract]The parallel distributed processor (PDP) derives its ability to learn complex and subtle pattern discriminations from changes that occur in the so-called 'weights' of the synaptic connections between the multiple interconnected nodes of which the device consists as a consequence of previous activation of those connections. In order for the device to have that property, the changes which occur in the synaptic weights must conform to what is known as 'a learning rule' or to a limited number of such rules depending on the circumstances. McClelland and Rumelhart (1988) propose two such rules: "the so-called Hebbian or correlational learning rule .... and the error-correcting or 'delta' learning rule." Attention is drawn to the analogy, if not coincidence, between these learning rules and such traditional learning principles as association by contiguity in the case of the Hebbian or correlational learning rule and the Law of Effect in the case of the error-correcting or 'delta' rule. It is suggested that both of these learning rules are needed, the correlational/contiguity rule to control input selection by the mechanism of selective attention and the 'delta' rule/Law of Effect to control output selection. It is argued that, in the case of living organisms, a second input selection principle is required in order to account for the preoccupation of attention with the motivationally significant at the expense of the motivationally insignificant. Identification of the error-correction rule with the Law of Effect draws attention (a) to the fact that in living organisms the error- and correct-messages are constituted by the immediate consequences of behavior, and that these are differentiated into error-messages (disinforcements) and correct-messages (reinforcements) by the motivational attitude of the organism to those consequences, (b) to the fact that, in contrast to the prejudices of learning theorists in the nineteen thirties who were inclined to deny the weakening effect of punishment on the strength of response tendencies, on the connectionist view it is error-correction (disinforcement) rather than confirmation (reinforcement) that does all the work. It is concluded that what we need is a symmetrical conception of the Law of Effect which allows both the strengthening of response tendencies by success and the weakening of response tendencies by failure.
[References]  [Related]  [Talks]  

Place, U. T. (1991e). Symbolic processes and stimulus equivalence [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of 17th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis - May 24-27 1991 - Atlanta, Georgia (p. 357). Society for the Advancement of Behavior Analysis
[Related]  [Talks]  

Place, U. T. (1991f). On the social relativity of truth and the analytic/synthetic distinction. Human Studies, 14, 265-285. doi:10.1007/bf02205609
[Abstract]Three solutions are examined to the problem of cultural chauvinism posed by the fact that the verb `to know' commits the speaker to the truth of what is known. Two, the doctrine that truth is socially relative and the doctrine that truth determination procedures are socially relative, are rejected. A third, the view that truth is relative to linguistic convention is defended. Holding this view commits the author to an intensionalist theory of reference, a conceptualist theory of universals, a defence of the analytic-synthetic distinction against Quine's critique, and the view that the basic principles of science are analytic.
[References]  [3 citing publications]  [14 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1991f On the Social Relativity of Truth and the Analytic Synthetic Distinction.pdf

Place, U. T. (1991g). E. G. Boring and the mind-brain identity theory [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society 1991 Abstracts, 2.
[References]  [Related]  [Talks]  
Download: 1991g Abstract of E.G. Boring and the Mind-Brain Identity Theory.pdf

Place, U. T. (1991h). Error-correction in connectionist networks: A new perspective on the law of effect [Unpublished paper. Presented to the Annual Conference of the British Psychological Society, Bournemouth, 12^th April 1991, Session on Behavioristic Perspectives on Cognitive Psychology and to the 17^th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Atlanta, Georgia, May 26^th 1991.] .
[References]  [Related]  [Talks]  
Download: 1991h Error Correction in Connectionist Networks - A New Perspective on the Law of Effect.pdf

Place, U. T. (1991i). Dispositions as intentional states. Conceptus, XXV(66), 7-16. With D. M. Armstrong and C. B. Martin ‘A debate on dispositions: their nature and their role in causation, Part I: The Armstrong-Place debate, Chapter 2'.

Place, U. T. (1991j). On confounding conceptualism with nominalism.' Conceptus, XXV(66), 30-44. With D. M. Armstrong and C. B. Martin ‘A debate on dispositions: their nature and their role in causation, Part I: The Armstrong-Place debate, Chapter 4'.

Place, U. T. (1991k). From syntax to reality: the picture theory of meaning [Discussion paper presented to a small conference on 'Footprints of the Brain in the Syntax of Natural Language' at the Neurosciences Institute, New York, February 1991].
Keywords: picture theory of meaning
[References]  [Talks]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1991k From Syntax to Reality - the Picture Theory of Meaning.pdf revised version from 1999

Place, U. T. (1991l). Serbo-Croat translation of 'Towards a connectionist version of the causal theory of reference.' SOL.
Note:
Translation of Place, U. T. (1989b). Towards a connectionist version of the causal theory of reference. Acta Analytica, 4(5), 71-97.

Place, U. T. (1992-03-30). Unsupervised and supervised learning in neural networks. Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College, London, 30 March 1992.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1992-04-14). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society, Bishop Grosseteste College, Lincoln, 14 April 1992.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1992-04-18) Intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. Annual Meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Memphis, Tennessee, 18 April 1992.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1992-05-25). Is there an operant analysis of animal problem-solving? The Eighteenth Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, San Francisco, 25 May 1992.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1992-06-09). Selectionism and connectionism: their implications for a return to an empiricist/behaviorist linguistics. Presented in absentia at the 1992 Conference of the Sociolinguistics Research Committee for Sociolinguistics of the International Sociological Association on 'The interface between Sociology and Linguistics', Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 9-11 June 1992.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1992-06-14). Symbolic processes and stimulus equivalence. The Fifteenth Symposium on Quantitative Analyses of Behavior on 'Stimulus Relations', Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 14 June 1992.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1992-07-09). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. Research group on 'Biological Bases of Human Culture', Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung, Universität Bielefeld, 9 July 1992.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1992-08-06). The Tower of Babel: Some speculations on the origin of religion. Centennial Conference of the Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds, on the Philosophy of Religion, Fairbairn House, Clarendon Road, Leeds, 6 August 1992.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1992-10-06). The three term contingency as a Link between the Associationist and Radical Behaviorist Traditions in the Experimental Analysis of Behavior [Invited Address]. First International Congress on Behaviorism and the Sciences of Behavior, Guadalajara, Mexico, 6 October 1992.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1992-10-09) About behavioral views of language. Symposium on 'Conceptual Problems in Psychology', First International Congress on Behaviorism and the Sciences of Behavior, Guadalajara, Mexico, 9 October 1992.

Place, U. T. (1992-11-05) Philosophical fashion and scientific progress in the theory of universals. Department of Psychology, University of Wales, Bangor, 5 November 1992
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1992-11-26). Philosophical fashion and scientific progress in the theory of universals [billed as 'A connectionist/behaviour-analytic perspective on the relation between pre-linguistic and post-linguistic concepts'], Conference of the Linguistic Society of Belgium on Conceptual and Linguistic Representation, Antwerp, 26-28 November 1992.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1992a). Behavioral contingency semantics and the correspondence theory of truth. In S. C. Hayes,& L. J. Hayes (Eds.), Understanding verbal relations: The Second and Third International Institute on Verbal Relations (Chapter 9, pp. 135-151). Context Press.
Keywords: behaviour analysis, behavioural contingency semantics, correspondence theory of truth, picture theory of meaning, situation, three-term contingency
[References]  [Talks]  [2 citing publications]  [15 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1992a Behavioral Contingency Semantics and the Correspondence Theory of Truth.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992b). Is there an operant analysis of animal problem-solving? [Conference presentation, presented at 18th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis - May 25-28 1992 - San Francisco, California]. Association for Behavior Analysis. Abstract published in Proceedings of 18th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis - May 25-28 1992 - San Francisco, California (p. 155). Society for the Advancement of Behavior Analysis.
[Abstract]In 'An operant analysis of problem-solving', Skinner (1966/1969/1988) develops an account of problem-solving based on the distinction between two different ways in which an organism can learn to adapt to environmental contingencies: (1) contingency-shaped behavior in which the behavior of an organism is progressively shaped by repeated exposure to the contingency itself, and (2) rule-governed behavior in which a verbally competent human being adapts to a contingency by constructing a verbal formula or rule which is said to "specify" the contingency in question. A rule may be constructed, as in the case of contingency-shaped behavior, in the light of repeated exposure to the contingency itself. It may equally well be based on information about the contingency supplied by another speaker, on information derived from a written text, or on an inference from other rules derived from any or all these sources. It is this case where the agent infers a new rule tailor-made for the problem with which he/she is confronted that Skinner has in mind in offering an analysis of problem-solving in these terms. There is a growing body of empirical evidence (Hayes 1989) which confirms the accuracy of Skinner's description of problem-solving as it occurs in the case of verbally competent human beings. But animals also solve problems; and so do pre-verbal human infants. This kind of problem-solving cannot simply be a matter of contingency-shaping, though previous contingency-shaped behavior is the only resource from which a pre-verbal organism can draw in selecting an appropriate problem-solving strategy. It requires some mechanism like that which Köhler (1925) refers to as "insight" whereby the stimulus class which currently controls a particular response class is somehow stretched so as to include the current stimulus situation. The case for postulating such a behavior mediating mechanism within the conceptual framework of radical behaviorism is argued by appealing (a) to the analogy between attending behavior and thinking by talking to oneself, and (b) to the process whose existence is implied by Skinner's (1938) account of "stimulus class" whereby an organism learns to break up its stimulus environment into stimulus classes "along the natural lines of fracture."
Keywords: the natural lines of fracture, stimulus class, rule-governed behaviour, problem-solving, Skinner
[References]  [Talks]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1992b Is There an Operant Analysis of Animal Problem-Solving.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992c). Eliminative connectionism and its implications for a return to an empiricist/behaviorist linguistics. Behavior and Philosophy, 20, 21-35. www.jstor.org/stable/27759268
[Abstract]For the past three decades linguistic theory has been based on the assumption that sentences are interpreted and constructed by the brain by means of computational processes analogous to those of a serial-digital computer. The recent interest in devices based on the neural network or parallel distributed processor (PDP) principle raises the possibility ("eliminative connectionism") that such devices may ultimately replace the S-D computer as the model for the interpretation and generation of language by the brain. An analysis of the differences between the two models suggests that that the effect of such a development would be to steer linguistic theory towards a return to the empiricism and behaviorism which prevailed before it was driven by Chomsky towards nativism and mentalism. Linguists, however, will not be persuaded to return to such a theory unless and until it can deal with the phenomenon of novel sentence construction as effectively as its nativist/mentalist rival.
[References]  [Talks]  [1 citing publications]  [8 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1992c Eliminative Connectionsm -Its Implications for a Return to an Empiricist-Behaviorist Linguistics.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992d). The role of the ethnomethodological experiment in the empirical investigation of social norms, and its application to conceptual analysis. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 22, 461-474. doi:10.1177/004839319202200403
[Abstract]It is argued that conceptual analysis as practiced by the philosophers of ordinary language, is an empirical procedure that relies on a version of Garfinkel's ethnomethodological experiment. The ethnomethodological experiment is presented as a procedure in which the existence and nature of a social norm is demonstrated by flouting the putative convention and observing what reaction that produces in the social group within which the convention is assumed to operate. Examples are given of the use of ethnomethodological experiments, both in vivo and as a thought experiment, in order to demonstrate the existence of otherwise invisible conventions governing human social behavior. Comparable examples are cited from the writings of ordinary language philosophers of ethnomethodological thought experiments designed to demonstrate the existence of linguistic conventions.
[References]  [Talks]  [1 citing publications]  [12 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1992d The Role of the Ethnomethodological Experiment in the Empirical Investigation of Social Norms, and its Application to Conceptual Analysis.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992e). Behaviorism and behavior analysis in Britain - An historical overview. The ABA Newsletter, 15(4), 5-7.
[References]  
Download: 1992e Behaviorism and Behavior Analysis in Britain.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992f). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. Acta Analytica, 7(8), 53-72.
[Abstract]How much of the mental life which we attribute to ourselves and our fellow human beings should we attribute to other creatures, particularly those mammals to which we are most closely related in evolutionary terms, given that such creatures do not communicate with one another by means of anything resembling human natural language? The paper approaches this question historically by considering the positions taken by Aristotle, Descartes, the post-Darwinians such as Romanes, the behaviorists down to Skinner, and contemporary philosophers such as Davidson and Fodor. A distinction is drawn between two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private which I argue we should not hesitate to attribute to all warm-blooded vertebrates and the linguistic/social which is exclusively human. The concept of consciousness as biological and private is the 'consciousness' of traditional introspective psychology and of 'Is consciousness a brain process?' (Place 1956). It comprises the phenomena of selective attention, conceptualization, mental image formation, emotional reaction and motivation. The concept of consciousness as linguistic and social is the consciousness of Hegel, Marx, Vygotsky, Skinner and much contemporary philosophical psychology. It consists of an integrated system of propositional attitudes (beliefs) all of which are either formulated or susceptible to formulation as sentences in natural language (Skinner's "contingency-specifying stimuli" or "rules").
Note:
The download is a version revised after publication by the author.
[References]  [Talks]  [4 citing publications]  
Download: 1992f Two Concepts of Consciousness the Biological Private and the Linguistic Social.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992g). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society 1992 Abstracts, 67.
[Related]  

Place, U. T. (1992h). The Tower of Babel: some speculations on the role of technology, language and trade on the evolution of religion, philosophy and science [Conference presentation with additional notes, presented at the Centennial Conference of the Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds, on the Philosophy of Religion, Fairbairn House, Clarendon Road, Leeds, 6 August 1992]. Department of Philosophy, University Leeds.
[Abstract]The paper explores the relationship between three features which, it is often claimed, distinguish human beings from other species of living organism: (1) the ability to colonize a new environment by developing an appropriate technology, (2) the ability to communicate with one another by means of a learned language, and (3) the propensity to develop a system of magico-religious beliefs and practices. The Tower of Babel legend is seen as reflecting the way in which a new environment and the development of a new set of technologies designed to deal with that environment leads to changes in linguistic practice within the community involved. The dependence of human beings on the possession of integrated systems of causal theory and technological practice for their survival, is proposed as the motive for the creation of a system of magico-religious beliefs and practices in those areas of human life where understanding of the causal relations and consequent technological control is lacking. Because they are not constrained in the way that technological beliefs and practices are constrained, by the need for precise control over the technological process, magico-religious belief systems tend to proliferate in much the same way that languages proliferate as a consequence of the Tower of Babel phenomenon. The consequent multiplicity of magico-religious belief systems creates a barrier to trade and other forms of social co-operation between communities which differ in this respect which, to judge by the lengths to which human beings have gone to iron out such differences, is more serious than that presented by differences in language. The development of philosophy, the supra-national religions and science are interpreted as successive responses to this problem.
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1992h The Tower of Babel.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992i). Philosophical fashion and scientific progress in the theory of universals. [Unpublished paper. Presented November 5th 1992, Department of Psychology, University of Wales, Bangor; November 26-28, 1992, Conference of the Linguistic Society of Belgium on Conceptual and Linguistic Representation, Antwerp]
[Abstract]Are universals (kinds) something over and above the things (their instances) of which they are kinds? Does the universe come already packaged into kinds of thing, or are the universals which the human and animal mind distinguishes simply the product of the mind's classificatory activity? Whether universals are mind-independent or mind-dependent, are the concepts human beings and other living organisms have of them innate or are they generated wholly or in part by some kind of learning process. In either case, what assurance do we have that our conceptual scheme does not seriously misrepresent the way things are, as Kant puts it, "in themselves." While the tides of philosophical fashion have flowed backwards and forwards between the poles of this debate ever since the time of Plato and Aristotle, it is argued that there is now some reason to think that the current tide which appears to be moving away from platonism and nativism and back towards conceptualism and empiricism may be taking us towards a permanent scientifically-based resolution of the problem. This solution, if that is what it is, gives due weight to both innate factors and learning at the biological level and to social construction at the level of human linguistic communication. It sees Darwin's principle of variation and natural selection as operating as much in the ontogenetic development of our conceptual scheme as in its phylogeny, and as providing the assurance we need that, in B.F.Skinner's words, it takes "account of the natural lines of fracture along which behavior and environment actually break." (Skinner 1938 p.33).
Keywords: conceptualism, connectionism, universals
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1992i Philosophical Fashion and Scientific Progress in the Theory of Universals.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992j). Towards a reconciliation between the associationist and radical behaviorist traditions in the experimental analysis of behavior. [Unpublished paper. Presented under the title 'The three term contingency as a link between the associationist and radical behaviorist traditions in the experimental analysis of behavior' as Invited Address to the First International Congress on Behaviorism and the Sciences of Behavior, Guadalajara, Mexico, 6th October 1992].
[Abstract]It is an implication of the Law of Non-Contradiction that two incompatible descriptions of the same class of phenomena cannot both be true. This suggests that the future for radical behaviorism must lie in achieving a reconciliation with other disciplines and approaches studying the same or closely related phenomena. The approach known as "associative learning theory" shares a common data basis with radical behaviorism in the area of the experimental analysis of animal behavior. It is separated from radical behaviorism by a different view of the nature of what is learned. According to the radical behaviorist, under certain antecedent conditions (discriminative stimulus + establishing condition) an organism learns to emit a response. According to associative learning theory what is learned is an association between a pair of consecutive stimulus events. When presented with the first member of the pair, the organism learns to "predict" or "expect" the second member of the pair. Until recently, the principal application of this principle was Rescorla and Wagner's (1972) analysis of  Pavlovian (respondent) conditioning. More recently, Adams and Dickinson's (1981) reinforcer-devaluation experiment has led associationists to pay more attention to instrumental (operant) learning. It has also opened up an interesting divergence of views between Dickinson (1988; Heyes and Dickinson, 1991; Dickinson & Balleine, forthcoming) who takes it as evidence of a discontinuity between respondent conditioning, which he interprets in terms of the establishment of mechanical associations, and operant learning which he interprets in terms of the ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’ of philosophical action theory, and Rescorla (1991) who uses it as evidence for an interpretation of operant learning based on the same principles of stimulus-stimulus association invoked by Rescorla and Wagner to account for respondent conditioning. Standing in the way of a reconciliation between radical behaviorism and associative learning theory are the misgivings of the former about the use made by the latter of ‘mentalistic’ concepts, such as ‘expect,’ ‘anticipate,’ and ‘predict.’ These misgivings may be allayed if attention is paid to the results of applying to such concepts the technique, known as ‘conceptual analysis,’ developed by Wittgenstein (1953; 1958) and the philosophers of the Oxford ‘ordinary language’ school. A recent application of this technique to the linguistic phenomenon known variously as ‘intentionality’ or ‘intensionality’ shows that it consists of two distinct varieties of ‘referential anomaly’ which ‘infect’ the grammatical objects of certain verbs. In one case, the grammatical object is used to indicate a range of possible events any one of which, if it were to occur, would constitute a manifestation or satisfaction of a disposition. In the other case, the grammatical object functions as a quotation of what the agent either has said or might be expected to say or have said. Referential anomaly of the dispositional kind is both unavoidable and benign, but the use of quotations to characterize behavioral dispositions is acceptable for scientific purposes only in those cases where the behavior in question is in fact subject to linguistic control. Since the grammatical object of the verbs ‘know,’ ‘believe’ and ‘think,’ as they occur in belief/desire explanations, takes the form of an embedded indicative sentence in oratio obliqua or indirect reported speech, Dickinson's explanation of instrumental/operant learning in animals involves the scientifically unacceptable metaphor of linguistic initiation and control. Rescorla's theory, on the other hand, requires nothing more than that the organism learn to ‘expect’ or ‘anticipate’ an event (the outcome), given the combination of an antecedent discriminative stimulus and the stimulus constituted by the incipient emission of the response which it evokes. In this case the anomaly of reference in the noun phrase which occurs as the grammatical object of the verb reflects its use as a device for indicating a range of possible outcomes any one of which, if it occurred, would fulfill and confirm the expectation which it specifies.
Note:
UTP made changes to the text of the presentation in 1995 and in 1999.
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1992j 1999 Towards a Reconciliation between the Ascociationist and Redical Behaviorist Traditions in the Experimental Analysis of Behavior.pdf

Place, U. T. (1992k). Selectionism, connectionism and the re-socialization of linguistics. [Unpublished paper. Presented in absentia under the title 'Selectionism and connectionism: Their implications for a return to an empirical/behavioristic linguistics' at the 1992 Conference of the Research Committee for Sociolinguistics of the International Sociological Association on 'The interface between Sociology and Linguistics', Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 9th-11th June 1992].
Note:
Last change to the text of the presentation made by UTP is from 1999.
[Talks]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1993-03-31). Is there an operant analysis of animal problem-solving. Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College, London, 31 March 1993.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1993-03-31). Following "the natural lines of fracture": concept formation in neural networks. Symposium on `Associationism, Behaviour Analysis, and Connectionism' at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College, London, 31 March 1993.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1993-04-04). Folk psychology from the standpoint of conceptual analysis. Symposium on '"Folk Psychology": Its Implications for Psychological Science' organized by the History and Philosophy of Psychology Section for the Annual Conference of the British Psychological Society, Blackpool, 4 April 1993.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1993-04-09). Holism and cognitive dissonance in the discrimination of correspondence between sentences and situations. Annual Convention of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, New Orleans, LA, 9 April 1993.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1993-04-14). Psychologism and anti-psychologism: an historical overview. Symposium on 'Psychologism and Human Reasoning' at the Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society, College of Ripon and York St. John, York Campus, 14 April 1993.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1993-04-23). The role of the ethnomethodological experiment in the empirical investigation of social norms, and its application to conceptual analysis. Department of Sociology and Political Science, Central European University, Prague, 23 April 1993.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1993-05-23). Sentence and sentence structure in a behavioral view of language. Nineteenth Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Marriott Hotel, Chicago, IIllinois, 29 May 1993.

Place, U. T. (1993-06-10). Unsupervised and supervised learning in neural networks. Inter-Univerrsity Centre Conference on 'Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind', Park Hotel, Bled, Slovenia, 10 June 1993.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1993-10-22). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social. Seminar, Department of Psychology, University of St. Andrew's, 22 October 1993.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1993a). Two concepts of consciousness: the biological/private and the linguistic/social.(shortened version) The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 16, 11-23.
Note:
For the full version see Place 1992f
[Related]  

Place, U. T. (1993b). A behavioral view of language [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of the 19th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis (p. 550). Society for the Advancement of Behavior Analysis.

Place, U. T. (1993c). A radical behaviorist methodology for the empirical investigation of private events. Behavior and Philosophy, 20, 25-35. www.jstor.org/stable/27759281
[Abstract]Skinner has repeatedly asserted that he does not deny either the existence of private events or the possibility of studying them scientifically. But he has never explained how his position in this respect differs from that of the mentalist or provided a practical methodology for the investigation of private events within a radical behaviorist perspective. With respect to the first of these deficiencies, I argue that observation statements describing a public state of affairs in the common public environment of two or more observers which those observers confirm as a correct description provide a far more objective and secure foundation for empirical knowledge than statements describing private events in the experience of a single individual. In the course of this argument, I also invoke Wittgenstein's (1953) demonstration — his 'private language argument' — of the incoherence of traditional subjective empiricism. Regarding the second deficiency, I argue that observation statements describing private events can serve as data for an objective study, provided that (a) the verbal behavior in which they consist and its context are objectively observed and recorded, and (b) an explanation is given of how this verbal behavior is generated by the events it reports.
Keywords: methodological behaviorism, objectivity principle, private events, private language argument, radical behaviorism
[References]  [Talks]  [7 citing publications]  [3 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1993c A Radical Behaviorist Methodology for the Empirical Investigation of Private Events.pdf

Place, U. T. (1993d). Holism and cognitive dissonance in the discrimination of correspondence between sentences and situations. Acta Analytica, 8(10), 143-155.
[Abstract]A synthetic proposition is true, if there exists a situation corresponding to that which the proposition depicts. Assurance that such correspondence obtains depends on the coherence of a body of pragmatically tested beliefs, anchored to reality by objective observation statements endorsed as correct by the relevant linguistic community. Hull's "primitive suggestibility" and Festinger's "cognitive dissonance" are invoked to explain how failures of correspondence are detected.
Keywords: conceptualism, correspondence theory of truth, holism, picture theory of meaning
Note:
Added to the full text: unpublished rephrasing of some of the central points of this article by the author.
[References]  [Talks]  [5 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1993d Holism and Cognitive Dissonance in the Discrimination of Correspondence between Sentences and Situations.pdf

Place, U. T. (1993e). Is there an operant analysis of animal problem-solving [Abstract]. Behavioral Development, 3(3), 5.
[Related]  

Place, U. T. (1993f). With D. M. Armstrong and C. B. Martin 'A debate on dispositions: their nature and their role in causation, Part II: The Martin-Armstrong-Place debate, Chapter 7. Microstructural properties: categorical or dispositional?. Conceptus, XXVI(68/69), 33-39.

Place, U. T. (1993g) Folk psychology from the standpoint of conceptual analysis [Conference presentation]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society 1993, 30.
[Related]  

Place, U. T. (1993h). Psychologism and anti-psychologism: An historical overview [Conference presentation]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society 1993, 37.
[Abstract]Psychologism is the (mistaken) belief that logic is a descriptive science, that the laws of logic describe how people think in the way that the laws of motion describe how things move. Anti-psychologism repudiates psychologism, holding that logic is a normative or prescriptive science like ethics. Its laws tell us how people ought to think, not how they actually think in practice. Psychologism has always had a strong following within psychology, even though the difficulty most human subjects encounter in making correct logical inferences is not easily reconciled with it. But in philosophy the influence of Frege (1894) on Russell and Wittgenstein on the one hand and Husserl on the other has ensured that anti-psychologism has been the dominant orthodoxy both in Austro-Anglo-Saxon Analytic Philosophy and in Continental (German-French) Phenomenology. More recently, Fodor (1975) has pointed out that the causal role played by formally stated logical rules in the basic software of the serial-digital computer shows (a) that psychologism cannot be dismissed, as it has been in the past, on the grounds that logical principles are not the kind of thing that can enter into a causal relation, and (b) that if, as Fodor himself thinks, the serial-digital computer is the right model for the functioning of the brain, psychologism must actually be true. With the replacement of the serial-digital computer by the connectionist network as the preferred model for the way the brain functions, anti-psychologism looks set to become the dominant orthodoxy once again. But this time the case will be argued, not on a priori grounds, but on the the empirical evidence which renders psychologism a massively implausible account of how thought is actually generated.
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1993h Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism - A Historical Overview.pdf

Place, U. T. (1993i). Following 'the natural lines of fracture': Concept formation in neural networks [Conference presentation, presented at the Symposium on Associationism, Behaviour Analysis and Connectionism, held at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College, London 31st March 1993].
[Abstract]It is an implication of Darwin's theory of evolution by variation and natural selection that the survival and reproduction of complex free-moving living organisms, animals in other words, depends on their ability to change the spatial relations between themselves and other objects, including other organisms of the same and of different species, and so bring about the conditions necessary for that survival and reproduction. In order to do that the organism requires a system - its nervous system - whose function is to match the output to the current stimulus input on the one hand and the organism's current state of deprivation with respect to conditions required for its survival and successful reproduction on the other. Matching behaviour to the conditions required for survival and reproduction is the function of the motivational/emotional part of the system. Matching behaviour to current stimulus input is the function of the sensory/cognitive part of the system. The sensory/cognitive system cannot perform its function successfully without the ability to group inputs together in such a way that every actual and possible member of the class or category so formed is a reliable indicator of the presence of an environmental situation in which a particular behavioural strategy or set of such strategies is going to succeed. In other words the survival and reproduction of an organism of this kind depends crucially on its having a conceptual scheme, a conceptual scheme moreover, which reliably predicts the actual behaviour-consequence relations operating in the organism's environment. Although verbs such as ‘classifying’, ‘categorizing’ and ‘conceptualizing’ are not to be found in Skinner's writings, there is an important passage in The Behavior of Organisms (Skinner 1938) where he addresses the issue which others talk about when they use such terms. Thus in Chapter One, after outlining his "System of Behavior", he goes on to say The preceding system is based upon the assumption that both behavior and environment may be broken into parts which retain their identity throughout an experiment and undergo orderly changes. If this assumption were not in some sense justified, a science of behavior would be impossible. But the analysis of behavior is not an act of arbitrary sub-dividing.  We cannot define the concepts of stimulus and response quite as simply as ‘parts of behavior and environment’ without taking account of the natural lines of fracture along which behavior and environment actually break. (Skinner 1938 p.33). What Skinner has primarily in mind in this passage is the way the scientist's concepts need to be shaped into conformity with what he calls "the natural lines of fracture." But on the Darwinian argument the same must be true of the stimulus classes within which any living organism's behaviour generalises and between which it discriminates. It is argued that studying the properties of artificially constructed neural networks helps us to understand how the brain develops patterns of generalisation and discrimination which do indeed "follow the natural lines of fracture along which behavior and environment actually break." Attention is drawn to the role of the ‘hidden layer’ in responding to resemblances of pattern, to the role of re-entrant/recurrent and reverberatory circuits in establishing expectations on the basis of consecutive stimulus patterns, and to the role of error-correction in bringing stimulus classes into line with the contingencies experienced during learning.
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1993i Following 'The Natural Lines of Fracture' - Concept Formation in Neural Networks.pdf

Place, U. T. (1993j). Unsupervised and supervised learning in neural networks [Unpublished paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College, London, 30th March 1992, and at the Inter-Univerrsity Centre Conference on 'Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind,' Park Hotel, Bled, Slovenia, 10th June 1993].
[Abstract]The paper examines the relationship between three distinctions, two drawn from the current literature on learning in connectionist networks and one from the animal learning literature: 1. the distinction drawn by connectionists between 'unsupervised' and 'supervised' learning, 2. the distinction also drawn by connectionists between the Hebbian and 'delta' or error-correction learning rules, and 3. the distinction drawn within traditional learning theory between classical or respondent conditioning on the one hand and instrumental or operant learning on the other. It is argued that, despite differences in the way error-correction is applied in the two cases, the distinction between unsupervised and supervised learning corresponds closely to that between classical and instrumental learning. But, whereas unsupervised learning is usually implemented in artificial networks by a version of the Hebbian rule and supervised learning by the 'delta' rule, recent and not so recent work in animal learning suggests that, given plausible assumptions about the arrangement of the network, a version of the Hebbian rule can account for both types of learning.
[References]  [Talks]  

Place, U. T. (1994-04-06). Philosophical fashion and scientific progress in the the theory of universals. Symposium on social constructivism and scientific realism, Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society, College of Ripon and York St. John, York Campus, 6 April 1994.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1994-04-12). Sharpness: An interesting exception to the rule that dispositional properties require explanation in terms of their owner's microstructure. 20th Annual Philosophy of Science Course, Inter-University Graduate Centre, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 12 April 1994.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1994-05-28). Contextualism, mechanism and the conceptual analysis of the causal relation. Symposium on '"The Bogy of Mechanism": Alternative Philosophical Perspectives on the Contextualism/Mechanism Debate?' at the Twentieth Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Atlanta, GA, 28 May 1994.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1994-05-29). Conceptual analysis as the empirical study of linguistic convention: Some implications for behavior analysis. The Twentieth Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Atlanta, GA, 29 May 1994.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1994-06-02). Philosophical fashion and scientific progress in the the theory of universals. The Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Memphis, TN, 2 June 1994.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1994-08-25). Consciousness: Which brain process is it? Conference on 'Consciousness at the crossroads between philosophy and cognitive science.' Maribor, Slovenia, 25 August 1994.

Place, U. T. (1994-10-07). Linguistic behaviorism as a philosophy of empirical science. The Second International Congress on Behaviorism and the Sciences of Behavior, Palermo, Italy, 7 October 1994.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1994a). Connectionism and the resurrection of behaviourism. Acta Analytica, 9(12), 65-79.
[Abstract]The demise of behaviourism is traced to the advent of the serial-digital computer as a model for the functioning of the brain. With the advent of a new model in the shape of the parallel distributed processor (PDP) or connectionist network, the resurrection of behaviourism can be predicted. The relation between the two models is explained in terms of Skinner's (1966) distinction between "contingency-shaped" (modelled by the PDP) and "rule-governed" behaviour. Rule-governed behaviour in Skinner's sense is behaviour controlled by a verbal/symbolic "specification" of the relevant contingencies. The S-D computer is a device designed by a PDP (the human brain) to compensate for its own slowness and inefficiency in constructing and manipulating such symbolic specifications.
[References]  [Talks]  [1 citing publications]  
Download: 1994a Connectionism and the Resurrection of Behaviorism.pdf

Place, U. T. (1994b). Philosophical fashion and scientific progress [in the theory of universals. Presentation abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society 1994, 87.
[Related]  [Talks]  

Place, U. T. (1994c). Contextualism, mechanism and the conceptual analysis of the causal relation [Conference presentation, presented at a symposium on "The Bogy of Mechanism": Alternative Philosophical Perspectives on the Contextualism/Mechanism Debate, conducted at the Twentieth Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Atlanta, GA, May 28th 1994]. Association for Behavior Analysis.
[Abstract]The notion that mechanism and contextualism are two alternative and conflicting ways of conducting the scientific enterprise rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of the causal relation. Every effect is the outcome of many causes. Where the effect is an event, there is always a single triggering event which combines with a set of standing conditions which are already in place to complete the set of causes which are jointly sufficient for the coming about of the effect. In a mechanism, one triggering event leads inevitably to another because any variation in the standing conditions has been eliminated by strict control of the context within which the causal process takes place. Most mechanisms are a product of human artifice. Some, such as the movements involved in animal locomotion, are the product of natural selection. Another example of mechanical causation in biology is the transmission of excitation across the synapse from the pre-synaptic to the post-synaptic neuron. However, research by connectionists on the properties of artificial neural networks shows that mechanical causation at the neuro-synaptic ('molecular') level yields multi-factorial contextual causation at the ('molar') level of the network as a whole.
[References]  [Talks]  [1 citing publications]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1994c Contextualism, Mechanism and the Conceptual Analysis of the Causal Relation.pdf

Place, U. T. (1994d). Sharpness: an interesting exception to the rule that dispositional properties require explanation in terms of their owner's microstructure [Conference presentation, presented to the Twentieth Annual Conference on the Philosophy of Science at the Inter University Centre, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 12th April 1994]. Inter University Centre, Dubrovnik.
[Abstract]The most common form of distinctively scientific causal explanation is an explanation of the dispositional properties shared by instances of a universal or kind. Such explanations typically invoke the structural properties of the property-bearer. In the majority of cases and in all cases where a specifically scientific explanation is required, what are invoked are features of the microstructure of the property-bearer which are not accessible to ordinary observation at the level of common sense. An interesting exception is the case of the sharpness of a knife or needle. Sharpness is a property and a concept with a number of unusual features. Most property-concepts are either purely dispositional, as in the case of such things as the brittleness of glass, the flexibility of rubber or the magnetic properties of an iron bar, or they are structural properties, such as the external shape and internal arrangement of an object. Sharpness, by contrast, is a property with two aspects, a purely dispositional aspect, the property-bearer's propensity to cut or pierce, and a structural aspect, the fineness and hardness of its edge or point. However, the relation between these two aspects is a causal relation between "distinct existences", not a relation of identity. The dispositional property, aptness to cut or pierce, depends on and is explained by the structural properties, the fineness and hardness of the edge or point. In this it differs from most other dispositional properties. For in this case, the structural properties on which the dispositional property depends are features of the macrostructure rather than the microstructure of the property-bearer. They are thus available to common observation by the man- or woman-in-the-street in a way that the microstructural properties on which most dispositional properties depend are not. Hence the absorption of both cause and its effect into a single common-sense concept. Causal relations and the causal explanations which invoke them have two components: (a) a categorical component, some kind of contact or proximity between the causal agent and the causal patient, and (b) a dispositional component which provides the "cement" which, in the explanation, takes the form of a 'covering law' and governs the interaction between the two. In this respect, the causal relation whereby aptness to cut or pierce is generated by the structural properties of fineness and hardness of edge or point is no exception. Of the two structural properties which stand as cause to the dispositional property as effect, one, the fineness of the edge or point, is categorical; the other, its hardness, is dispositional. From a philosophical standpoint the 'sharpness' example raises two interesting questions: (1) In what sense does the effect, the aptness to cut or pierce, constitute a "distinct existence" from its causes, the fineness and hardness of the edge or point, as Hume's principle requires? (2) What light, if any, is thrown by this example on the problem of the source of the dispositional properties of an elementary particle which has no microstructure (the 'charm' of the quark)?
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1994d Sharpness.pdf

Place, U. T. (1994e). Conceptual analysis as the empirical study of linguistic conventions: Some implications for behavior analysis [Conference presentation at the Twentieth Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Atlanta, Georgia, May 29th 1994].
[Abstract]In a recent paper (Place 1992), the writer has argued that conceptual analysis, as practised by the philosophers of the 'ordinary language' school, is an empirical study of the linguistic conventions to which a speaker must conform if what she says is to be understood by (i.e., is to effectively control the behavior of) any competent interpreter of the language, dialect or technical code she is using. Since conformity to social norms and conventions is maintained by the avoidance of the aversive consequences of failing to do so, the only way to demonstrate unambiguously the existence of such a norm or convention is to perform an ethnomethodological experiment (Garfinkel 1964) in which the putative norm or convention is deliberately flouted so that the actual social consequences of so doing can be observed. Because of the social disruption and hostility towards the experimenter which such an experiment is liable to incur, in practice most such investigations take the form of a thought experiment in which the researcher invites the reader to imagine or recollect from her own past experience the consequences of flouting the convention in question. Though the consequences of flouting linguistic conventions are less serious, the reluctance of philosophers, in their professional capacity, to engage in any form of practical activity has ensured that the methodology of conceptual analysis is likewise that of the ethnomethodological thought experiment. In this case the existence of a linguistic convention is demonstrated by constructing a sentence which flouts the putative convention, and then asking the reader to consider how she would react, if confronted by such a sentence in the course of ordinary conversation. Provided the linguistic conventions which are studied in this way are universal in the sense that some version of them is to be found in every natural language, conceptual analysis so conceived can provide valuable insights into (a) the different ways in which language is used to control the behavior of the listener (pragmatics), (b) the way in which sentences are used to depict or represent segments of environmental reality, possible future events and states of affairs as well as actual past and present ones, (semantics) and (c) the nature of the reality thereby depicted (metaphysics). In relation to behavior analysis, conceptual analysis has important implications for the study of verbal behavior, for an understanding of the relation between our ordinary psychological language ("folk psychology") and the language of behavior analysis on the one hand and the language of physiology on the other, and for an understanding of some of the concepts, such as the concepts of 'cause' and 'effect' which are fundamental to the enterprise of empirical science as a whole.
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1994e Conceptual Analysis as the Empirical Study of Linguistic Convention - Some Implications for Behavior Analysis.pdf

Place, U. T. (1995-04-05). Conceptual analysis as the empirical study of linguistic convention. The Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology, Section of the British Psychological Society, University of Aberdeen, 5 April 1995.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1995-04-11). Conceptual analysis and the concept of reinforcement in classical/respondent conditioning and instrumental/operant learning. Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College, London, 11 April 1995.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1995-04-15). Response from psychology to Fred Dretske's Saturday morning Presidential speaker's presentation "What Good is Consciousness?" Annual Meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Virginia Beach, VA, 15 April 1995.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1995-04-17). The functions of consciousness. Philosophy Society, Hampden-Sydney College, VA, 17 April 1995

Place, U. T. (1995-04-19). The functions of consciousness. Philosophy Society, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 19 April 1995

Place, U. T. (1995-05-30). Behaviorism as an ethnomethodological experiment. Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Atlanta, GA, 30 May 1995.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1995-05-30). Chairman's introduction to a Panel Discussion sponsored by the Development Special Interest Group on 'How can we persuade linguists and developmental psychologists that language is learned?' Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Atlanta, GA, 30 May 1995.

Place, U. T. (1995-06-15). Metaphysics as the empirical study of the interface between language and reality. Conference on Metaphysics, Bled, Slovenia, 15 June 1995.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1995-08-31). The functions of consciousness and its constituent parts. Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 31 August 1995.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1995/6). Symbolic processes and stimulus equivalence. Behavior and Philosophy, 23/24, 13-30. www.jstor.org/stable/27759337
[Abstract]A symbol is defined as a species of sign. The concept of a sign coincides with Skinner's (1938) concept of a discriminative stimulus. Symbols differ from other signs in five respects: (1) They are stimuli which the organism can both respond to and produce, either as a self-directed stimulus (as in thinking) or as a stimulus for another individual with a predictably similar response from the recipient in each case. (2) they act as discriminative stimuli for the same kind of object for all members of the verbal community within which they function as symbols; (3) they acquire their properties by virtue of arbitrary social convention rather than any natural and intrinsic connection between the sign and what it is a sign of; (4) competent members of the verbal community can both produce the appropriate symbol in response to a naturally occurring sign of the presence of the object or a sample of the kind of object which the symbol stands for and select the appropriate object when presented with the symbol; (5) they form stimulus equivalence classes of the kind demonstrated in the matching-to-sample task (Sidman, 1971; Sidman and Tailby, 1982) both with other symbols having the same meaning and, more important, with the naturally-occurring non-symbolic signs of the presence of the object or kind of object which the symbol stands for.
[References]  [Talks]  [13 citing publications]  [4 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1995-6 Symbolic Processes and Stimulus Equivalence.pdf

Place, U. T. (1995a). The Searle fallacy: a reply to John Beloff (and in passing to John Searle). The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 21, 5-18.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 1995a The Searle Fallacy a Reply to John Beloff (and in passing to John Searle).pdf

Place, U. T. (1995b). 'Is consciousness a brain process?' Some misconceptions about the article. In B. Borstner, & J. Shawe-Taylor (Eds.), Consciousness at the crossroads of cognitive science and philosophy: Selected proceedings of the final meeting of the Tempus Project 'Phenomenology and Cognitive Science', Maribor, Slovenia, 23-7 August, 1994 (pp. 9-15). Imprint Academic.
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1995b 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process' Some Misconceptions about the Article.pdf

Place, U. T. (1995c). Conceptual analysis as the empirical study of linguistic convention [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society 1995, 143.
[Abstract]Recent developments such as connectionism in the field of artificial intelligence and selectionism in the neurosciences point away from a conception of the rules of language as a set of formal principles genetically inscribed onto the brain's equivalent of a hard disk and towards the notion that they are social conventions acquired and maintained by the error-correcting practices of a linguistic community. These developments should lead to a revival, not only of an empiricist/behaviourist linguistics, but also of conceptual analysis conceived as the empirical investigation of linguistic convention, using as its research tool Garfinkel's ethnomethodological experiment in which the putative convention is deliberately flouted so that the social consequences of so doing can be observed or, in the case of a thought experiment, imagined. Some implications of such a revival for our conception of the role of the philosopher in relation to psychology are examined. It is suggested that in order to explain how a "grammatical investigation" (Wittgenstein 1953) can throw light on the structure of reality, we need to invoke a combination of Frege's (1891/1960) "function and argument" analysis of the sentence and Wittgenstein's (1921/1961) "picture theory" of its meaning. This theoretical underpinning shows us how conceptual analysis construed as an empirical investigation of linguistic conventions can yield (a) a conception of mental life as proceeding from mental activity/process through an instantaneous mental event to a mental disposition, and (b) an argument against the existence of abstract objects such as the mind and its faculties.
Keywords: picture theory of meaning
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1995c Conceptual Analysis as the Empirical Study of Linguistic Convention.pdf

Place, U. T. (1995d). A psychologist's response to Professor Dretske's ' What good is consciousness'. [Unpublished response to Fred Dretske's Saturday morning Presidential speaker's presentation "What Good is Consciousness?" Annual meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Virginia Beach, VA, April 15th , 1995].
Note:
The presentation of Professor Dretske is published as Dretske, F. (1997). What good is consciousness? Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 27(1), 1-15.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [Talks]  
Download: 1995d A Psychologist's Response to Professor Dretske's 'What Good is Consciousness'.pdf

Place, U. T. (1995e). Conceptual analysis and the concept of reinforcement in classical/respondent conditioning and instrumental/operant learning [Presentation given at the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College, London, 11th April 1995].
[Abstract]Conceptual analysis is the empirical investigation of the social conventions which govern the construction of intelligible sentences in natural language. Although it has application to other aspects of language, the focus is on features that are universal across languages and on ordinary rather than technical language. In relation to the scientific study of the behaviour of living organisms, it gives us insight both into the respects in which common sense psychology serves functions which have no place in the scientific enterprise and into the way behaviour is in fact regulated, based on thousands of years of experience of how it looks from without as well from within. The way in which the distinction between classical/respondent conditioning and instrumental/operant learning is marked in the sentences of common sense psychology is discussed as a means of reconciling the different technical languages of behaviour analysis and associative learning theory.
[References]  [Talks]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1995e Conceptual Analysis and the Concept of Reinforcement.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996-03-26). Rescuing the science of human behaviour from the ashes of socialism. Symposium on Philosophical and Conceptual Issues in Behavioural Psychology'', Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College, London, 26 March 1996.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1996-04-03). Mental causation is no different from any other kind. The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Section, Tenth Annual Conference, University College of Ripon and York St. John, York Campus, 3 April 1996.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1996-05-27). A selectionist approach to the problem of universals. Session devoted to 'Conceptual and Philosophical Issues in Behavior Analysis', 22nd Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, San Francisco, 27 May 1996.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1996-05-28). Three senses of the word "tact": Their location within first language acquisition. Symposium 'Current Behavioral Research with Young Children' , 22nd Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, San Francisco, 28 May 1996.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1996-07-04). Causal conditionals and their truthmakers. I.U.C. Conference on 'Truth', Bled, Slovenia, 4 June 1996.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1996-07-18). On the anti-depressant effect of suppressing REM sleep. Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Barcelona, 18 July 1996.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1996-11-02) From mystical experience to biological consciousness: a pilgrim's progress? Conference on 'Mystical Experience', Institute of Psychiatry, University of London, 2 November 1996.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1996a). Names as constituents of sentences: an omission. Commentary on P. Horne and C. F. Lowe, 'On the origins of naming and other symbolic behavior'. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 65, 302-304. doi:10.1901/jeab.1996.65-302
[Abstract]After Skinner's (1957) insistence on separating the behavior of the speaker from that of the listener, Horne & Lowe (1996) have brought these two aspects of language back together by showing that in learning a name the child must not only learn, as speaker, to produce the name when presented with the object to which it applies, it must also learn, as listener, to select the object when presented with the name. What is missing from their account is the recognition that it is sentences, rather than names, that are the functional units of language, and that a primitive sentence requires a function or predicate in the form of an action-name in addition to one or more object-names. They are also chided for failing to distinguish the three senses of Skinner's term "tact" to which the writer drew attention in an earlier paper (Place 1985).
[References]  [Is reply to]  [1 citing publications]  
Download: 1996a Names as Constituents of Sentences - An Omission.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996b). Summary of Dispositions: A Debate [Unpublished paper].
Note:
Unpublished summary of the positions adopted in the book Dispositions: A Debate. UTP hoped in vain that his co-authors would fill in their positions.
[References]  
Download: 1996b Summary of Dispositions A Debate.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996c). Dispositions as intentional states. In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin, U. T. Place, & T. Crane (Ed.) Dispositions: A debate (Chapter 2, pp. 19-32). Routledge.
[Abstract]All three authors agree that 'This glass is brittle' entails 'If it were suitably struck, it would break'. They also agree that such a statement, if true, requires a state of affairs whose existence makes it true (its truthmaker). They disagree as to its nature. For Place, it is an intentional state which "points towards" a possibly-never-to-exist future and a counterfactual past. In accordance with the conceptualist theory of universals and the picture theory of meaning which he outlines, such states are construed as properties of particulars. They provide Hume's "invisible glue" which sticks cause to effect.
Keywords: picture theory of meaning
[References]  [Related]  [6 citing publications]  
Download: 1996c Chapter 2 Dispositions as Intentional States.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996d). A conceptualist ontology. In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin. U. T. Place, & T. Crane (Ed.) Dispositions: A debate (Chapter 4, pp. 49-67). Routledge.
[Abstract]Nominalised predicates, opaque contexts and monadic relational predicates are cases where surface structure conceals an underlying complexity. A conceptualist picture theory of meaning allows different ways of carving up reality into atomic situations. To say that a universal exists means either that it has at least one instance or that some creature has that concept. Structural factors combine to cause dispositions. Dispositions combine with the relevant conditions to cause their manifestations. Type-identities begin as contingent hypotheses and become necessary when used in classification. The existence of individual dispositional properties, not Laws of Nature, are the truthmakers for causal counterfactuals.
Keywords: picture theory of meaning
[References]  [Related]  [3 citing publications]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 1996d Chapter 4 A Conceptualist Ontology.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996e). Structural properties: categorical, dispositional or both? In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin, U. T. Place, & T. Crane (Ed.) Dispositions: A debate (Chapter 7, pp. 105-125). Routledge.
[Abstract]Martin's "linguisticism" which converts existence into the truth of an existential statement is found in such doctrines as "To exist is to be the value of a variable", "Wanting is a propositional attitude", and "Causal conditionals are of the form 'If p, then q'". The (dispositional) properties of the whole are caused by, are often predictable from, but are not reducible to, the (categorical) arrangement of its parts and their dispositional properties. An unmanifested dispositional property is a law of the nature of the property-bearer which governs how it would behave, if its manifestation conditions were to be fulfilled.
[References]  [Related]  [1 citing publications]  
Download: 1996e Chapter 7 Structural Properties - Categorical, Dispositional or Both .pdf

Place, U. T. (1996f). Conceptualism and the ontological independence of cause and effect. In D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin, U. T. Place, & T. Crane (Ed.) Dispositions: A debate (Chapter 10, pp. 153-162). London: Routledge.
Keywords: conceptualism
[References]  [Related]  [1 citing publications]  
Download: 1996f Chapter 10 Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996g). Intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. Dialectica, 50, 91-120. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00001.x
[Abstract]Martin and Pfeifer (1986) have claimed "that the most typical characterizations of intentionality . . . all fail to distinguish . . . mental states from . . . dispositional physical states." The evidence they present in support of this thesis is examined in the light of the possibility that what it shows is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. Of the five marks of intentionality they discuss a critical examination shows that three of them, Brentano's (1874) inexistence of the intentional object, Searle's (1983) directedness and Anscombe's (1965) indeterminacy, are features which distinguish T-intenTional/dispositional states, both mental and non-mental (physical), from non-dispositional "categorical" states. The other two are either, as in the case of Chisholm's (1957) permissible falsity of a propositional attitude ascription, a feature of linguistic utterances too restricted in its scope to be of interest, or, as in the case of Frege's (1892) indirect reference/Quine's (1953) referential opacity, evidence that the S-intenSional locution is a quotation either of what someone has said in the past or might be expected to say, if the question were to arise at some time in the future.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [Talks]  [43 citing publications]  [10 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 1996g Intentionality as the Mark of the Dispositional.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996h). Mental causation is no different from any other kind. The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 23, 15-20.
[Abstract]Mental causation, as the term is used here, is the relation between an individual's beliefs, desires and intentions on the one hand and the behaviour they motivate on the other. Until it was challenged by Donald Davidson (1963/1980), the accepted view amongst philosophers was that mental causation in this sense is not a causal relation ("reasons are not causes"). Now most subscribe to Davidson's view that it is a causal relation, but an anomalous one. I argue that it is a standard causal relationship which differs in no way from other non-mental cases of causation.
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1996h Mental Causation is No Different from Any Other Kind.pdf this is a shortened version of the unpublished:  1996h Full version of Mental Causation is No Different from Any Other Kind.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996i). The properties of conscious experiences: A second reply to John Beloff. The British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 23, 31-33.
[References]  [Is reply to]  
Download: 1996i The Properties of Conscious Experiences A Second Reply to John Beloff.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996j). Linguistic behaviorism as a philosophy of empirical science. In W. O'Donohue, & R. Kitchener (Eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology ( Chapter 9, pp. 126-140). Sage. doi:10.4135/9781446279168.n9
[Abstract]Linguistic behaviorism is a philosophy of science with application to every empirical science from physics to sociology. It holds that • philosophy, including the philosophy of science, uses conceptual analysis to study the interface between language and the 'reality' it depicts, • conceptual analysis is an empirical investigation of the conventions governing the construction of intelligible sentences in natural language and its technical derivatives, • conformity to linguistic convention is maintained by selective social reinforcement. It endorses the analytic/synthetic distinction, a picture theory of the meaning of sentences, a correspondence theory of synthetic truth and a counterfactual theory of causal necessity.
Keywords: correspondence theory of truth, picture theory of meaning
[References]  [Talks]  [3 citing publications]  [10 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1996j Linguistic Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Empirical Science.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996k). Introduction of 'Folk psychology and its implications for psychological science'. In W. O'Donohue, & R. Kitchener (Eds.) The Philosophy of Psychology (Chapter 17, pp. 243-244). Sage. doi:10.4135/9781446279168.n17
Download: 1996k Introduction of 'Folk psychology and its implications for psychological science'.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996l). Folk psychology from the standpoint of conceptual analysis. In W. O'Donohue, & R. Kitchener (Eds.) The Philosophy of Psychology (Chapter 17, pp. 264-270). Sage. doi:10.4135/9781446279168.n17
[Abstract]Before deciding what status should be given to folk psychology within scientific psychology, we must understand its linguistic peculiarities. To do that, we need to attend to research on the topic within the philosophical tradition known as "conceptual analysis." This research enables us to identify six respects in which folk psychological language can lead us astray, when used in a scientific context: (1) the creation of bogus abstract entities by the process of "nominalizing" predicates and other non-substantival parts of speech, (2) the persistent use of adjectives with evaluative (good/bad) connotations, (3) the systematic evaluation of the content of other people's cognitive attitudes and judgments from the standpoint of the speaker, (4) the distortion of causal accounts of human action by the demand for a single scapegoat on whom to pin the blame when things go wrong, (5) the use of the metaphor of linguistic control when explaining behavior that is not subject to that type of control, (6) the unavoidable use of simile when describing private experience.
[References]  [Talks]  [2 citing publications]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1996l Folk Psychology from the Standpoint of Conceptual Analysis.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996m). Metaphysics as the empirical investigation of the interface between language and reality. Acta Analytica, 11(15), 97-118.
[Abstract]The rules of syntax and semantics on conformity to which linguistic communication depends are construed as social conventions instilled and maintained by the error-correcting practices of a linguistic community. That conception argues for the revival of conceptual analysis construed as the empirical investigation of such conventions using the ethnomethodological thought experiment as its primary research tool, and for a view of metaphysics as the empirical study of the interface between utterances and the reality they depict.
[References]  [Talks]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1996m Metaphysics as the Empirical Study of the Interface between Language and Reality.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996n). A selectionist approach to the problem of universals [Conference presentation, presented in the session 'Conceptual and Philosophical Issues in Behavior Analysis' of the 22nd Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, San Francisco, May 27th 1996]. Association for Behavior Analysis.
[Abstract]As it is discussed by philosophers, the problem of universals has two aspects: an ontological aspect and an epistemological aspect. Views on the ontological aspect divide between "realism" which holds that universals are abstract objects, distinct from their instances, with which the organism's concepts must line up if it is to survive and reproduce, and "constructivism" which holds that the organism's concepts are the only universals there are. Views on the epistemological issue divide between "nativism" which holds that concepts are innate, and "empiricism" which holds that they are learned. Most realists are nativists. Most constructivists are empiricists. Selectionist considerations suggest a middle position between these extremes: (1) There are no universals in the absence of a classifying organism (constructivism). (2) There is a significant innate contribution to the organism's system of concepts (nativism). (3) The fine tuning which brings the organism's concepts into line with what Skinner (1938) calls "the natural lines of fracture along which environment and behavior actually break" is a matter of contingency-shaped discrimination learning (empiricism). (4) There are objective constraints which ensure that the concepts so formed line up with "real" similarities and differences between objects, events and states of affairs in the organism's interactions with the environment (realism).
Keywords: universals
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1996n A Selectionist Approach to the Problem of Universals.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996o). On the anti-depressant effect of suppressing REM sleep [Conference presentation, presented at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology at Barcelona on the 18th of July 1996]. European Society for Philosophy and Psychology.
[Abstract]In a paper presented to the 1995 Euro-SPP Meeting in Oxford Kathleen Taylor and I proposed the identification of conscious experience with the activity of what we call the "central input focuser (CIF)" which restructures the figure-ground relations within what Broadbent (1971) has called the "evidence" on which the categorization of problematic inputs is based. We further suggested that rapid-eye-movement (REM) sleep is a condition in which the CIF is allowed to "freewheel" while decoupled from sensory input. As a result the vivid dream imagery which is characteristic of and peculiar to this phase of sleep recapitulates those associations formed during the preceding period of waking which have acquired motivational significance and hence an emotional charge by virtue of their resemblance to or associative links with emotionally charged events in the dreamer's past life. The effect of this is to ensure that the dreamer's attention is caught by inputs which have these emotionally charged associations during subsequent periods of waking consciousness. In this paper an explanation, based on this hypothesis, is offered of the well-known fact that anti-depressant drugs have the effect of suppressing REM sleep; though what the hypothesis in fact explains is why a drug that suppresses REM sleep should have an anti-depressant effect.
[References]  [Talks]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1996o On the Anti-Depressant Effect of Suppressing REM Sleep.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996p). Review of Morris (1996) Some reflections on contextualism, mechanism, and behavior analysis [Unpublished review of the manuscript submitted by Morris.]
[References]  [Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: 1996p Review of Morris (1996), Some reflections on contextualism, mechanism, and behavior analysis.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996q). The picture theory of meaning and its implication for the theory of truth and its discrimination. Communication and Cognition, 29, 5-14.
[Abstract]Linguistic behaviourism is an approach to linguistics, philosophy and the philosophy of science which combines Skinner's (1957) thesis that language is a form of learned social behaviour maintained by the reinforcement practices of a linguistic or, as he would say, "verbal" community with Chomsky's (1957, etc.) insistence that the functional unit of language is the sentence and that sentences are seldom repeated word-for-word, but are typically constructed anew on each occasion of utterance. The ability of the listener or reader to be directed by an imperative sentence to do something she has never done before or to be alerted by a declarative sentence to the existence of a situation the like of which she has never encountered and to which she would otherwise have no access is explained on a version of the picture theory of meaning in which the structure and content of the sentence maps onto the structure and content of the situation which is thereby depicted. Hand in hand with the picture theory of meaning goes a correspondence theory of what it means for a contingent proposition to be true. But in accounting for the way true contingent propositions are discriminated, both the coherence and the pragmatic principles are invoked.
Keywords: correspondence theory of truth, picture theory of meaning
[References]  [1 citing publications]  [3 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1996q The Picture Theory of Meaning and its Implication for the Theory of Truth and its Discrimination.pdf

Place, U. T. (1996r). Three senses of the word "tact": Their location within first language acquisition [Unpublished paper, presented to the symposium 'Current Behavioral Research with Young Children' of the 22nd Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, San Francisco, May 28th 1996].
[Talks]  

Place, U. T. (1997-03-27). From mystical experience to biological consciousness: a pilgrim's progress? The Annual Conference of the British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Section, College of Ripon and York St. John, 27 March 1997.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1997-04-08) Two theories of meaning: the two-factor dispositional/relational and the single-factor relational'. The Twenty Third Philosophy of Science Course, Inter-University Centre, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 8 April 1997.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1997-05-23). Linguistic Behaviorism. The Twenty Third Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Chicago, IL, 23 May 1997.

Place, U. T. (1997-06-05). De Re Modality without Possible Worlds. Inter-University Centre Conference on 'Modality', 5 June 1997.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1997-06-15). Consciousness and the zombie-within: A functional analysis of the blindsight evidence. First Conference of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Claremont, CA, 15 June 1997.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1997-06-21). We needed the analytic-synthetic distinction to formulate mind-brain identity then: we still do. Symposium on 'Forty years of Australian Materialism', Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds, 21 June 1997.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1997-07-04) On the role of the human hand in the evolution of language.13th Annual Meeting of the Language Origins Society, Pilsen, Czech Republic, 4th July 1997. 13th Annual Meeting of the Language Origins Society, Pilsen, Czech Republic, 4 July 1997.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1997-07-10). Linguistic behaviourism and the correspondence theory of truth. Symposium on 'Finding the Truth in Behaviour Analysis', Third European Meeting for the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour, Dublin, 10 July 1997.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1997-08-15), Connectionism and the problem of consciousness. Conference on Horgan & Tienson Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 15 August 1997.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1997-08-28). Wundt's theory of imageless thought as a possible key to the role of slow-wave sleep in depressive ruminations. Sixth Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Padova, 28 August 1997.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1997-12-12). Consciousness and the Zombie-within Department of Psychology, Glasgow Caledonian University, 12 December 1997.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1997a). Contingency analysis applied to the pragmatics and semantics of naturally occurring verbal interactions. In J. L. Owen (Ed.), Context and communication behavior (Chapter 18, pp. 369-385). Context Press.
[Abstract]Contingency analysis is a technique for analyzing the relation between a living organism and its environment based on a generalized version of Skinner's (1969) concept of the "three-term contingency." It can be applied to the analysis of any sequence of events in which a single individual interacts with its environment or, as in the case of social behavior, in which two or more individuals interact with each other. It is particularly valuable when applied to the analysis of naturally-occurring verbal interactions, such as conversations and business transactions. It can be applied not only to the sequence of events whereby utterances follow one another as the interaction proceeds, their pragmatics, but also to the semantic content of the utterances, the sequence of events called for by what Skinner (1957) calls a "mand" or those recorded or predicted by the kind of declarative sentence he sometimes (Place 1985) calls a "tact".
[References]  [Talks]  [2 citing publications]  [5 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1997a Contingency Analysis Applied to the Pragmatics and Semantics of Naturally Occurring Verbal Interactions.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997b). Linguistic behaviorism and the correspondence theory of truth. Behavior and Philosophy, 25, 83-94. www.jstor.org/stable/27759370
[Abstract]Linguistic Behaviorism (Place, 1996) is an attempt to reclaim for the behaviorist perspective two disciplines, linguistics and linguistic philosophy, most of whose practitioners have been persuaded by Chomsky's (1959) Review of B. F. Skinner's (1957) Verbal Behavior that behaviorism has nothing useful to contribute to the study of language. It takes as axiomatic (a) that the functional unit of language is the sentence, and (b) that sentences are seldom repeated word-for-word, but are constructed anew on each occasion of utterance out of units, words, phrases and turns of phrase, that are repeated. On this view, the problem of discriminating the true from the false arises from the use of novel declarative sentences (statements) to depict or, to use Skinner's term, "specify" contingencies the like of which the listener need never have encountered and to which he would otherwise have no access. In such cases the listener needs to distinguish among the sentences he receives from other speakers between those where the situation depicted/specified corresponds to that which actually exists at the time and place specified in the sentence and are, therefore, true, and those to which no actual situation corresponds and which are, therefore, false.
Keywords: correspondence theory of truth, linguistic behaviorism
[References]  [Talks]  [1 citing publications]  
Download: 1997b Linguistic Behaviourism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997c). From mystical experience to biological consciousness: a pilgrim's progress? [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society, 5, 117.
[Talks]  

Place, U. T. (1997d). Rescuing the science of human behavior from the ashes of socialism. Psychological Record, 47, 649-659. doi:10.1007/BF03395251
[Abstract]The discredit into which the socialist ideal has fallen as a consequence of recent political events calls into question, not just the viability of a particular political and economic system but, the very idea that the social order can be improved by applying principles derived from the scientific study of human social behavior. Before the collapse of socialism, the idea of a science of human behavior, construed in biological terms as a branch of the science of the behavior of free-moving living organisms in general, had been undermined by Chomsky's (1959) repudiation of the behaviorist project to construct a science of language (verbal behavior) based on principles derived from the study of animal learning. I contend that only by reinstating the link between linguistics and the study of animal learning can confidence be restored in the possibility of a genuine science of human behavior with application to the problem of constructing a better social order.
[References]  [Talks]  [3 citing publications]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1997d Rescuing the Science of Human Behavior from the Ashes of Socialism.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997e). On the nature of conditionals and their truthmakers. Acta Analytica, 12(18), 73-88.
[Abstract]Standard propositional and predicate logic fails both as a model for natural language and, since it cannot handle causation, as a language for science. The failure to handle causation stems from a misconstrual of the causal conditional as a relation between the truth of two propositions (If p, then q). What the causal conditional in fact specifies is a 'relation' between the possible existence or non-existence of two situations made true by the existence of the dispositional properties of the concrete particulars involved.
[References]  [Talks]  [5 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1997e On the Nature of Conditionals and Their Truthmakers.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997f). De re modality without possible worlds. Acta Analytica, 12(19), 131-145.
[Abstract]A distinction is drawn between de dicto modality which is a matter of which propositions can, cannot and must be true, given the laws of logic, and de re modality which is a matter of which situations (events or states of affairs) can, cannot and must exist, given the laws of nature. It is argued that Kripke's de re modality, defined in terms of what is true in some possible world, no possible world and all possible worlds, is an unsatisfactory amalgam of the two.
[References]  [Talks]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1997f De Re Modality Without Possible Worlds.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997g). We needed the analytic-synthetic distinction to formulate mind-brain identity then: we still do [Conference presentation, presented at a Symposium on 'Forty years of Australian Materialism', June 21st 1997]. Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds.
[Abstract]Quine's (1951/1980) repudiation of the analytic-synthetic distinction undermines three principles fundamental to the view expounded in ‘Is consciousness a brain process?' (Place 1956): the idea that problems, such as that of the relation between mind and body, are partly conceptual confusions to be cleared away by philosophical analysis and partly genuine empirical questions to be investigated and answered decisively by the relevant empirical science, the distinction between the meaning of what the individual says when she describes her private experiences and the nature of the actual events she is describing as revealed by science, and the claim that, unless the connection is obscured by the different ways in which the two predicates come to be applied, co-extensive predicates become conceptually (intensionally) connected, and sentences asserting their identity become analytic. It is argued that, if the object is, as it should be, to assimilate this case to other cases of type-identity in science, rather than perpetuate the problem, these principles are still needed.
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1997g We Needed the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction to Formulate the Mind-Brain Identity Then We Still Do.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997h). Wundt's theory of imageless thought as a possible key to the role of slow-wave sleep in depressive ruminations [Conference presentation, presented at the Sixth Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology (ESPP), Padova, 28th August 1997]. European Society for Philosophy and Psychology
[Abstract]Sleep contributes in two ways to the aetiology of clinical depression. The dream imagery of REM sleep stamps in associations between current environmental events and other emotionally charged incidents in the past, only some of which are depressive in nature. The imageless ruminations of slow-wave sleep have a more specific depressive effect in that they keep alive, often indefinitely, problems for which no solution is to be found.
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1997h Wundt's Theory of Imageless Thought as Possible Key to the Role of Slow-Wave Sleep in Depressive Ruminations.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997i). Linguistic behaviourism and the correspondence theory of truth [Conference presentation abstract, presented at the Symposium on 'Finding the Truth in Behaviour Analysis']. In J.C. Leslie (Ed.) EMEAB III Proceedings of the Third European Meeting for the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour, July 10-13 1997, Dublin, Ireland (p. 59). University of Ulster.
Keywords: correspondence theory of truth, linguistic behaviorism
[Related]  [Talks]  

Place, U. T. (1997j). Is consciousness a grain process? A response to Graham & Horgan [Unpublished response to a final draft (1997) of Graham, G., & Horgan, T. (2002). Sensations and grain processes. In J. H. Fetzer (Ed.), Consciousness Evolving (pp.63-86). John Benjamins.]
Note:
[There is some overlap with Place (1999e).]
[References]  [Is reply to]  
Download: 1997j Is Consciousness a Grain Process - A Response to Horgan & Graham.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997k). Two theories of meaning: The two-factor dispositional/relational and the single factor relational [Presented at the Twenty Third Philosophy of Science Course, Inter-University Centre, Dubrovnik, 8th April 1997].
[Abstract]Theories of meaning are of two kinds, two-factor dispositional/relational theories and single factor relational theories. A two-factor dispositional/relational theory of meaning holds that the word 'meaning' has two senses: a primary and fundamental sense in which meaning is a disposition and a secondary and derivative sense in which meaning is a relation. (a) In the primary or dispositional sense, the meaning of a linguistic expression, such as a phrase or sentence, is a disposition, shared by relevantly competent speakers and interpreters of a particular natural language or technical code, to apply certain criteria (which they need not be able to state) in deciding whether or not a particular they encounter is either an instance to which, in the case of a general term or universally quantified sentence, the expression applies or, in the case of a singular term or singularly quantified sentence, the individual to which it refers. (b) In the secondary or relational sense, the meaning of a linguistic expression is the actual individuals assigned, by the application of those criteria, to the extension of a general term or universally quantified sentence or the actual individual referred to by a singular term or singularly quantified sentence when uttered on a particular occasion, as determined by the criteria. Taking their cue from Quine's (1951/1980) repudiation of the analytic/synthetic distinction, many philosophers have defended a purely relational/extensional theory of meaning in which dispositional notions such as 'intension', 'Sinn' ('sense'), 'analytic' and 'necessary' (defined in terms of what it is self-contradictory to deny) play no part. Motivation for the single-factor relational theory comes from logic. That for the two-factor dispositional relational theory defended here comes from psychology. The application of the two-factor theory to scientific principles such as 'Water is H₂O' and Ohm's Law is described.
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1997k Two Theories of Meaning - The Two-Factor Dispositional Relational and the Single Factor Relational.pdf

Place, U. T. (1997l). Consciousness and the Zombie-within. [Paper presented at the Inaugural Conference of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Claremont, CA, June 15th 1997.]
[Talks]  [3 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1998-04-06) The role of the hand in the evolution of language [poster]. 2nd International Conference on the Evolution of Language, City University, London, 6-9 April 1998.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1998-04-15) Behaviourism and the evolution of language. 12th Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology, Section of the British Psychological Society, College of Ripon and York St. John, York Campus, 15 April 1998.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1998-05-25) The role of the hand in the evolution of language. Symposium on Recent Conceptual Advances in Developmental Behavior Analysis, 24th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Orlando, FL, 25 May 1998.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1998-06-04). Vagueness as a mark of dispositional intentionality. IUC Conference on Vagueness, Kompas Hotel, Bled, Slovenia, 4 June 1998.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1998-06-19). Workshop on 'Consciousness and the Identity Theory'. Conference on 'Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Issues', Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Bremen, Germany, 19 June 1998.
[Abstract]This workshop will examine whether the thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain differs from other cases of what I call “compositional type-identities“ in science, such as 'Water is H₂O', 'The temperature of a body is its rate of molecular motion', 'Lightning is an electric discharge through the atmosphere', only to the extent that the brain process or processes in question have not yet been precisely specified by neuroscientific research. The rapid development of such research in recent years makes it likely that such exact specification will soon be possible. It is, therefore, imperative that we examine whether the analogy holds good, or whether the alleged disanalogies are such as to rule out such identification. We begin with a brief history of the identity theory, beginning with Boring (1933), Place (1954; 1956), Feigl (1958; 1967), Smart (1959), followed by a glance at subsequent developments, such as eliminative materialism (Feyerabend 1963; Rorty 1965; Churchland 1981), central state materialism (Armstrong 1968), token identity physicalism (Davidson 1970/1980), Kripke's (1972/1980) intuition, and the qualia problem (Nagel 1974). We shall then examine topics such as the nature of the identity relation, the 'is' of composition versus the 'is' of identity, Boring's claim that perfect correlation is identity, the process whereby compositional type identities become analytic, with a consequent change in the meaning of the common sense concept involved, once they become matters of established scientifc fact, before considering some of the alleged disanalogies between the consciousness brain-process case and standard cases of compositional type-identity.
[References]  

Place, U. T. (1998-06-20). The neuroanatomy of consciousness and the zombie-within. Conference on 'Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Issues', Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Bremen, Germany, 20 June 1998.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1998-06-21). The evolution of an information-flow diagram [Poster]. Conference on 'Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Issues', Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Bremen, Germany, 21 June 1998.
[Abstract]My contribution for this year's ASSC Conference includes two diagrams showing a suggested arrangement of modules within two interacting input-output transformation systems in the brain which I call respectively “consciousness“ and “the zombie-within“. These diagrams are lineally descended from the “information-flow diagram for the organism“ which Donald Broadbent published as Figure 7 (p. 299) in his 1958 book PERCEPTION AND COMMUNICATION. In DECISION AND STRESS (1971, pp. 11-16) Broadbent introduced no less than SEVEN modifications to the model as proposed in the 1958 book and set out in the original diagram. He made no attempt, however, to produce a new information-flow diagram incorporating these changes. For an unpublished series of lectures given in the University of Amsterdam in 1973-4, I prepared a revised version of the 1958 diagram incorporating these changes, but including some additions and omissions of my own. Further revisions of this diagram were prepared for papers, also unpublished, presented: in 1988 at the Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society in Leeds, in 1991 at the Neurosciences Institute, then in New York, NY, in 1995 at the Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology in Oxford, and in 1997 at last year's Inaugural ASSC Conference at Claremont, CA. In so far as copies still survive, all these versions together with some related documentary material will be displayed as an historical record of the evolution of the current model.

Place, U. T. (1998-07-23) On the role of the human hand in the evolution of language [poster]. 6th International Pragmatics Conference, Reims, France, 23 July 1998.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1998-11-20). Behaviorism and the Evolution of Language. The Fourth International Congress on Behaviorism and the Sciences of Behavior, Seville, Spain, 20 November 1998.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1998-11-20). The Role of the Hand in the Evolution of Language [poster]. The Fourth International Congress on Behaviorism and the Sciences of Behavior, Seville, Spain, 20 November 1998.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1998-11-21). Evidence for the role of operant reinforcement in the acquisition and maintenance of linguistic competence [Presentation]. The Fourth International Congress on Behaviorism and the Sciences of Behavior, Seville, Spain, 21 November 1998.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1998a). From mystical experience to biological consciousness: a pilgrim's progress? In Man Cheung Chung (Ed.), Current Trends in History and Philosophy of Psychology, (Vol. 1, 1998, chapter 8, pp. 43-48). British Psychological Society.
[Abstract]I recount the history of a thought process leading from an adolescent interest in mystical experience to an article entitled 'Is consciousness a brain process?' (Place 1956) in which I gave an affirmative answer to that question. A psychological research project designed to demonstrate the adaptive function of a personality transformation brought about through mystical experience becomes an attempt to resolve the mind-body problem through an empirical evaluation of the hypothesis that consciousness is a behaviour-controlling process in the brain. The mystic's insistence on the inadequacy of words to describe such experiences leads through the logical positivist's claim that religious language is nonsense, to the view that nothing that introspecting subjects say about their experiences is inconsistent with anything the physiologist might say about the brain processes in which on this view they consist.
Note:
This is a shortened version of Place (2004).
[References]  [Related]  [Talks]  [1 citing publications]  
Download: 1998a From Mystical Experience to Biological Consciousness.pdf

Place, U. T. (1998b). Sentence and sentence structure in the analysis of verbal behavior. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 15, 131-133. doi:10.1007/BF03392935
[References]  [2 citing publications]  
Download: 1998b Sentence and Sentence Structure in the Analysis of Verbal Behavior.pdf

Place, U. T. (1998c). Behaviourism and the evolution of language. In Man Cheung Chung (Ed.), Current Trends in History and Philosophy of Psychology Volume 2 (Chapter 9, pp. 55-61). British Psychological Society.
[Abstract]The view that linguistic competence is acquired and maintained according to the principle of selective operant reinforcement is defended, partly on grounds of evolutionary probability and the special nature of human environmental adaptation, and partly on the basis of two strands of empirical evidence: experimental evidence from studies of "verbal conditioning" and observational evidence of naturally-occurring verbal interactions in the work of discourse and conversation analysts.  But, since selective operant reinforcement is as much part of animal as it is of human learning, that principle by itself cannot explain why only humans have developed language and why apes can, at best, attain to the linguistic competence of a human two-year-old.
[References]  [Talks]  [1 citing publications]  
Download: 1998c Behaviourism and the Evolution of Language.pdf

Place, U. T. (1998d). Behaviourism as a standpoint in linguistics. Connexions, (4), 26-30.
[Abstract]The thesis of this paper is that behaviourism is the only adequate scientific foundation for the disciplines of psychology, linguistics and linguistic philosophy.  Behaviourism in psychology is presented as a convergence of six principles: (1) behaviour as the subject matter of psychology, (2) the objectivity principle, (3) the rejection of mentalistic explanation, (4) the three-term contingency, (5) the distinction between discriminative stimuli and establishing conditions, and (6) learning theory. Behaviourism in linguistics and linguistic philosophy is seen as resting on ten principles: (1) language as communication in the service of technology, (2) language and thought, (3) the sentence as the functional unit of linguistic communication, (4) novel sentence-construction, (5) novel sentences and the representation of unfamiliar contingencies, (6) sentence-construction and the win-shift/fail-stay contingency, (7) the picture theory of the meaning of sentences, (8) the associative learning of word and phrase meaning, (9) lexical words, syntactic words and Bickerton's "proto-language", (10) mutations and the facilitation of language learning.
Note:
About the journal: Connexions - An online journal of cognitive science. ISSN 1368-3233. In the period 1997 - 2003 there appeared 6 issues. The journal is archived at www.keithfrankish.com/connexions/
[References]  [Talks]  [2 citing publications]  
Download: 1998d Behaviourism as a Standpoint in the Science of Linguistics.pdf

Place, U. T. (1998e) Evidence for the role of operant reinforcement in the acquisition and maintenance of linguistic competence. Connexions, (4), 31-37.
Note:
About the journal: Connexions - An online journal of cognitive science. ISSN 1368-3233 In the period 1997 - 2003 there appeared 6 issues. The journal is archived at www.keithfrankish.com/connexions/
[References]  [Talks]  [2 citing publications]  
Download: 1998e Evidence for the Role of Operant Reinforcement in the Acquisition and Maintenance of Linguistic Competence.pdf

Place, U. T. (1998f). Disposizione ('Dispositions' translated into Italian by Giacomo Gava). In G. Gava, Lessico Epistemologico (Epistemological Lexicon, 2nd edition, pp. 44-51). CLEUP (Cooperativa Libraria Editrice Università di Padova).
[References]  
Download: 1998f Dispositions.pdf the English original that is translated into Italian

Place, U. T. (1998g). In praise of the breadth of British Philosophers. Letter to the Editor in response to an article by Malcom Bradbury which appeared in the edition for 29/11/98, The Observer 6/12/98, p. 30.
Download: 1998g In Praise of the Breadth of British Philosophers.pdf

Place, U. T. (1998h). The neuroanatomy of consciousness and the zombie-within. [Paper presented at the Second Annual Conference of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Bremen, Germany, 20th June 1998].
[Abstract]In Chapter 3 of their book, Milner & Goodale (1995) concede that, since the ventral and dorsal streams as defined by Ungerleider & Mishkin (1982) bifurcate "downstream" of the striate cortex (V1), neither stream can account for the visual functions which survive lesions of V1 ("blindsight"). However, on their Figure 3.1 (p. 68) they show another pathway which I call the 'Sub-Cortical (S-C) to dorsal pathway' (SUPERIOR COLLICULUS, PULVINAR, POSTERIOR PARIETAL CORTEX) which bifurcates from the ventral pathway (LATERAL GENICULATE NUCLEUS, V1-V5, INFERO-TEMPORAL CORTEX) at the retina. Not only does the S-C to dorsal pathway explain blindsight. It also coincides exactly with Michael Posner's (Posner & Petersen 1990; Posner and Dehaene 1994) "posterior attention system". This allows us to identify the superior colliculus and pulvinar with that part of the "zombie-within" (Place 1997) which involuntarily attracts the focus of conscious attention to any input which it identifies as problematic and the posterior parietal cortex as the structure which, in addition to its role in the feedback control of voluntary movement, maintains voluntary control over the focus of conscious attention (in the ventral stream in the case of vision) until a satisfactory categorization of the input is achieved. This, when combined with the known functions of the ventral pathway, allows us, in the case of vision, to identify actual anatomically defined structures corresponding to most of the functionally defined modules envisaged in 'Consciousness and the zombie-within' (Place 1997) up to the point where conscious experience gives way to categorization.
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1998h The Neuroanatomy of Consciousness and the Zombie-within.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999-03-29). Evidence for the role of operant reinforcement in the acquisition and maintenance of linguistic competence [Presentation]. Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College London, 29 March 1999.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1999-04-14). Behaviourism as a standpoint in the science of language [Presentation]. Annual Conference of the History and Philosophy of Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society, College of Ripon and York St. John, York Campus, 14 April 1999.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1999-05-27). Qualia as dispositional properties of experiences [Presentation]. Conference on the 'Naturalization of Consciousness', Certosa di Pontignano, Siena, 27-30 May 1999.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1999-05-31). The picture theory of meaning [Presentation]. IUC Conference on Epistemology, Bled, Slovenia, 31 May- 5 June 1999.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1999-07-23). Qualia as dispositional properties of experiences (shortened version) [Presentation]. Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, University of Warwick, 23-27 July 1999.
[Text]  

Place, U. T. (1999a). Ryle's behaviorism. In W. O'Donohue, & R. Kitchener (Eds.), Handbook of Behaviorism (Chapter 13, pp. 361-398). Academic Press. doi:10.1016/B978-012524190-8/50014-0
[Abstract]A distinction is drawn between the OR-behaviorism of the Americans which wants to make psychology more scientific and the OUR-behaviourism of Wittgenstein and Ryle which comes from the philosophy of language. Ryle's doctrines are classified into those that derive from Wittgenstein and those that are peculiar to Ryle. The latter are sub-classified into failures and successes. Criticisms of Ryle's position by Place, Geach, Medlin, Armstrong and Martin are examined and, where possible, rebutted. I conclude that, with some important exceptions, the dispositional analysis of mental concepts survives, as does, more controversially, the hypothetical analysis of dispositional statements.
Note:
'Brian Medlin challenges Ullin Place on the question of probity in Place's paper "Ryle's Behaviorism" and holds him accountable for defaming him. Medlin wants this rectified. In further correspondence Medlin wants the passage withdrawn from the paper. As the book had already been published, Ullin requested from the publisher that a corrigendum slip be printed and inserted into unsold copies of the book, and sewn in if any further copies of the book were printed.' Note on Box 1, Folder 025 (letters exchanged between Jack Smart, Ullin T. Place, Brian Medlin, Jim Franklin, David Armstrong) held in the Brian Medlin Collection at the Library of Flinders University, Adelaide, South Australia.
[References]  [11 citing publications]  [4 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1999a Ryle's Behaviorism.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999b). Intentionality and the physical - a reply to Mumford. Philosophical Quarterly, 49, 225-231. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00139
[Abstract]Martin and Pfeifer (1986) claim "that the most typical characterizations of intentionality" proposed by philosophers are satisfied by physical dispositions. If that is correct, we must conclude either, as they and Mumford do, that the philosophers are wrong and intentionality is something else or, as I do, that intentionality is what the philosophers say it is, in which case it is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. To my contention that the intentionality of a disposition consists in its being directed towards its future manifestations Mumford objects that the notion of directedness is obscure and cannot in the light of Martin's (1994) argument be elucidated by reference to what would happen if the conditions for its manifestation are satisfied. But Martin's argument rests on the mistaken assumption that causal conditionals of which dispositional ascriptions are an instance are of the form 'If p then q'.
[References]  [Is reply to]  [11 citing publications]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1999b Intentionality and the Physical - A Reply to Mumford.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999c). Behaviourism and the evolution of language [Conference presentation abstract]. Proceedings of the British Psychological Society, 7, 84.
[Related]  

Place, U. T. (1999d). Connectionism and the problem of consciousness. Acta Analytica, 14(22), 197-226.
[Abstract]This paper falls into three parts. In Part 1 I give my reasons for rejecting two aspects of Horgan and Tienson's position as laid out in their book, the language of thought and belief-desire explanations of behaviour, while endorsing the connection they see between linguistic syntax and the syntax of a motor skill. In Part 2 I outline the theory that the brain consists of two input-output transformation systems consciousness whose function is (a) to categorise problematic inputs, (b) to select a response appropriate to such inputs once they have been categorised and (c) to initiate and monitor the execution of such response once selected, and the "zombie-within" whose function is (a) to identify and alert consciousness to any inputs that are problematic either because they are unexpected or because they are significant relative to the agent's current or perennial motivational concerns. In Part 3 I consider how far the properties of the two systems outlined in Part 2 can be understood in terms of the known properties of connectionist networks.
Keywords: connectionism, consciousness, problematic input, zombie-within
Note:
The download file contains some text added by the author after publication. Footnote 2 is added.
[References]  [Related]  [Talks]  [3 citing publications]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1999d Connectionism and the Problem of Consciousness.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999e). Token- versus type-identity physicalism. Anthropology and Philosophy, 3(2), 21-31.
[Abstract]The observation that identity is a relation between two names or descriptions which refer to the same individual (token-identity) or the same kind or class of things (type-identity) suggests that, unless the descriptions in question are specified, physicalism, understood as the claim that every mentally specified state or process is identical with some physically specified state or process, is empty hand-waving. It can be argued on behalf of the type-identity physicalist that future psycho-physiological research will allow us to specify which types of mentally-specified states or processes are identical with which physically-specified states or processes. No such possibility can be envisaged if token-identity physicalism (Davidson 1970/1980) is true. Consequently, the case for token-identity physicalism must rest on an a priori argument. But the argument which Davidson offers is inconclusive. Token-identity physicalism is, therefore, in serious danger of being side-lined, should evidence supporting the stronger type-identity thesis be forthcoming.
[References]  [7 citing publications]  [1 reprinting collections]  
Download: 1999e Token- versus Type-Identity Physicalism.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999f). Vagueness as a mark of dispositional intentionality. Acta Analytica, 14(23), 91-109.
[Abstract]Vagueness (within rather than at the boundaries of a concept) is one of the "three salient things about intention" listed by Elizabeth Anscombe (1965) in her paper ‘The intentionality of sensation’. In an unpublished paper John Burnheim has claimed that "physical causal dispositions" satisfy these "three marks of intentionality given by Anscombe." Subsequent discussion by C. B. Martin and K. Pfeifer (1986) and Place (1996) shows that if the various marks of intentionality proposed by Brentano, Chisholm, Anscombe, Lycan and Searle are sorted according to Kneale's (1968) distinction between intenTional states and intenSional locutions it turns out that all of the former (Anscombe's three marks plus Searle's/Brentano's directedness) are found in physical dispositions, while the latter (Chisholm's second and third marks) are marks of a quotation.
[References]  [Talks]  [4 citing publications]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: 1999f Vagueness as a Mark of Dispositional Intentionality.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999g). Intentionality naturalized: dispositions and quotations [Unpublished paper].
[Abstract]Martin and Pfeifer have argued that physical dispositions satisfy all the accepted marks of intentionality. My own researches suggest the following conclusions: 1. ‘Intentionality’ means whatever the accepted marks make it mean. 2. Hence, if Martin and Pfeifer are right, intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. 3. We need to distinguish intentionality, as described by Brentano, Anscombe and Searle's “intentionality-with-a-t” which is the mark of the dispositional from Frege's “indirect reference", Quine’s “referential opacity”, Geach's “non-Shakespearianity” and Searle’s “intensionality-with-an-s” which is the mark of a quotation.
[References]  [1 citing publications]  
Download: 1999g Intentionality Naturalized - Dispositions and Quotations.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999h). The picture theory of meaning: A rehabilation [Conference presentation; presented to the IUC Conference on Epistemology, Bled, Slovenia, 31st May - June 5th 1999].
[Abstract]I argue the case for a rehabilitation of the "picture theory" of the meaning of sentences expounded by Wittgenstein (1921/1971) in the Tractatus, but abandoned by him in moving from his earlier to his later philosophy. This rehabilitation requires the replacement of 'facts' as the objects which sentences depict by 'situations' (Barwise and Perry 1983) and the recognition that the situation depicted by a sentence is an "intentional object" (Brentano 1871/1995). It also implies a different view of the way his sense (Sinn)/reference (Bedeutung) distinction should be applied to the meaning of sentences from that maintained by Frege (1892/1960) himself. Such a theory opens the door to a thorough-going empiricist theory of the acquisition of both concepts and sentence structure.
Keywords: picture theory of meaning
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 1999h The Picture Theory of Meaning - A Rehabilitation.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999i). Comments on 'Causality, Senses and Reference' [Section from A defense of emergent downward causation by Teed Rockwell http://www.cognitivequestions.org/causeweb.html] www.cognitivequestions.org/utplacecaus.html
Download: 1999i Comments on Causality, Senses and Reference.pdf

Place, U. T. (1999j) Are qualia dispositional properties? [Paper presented at the Università di Siena and Terza Università di Roma conference on "Consciousness Naturalized", Certosa di Pontignano, Siena - published as Place, U. T. (2000). The causal potency of qualia its nature and its source. Brain and Mind, 1, 183-192].
[Related]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Place, U. T. (1999k). Introduction to Essays in Radical Empiricism [Unpublished; edited by T. W. Place]
[Abstract]This is a compilation of introductions that U. T. Place wrote in 1999 to books intended to form a book series under the title “Essays in Radical Empiricism”. Place couldn’t finish this project because of his death on 2 January 2000. The idea was that the books would consist of his published and unpublished papers. Each book would start with an introductory chapter, with the first three sections being the same for all books. These sections were called “Radical Empiricism”, “Metaphilosophy”, and “Conceptual Analysis” and are reproduced in this document as the first three sections. In each book, these sections were to be followed by a section that introduced the theme of the book in question. All the finished sections that introduce a theme are included here. Because not all themes are covered this way, I added sections from a letter in which Place discussed his “Nachlaß” in October 1999. The themes on which Place published and that are missing in this overview are, amongst others, language learning, the evolution of language, and emotion and mood.
[References]  
Download: 1999k Introduction to Essays in Radical Empiricism.pdf

Place, U. T. (2000a). Consciousness and the zombie-within: a functional analysis of the blindsight evidence. In Y. Rossetti, & A. Revonsuo (Eds.), Beyond dissociations: Interaction between dissociated implicit and explicit processing (pp. 295-329). John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/aicr.22.15pla
[Abstract]Cowey & Stoerig's (1995) demonstration that the phenomenon of blindsight applies to monkeys with striate cortical lesions in the same way as it does to humans with similar lesions makes it plausible to argue that the behaviour of mammals and probably that of other vertebrates is controlled by two distinct but closely interdependent and interacting systems in the brain which I shall refer to respectively as 'consciousness' and the 'sub-conscious automatic pilot or "zombie" within'. On this hypothesis, consciousness has three functions, (a) that of categorizing any input that is problematic in that it is either unexpected or significant relative to the individual's current or perennial motivational concerns, (b) that of selecting a response appropriate both to the presence of a thing of that kind and to the individual's motivational concerns with respect to it, and (c) that of monitoring the execution of that response. Conscious/phenomenal experience, on this view, is the first stage in the process whereby problematic inputs are processed by consciousness. Its function is to modify the figure-ground relations within the central representation of a problematic input until an adequate categorization is selected. The sub-conscious automatic pilot or “zombie-within” has two functions (a) that of continuously scanning the total current input and alerting consciousness to any input it identifies as problematic, (b) that of protecting consciousness from overload either by ignoring those non-problematic inputs which require no response or by responding appropriately but automatically to those for which there already exists a well practised skill or other “instinctive” response pattern.
Keywords: consciousness
[References]  [Talks]  [5 citing publications]  [5 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  
Download: 2000a Consciousness and the Zombie-within a Functional Analysis of the Blindsight Evidence.pdf

Place, U. T. (2000b). The causal potency of qualia: Its nature and its source. Brain and Mind, 1, 183-192. doi:10.1023/A:1010023129393
[Abstract]There is an argument (Medlin, 1967; Place, 1988) which shows conclusively that if qualia are causally impotent we could have no possible grounds for believing that they exist. But if, as this argument shows, qualia are causally potent with respect to the descriptions we give of them, it is tolerably certain that they are causally potent in other more biologically significant respects. The empirical evidence, from studies of the effect of lesions of the striate cortex (Humphrey, 1974; Weiskrantz, 1986; Cowey and Stoerig, 1995) shows that what is missing in the absence of visual qualia is the ability to categorize sensory inputs in the visual modality. This would suggest that the function of private experience is to supply what Broadbent (1971) calls the “evidence” on which the categorization of problematic sensory inputs are based. At the same time analysis of the causal relation shows that what differentiates a causal relation from an accidental spatio-temporal conjunction is the existence of reciprocally related dispositional properties of the entities involved which combine to make it true that if one member of the conjunction, the cause, had not existed, the other, the effect, would not have existed. The possibility that qualia might be dispositional properties of experiences which, as it were, supply the invisible “glue” that sticks cause to effect in this case is examined, but finally rejected.
[References]  [Talks]  [4 citing publications]  [1 reprinting collections]  
Download: 2000b The Causal Potency of Qualia.pdf

Place, U. T. (2000c). The role of the hand in the evolution of language. Psycoloquy, 11(7), January 23. www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.007
[Abstract]This article has four sections. Section I sets out four principles which should guide any attempt to reconstruct the evolution of an existing biological characteristic. Section II sets out thirteen principles specific to a reconstruction of the evolution of language. Section III sets out eleven pieces of evidence for the view that vocal language must have been preceded by an earlier language of gesture. Based on those principles and evidence, Section IV sets out seven proposed stages in the process whereby language evolved: (1) the use of mimed movement to indicate an action to be performed, (2) the development of referential pointing which, when combined with mimed movement, leads to a language of gesture, (3) the development of vocalisation, initially as a way of imitating the calls of animals, (4) counting on the fingers leading into (5) the development of symbolic as distinct from iconic representation, (6) the introduction of the practice of question and answer, and (7) the emergence of syntax as a way of disambiguating utterances that can otherwise be disambiguated only by gesture.
[References]  [Talks]  [12 citing publications]  [2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: 2000c The Role of the Hand in the Evolution of Language.pdf

Place, U. T. (2000d). The two-factor theory of the mind-brain relation. Brain and Mind, 1, 29-43. doi:10.1023/A:1010087621727
[Abstract]The analysis of mental concepts suggests that the distinction between the mental and the nonmental is not ontologically fundamental, and that, whereas mental processes are one and the same things as the brain processes with which they are correlated, dispositional mental states depend causally on and are, thus, "distinct existences" from the states of the brain microstructure with which 'they' are correlated. It is argued that this difference in the relation between an entity and its composition/underlying structure applies across the board. All stuffs and processes are the same thing as is described by a description of their microstructure. In all cases where the manifestation of a disposition extends beyond the "skin" of the dispositional property bearer, dispositions invariably depend causally on the structure, usually the microstructure, of the bearer.
[References]  [4 citing publications]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  
Download: 2000d The Two Factor-Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation.pdf

Place, U. T. (2000e). Behaviorism as an ethnomethodological experiment: Flouting the convention of rational agency. Behavior & Philosophy, 28(1/2), 57. www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27759404.pdf
[Abstract]As interpreted here, Garfinkel's "ethnomethodological experiment" (1967) demonstrates the existence of a social convention by flouting it and observing the consternation and aversive consequences for the perpetrator which that provokes. I suggest that the hostility which behaviorism has provoked throughout its history is evidence that it flouts an important social convention, the convention that, whenever possible, human beings are treated as and must always give the appearance of being rational agents. For these purposes, a rational agent is someone whose behavior is controlled by a logically consistent body of means-end beliefs ("rules" in Skinner's terminology) and complementing desires which between them provide a basis for predicting how the individual will behave and for suggesting what arguments will persuade the agent to modify his or her beliefs and the behavior based upon them. The behaviorist flouts this convention by suggesting that its fictional character makes it unsuitable for the purposes of scientific explanation of behavior. The hostility that this suggestion provokes is evidence of the importance attached by the verbal community both to preserving a consistent and rational connection between what is said and what is done and presenting it as part of the natural order of things.
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: 2000e Behaviorism as an Ethnomethodological Experiment.pdf

Place, U. T. (2000f). Identity theories. In M. Nani, & M. Maraffa (Eds.), A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Roma Tre University. Retrieved Februari 9, 2019, from http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/mbit.htm
Note:
This article is an adaptation of the Amsterdam lecture 21 and lecture 22 (1974).
[References]  [4 citing publications]  
Download: 2000f Theories of Mind.pdf

Place, U. T. (2000g). From icon to symbol: An important transition in the evolution of language [Abstract]. Proceedings of the 3rd International Evolution of Language Conference (pp. 183-184). École Nationale Supérieure des Télécommunications. www.infres.telecom-paristech.fr/confs/evolang/actes/_actes56.html
[References]  [2 citing publications]  
Download: 2000g From Icon to Symbol - An Important Transition in the Evolution of Language.pdf

Place, U. T. (2002). A pilgrim's progress? From mystical experience to biological consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(3), 34-52. www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2002/00000009/00000003/1261
[Abstract]Ullin Thomas Place died on 2nd January 2000 at the age of seventy-five. I had met him a little over three years earlier, in November 1996, during the annual 'Mind and Brain' symposium organized by Peter Fenwick and held at the Institute of Psychiatry in London. At that meeting Professor Place delivered a slightly shortened version of the paper reproduced here, in which he told his personal story — a pilgrim's progress? — recounting, as he put it, 'the history of a thought process leading from an adolescent interest in mystical experience to an article entitled 'Is consciousness a brain process?' [Place, 1956] in which I argued for an affirmative answer to that question'. [Abstract by Anthony Freedom]
[References]  [Related]  [2 citing publications]  
Download: 2002 A Pilgrim's Progress.pdf

Place, U. T. (2002/3) Some thoughts on the work of the Würzburg School and the controversy it provoked, prompted by a visit to Würzburg 10-16 October 1989. Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung, 10, 261-280
[Abstract]Der Autor berichtet über einen Besuch in Würzburg und der Suche nach Spuren der „Würzburger Schule“ und kommt dabei auf einige grundsätzliche Fragen der „Denkpsychologie“ zu sprechen. Dabei korrigiert er alte Missverständnisse, die er großen Teils in der unterschiedlichen Verwendung der Terminologie bzw. in ihrer Übersetzung (speziell: ‚Introspektion‘; ‚Selbstbeobachtung‘ vs. Brentanos ‚Innere Wahrnehmung‘) erblickt und schildert die (durch Behaviourismus, Gestaltpsychologie und Psychoanalyse unterbrochene, durch Computermodelle wieder aktuell gewordene) Wirkung für die Gegenwartspsychologie.
Note:
Posthumously publication of Place (1989g).
[Related]  
Download: 1989g Some Thought on the Work of the Wurzburg School and the Controversy it Provoked.pdf

Place, U. T. (2004). From mystical experience to biological consciousness. A pilgrim's progress? In G. Graham, & E.R. Valentine (Eds.), Identifying the mind: Selected papers of U. T. Place (pp. 14-29). Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]I recount the history of a thought process leading from an adolescent interest in mystical experience to an article entitled 'Is consciousness a brain process?' in which I argued for an affirmative answer to that question. For the first time in recent history the materialist thesis was presented in a form in which it could withstand what had previously been regarded as decisive philosophical objections. The paper contains a critique of the "phenomenological fallacy" in which I draw attention to how little we can really say about the properties of our private experiences. This argument owes much to the insistence of the mystics on the inadequacy of words to describe their experiences.
Keywords: consciousness
Note:
This paper is published with minor editorial changes and without the abstract and the appendix in G. Graham and E. R. Valentine (Eds.) (2004). Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place (pp. 14-29). Oxford University Press,. The paper was already finished in 1996. A shortened version was presented to the Mind and Brain symposium, organized by Dr. Peter Fenwick at the Institute of Psychiatry, London, in November 1996 and to the Eleventh Annual Conference of the British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy Section, York, March 1997. It was published under a different title and edited by Anthony Freeman including an editorial introduction and footnotes as Place, U. T. (2002). A pilgrim’s progress? Journal of Consciousness Studies. 9(3), 34-52.
[References]  [Related]  [Talks]  [2 citing publications]  [1 reprinting collections]  
Download: 2004 From Mystical Experience to Biological Consciousness.pdf

Place, U. T., & Smart, J. J. C. (1955). Contradictories and entailment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 15, 541-544. doi:10.2307/2103914
[References]  
Download: Place & Smart (1955) Contradictories and Entailment.pdf

Place, U. T., & Sofroniou, N. (1987-12-19). Equivalence classes, relational frames and the autoclitic. Christmas Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College , London, 19 December 1987.
[Text]  

Place, U. T., & Sofroniou, N. (1987). Equivalence classes, relational frames and the autoclitic. [Unpublished paper presented at the Christmas Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University College, London, December 1987].
[Abstract]Sidman (Sidman 1971 and Sidman and Tailby 1982) defines an "equivalence class" in terms of the generalisation of responses on a matching to sample task which conforms to the principles of reflexivity (or identity), symmetry and transitivity. More recently, Hayes (forthcoming) has proposed that equivalence in this sense is only one amongst a number of "relational frames" which the child abstracts from particular relations which it encounters in the process of acquiring language. Hayes is not specific in characterising the experiences from which the child is supposed to abstract these relational frames. This paper explores the suggestion (Place forthcoming) that relational frames are a species of what Skinner (1957) calls "autoclitic frames". As here conceived, autoclitics are construed as syntactic operators which enable the speaker to construct novel sentences which are nevertheless intelligible to the listener. Likewise an autoclitic frame is seen as an abstract framework formed by autoclitic words, prefixes, suffixes and other autoclitic features, such as word order. When completed by the insertion of the appropriate tact words, phrases or clauses, an autoclitic frame yields an intelligible phrase or sentence. This hypothesis predicts that the child's acquisition of the ability to generalise in accordance with the principles of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity on the matching to sample task will be found to depend on its ability to construct and draw the appropriate inferences from relational sentences which legitimise inferences of these kinds.
[References]  [Talks]  
Download: Place & Sofroniou (1987) Equivalence Classes, Relational Frames and the Autoclitic.pdf

Place, U. T., & Taylor, K. E. (1995). The functions of consciousness and its constituent parts [Conference presentation, presented to the Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, St. Catherine's College, Oxford, 31st August 1995]. European Society for Philosophy and Psychology
[References]  [Talks]  [3 referring publications by Place]  
Download: Place & Taylor (1995) The Functions of Consciousness and its Constituent Part.pdf

Place, U. T., & Wheeler Vega, J. (1999-06-27) An anticipation of Reversal Theory within a conceptual-analytic and behaviorist perspective [Presentation; presented by Jason Wheeler]. 9th International Conference on Reversal Theory, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, 28 June - 2 July 1999.
[Text]  

Place, U. T., & Wheeler Vega, J. A. (1999). An anticipation of reversal theory within a conceptual-analytic and behaviorist perspective [Conference presentation, presented by the second author at the 9^th International Conference on Reversal Theory, June 28 - July 2]. University of Windsor, Ontario, Canada.
[Abstract]Michael Apter denies that behaviorism can provide an adequate account of human action, referring to it in one place as "a kind of methodological vandalism" (Apter, 1989, p. 2). It is the purpose of this paper to show how the first author came, as a behaviorist and analytic philosopher, to a position that anticipates reversal theory to a surprising extent. The basis of this position is an analysis of polar statements concerning 'wanting': 'X wants O', and 'X does not want O'. These sentences imply a number of corollaries. For example, if 'X wants O', then: 'X will be pleased if O appears', 'X will be worried if it looks as if O will not appear', and 'X will be angry or miserable if O fails to appear'. Contrasting entailments follow ‘X does not want O'. These implications display the relationship between the motivational concepts of 'wanting' and 'not wanting', and emotion concepts such as being pleased, worried, angry, miserable, &c. This set of reciprocally related entailments provide, it will be argued, the conceptual foundation of reversal theory. This analysis led the first author to develop a behavioral theory of emotion, in which the various emotions can be located on two dimensions (after Myers, 1923): 'pleasant/unpleasant', and 'high-arousal/low-arousal'. Emotions are distinguished by reference to a third variable: a characteristic 'impulse' appropriate to the type of contingency in which the emotion in question is evoked. The notions of 'wanting' and 'not wanting' are defined, in the language of operant psychology, as differences in the reinforcing effect of actual and potential stimuli with respect to actual and potential operant responses by the organism. Some illustrative clinical and experimental applications of the theory by the first author, in the 1960's, are outlined.
[References]  [Talks]  [1 referring publications by Place]  
Download: Place & Wheeler Vega (1999) An Anticipation of Reversal Theory within a Conceptual Analytic and Behaviorist Perspective.pdf

Plato (1953). Phaedo. In W.D. Woodhead (Tr. & Ed.) Plato: Socratic Dialogues. Nelson.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Plato (1961). Parmenides, Theaitetos, Sophist, Statesman (English translation with introduction by John Warrington). Dent.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Pockett , S. (2022). Midwifing a science of consciousness: the role of Kuhnian paradigms. Journal of NeuroPhilosophy, 1(1). doi:10.5281/zenodo.6637736
[Abstract]It is argued that in terms of Thomas Kuhn's analysis of how different fields of science develop and progress, consciousness research is still in the pre-paradigm or pre-science phase that precedes the advent of any universally accepted paradigm.  A means by which this long-standing situation may be escaped is here suggested. This is to treat each of the three distinct theoretical positions that presently drive experimental research on the nature of consciousness as mini-paradigms and then apply the same logic that Kuhn sees as underpinning paradigm shifts in mature sciences to decide which of these three mini-paradigms becomes the first universally accepted paradigm of a mature science of consciousness. At present, the three mini-paradigms that drive experimental research on the nature of consciousness are: (1) the cognitive-science process theory mini-paradigm ("consciousness is a process, not a thing"), (2) the neurophysiologists' preferred psychoneural identity theory mini-paradigm ("consciousness is brain activity") and (3) the EMF field theory mini-paradigm  ("consciousness is a 4-D electromagnetic pattern generated by brain activity"). In established science, paradigms shift when enough 'anomalies' – falsified predictions or largely unrecognised but once-recognised-unacceptable consequences – build up to make the existing paradigm uncomfortable for those who operate within it.  At this point, a sudden paradigm shift occurs, ushering in another long period of 'normal science' during which the new paradigm drives experimentation. With regard to the three existing mini-paradigms on the nature of consciousness, it is argued that (1) recognition that processes are abstract entities –and that this renders the "consciousness is a process, not a thing" mini-paradigm dualist – makes this mini-paradigm unacceptable to practitioners who regard dualism as unscientific and who prefer to see themselves as staunchly scientific, and therefore as monists. (By definition, monists equate consciousness with physical entities, while dualists equate it with abstract entities). (2) The strong prediction of the "consciousness is brain activity" mini-paradigm – that conscious experiences should invariably correlate with the firing of either particular single neurons or groups of single neurons in the brain – has now been falsified often enough to make this mini-paradigm unacceptable to its practitioners. And this leaves intact only the "consciousness is a 3-D electromagnetic field" mini-paradigm – the idea that conscious experiences are particular 3-dimensional (or, given that they change in time, strictly speaking 4-dimensional) patterns in the electromagnetic field generated by brain activity. And as a result, it is suggested that this third mini-paradigm might usefully become the first universally accepted full paradigm, which would finally allow announcement of the birth of a Kuhnian science of consciousness.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Pockett , S. (2023). What are Conscious Sensations? Journal of NeuroPhilosophy, 2(1), 56-75. doi:10.5281/zenodo.7740150
[Abstract]Existing theories about the nature of conscious sensations are discussed.  The oldest classification system contrasts dualist theories (which say consciousness is an abstract entity) with monist theories (which say consciousness is a concrete entity).  A more recent system contrasts process theories ("consciousness is a process, not a thing") with vehicle theories (consciousness is a property of one or more of the things associated with brain processes). The present paper first points out that processes are abstracta, which makes process theories dualist. It then argues that (a) dualist theories are untestable and therefore unscientific and (b) process theories which invoke information are at odds with the normal definition of information.  Then two separate kinds of vehicle theory are discussed: first the neural identity theory and then a theory that pulls together the enormous volume of data generated by Crick's suggestion to forget about theories and simply measure the neural correlates of consciousness into a proposal equating sensory consciousness with certain patterns in the electromagnetic fields generated by brain function.  The paper concludes with an injunction to stop researching this topic altogether, on the grounds that the results are likely to be used in unacceptably dystopian developments.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Polák, M. (2022). Heat and Pain Identity Statements and the Imaginability Argument. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 18(2), A1-31. doi:10.31820/ejap.18.2.1
[Abstract]Even after many years of empirical and conceptual research there are underlying controversies which lead scholars to dispute identity theory. One of the most influential examples is Kripke’s modal argument leading to the rejection of the claim that pain and C-fibres firing are identical. The aim of the first part of the paper is to expose that Kripke does not rigorously distinguish the meaning of individual relata entering the identity relation, and therefore his claim about the faultiness of the analogy between propositions “heat is molecular motion”, and “pain is C-fibres firing”, is mistaken. Moreover, whilst much emphasis within metaphysics of mind-brain relations has been placed upon conscious phenomenal states, it might be worthwhile to also consider cases of unconscious phenomenal states. If one admits the unconscious phenomenal states, such as unconscious pain, then, Kripke’s claim is further discredited by the fact that even pain can be individuated through its contingent property. Identity statements about pain could therefore be analogous to any other identity statements. The second part of the paper focuses on the relevance of the modal argument in confrontation with empirical evidence. It argues against the assumption embedded in the modal argument that an identical neurobiological pattern occurs regardless of whether conscious pain is present or completely absent.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Polák, M., & Marvan, T. (2018) Neural Correlates of consciousness meet the theory of identity. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 1269. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269 www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269
[Abstract]One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of consciousness, we argue (see Against Causal Accounts of NCCs) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of type. Surprisingly, neither philosophers nor neuroscientists have taken much care in defining this central concept; more often than not, the term is used only implicitly and vaguely. We attempt to open a debate on this subject and remedy this unhappy state of affairs, proposing a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. The fourth part of the paper compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection. We conclude by stressing that scientists working on consciousness should engage more with metaphysical issues concerning the relation of brain processes and states of consciousness. Without this, the ultimate goals of consciousness research can hardly be fulfilled.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1988a) in context]  

Polger, T. W. (2004). Natural Minds. MIT Press.
[Abstract]In Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain -- that sensations are brain processes -- and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advocates holds that conscious processes, events, states, or properties are type- identical to biological processes, events, states, or properties -- a tough-minded account that maintains that minds are necessarily identical to brains, a position held by few current identity theorists. Polger's approach to what William James called the great blooming buzzing confusion of consciousness begins with the idea that we need to know more about brains in order to understand consciousness fully, but recognizes that biology alone cannot provide the entire explanation. Natural Minds takes on issues from philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and metaphysics, moving freely among them in its discussion. Polger begins by answering two major objections to identity theory -- Hilary Putnam's argument from multiple realizability (which discounts identity theory because creatures with brains unlike ours could also have mental states) and Saul Kripke's modal argument against mind-brain identity (based on the apparent contingency of the identity statement). He then offers a detailed account of functionalism and functional realization, which offer the most serious obstacle to consideration of identity theory. Polger argues that identity theory can itself satisfy the kind of explanatory demands that are often believed to favor functionalism.
Keywords: mind-brain identity theory, consciousness
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Polger, T. W. (2009). Identity theories. Philosophy Compass, 4, 1–13. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00227.x
[Abstract]Identity theories are those that hold that ‘sensations are brain processes’. In particular, they hold that mental ⁄ psychological state kinds are identical to brain ⁄ neuroscientific state kinds. In this paper, I isolate and explain some of the key features of contemporary identity theories. They are then contrasted with the main live alternatives by means of considering the two most important lines of objection to identity theories.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960) in context]  

Polger, T. W. (2011). Are sensations still brain processes? Philosophical Psychology, 24(1), 1–21.
[Abstract]Fifty years ago J. J. C. Smart published his pioneering paper, ‘‘Sensations and Brain Processes.’’ It is appropriate to mark the golden anniversary of Smart’s publication by considering how well his article has stood up, and how well the identity theory itself has fared. In this paper I first revisit Smart’s (1959) text, reflecting on how it has weathered the years. Then I consider the status of the identity theory in current philosophical thinking, taking into account the objections and replies that Smart discussed as well as some that he did not anticipate. Finally, I offer a brief manifesto for the identity theory, providing a small list of the claims that I believe the contemporary identity theorist should accept. As it turns out, these are more or less the ones that Smart defended fifty years ago.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  

Polger, T. W. (2012). Metaphysics of mind. In R. Barnard, & N Manson (Eds.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. Continuum Publishing.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Polger, T. W., & Shapiro, L. A. (2016). The Multiple Realization Book. Oxford University Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Pollock, J. L. (2008). What am I? Virtual machines and the mind/body problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76(2), 237–309.
[Abstract]When your word processor or email program is running on your computer, this creates a "virtual machine” that manipulates windows, files, text, etc. What is this virtual machine, and what are the virtual objects it manipulates? Many standard arguments in the philosophy of mind have exact analogues for virtual machines and virtual objects, but we do not want to draw the wild metaphysical conclusions that have sometimes tempted philosophers in the philosophy of mind. A computer file is not made of epiphenomenal ectoplasm. I argue instead that virtual objects are "supervenient objects". The stereotypical example of supervenient objects is the statue and the lump of clay. To this end I propose a theory of supervenient objects. Then I turn to persons and mental states. I argue that my mental states are virtual states of a cognitive virtual machine implemented on my body, and a person is a supervenient object supervening on his cognitive virtual machine.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Polten, E. P. (1973). Critique of the psycho-physical identity theory: A refutation of scientific materialism and an establishment of mind-matter dualism by means of philosophy and scientific method. Mouton.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Reviews]  

Popper, K. R. (1935). Logik der Forschung (English translation as The Logic of Scientific Discovery - 1959. Hutchinson).
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Popper, K. R. (1957). The poverty of historicism Beacon.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Popper, K. R. (1963). Conjectures and Refutations. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Popper, K. R. (1972). Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Popper, K. R., & Eccles, J. C. (1977). The Self and its Brain: An argument for Interactionism. Springer Verlag.
[1 referring publications by Place]  [Reviews]  

Posner, M. I., & Dehaene, S. (1994). Attentional networks. Trends in Neuroscience, 17, 75-79.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Posner, M. I., & Petersen, S. E. (1990). The attention system of the human brain. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 13, 25-42.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Posner, M. I., & Warren, R. E. (1972). Traces, concepts and conscious construction. In A. W. Melton, & E. Martin (Eds.) Coding Processes in Human Memory. Winston.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Potrč, M. (1995). U. T. Place. The British founder of physicalism: from behaviorism to connectionism. In Jaakko Hintikka & Klaus Puhl (Eds.), The British tradition in 20th century philosophy. Proceedings of the 17th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, 14th to 21th August 1994, Kirchberg am Wechsel (Schriftenreihe der Wittgenstein-Gesellscha
[Abstract]Dualism recognized the existence of inner mental processes and states, but without any material or physical foundation. Behaviourism, on the contrary, even if it did not deny their existence, refused to attribute any explanatory role to inner states and processes. In the British Journal of Psychology, in 1956, Place published a paper Is Consciousness a Brain Process?, There, he advocated a form of physicalism which steers a middle course between dualism and behaviourism. Mental processes were considered to be literally inside the body and identical with material/physical processes in the brain. It is well known that dualism was seriously undermined by this theory. But it is less well known that Place held his theory to be compatible with behaviourism. He draws a distinction between mental processes which he thinks are processes in the brain and mental states which he thinks, following Ryle (1949), are dispositions to talk and behave in a variety of broadly specifiable ways. The identity theory as applied to mental processes is seen as complementing rather than replacing Ryle's behaviourism. The exclusion of mental states allows Place to avoid the difficulties which confront the attempt to extend type identity theory to cover propositional attitudes, and which have led many to adopt the token identity version. Unlike token identity physicalism which regards any attempt to establish psycho-physical correlations as futile, Place's version of type identity theory predicts such correlations across individuals in the case of mental processes and within individuals in the case of mental states. This, combined with an emphasis which comes from his background in behaviourist psychology on learning as the primary source of mental/behavioural dispositions, makes it easy for Place (1991) to embrace connectionism which he regards as entirely compatible with behaviourism. He does not emphasize the compatibility between type identity theory and connectionism, probably because this point is obvious to him. There is no analogous way of establishing links with brain science in the case of token identity theory.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1989d)]  [Citing Place (1994a)]  
Download: Potrc (1995) U T Place - The British Founder of Physicalism - from Behaviorism to Connectionism.pdf

Potrč, M. (2000). In memoriam - Ullin Thomas Place. Acta Analytica, 15(25), 7-18.
[Abstract]Ullin Thomas Place is known as the Australian materialist who introduced the thesis of type identity. But his work is of [a] much larger spectrum, involving behaviorism, connectionism, dispositions, natural laws, picture theory of meaning and consciousness. Place's relationship with Slovenia is reviewed, beginning with some personal memories.
[Citing Armstrong & Place (1991)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1977a)]  

Potrč, M. (2020). Zero point content Synthesis Philosophica, 69(1), 113–133.
[Abstract]The strategy is to first present the usual content atomistic fullness approaches, in their occurrent and dispositional guises. Then, the focal point semantic treatments are summarized. This difference may be explained through workings of chromatic illumination from the local external information inviting incline surrounding at the background cognitive landscape, in two directions. First, the external information is appreciated, and thus becomes a total cognitive state non-dimensional point at the middle level of the cognitive system’s description. At the upper level of description, total cognitive state content obtains its experiential richness from the multiple characteristics present in the mentioned local environment, and appreciated in it, without which they would be explicitly represented in epistemic agent’s consciousness. Failure of this second step leads to the requirement of content’s explicit representation. In comparison, the failure to apply chromatic illumination to the external information leads to the externalist focal point semantic strategies.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Povinelli, D. J., & Davis, D. R. (1994). Differences between chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and humans (Homo sapiens) in the resting state of the finger: implications for pointing. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 108, 134-139
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Powell, J. P. (1969). The brain and consciousness: a reply to Professor Burt. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 22, 27-28.
[Abstract]This article presents a criticism of C. Burt's article. Essentially, Burt's "mental field" theory is questioned in terms of its plausibility and scientific status. It is argued that the "astonishing complexity of the brain may well baffle us, but our lack of understanding can scarcely be ameliorated by mystery-mongering.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Price, H. H. (1932). Perception Methuen.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Price, H. H. (1953). Thinking and experience Hutchinson.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Pringle-Patterson, A. S. (Ed.) (1924). Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding Clarendon Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Prior, A. N. (1957). Time and modality Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Prior, A. N. (1968). Intentionality and Intensionality II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes, LXII, 91-106.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Proust M. (1923). À la recherche du temps perdu (8 volumes). Éditions de la nouvelle Revue Française
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Pryor, K. (1984). Don't shoot the dog! Bantam Books.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Puccetti, R. (1964). Science, analysis, and the problem of mind. Philosophy, 39(149), 249-259. doi:10.1017/S0031819100055625
[Citing Place (1960)]  

Putnam, H. (1960). Minds and machines. In S. Hook (Ed.), Dimensions of mind. Collier Books.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Putnam, H. (1962). Dreaming and 'depth grammar.' In R.J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy (First Series, pp. 211-235), Blackwell.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Putnam, H. (1964). Robots: Machines or artificially created life? The Journal of Philosophy, 61, 668-691.
[1 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Putnam, H. (1967). Psychological Predicates. In W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merill, (Eds), Art, Mind and Religion (pp. 37-48). University of Pittsburgh Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Putnam, H. (1975). Mind, language and reality, Philosophical papers, Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of 'meaning'. In K. Gunderson (Ed.) Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (VII). University of Minnesota Press.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1948). On what there is, Review of Metaphysics. Reprinted in From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, 1953, Chapter I.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1951). Two dogmas of empiricism. Philosophical Review, LX. Reprinted in W. v. O Quine (1953), From a logical point of view. Harvard University Press.
[14 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1953). On mental entities. Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 80(3), 198-203.
[1 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1953). From a logical point of view. Harvard University Press.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1953). Reference and modality. In From a Logical Point of View (chapter VIII, pp. 139-159). Harvard University Press.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1960). Word and Object. M.I.T. Press.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. (1969). Epistemology naturalized. In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Quine, W. v. O. & Ullian, I. S. (1970). The Web of Belief. Random House.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Quinlan (1991). Connectionism and Psychology. Chicago University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Quinton, A. (1973). The Nature of Things Routledge & Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Rachlin, H. (1985). Pain and behavior. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8, 43-53.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Rafal, R., & Robertson, L. (1995). The neurology of visual attention. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences (Ch. 40, pp. 625-648). MIT Press, .
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Raichle, M. E., Fiez, J. A., Videen, T. O., MacLeod, A.-M. K., Pardo, J. V., Fox, P. T., & Petersen, S. E. (1994). Practice-related changes in human functional anatomy during non-motor learning. Cerebral Cortex, 4, 8-26.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Raimondi, A. (2021). Crane and the mark of the mental. Analysis, 81(4), 683–693. doi.:10.1093/analys/anab035
[Abstract]Brentano’s (1874) suggestion that intentionality is the mark of the mental is typically spelled out in terms of the thesis that all and only mental states are intentional. An influential objection is that intentionality is not necessary for mentality (McGinn 1982; Dretske 1995; Deonna and Teroni 2012; Bordini 2017). What about the idea that only mental states are intentional? In his 2008 paper published in Analysis, Nes shows that on a popular characterization of intentionality, notably defended by Crane (2014 [1998], 2001), some non-mental states come out as intentional. Crane (2008) replies that the concept of representation solves the problem. In this paper, I argue that no representational account of intentionality meets Nes’s challenge. After distinguishing between two notions of representation, I contend that there are two versions of Crane’s representational account, but neither of them is able to solve the problem posed by Nes.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Rainey, S. (2023). Clinical Implications. In S. Rainey, Philosophical Perspectives on Brain Data (Chapter 3, pp. 65-91). Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-27170-0_3
[Abstract]Scientific realism is the philosophical conviction that the posits of science—quarks, electrons, forces—are real, not just ways of accounting for the world. If true, we might take from this the view that a full story of the world and everything in it is most possible through the pursuit of scientific experimentation and observation. The truths of science, on this view, are the truths of nature. Scientific truths are true despite what anyone may actually think of them. This poses a problem for one of the more salient objects in our world—human beings. From the perspective of each of us, what’s most notable about the world is that it’s a place that we are in at a time. We can’t help but experience the world in terms of our subjectivity, in other words. Even the simplest cases of perspectival relativism attest to that. From a person’s point of view, a full story of the world given in objective terms will describe all but one fact; the fact of that point of view itself (or the ‘I’ that describes).
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Ravetz, J. R. (1971). Scientific knowledge and its social problems Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Ray, J. (1972). Do mental mvents mxist? Physiological adumbrations. British Journal of Psychiatry, >120(555), 129-132. doi:10.1192/bjp.120.555.129
[Abstract]In this paper, elaboration of a Realist answer to some of the classical questions of psychology and epistemology will be sought, starting from a knowledge of Soviet and Western findings in psychophysiology (particularly the work of Pavlov, 1932, and Hebb, 1949; see also the summary by Burt, 1968). The point of departure taken in the philosophical literature is the paper by Place (1969). This paper will adopt a reflexological model of brain function—with its implied view that memory is synaptically encoded. While this model has largely fallen into disfavour it is used here paradigmatically—to show that well-developed physiological models in general can provide a satisfactory account of ‘mental’ phenomena.
[Citing Place (1969a)]  

Raz, A., & Donchin, O. (2003). A zetetic’s perspective on gesture, speech, and the evolution of right-handedness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26(2), 237-238.
[Abstract]Charmed by Corballis’s presentation, we challenge the use of mirror neurons as a supporting platform for the gestural theory of language, the link between vocalization and cerebral specialization, and the relationship between gesture and language as two separate albeit coupled systems of communication. We revive an alternative explanation of lateralization of language and handedness.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  

Reed, P. (2001). Editorial: Ullin Place, 1924-2000. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 155-157. [Ullin Place Special Issue] www.jstor.org/stable/27759424
Download: Reed (2001) Editorial - Ullin Place, 1924-2000.pdf

Reed, P. (2022). The concept of intensionality in the work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 20-38. behavior.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/BPv50-Reed.pdf
[Abstract]The current paper overviews of the notion of intensionality as it is presented in the work of Ullin Place, with the aim of characterising Place’s somewhat neglected thinking about this topic. Ullin Place’s work showed a development regarding his views concerning this topic, which, in themselves, illustrate a variety of possible stances that can be taken towards the concept of intensionality. Ultimately, Place suggested that ‘intensional’ statements are not necessarily connected with ‘mentalistic’ language, nor with ‘mentalistic’ explanations. Rather, Place came to the view that intensionality should be taken to be the mark of the ‘conversational’ – that is, it is a property of verbal behaviour that characterises nonscientific everyday discourse. This view has relevance to furthering the understanding of Place’s work regarding intensionality, and also relevance for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science.
Note:
Place (2022) argues that this article is a rather misleading exposition of Ullin T. Place's work on intensionality and the types of language in behavioural science.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1978a)]  [Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1984c)]  [Citing Place (1987a)]  [Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Reed (2022) The Concept of Intensionality in the Work of Ullin T Place.pdf

Reeke, G. N., & Edelman, G. M. (1988). Real brains and artificial intelligence. Daedalus, 117, 143-173.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Rees, W. L. (1976). Stress, Distress and Disease. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 128()1, 3-18.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Rees, W. R. (1957-8). Continuous States. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 58, 223-244
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Reese, H. W. (1991). Place's conversation analysis. In L. J. Hayes, & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Dialogues on verbal behavior: The First International Institute on Verbal Relations (A Discussion of Chapter 5, pp. 110-115). Context Press.
[Is reply to]  

Reese, H. W. (1992). Problem solving by algorithms and heuristics. In S. C. Hayes, & L. J. Hayes (Eds.), Understanding Verbal Relations (Chapter 10, pp. 153-179). Context Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Reese, H. W., & Overton, W. F. (1970). Models of development and theories of development. In L. R. Goulet, & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Research and theory. Academic Press. doi:10.1016/B978-0-12-293850-4.50011-X
[Abstract]Models, which originate in metaphor, exist on several levels ranging from all inclusive metaphysical models to narrowly circumscribed models of specific features of theories. Models at the more general levels form the determining logical context for models at lower levels. This categorical determinism stretches from metaphysical levels through scientific theories, to the manner in which we analyze, interpret, and make inferences from empirical evidence. Two radically different models which have had a pervasive effect upon the nature of psychology generally and developmental psychology specifically are the organismic and mechanistic world views. The history and nature of those models are discussed and the manner in which they become transformed into corrolary issues which form the metatheoretical basis for theory construction is analyzed. Theories built upon different world views are logically independent and cannot be assimilated to each other. They reflect different ways of looking at the world and, as such, are incompatible in their implications.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Rego, F. (2021). Relationship Between Body and Soul According to Saint Thomas: An Obsolete Issue? In P. Á. Gargiulo, & H. L. Mesones Arroyo (Eds.), Psychiatry and Neuroscience Update: From Epistemology to Clinical Psychiatry (Vol. IV, 73-88). Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-61721-9_8
[Abstract]In spite of the opinion of materialistic thinkers, from ancient times, the soul was understood as the principle of life, and far from restricting its activity to purely vegetative and sentient functions, it was extended to the rational field as well. For better understanding, see what happens to a tree leaf, when at the end of its cycle of life, it falls and changes color from bright green to grey and turns brittle. It happens because it is a leaf deprived of life. And the same thing happens with the human body when it stops having the vital impulse of its own soul, initiating an irreversible corruption process. This is a point of view that gives way to the reasonableness of the human existence and to the justification of the question because of the relationship that soul and body have between them. Said briefly, the soul, although not understood as a sensitive reality, does not have to be considered as a nonexistent or mythological reality but also as a real order that links to the body as substantial formal essential principle. It determines the body in the order of being and the way of being, that is, the soul makes man to be and to be what he is and, at the same time, enlivens him and founds all his spiritual and organic activities.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Renz, G. (2021). What is God’s Power?. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 13(3). doi:10.24204/ejpr.2021.3295
[Abstract]Theists claim that God can make a causal difference in the world. That is, theists believe that God is causally efficacious, has power. Discussion of divine power has centered on understanding better the metaphysics of creation and sustenance, special intervention, governance, and providing an account of omnipotence consistent with other divine attributes, such as omnibenevolence. But little discussion has centered on what, deep down ontologically, God’s power is. I show that a number of prominent accounts of power fail to model what divine power could be, and then develop an account based on teleological and primitivist accounts of power.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Renz, G. (2025). Whence The Form? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1–18. doi:10.1080/00048402.2025.2465668
[Abstract]Hylomorphists claim that substances—human beings, oak trees, chemical compounds—are compounds of matter and form. If a house is a substance, then its matter would be some bricks and timbers and its form the structure those bricks and timbers take on. While hylomorphism is traditionally presented as a theory of change, it only treats the coming-to-be and passing-away of matter-form compounds. But many hylomorphists understand forms to be entities in their own right, as parts or constituents of substances. So, a neglected question arises: how, when, and from where do forms come to be? I take up the view of one prominent and representative hylomorphist, Kathrin Koslicki, and argue that she cannot answer these questions satisfactorily. I close with a proposal for an account of the generation of forms based on machinery many hylomorphists already accept, namely, causal powers, that points to a deflationary metaphysics of form.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Rescorla, R. A. (1991). Associative relations in instrumental learning: The eighteenth Bartlett Memorial Lecture. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 43B, 1-23.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Rescorla, R. A., & Wagner, A. R. (1972). A theory of Pavlovian conditioning: Variations in the effectiveness of reinforcement and non-reinforcement. In A. H. Black, & W. F. Prokasy (Eds.), Classical Conditioning, Vol. 2: Current Research and Theory. Prentice-Hall.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Reynhout, G., & Carter, M. (2011). Social Stories™: a possible theoretical rationale, European Journal of Special Needs Education, 26(3), 367-378. doi:10.1080/08856257.2011.595172
[Abstract]Social Stories™ are an intervention widely used with individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). This paper discusses a possible theoretical rationale that might account for the purported efficacy of Social Stories™. Attributes of individuals with ASD in relation to Social Story intervention including difficulties with theory of mind (involving perspective taking and emotion perception), weak central coherence, visual learning style, intellectual ability and comprehension, and stimulus overselectivity are considered. In addition, behavioural explanations are explored. Probably the most parsimonious explanation is that Social Stories may be viewed as loose contingency contracts, which highlight natural reinforcers. It is noted however, that the possible underlying mechanisms remain speculative and that there may be many factors involved.
[Citing Place (1988b)]  

Rizzolatti, G., & Arbib, M. A. (1998). Language within our grasp. Trends in Neuroscience, 21, 188-194.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Roberts, H. (1967). The Construction of Consciousness. Psychological Reports, 20(1), 99–102. doi:10.2466/pr0.1967.20.1.99
[Abstract]Consciousness is analyzed after a brief review of some aspects of the present stage of understanding of consciousness. Discerned as its elements are brain configurations, in principle as described by Wolfgang Koehler or D. O. Hebb, and which are functionally termed “schemata.” Basic schemata represent, that is, are activated by and associated with, environmental, somatic, and psychic conditions. Self, being, and relation schemata are defined. Primal and self consciousness (collectively basic consciousness), relational consciousness, and metaconciousness (conciousness of consciousness) are formulated as organizations of schemata.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Robinson, G. M. (1977). Procedures for the acquisition of syntax. In W. K. Honig, & J. E. R. Staddon (Eds.), Handbook of Operant Behavior. Prentice-Hall.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Robinson, H. (1982). Matter and sense: A critique of contemporary materialism. Cambridge University Press
[Abstract]Published in 1982 by CUP  it discusses the forms of materialism then current, including Davidson, early Rorty, but concentrating on Smart and Armstrong, and arguing that central state materialism fails to give a better 'occurrent' account of conscious states than does behaviourism/functionalism, as Armstrong claims. The book starts with a version of the 'knowledge argument' and ends with a chapter claiming that our conception of matter/the physical is more problematic than our conception of mind.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Robinson, Z., Maley, C., & Piccinini, G (2015). Is Consciousness a spandrel? Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1(2), 365-383. doi:10.1017/apa.2014.10
[Abstract]Determining the biological function of phenomenal consciousness appears necessary to explain its origin: evolution by natural selection operates on organisms’ traits based on the biological functions they fulfill. But identifying the function of phenomenal consciousness has proven difficult. Some have proposed that the function of phenomenal consciousness is to facilitate mental processes such as reasoning or learning. But mental processes such as reasoning and learning seem to be possible in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. It is difficult to pinpoint in what way phenomenal consciousness enhances these processes or others like them. In this paper, we explore a possibility that has been neglected to date. Perhaps phenomenal consciousness has no function of its own because it is either a by-product of other traits or a (functionless) accident. If so, then phenomenal consciousness has an evolutionary explanation even though it fulfills no biological function.
[Citing Place (2000b)]  

Rockwell, W. T
[Abstract]

1. 15 June 1996, letter from Place to Rockwell (Comment on “On what the mind is identical with”)
2. 17 January 1998, Place answering Rockwell (On experience)
3. 23 January 1998, letter from Place to Rockwell (Sensory experience and behaviourism)
4. 17 February 1998, letter from Place to Rockwell (The sensation/perception issue)
5. 16 July 1998, letter from Place to Rockwell (Evidence as the function of conscious/phenomenal experience)
6. 21 December 1998, letter from Rockwell to Place (Publish the Gibson correspondence?)
7. 27 January 1999, letter from Place to Rockwell (Comments on ‘Causality, Senses and Reference’)

Rockwell, W. T. (1994). On what the mind is identical with. Philosophical Psychology, 7(3), 307–323. doi:10.1080/09515089408573126
[Abstract]The unity of mind and body need not imply accepting the unity of mind and brain, because the mind‐brain identity is something that science has presupposed, not discovered. I cite evidence from modern neuroscience that cognitive activities are distributed throughout the human nervous system, which challenges the ‘scientific’ assumption (believed by Descartes, among others) that the brain is the seat of the soul, and the rest of the nerves are mere message cables to the brain. Dennett comes close to accepting this point when he criticizes ‘Cartesian materialism’, and yet he still claims that Vie head is headquarters’. Accepting that the mind is the entire nervous system solves some philosophical problems, for Dennett and others. There is also some evidence that indicates that some cognitive activities may be hormonal rather than neural, which raises some challenging problems for the once obvious distinction between causing a mental state and embodying that state.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Rodríguez, S.S. (2022). The ontology of perceptual experience. Rowman & Littlefield.
[Abstract]Contemporary philosophy of perception typically focuses on discussions concerning the content and the phenomenology of perceptual experience. In a significant departure from this tradition, The Ontology of Perceptual Experience explores the very conscious phenomena to which intentional or phenomenal features are thus ascribed. Drawing on a new wave of research— including the work of maverick philosophers like Helen Steward, Brian O’Shaughnessy, and Matthew Soteriou—this book examines two ways of categorizing perceptual experiences in accordance to their dynamic structure: on the one hand, Experiential Heracliteanism, an approach striving to describe perceptual experiences in terms of irreducibly dynamic components; and, on the other, Experiential Non-Heracliteanism, which conceives perceptual experiences as dynamic phenomena that may nevertheless be described in terms of non-dynamic elements. Sebastián Sanhueza Rodríguez describes both proposals and makes a modest case on behalf of the Non-Heraclitean approach against its increasingly popular Heraclitean counterpart. This case crucially turns on the fact that the Heracliteanist engages in a controversial and perhaps unnecessary commitment to irreducibly dynamic processes. The ontological framework this book unpacks offers a platform from which traditional issues in the philosophies of mind and perception may be revisited in refreshing and potentially fruitful ways.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Rollins, C. D. (1967). Are mental events actual physical? In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The identity theory of mind (pp. 21-37). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Romanes, G. J. (1882). Animal Intelligence. Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Romanes, G. J. (1888). Mental evolution in man: Origin of human faculty Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Rorschach, H. (1932/1942). Psychodiagnostik Hans Huber. English translation as Psychodiagnostics by P. Lemkau & B. Kronenberg, ed. W. Morganthaler. Grune & Stratton.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Rorty, R. (1965). Mind-brain identity, privacy, and categories. The Review of Metaphysics, xix, 24-54.
[5 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Ros, A. (1997). Reduktion, Identität und Abstraktion. Philosophie der Psychologie Bemerkungen zur Diskussion um die These von der Identität physischer und psychischer Phänomene. In M. Astroh, D. Gerhardus & G. Heinzmann (Eds.), Dialogisches Handeln. Eine Festschrift für Kuno Lorenz (pp. 403-425). Spektrum Verlag. Republished in: e-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie, 2007, 7. www.jp.philo.at/texte/RosA1.pdf
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Roselli, A., & Austin, C. (2021). The dynamical essence of powers. Synthese, 199, 14951–14973. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03450-8
[Abstract]Powers are properties defined by what they do. The focus of the large majority of the powers literature has been mainly put on explicating the (multifaceted) results of the production of a power in certain (multifaceted) initial conditions: but all this causal complexity is bound to be—and, in fact, it has proved to be—quite difficult to handle. In this paper we take a different approach by focusing on the very activity of producing those multifaceted manifestations themselves. In this paper, we propose an original account of what the essence of a power consists in which stems from a radical reconceptualisation of power-causation according to which counterfactuals are to be explained away by powers, and not vice-versa. We call this approach the dynamical operator account of powers. According to this account, the causal role of powers consists in their ensuring that the ontological transition from a stimulus S to a manifestation M happens. Powers thus have a dynamical essence which consists in the fundamental activity of generating the counterfactuals typically associated with them. We show that if one conceptualises this functional activity as the metaphysical fulcrum around which counterfactual-based causation revolves, one is granted not only an improved methodology to individuate powers but also a better understanding of their knowability, modality and directedness.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Rosenblatt, F. (1959). Two theorems of statistical separability in the perceptron. In Mechanisation of Thought Processes: Proceedings of a Symposium held at the National Physical Laboratory, November 1958. Vol. 1, (pp. 421-456). HM Stationery Office.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Rosenblueth, A., Wiener, N. & Bigelow, J. (1943). Behavior, Purpose and Teleology. Philosophy of Science, 10, 18-24.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Ross, Don & Spurrett, David (2004). What to say to a skeptical metaphysician: A defense manual for cognitive and behavioral scientists. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27(5), 603-627.
[Abstract]A wave of recent work in metaphysics seeks to undermine the anti-reductionist, functionalist consensus of the past few decades in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. That consensus apparently legitimated a focus on what systems do, without necessarily and always requiring attention to the details of how systems are constituted. The new metaphysical challenge contends that many states and processes referred to by functionalist cognitive scientists are epiphenomenal. It further contends that the problem lies in functionalism itself, and that, to save the causal significance of mind, it is necessary to re-embrace reductionism.
We argue that the prescribed return to reductionism would be disastrous for the cognitive and behavioral sciences, requiring the dismantling of most existing achievements and placing intolerable restrictions on further work. However, this argument fails to answer the metaphysical challenge on its own terms. We meet that challenge by going on to argue that the new metaphysical skepticism about functionalist cognitive science depends on reifying two distinct notions of causality (one primarily scientific, the other metaphysical), then equivocating between them. When the different notions of causality are properly distinguished, it is clear that functionalism is in no serious philosophical trouble, and that we need not choose between reducing minds or finding them causally impotent. The metaphysical challenge to functionalism relies, in particular, on a naïve and inaccurate conception of the practice of physics, and the relationship between physics and metaphysics.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Rossetti, Y. (1997). Implicit perception in action: short-lived motor representations in space. In P.G. Grossenbacher (Ed.), Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Rossetti, Y., Rode, G., & Boisson, D. (1995). Implicit processing of somesthetic information: a dissociation between Where and How? Neuroreport, 6(3), 506-510.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Rubin, E. (1915). Synsoplevede Figurer. Gyldendalska
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Rumelhart, D. E., McClelland, J. L, & the PDP Research Group (1986). Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the microstructure of cognition (Volumes 1 and 2). MIT Press.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Russell, B. (1900). A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz Allen & Unwin.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Russell, B. (1903). The Principles of Mathematics. Allen and Unwin.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Russell, B. (1914). The relation of sense-data to physics. Scientia, 16, 1-27. No.4 reprinted in Mysticism and Logic, Longmans and Green, 1917, Chap.VIII.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Russell, B. (1918/1919). The philosophy of logical atomism. The Monist, xxviii, 495-­527; xxix, 32‑63; xxix, 190-222; xxix, 345-380. Reprinted in B. Russell (1956), Logic and Knowledge, Essays 1901-1950 (Edited by R. C. Marshall). Allen and Unwin.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Russell, B. (1921). The Analysis of Mind Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Russell, B. (1940). Inquiry into meaning and truth. Allen and Unwin.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Russell, B. A. W. (1905). On Denoting. Mind, 4, 479-493
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Russell, B. A. W. (1919). Introduction to mathematical philosophy Allen and Unwin.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Ryle, G. (1938). Categories. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 38, 189-206.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson.
[83 referring publications by Place]  

Ryle, G. (1954). Dilemmas. Cambridge University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Ryle, G. (1958). A puzzling element in the notion of thinking. Proceedings of the British Academy, XLIV, 129-144.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Sacks, H. (1972). On the analysability of stories by children. In J. J. Gumpertz, & D. Hymes (Eds.), Directions in sociolinguistics: The ethnography of communication (pp. 329-345).
[Abstract]Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Sacks, H. (1973). The preference for agreement in natural conversation. Paper presented to the Summer Institute of Linguistics, Ann Arbor, 1973.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Samitharathana, W. (2023). Is Reductive Materialism a Defensible Philosophy of Mind? American Journal of Psychology, 5(2), 1 - 8.
[Abstract]Over the past decades, reductive materialism has made a recipe for philosophy of mind to explore the subtle nature of the human mind. By and large, many identity theorists were likely to argue that mental states can be found in cognitive faculties of the brain so that the mind, if not most, associates with discoverable phenomena with no burden of proof. To put this bluntly, reductive materialism is typically defined by its very nature: all mental states are neurological states of the brain; ergo, it is implausible to make room for the substance dualism thereto. In response to this naturalist stance, aka reductive materialism, this article, thereby, contends that reductive materialism cannot be placed in a defensible position in philosophy of mind vis-à-vis the Kripkean modality; accordingly, this brief survey has identified several barnstorming findings in support of the thesis: the necessity and contingency, the core plank of possibility, rigid and non-rigid designators, and conceivability and possibility. In spite of its limitations, the study certainly adds to our understanding of the so-called reductive materialism in philosophy of mind. Nevertheless, a full discussion of naturalism lies beyond the scope of this study. Further work is, therefore, needed to fully digest the implications of reductive materialism and Kripke’s modal argument.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Sartre, J. P. (1962). Sketch for a Theory of Emotions Methuen.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. (1986). Ape language: From conditioned response to symbol Columbia University Press
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Schank, R. C. (1982). Dynamic memory: A theory of reminding and learning in computers and people. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Schegloff, E. A. (1968). Sequencing in conversational openings. American Anthropologist, 70, 1075-1095.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Schegloff, E. A. (1982). Discourse as an interactional achievement: some uses of "Uh huh" and other things that come between sentences. In D.Tannen (Ed.), Georgetown University Roundtable on Languages and Linguistics 1981. Georgetown University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Schegloff, E. A., & Sacks, H. (1973). Opening up Closings. Semiotica, 8(4), 289-327. doi:10.1515/semi.1973.8.4.289
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Schilpp, P. A. (Ed.) (1942). The philosophy of G. E. Moore. North-western University and Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Schlicht, T. (2022}. Minds, Brains, and Deep Learning: The development of Cognitive Science through the lens of Kant’s approach to cognition. In H. Kim, & D. Schönecker (Eds.), Kant and Artificial Intelligence (Chapter 1, pp. 3-38). De Gruyter.
[Abstract]This paper reviews several ways in which Kant’s approach to cognition has been influential and relevant for the development of various paradigms in cognitive science, such as functionalism, enactivism, and the predictive processing model of the mind. In the second part, it discusses philosophical issues arising from recent developments in artificial intelligence in relation to Kant’s conception of cognition and understanding. More precisely, it investigates questions about perception, cognition, learning, understanding, and about the age-old debate between empiricists and rationalists in the context of so-called deep neural network architectures as well as the relevance of Kant’s conception of cognition and understanding for these issues.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Schlicht, T. (2025). Predictive processing’s flirt with transcendental idealism. Noûs, 1–23. doi:10.1111/nous.12552
[Abstract]The popular predictive processing (PP) framework posits prediction error minimization (PEM) as the sole mechanism in the brain that can account for all mental phenomena, including consciousness. I first highlight three ambitions associated with major presentations of PP: (1) Completeness (PP aims for a comprehensive account of mental phenomena), (2) Bayesian realism (PP claims that PEM is implemented in the brain rather than providing only a model), and (3) Naturalism (PP is typically presented as yielding a naturalistic view of the mind). Then I demonstrate that many proponents of PP also endorse a form of Kantian transcendental idealism (TI), based on a characterization of  experiential content as the brain’s currently best hypothesis about the world. I argue that endorsing this claim (4), that is, that we only experience the world as it appears, but not the world itself, sabotages achieving the three ambitions. The argument proceeds by discussing the prospects of each ambition in turn,  drawing on discussions in the philosophy of science about realism and its alternatives, about the motivation and features of computational models, and about the foundational role of consciousness for science.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Schlick, M. (1932). Positivismus und Realismus Erkenntnis, 3, 1-31
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Schlick, M. (1935). Facts and propositions. Analysis, 2, 5.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Schnaitter (1986). The role of consequences in a behavioral theory of ethics. In L. J. Parrott, & P. N. Chase (Eds.), Psychological Aspects of Language: The West Virginia Lectures (Commentary, pp.179-183). Charles C. Thomas.
[Citing Place (1986a)]  [Is reply to]  

Schneider, S. (2001). Identity theory. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. iep.utm.edu/identity/
[Abstract]Identity theory is a family of views on the relationship between mind and body. Type Identity theories hold that at least some types (or kinds, or classes) of mental states are, as a matter of contingent fact, literally identical with some types (or kinds, or classes) of brain states. The earliest advocates of Type Identity—U.T. Place, Herbert Feigl, and J.J.C. Smart, respectively—each proposed their own version of the theory in the late 1950s to early 60s. But it was not until David Armstrong made the radical claim that all mental states (including intentional ones) are identical with physical states, that philosophers of mind divided themselves into camps over the issue. Over the years, numerous objections have been levied against Type Identity, ranging from epistemological complaints to charges of Leibniz’s Law violations to Hilary Putnam’s famous pronouncement that mental states are in fact capable of being “multiply realized.” Defenders of Type Identity have come up with two basic strategies in response to Putnam’s claim: they restrict type identity claims to particular species or structures, or else they extend such claims to allow for the possibility of disjunctive physical kinds. To this day, debate concerning the validity of these strategies—and the truth of Mind-Brain Type Identity—rages in the philosophical literature.
Note:
Central-State Materialism is falsely attributed to Place and Smart. It is Armstrong who defended this. The alternative of Central-State Materialism is the Two Factor theory as defended by Place, see, e.g., Place (2000d).
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1969)]  [Citing Place (1967)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  

Schoneberger, T. (1991). Verbal understanding: Integrating the conceptual analyses of Skinner, Ryle, and Wittgenstein. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 9, 145-151
[Abstract]Gilbert Ryle's (1949) and Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1953; 1958; 1974/78) conceptual analyses of verbal understanding are presented. For Ryle, the term understanding signifies simultaneously an acquired disposition and a behavioral episode. For Wittgenstein, it signifies simultaneously a skill and a criterial behavior. Both argued that episodes of understanding comprise heterogenious classes of behaviors, and that each member of such a class is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of understanding. Next, an approach integrating the analyses of Ryle and Wittgenstein with that of Skinner is presented. Lastly, it is argued that this integrated analysis adequately counters Parrott's (1984) argument that understanding, for Skinner, is potential behavior and not an event.
[Citing Place (1987a)]  

Schouten, M., & Looren de Jong, H. (2007). Mind matters; The roots of reductionism In M. Schouten, & H. Looren de Jong (Eds.), The matter of the mind: Philosophical essays on psychology, neuroscience, and reduction (Chapter 1, pp. 1-27). Blackwell Publishing.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Schusterman, R. J., & Gisiner, R. C. (1988). Artificial language comprehension in dolphins and sea lions: The essential cognitive skills. The Psychological Record, 38, 311-348.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Schusterman, R. J., & Gisiner, R. C. (1989). Please parse the sentence: Animal cognition in the procrustean bed of linguistics. The Psychological Record, 39, 3-18.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Schusterman, R. J., & Kastak, D. (1993). A California sea lion (Zalophus
californianus) is capable of forming equivalence relations. The Psychological Record, 43, 823-839.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Schusterman, R. J., & Krieger, K. (1984). California sea lions are capable of semantic comprehension. The Psychological Record, 34, 3-23.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Seager, W. (2009). Panpsychism. In: B. P. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann, & S. Walter (Eds.), Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 11, pp. 206-220).
[Abstract]Panpsychism endorses the co-fundamental status of matter and mind in so far as it allows there are features of the world which are non-mental. Panpsychism is also not generally a view in which mentality is taken as ‘substantial’. It is more natural to regard panpsychism as expressing the view that, roughly speaking, everything exemplifies certain mental properties. However, it is an important and distinctive claim of many panpsychists that the ‘object/property’ metaphysics we take for granted is fundamentally mistaken and must be replaced with another metaphysical vision of the basic structure of reality.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech Acts. Cambridge University Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (1979). Intentionality and the use of language. In A. Margalit (Ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (1979). What is an Intentional State? Mind, LXXXVIII, 74-92.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (1980). Minds, brains and programs. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417-424.
[3 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality: an essay on the philosophy of mind. Cambridge University Press.
[10 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (1984). Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures. British Broadcasting Corporation.
[4 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Searle, J. R. (1992). The Rediscovery of Mind. M.I.T. Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Searle, J. R. (2004). Mind: A brief introduction. Oxford University Press
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Sekatskaya, M.A., & Kuznetsov, A. (2018). The Philosophy of Ullin Place. From Mysticism to Materialism [in Russian]. Philosophy. Journal of the Higher School of Economics, II(4), 181-192. doi:10.17323/2587-8719-2018-ii-4-181-192
[Abstract]Ullin Place was an extraordinary person. From his early interest in mysticism he later turned to anthropology, which in turn brought him to logical behaviorism. While working on the improvement of logical behaviorism Place formulated the thesis of mindbrain identity, and has thereby founded the identity theory, which is still one of the most influential approaches in contemporary philosophy of mind. At the same time Place continued to see himself as Gilbert Ryle's follower; he insisted that the ongoing discussions about the metaphysics of consciousness are meaningless because the philosophical problem is already solved and the time for empirical research has come. The paper shows how Place's biography was interrelated with the development of his materialistic philosophy, how his article "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" relates to the rest of his work, and how this article has influenced the debates in philosophy of mind in the second half of the twentieth century.

Seligman, M. E. P. (1975). Helplessness. Freeman.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Sellars, W. (1963). Science, Perception and Reality Routledge & Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Sellars, W., & Chisholm, R. M. (1958). Appendix: Intentionality and the mental. In Concepts, theories, and the mind-body problem. Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (Volume 2, pp. 507-539). University of Minnesota Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Shaffer, J. (1961). Could mental states be brain processes? Journal of Philosophy, 58, 813-822.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [2 reprinting collections]  

Shakespeare, W, (1606). King Lear.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Shallice, T. (1988). From neuropsychology to mental structure. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Shapiro, L. A., & Polger, T. W. (2012). Identity, variability, and multiple realization in the special sciences. New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical (pp. 264-88).
[Abstract]Compositional variation and variability in nature is abundant. This fact is often thought to entail that multiple realization is also ubiquitous. In particular, compositional variability among cognitive creatures is thought to provide conclusive evidence against the mind-brain type identity theory. In this chapter we argue that the type identity theory, properly understood, is compatible with a wide range of compositional and constitutional variation and variability. Similarly, contrary to received wisdom, variation poses no threat to reductionist ventures. Multiple realization as we understand it, requires a specific pattern of variation. Multiple realization is not self-contradictory; the kinds of variation that qualify as multiple realization are not impossible, but they are less common in general than is widely supposed.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960) in context]  [Citing Place (1988a )]  

Sharpley, A. L., & Cowen, P.J. (1995). Effect of pharmacologic treatments on the sleep of depressed patients. Biological Psychiatry, 37, 85-98.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Shaw, J. (2021). Feyerabend Never Was an Eliminative Materialist: Feyerabend’s Meta-Philosophy and the Mind–Body Problem. In K. Bschir & J. Shaw (Eds.), Interpreting Feyerabend: Critical Essays (pp. 114-131). Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108575102.007 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340065806_Feyerabend_Never_was_an_Eliminative_Materialist
[Abstract]Most contemporary philosophers of mind cite Feyerabend as an early proponent of eliminative materialism, or the thesis that there are no mental processes. This attribution, I argue, is incorrect. Rather, Feyerabend only showed that common objections against materialism presuppose problematic meta-philosophical commitments. In this paper, I show how Feyerabend’s meta-philosophy leads him to the conclusion that the mind-body problem admits of many different solutions which are to be sorted out as science progresses. Moreover, I show how Feyerabend’s view evolves from a methodological to an ethical view on what a proper solution to the mind-body problem would entail.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Sheinberg, D. L. & Logothetis, N. K. (1997). The role of temporal cortical areas in perceptual organization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA. 94, 3408-3413.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Shepard, R. N. (1984). Ecological constraints on internal representation: Resonant kinematics of perceiving, imagining, thinking, and dreaming. Psychological Review, 91(4), 417–447. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.91.4.417
[Abstract]Attempts a rapprochement between J. J. Gibson's (1961) ecological optics and a conviction that perceiving, imagining, thinking, and dreaming are similarly guided by internalizations of long-enduring constraints in the external world. Phenomena of apparent motion illustrate how alternating presentations of 2 views of an object in 3-dimensional space induce the experience of the simplest rigid twisting motion prescribed by kinematic geometry—provided that times and distances fall within certain lawfully related limits on perceptual integration. Resonance is advanced as a metaphor for not only how internalized constraints such as those of kinematic geometry operate in perception, imagery, apparent motion, dreaming, hallucination, and creative thinking, but also how such constraints can continue to operate despite structural damage to the brain.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Sherrard, C. (1987, December). Rhetorical weapons: Chomsky's attack on Skinner [Conference presentation]. Symposium on Discourse Analysis, London Conference of the British Psychological Society.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Sherringtion, C. S. (1940). Man on his Nature, Gifford Lectures 1937-8. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Shirvani, E., & Shirvani, M. (2023). Evaluation of the Relation between Cognitive Science and Embodied Cognition. World Journal of Neuroscience, 13, 210-227. doi:10.4236/wjns.2023.134014
[Abstract]This article delves into the intricate relationship between cognitive science and embodied cognition, offering transformative philosophical insights with profound implications for our understanding of the mind-body connection. In response to the journal’s feedback, we have enhanced the abstract to provide a more comprehensive overview of our study.
Background: We trace the historical evolution of ideas, from the inception of cognitive science rooted in analytic philosophy to the groundbreaking contributions of Rodney Brooks and others in the field of artificial intelligence. We also explore the work of scholars such as Agre, Chapman, and Dreyfus, shedding light on the role of cognitive metaphor and the concept of the cognitive unconscious in shaping our understanding of embodied cognition.
Purpose: Our study aims to shed light on the central theme that unites these various strands of thought—the rejection of the traditional, transcendental view of the subject in favor of the concept of an embodied subject. This embodied subject actively engages with its environment, shaping consciousness and cognition. This shift in perspective challenges classical epistemological theories and opens new avenues for inquiry.
Method: We have conducted a comprehensive literature review to explore the historical development and key concepts in the field of embodied cognition, with a particular focus on the philosophical underpinnings and their integration into cognitive science.
Results: Our examination of embodied cognition reveals that the mind is intimately connected to the body, with cognition emerging through interactions with the environment and perceptual experiences. This perspective challenges reductionist notions and demonstrates that mental states cannot be reduced to brain states alone. We also explore the relationship between functionalism and computational states of the brain, illustrating that mental states can be understood in the context of mathematical functions.
Conclusion: In conclusion, this paper highlights the profound implications of embodied cognition and suggests that the mind is not isolated from the body but intimately tied to it. This perspective provides a fresh approach to the mind-body problem, emphasizing the role of the environment and perceptual experiences in shaping cognition. We invite further research into the practical applications of embodied cognition in fields like artificial intelligence, robotics, and psychology, and encourage investigations into the intersections between cognitive science and various branches of philosophy, offering valuable insights into the nature of consciousness and cognition. In essence, this study provides a comprehensive overview of the evolution and implications of embodied cognition, laying the groundwork for further research and fostering a deeper appreciation of the profound shifts in perspective that this theory brings to our understanding of the human mind.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Shoemaker, S. (1963). Self Knowledge and Self Identity Cornell University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Sidman, M. (1960). Tactics of Scientific Research. Basic Books.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Sidman, M. (1971). Reading and audio-visual equivalences. Journal of Speech and Hearing Research, 14, 5-13.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Sidman, M. (1977). Teaching some basic prerequisites for reading. In P. Mittler (ed.), Research to Practice in Mental Retardation (II). University Park Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Sidman, M. (1986). Functional analysis of emergent verbal classes. In T. Thompson & M. D. Zeiler (Eds.), Analysis and integration of behavioural units. Erlbaum.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Sidman, M. (1990). Equivalence relations: Where do they come from? In D. E. Blackman, & H. Lejeune (Eds.), Behaviour analysis in theory and practice: Contributions and controversies (pp. 92-114). Erlbaum.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Sidman, M. (1992). Equivalence relations: Some basic considerations. In S. C. Hayes, & L. J. Hayes (Eds.), Understanding verbal relations (pp. 15-27). Context Press, .
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Sidman, M. & Tailby, W. (1982). Conditional discrimination vs. matching to sample: an expansion of the testing paradigm. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 37, 5-22.
[9 referring publications by Place]  

Siewert, C. (2016), Consciousness and Intentionality, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2016 (first version Fall 2002). plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/consciousness-intentionality/
[Abstract]To say you are in a state that is (phenomenally) conscious is to say—on a certain understanding of these terms—that you have an experience, or a state there is something it’s like for you to be in. Feeling pain or dizziness, appearances of color or shape, and episodic thought are some widely accepted examples. Intentionality, on the other hand, has to do with the directedness, aboutness, or reference of mental states—the fact that, for example, you think of or about something. Intentionality includes, and is sometimes seen as equivalent to, what is called “mental representation”. Consciousness and intentionality can seem to pervade much or all of mental life—perhaps they somehow account for what it is to have a mind; at any rate they seem to be important, broad aspects of it. But achieving a general understanding of either is an enormous challenge. Part of this lies in figuring out how they are related. Are they independent? Is one (or each) to be understood in terms of the other? How we address the issues to which these questions give rise can have major implications for our views about mind, knowledge, and value.
Note:
The first time Place (1956) is cited is in the Fall 2016 version.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Simpson, A. (2022). The museums and collections of higher education. Taylor & Francis.
[Abstract]The Museums and Collections of Higher Education provides an analysis of the historic connections between materiality and higher education, developed through diverse examples of global practice. Outlining the different value propositions that museums and collections bring to higher education, the historic link between objects, evidence and academic knowledge is examined with reference to the origin point of both types of organisation. Museums and collections bring institutional reflection, cross-disciplinary bridges, digital extension options and participatory potential. Given the two primary sources of text and object, a singular source type predisposes a knowledge system to epistemic stasis, whereas mixed sources develop the potential for epistemic disruption and possible change. Museums and collections, therefore, are essential in the academies of higher learning. With the many challenges confronting humanity, it is argued that connecting intellect with social action for societal change through university museums should be a contemporary manifestation of the social contract of universities.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Singer, P. (1979). Practical ethics. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of organisms: An experimental analysis of behavior. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[32 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1945). The operational analysis of psychological terms. Psychological Review, 52, 270-277, 291-294. doi:10.1037/h0062535
[Abstract]The major contributions of operationism have been negative, largely because operationists failed to distinguish logical theories of reference from empirical accounts of language. Behaviorism never finished an adequate formulation of verbal reports and therefore could not convincingly embrace subjective terms. But verbal responses to private stimuli can arise as social products through the contingencies of reinforcement arranged by verbal communities. In analyzing traditional psychological terms, we need to know their stimulus conditions (“finding the referent”), and why each response is controlled by that condition. Consistent reinforcement of verbal responses in the presence of stimuli presupposes stimuli acting upon both the speaker and the reinforcing community, but subjective terms, which apparently are responses to private stimuli, lack this characteristic. Private stimuli are physical, but we cannot account for these verbal responses by pointing to controlling stimuli, and we have not shown how verbal communities can establish and maintain the necessary consistency of reinforcement contingencies. Verbal responses to private stimuli may be maintained through appropriate reinforcement based on public accompaniments, or through reinforcements accorded responses made to public stimuli, with private cases then occurring by generalization. These contingencies help us understand why private terms have never formed a stable and uniform vocabulary: It is impossible to establish rigorous vocabularies of private stimuli for public use, because differential reinforcement cannot be made contingent upon the property of privacy. The language of private events is anchored in the public practices of the verbal community, which make individuals aware only by differentially reinforcing their verbal responses with respect to their own bodies. The treatment of verbal behavior in terms of such functional relations between verbal responses and stimuli provides a radical behaviorist alternative to the operationism of methodological behaviorists.
Note:
Reprinted in Skinner (1959). Cumulative Record. Reprinted: (1984). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7(4),  547-553. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00027321 Reprinted in Catania & Harnad (1988). The selection of behavior. The operant behaviorism of B. F. Skinner: Comments and consequences.
[5 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  [2 reprinting collections]  

Skinner, B. F. (1948). Walden Two. Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1950). Are theories of learning necessary? Psychological Review, 57, 193-216.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. Free Press and Macmillan.
[11 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal  behavior. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[43 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1959). Cumulative Record. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[Reprints in this collection]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1963). Behaviorism at fifty. Science, 140, 951-958.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1966). An operant analysis of problem solving. In B. Kleinmuntz (Ed.) Problem Solving: Research, Method and Theory, Wiley. Reprinted as Chapter 6 of Skinner, B.F. (1969). Contingencies of Reinforcement: A Theoretical Analysis. Appleton-Century-Crofts. Reprinted as Skinner, B. F. (1984). An operant analysis of problem solving. Behavioral and brain sciences, 7(4), 583-591. Reprinted with peer comments and a reply in A. C. Catania & S. Harnad (Eds.), The selection of behavior. The operant behaviorism of B. F. Skinner: Comments and consequences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 218-236.
[Abstract]Behavior that solves a problem is distinguished by the fact that it changes another part of the solver's behavior and is strengthened when it does so. Problem solving typically involves the construction of discriminative stimuli. Verbal responses produce especially useful stimuli, because they affect other people. As a culture formulates maxims, laws, grammar, and science, its members behave more effectively without direct or prolonged contact with the contingencies thus formulated. The culture solves problems for its members, and does so by transmitting the verbal discriminative stimuli called rules. Induction, deduction, and the construction of models are ways of producing rules. Behavior that solves a problem may result from direct shaping by contingencies or from rules constructed either by the problem solver or by others. Because different controlling variables are involved, contingency-shaped behavior is never exactly like rule-governed behavior. The distinction must take account of (1) a system which establishes certain contingencies of reinforcement, such as some part of the natural environment, a piece of equipment, or a verbal community; (2) the behavior shaped and maintained by these contingencies; (3) rules, derived from the contingencies, which specify discriminative stimuli, responses, and consequences, and (4) the behavior occasioned by the rules.
[23 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1969). Contingencies of reinforcement. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
[32 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyond freedom and dignity. Knopf.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism Knopf.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1975). The shaping of phylogenic behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 7, 117-120.
[10 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1977). Why I am not a cognitive psychologist. Behaviorism, 5, 1-10.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1981). Selection by consequences. Science, 213, 501-504. Reprinted with peer commentary in A. C. Catania and S. Harnad (Eds.) (1984). Canonical papers of B. F. Skinner. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7, 477-481. doi:10.1126/science.7244649
[Abstract]Selection by consequences is a causal mode found only in living things, or in machines made by living things. It was first recognized in natural selection, but it also accounts for the shaping and maintenance of the behavior of the individual and the evolution of cultures. In al three of these fields, it replaces explanations based on the causal modes of classical mechanics. The replacement is strongly resisted. Natural selection has now made its case, but similar delays in recognizing the role of selection in the other fields could deprive us of valuable help in solving the problems which confront us.
[9 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1984). Coming to terms with private events, author's response to open peer commentary on The operational analysis of psychological terms. In A. C. Catania & S. Harnad (Eds.),Canonical papers of B. F. Skinner. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7, 752-759.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1984). An operant analysis of problem solving. In A. C. Catania, & S. Harnad (Eds.), The Canonical Papers of B. F. Skinner. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7, 583-591.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1985). Reply to Place: "Three senses of the word 'tact'" Behaviorism, 13(2), 75-76.
[Citing Place (1985d)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Skinner (1985) Reply to Place - 'Three Senses of the Word 'Tact''.pdf

Skinner, B. F. (1987). Outlining a science of feeling. The Times Literary Supplement, 490, 501-2.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Skinner, B. F. (1989). The behavior of the listener. In S. C. Hayes (Ed.), Rulegoverned behavior: Cognition, contingencies and instructional control (pp. 85-96). Plenum.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Sklar, L. (1967). Types of inter-iheoretic reduction. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 18(2), 109–124. www.jstor.org/stable/686579
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Skokowski, P. (2018). Temperature, color and the brain: An externalist reply to the knowledge argument. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 9(2). 287–299
[Abstract]It is argued that the knowledge argument fails against externalist theories of mind. Enclosing Mary and cutting her off from some properties denies part of the physical world to Mary, which has the consequence of denying her certain kinds of physical knowledge. The externalist formulation of experience is shown to differ in vehicle, content, and causal role from the internalist version addressed by the knowledge argument, and is supported by results from neuroscience. This means that though the knowledge argument has some force against material internalists, it misses the mark entirely against externalist accounts.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Skokowski, P. (2022). Sensing Qualia. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 16. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2022.795405
[Abstract]Accounting for qualia in the natural world is a difficult business, and it is worth understanding why. A close examination of several theories of mind — Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory — will be discussed, revealing shortcomings for these theories in explaining the contents of conscious experience: qualia. It will be argued that in order to overcome the main difficulty of these theories the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theory, Grounded Functionalism, will be proposed, which retains multiple realizability while allowing for a scientifically based approach toward accounting for qualia in the natural world.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Skoyles, J. R. (2000) Gesture, Language Origins, and Right Handedness: Commentary on Place on Language-Gesture. Psycoloquy, 11(24). http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.024 http://courses.washington.edu/lingclas/200/Lectures/Biol/Psycoloquy_2000_Gesture,_language_and_right_handedness.pdf
[Abstract]The right:left ratio of handedness is 90:10 in humans and 50:50 in chimpanzees. Handedness is hereditary both in humans and chimpanzees: Why did this lead to the selection of right handedness in humans? Perhaps in a gestural stage of the evolution of language it was an advantage for signers to share the same signing hand for learning and understanding one other's gestures.
Keywords: mirror neurons
[Citing Place (2000c)]  [Is reply to]  

Slezak, P. P. (2002) Talking to ourselves: The intelligibility of inner speech. [Comments to Carruthers: The Cognitive Functions of Language.] Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(6), 699-700 doi:10.1017/S0140525X02490127 Link Text
[Abstract]The possible role of language in intermodular communication and non-domain-specific thinking is an empirical issue that is independent of the “vehicle” claim that natural language is “constitutive” of some thoughts. Despite noting objections to various forms of the thesis that we think in language, Carruthers entirely neglects a potentially fatal objection to his own preferred version of this “cognitive conception.”
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Slezak, P. P. (2002). The tripartite model of representation. Philosophical Psychology, 15, 239 - 270. doi:10.1080/0951508021000006085 Link Text
[Abstract]Robert Cummins [(1996) Representations, targets and attitudes, Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT, p. 1] has characterized the vexed problem of mental representation as “the topic in the philosophy of mind for some time now.” This remark is something of an understatement. The same topic was central to the famous controversy between Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld in the 17th century and remained central to the entire philosophical tradition of “ideas” in the writings of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and Kant. However, the scholarly, exegetical literature has almost no overlap with that of contemporary cognitive science. I show that the recurrence of certain deep perplexities about the mind is a systematic and pervasive pattern arising not only throughout history, but also in a number of independent domains today such as debates over visual imagery, symbolic systems and others. Such historical and contemporary convergences suggest that the fundamental issues cannot arise essentially from the theoretical guise they take in any particular case.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Slezak, P. P. (2002). The Imagery Debate: Déjà-vu all over again. [Commentary to Pylyshyn’s article: Mental Imagery]. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25, 209–210.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Slezak, P. P. (2002). Thinking about thinking: language, thought and introspection. Language & Communication, 22, 353–373. doi:10.1016/S0271-5309(02)00012-5 Link Text
[Abstract]I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers have said about the world or the sciences. (G.E. Moore, 1942, p. 14) Peter Carruthers has made a vigorous attempt to defend the admittedly unfashionable doctrine that we think ‘in’ language, despite its displacement by something like Fodor’s ‘language of thought’. The idea that we think in language has considerable intuitive persuasiveness, but I suggest that this is not the force of good argument and evidence, but a familiar kind of introspective illusion. In this regard, the question of language and thought derives a more general interest, since the illusion is independently familiar from other notorious disputes in cognitive science such as the ‘imagery debate’.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Slezak, P. P. (2008). The 'Hard' Problem and Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 30, 525 Link Text
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Slezak, P. P. (2018). Is There Progress in Philosophy? The Case for Taking History Seriously. Philosophy, 93(4), 529-555. doi:10.1017/S0031819118000232 Link Text
[Abstract]In response to widespread doubts among professional philosophers (Russell, Horwich, Dietrich, McGinn, Chalmers), Stoljar argues for a ‘reasonable optimism’ about progress in philosophy. He defends the large and surprising claim that ‘there is progress on all or reasonably many of the big questions’. However, Stoljar’s caveats and admitted avoidance of historical evidence permits overlooking persistent controversies in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are essentially unchanged since the 17th Century. Stoljar suggests that his claims are commonplace in philosophy departments and, indeed, the evidence I adduce constitutes an indictment of the widely shared view among professional analytic philosophers.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Slezak, P. P. (2023). Spectator in the Cartesian theatre: Where theories of mind went wrong since Descartes. Lexington Books.
[Abstract]The “Cartesian Theater” is Dennett’s famous metaphor for the idea that a homunculus or “little man” watches the screen on which our thoughts appear. However, contrary to much academic teaching and scholarship, Spectator in the Cartesian Theater: Where Theories of Mind Went Wrong since Descartes shows that Descartes was not guilty of this fallacy for which he has been blamed. In his physiological writings neglected by philosophers, Descartes explained that the pseudo-explanation arises not from what is included in our theory of consciousness, but rather from what is missing. We fail to notice that the theory is incomplete because we are intuitively doing part of the explanatory work. That is, we are the spectators in the Cartesian Theater. With detailed critiques, Peter Slezak shows that Searle’s Chinese Room Argument, Kripke’s theory of proper names, Davidson’s semantics of natural language and Kosslyn’s theory of visual imagery rely on what is intuitively meaningful to us rather than what follows from the theory. Slezak offers a novel solution to the elusive logic of the Cogito argument, showing it to be akin to the Liar Paradox. Since Descartes’ perplexity is our own, this shows how the subjective certainty of consciousness and the mind-body problem can arise for a physical system. An intelligent computer would think that it isn’t one.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Slezak, P. P. (2025). Who is the spectator in the Cartesian Theater? Philosophical Psychology doi:10.1080/09515089.2025.2573764
[Abstract]The “Cartesian Theater” is Dennett’s metaphor for the error of positing a homunculus or “little man” who watches an inner screen on which our thoughts appear – “the most tenacious bad idea bedevilling our attempts to think about consciousness.” However, I suggest Dennett’s analysis must be modified to avoid two significant mistakes. First, I show that, contrary to much academic teaching and scholarship, Descartes was not guilty of the homunculus or Cartesian Theater fallacy, as he explains in his physiological writings La Dioptrique and Traité de L’homme neglected by philosophers. Second, I argue that the Theater metaphor must be understood quite differently from the way it has been conceived by Dennett. Indeed, following Descartes, I suggest that the pseudo-explanation arises not from what is included in our theory to do the “clever work” but rather from what is missing. The temptation is not “to imagine an inner agent” but rather it is the failure to notice that a model can’t work without “an intelligent and comprehending reader” – the theorist. Finally, I argue that, once the error is properly understood in this way, we can see that it is implicated in several controversial theories in philosophy.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Slobin, D. I. (Ed.) (1985). The crosslinguistic study of language acquisition (2 volumes). Erlbaum.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1957). Plausible reasoning in philosophy. Mind, 66(261), 75-78.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review, LXVIII, 141-156.
Note:
A revised version with new references appeared in V. C. Chappell (Ed.) (1962), The philosophy of mind. Prentice-Hall. Later reprints are of this version.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [24 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  [7 reprinting collections]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1960). Sensations and brain processes: A rejoinder to Dr. Pitcher and Mr. Joske. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 38, 252-254.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1961). Colours. Philosophy, 36(137), 128-142. doi:10.1017/S0031819100057995
Note:
This article is reprinted as Chapter IV, The Secondary Qualities, "with some interpolations" of J. J. C. Smart (1963). Philosophy and Scientific Realism.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1962). Brain Processes and Incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XL, 68-70.
[2 referring publications by Place]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1963), Philosophy and scientific realism. Routledge and Kegan Paul
Note:
Much of Chapter IV, The Secondary Qualities “consists, with some interpolations, of” Smart (1961).
Chapter VI, Man as a Physical Mechanism, is reprinted in O'Connor (Ed.) (1969). Modern Materialism: Readings on Mind-Body Identity.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1963). Materialism. Journal of Philosophy, 60(22), 651-662.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1966). Philosophy and scientific plausibility. In P. K. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Mind, matter and method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl (pp. 377-390). University of Minnesota Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1959)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1967). Comments on the papers. In C. F. Presley (Ed.), The Identity Theory of Mind (pp. 84-93). University of Queensland Press.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [6 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1971). Reports of immediate experiences. Synthese, 22, 346-359. doi:10.1007/BF00413432
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960) in context]  [Citing Place (1967) in context]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1972). Further thoughts on the identity theory. The Monist, 56(2), 149-162 doi:10.5840/monist19725621
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1975). Book review of Critique of the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory. Eric P. Polten. The Hague: Mouton, 1973. Pp. xviii+290. 34 Guilders. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 5(1), 83-86.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Reviewed publication(s)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1975). On some criticisms of a physicalist theory of colours. In C. Cheng, C. (1975), Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-body Problem [Proceedings of the Conference on the Philosophy of Mind and Psychology, University of Hawaii, 1968.] (pp. 54-63). University of Hawaii Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1981). Physicalism and emergence. Neuroscience, 6(2), 109-113. doi:10.1016/0306-4522(81)90049-X.
[Abstract]This commentary is concerned to elucidate some views expressed by R. W. Sperry in a previous Commentary. A physicalist theory of mind is briefly expounded and defended and is compared with Sperry's views, and in passing also with some remarks by D. M. MacKay. It is necessary to distinguish two senses of the word ‘emergence’, a strong sense and a weak sense. The physicalist theory is emergentist only in the weak sense. There is some discussion as to whether Sperry should be interpreted as an emergentist in the strong sense, or only in the weak sense that is compatible with a mechanistic and physicalist ontology.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1989). C. B. Martin: A biographical sketch. In J. Heil (Ed. ), Cause, mind and reality: Essays honoring C. B. Martin (pp. 1-3). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1994). Mind and brain In R. Warner, & T. Szubka (Eds.), The mind-body problem: A guide to the current debate (pp. 19-23). Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Smart, J. J. C. (1999) Ullin Thomas Place [obituary]
Note:
Obituary written by professor J. J. C. (“Jack”) Smart in November 1999 at the request of Ullin Place; to be read at the latter’s funeral. Because he lived in Australia, it was impossible for Jack to attend the funeral. This obituary was likely used as input by Harry Lewis, a former Leeds colleague in the Department of Philosophy, in his contribution “An account of Ullin’s academic career” to the funeral in January 2000.
Download: Smart (1999) Obituary.pdf

Smart, J. J. C. (2000a). Ullin Thomas Place (1924-2000). Pelican Record, 41, 123-124. [Corpus Christi College, Oxford]

Smart, J. J. C. (2000b). Ullin Thomas Place (1924-2000). Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78, 432

Smart, J. J. C. (2004). Consciousness and Awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11(2), 41–50.
[Abstract]This article is an attempt to show how the so called 'hard problem' in the philosophy of mind (that of giving a physicalist account of consciousness) may in fact not be as hard as is usually supposed.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (2006). Metaphysical illusions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84(2), 167–175. doi:10.1080/00048400600758912
[Abstract]The paper begins by considering David Armstrong's beautiful paper ‘The Headless Woman Illusion and the Defence of Materialism’, which conjectures how we get the illusion that there are non-physical qualia. There are discussions of other metaphysical illusions, that there is a passage of time, that we have libertarian free will, and that consciousness is ineffable (which last also relates to Armstrong), and of their possible explanations. Moral: avoid appeal to so called intuition or phenomenology.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  

Smart, J. J. C. (2007). The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition, originally published in 2000, substantive revision in 2007). plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/mind-identity/
[Citing Graham & Valentine (2004)]  [Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1967)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1989a)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (1999d)]  
Download: Smart (2007) The Mind-Brain Identity Theory.pdf

Smart, J. J. C. (2014). Australasian Analytic Philosophy (1950s). In G. Oppy & N. N. Trakakis (Eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Second Edition, pp. 40-42; first edition 2010). Monash University Publishing.
[Citing Place (1954) in context]  [Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Smith, D. E. (1987). The everyday world as problematic: A feminist sociology. North Eastern University Press.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Smith, D. E. (2000) A memory of Ullin.
Download: Smith (2000) A Memory of Ullin.pdf

Smith, E. (2016) How to teach philosophy of mind Teaching Philosophy, 39(2), 177-207. doi:10.5840/teachphil201651649
[Abstract]The most notable contributions to contemporary philosophy of mind have been written by philosophers of mind for philosophers of mind. Without a good understanding of the historical framework, the technical terminology, the philosophical methodology, and the nature of the philosophical problems themselves, not only do undergraduate students face a difficult challenge when taking a first course in philosophy of mind, but instructors lacking specialized knowledge in this field might be put off from teaching the course. This paper is intended to provide a framework for instructors with little background in this area of philosophy to develop a course in philosophy of mind. This course, aimed at the advanced undergraduate student, provides students with the tools necessary for understanding some of the key readings in contemporary philosophy of mind and offers unique benefits to both majors and non-majors. The course described here focuses on just two of the main problems in philosophy of mind—the mind-body problem and the problem of phenomenal consciousness—and briefly touches on other issues one might address. Finally, several solutions to common challenges that arise in an advanced philosophy course are discussed.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Smoke, K. L. (1932). An objective study of concept formation. Psychological Monographs, 42, No. 191.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Smolensky, P. (1988). On the proper treatment of connectionism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 11, 1-59.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Smythies, J. R. (1957) A note on the fallacy of the 'phenomenological fallacy'. British Journal of Psychology, 48, 141-144.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Snowdon, P. (1995). Perception and attention [Paper presented to a one-day conference on `Attention and Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Issues', Department of Philosophy, University College London, 26th May 1995].
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Snowdon, P. F. (1989). On formulating materialism and dualism. In J. Heil (Ed.), Cause, mind and reality: Essays honoring C. B. Martin (pp. 137-158). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Soleimani Khourmouji, M. (2015). Place goes wrong in treating mind-brain relationship. Clarifying why identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. Philosophical Investigations, 9(17), 173-202. http://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir
[Abstract]U. T. Place claims that philosophical problems concerning the true nature of mind-brain relationship disappears or is settled adhering to materialism, especially type identity theory of mind. He takes above claim as a reasonable scientific hypothesis. I shall argue why it is not as he claims. At first, to pave the way for refutation, I will briefly clarify Place's approach to the subject in hand; although the rest of the paper will also contain more details about his position. Then, I will reduce his position into four theses and try to prove that the main claim of type identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. I think that we ought to regard type identity theory, at most, just as a hypothesis which approximately displays the function of mind-brain relationship but tells us nothing justifiably about its true nature.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1991f)]  [Citing Place (1996j)]  [Citing Place (1999e)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  [Citing Place (2000b)]  [Citing Place (2000a)]  [Citing Place (2004)]  
Download: Soleimani (2015) Place Goes Wrong in Treating Mind-Brain Relationship.pdf

Sorem, E. (2010). Searle, materialism, and the mind-body problem. Perspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy, 3, 30-54. www.ucd.ie/philosophy/perspectives/resources/issue3/Perspectives_volumeIII_SearleMaterialismMindBody.pdf
[Abstract]In The Rediscovery of Mind, Searle gives a spirited attempt to offer a “simple solution” to the mind-body problem in his “biological naturalism.” It is the purpose of this paper, however, to show that the solution he offers is not simple and is arguably incoherent as it currently stands. I focus on Searle’s claim that the key to solving the mind-body problem is to first reject the system of conceptual categories that underlies materialism and then adopt his biological naturalism. I argue that the positions articulated in this theory, however, appear to generate serious inconsistencies that make his proposal look either incoherent or suggestive of the sort of property dualism he wants to reject. Because Searle lacks a sufficient metaphysical scheme to produce compelling arguments against these particular accusations and because it is not clear that biological naturalism is the obvious or common-sense position he says it is, I conclude that his proposal cannot be a “simple solution.”
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Sosa, E. (Ed.) (1975) Causation and conditionals Oxford University Press
[Reprints in this collection]  

Spence, K. W. (1951). Theoretical interpretations of learning. In S. S. Stevens (Ed.), Handbook of Experimental Psychology. Wiley.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Sperling, G. (1967). Successive approximations to a model of short term memory. Acta Psychologica, 27, 285-292.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Sperry, R. W. (1974). Lateral specialization in the surgically separated hemispheres. In F. Schmitt, & F. Worden (Eds.), Neurosciences Third Study Program (Ch. I, Vol. 3, pp. 5- 19). MIT Press. people.uncw.edu/puente/sperry/sperrypapers/70s/180-1974.pdf
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Spielberger, C. D., & Levin, S. M. (1962). What is learned in verbal conditioning. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1, 125-132.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Spielberger, C. D., & Levin, S. M. (1962). What is learned in verbal conditioning? Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1, 125-132.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Spinoza, B. (1677). Ethica (Translated as Ethics).
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Spurrett, D, (2017). Physicalism as an empirical hypothesis. Synthese, 194, 3347–3360. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0986-
[Abstract]Bas van Fraassen claims that materialism involves false consciousness. The thesis that matter is all that there is, he says, fails to rule out any kinds of theories. The false consciousness consists in taking materialism to be cognitive rather than an existential stance, or attitude, of deference to the current content of science (whatever that content is) in matters of ontology, and a favourable attitude to completeness claims about the content of science at a time. The main argument Van Fraassen provides for saying that materialism is not cognitive is an account according to which materialism has responded, so far, to changes in science by abandoning previous hallmarks of the material (or physical), and accepting new ones instead of by taking materialism to have been refuted. I argue that van Fraassen’s conclusions run far ahead of what his arguments establish. The fact of revision and revolution in the history of science, and the undoubted provisionality and incompleteness of science as we have it, do indeed tell against simply letting current science determine what the physical (or material) is for philosophical purposes. But the alternative to betting on current science need not be unconditional open-endedness. The changes that materialists have accepted so far do not, furthermore, support the false consciousness interpretation. The reason for this is not that materialists will swallow anything, but rather that the changes accepted are consistent with the truth of materialism when appropriately characterized.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Stanovich, K. E., & West R. F. (2000). Behavioral and brain sciences, 23,(5), 645-665. www.keithstanovich.com/Site/Research_on_Reasoning_files/bbs2000.pdf
[Abstract]In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implications of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance errors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations underlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Unexpected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate. Note: System 1 an system 2. Table 3: The terms for the two systems used by a variety of theorists and the properties of dual-process theories of reasoning.

Stapledon, O. (1939). Philosophy and Living (2 Vols). Penguin.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Steele, D. L., & Hayes, S. C. (1991). Stimulus equivalence and arbitrarily applicable relational responding. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 56, 519-555.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Stein, B. E., & Meredith, M. A. (1993). The Merging of the Senses. MIT Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Steinhorst A. , & Funke, J. (2014). Mirror neuron activity is no proof for action understanding. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8 doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00333
[Abstract]Mirror neurons, which have been discovered by single cell recordings in the parieto-frontal areas of the macaque's brain (Rizzolatti et al., 1996), are neurons that discharge in the monkey's brain both when a specific action is observed and when the same action is performed by the monkey himself. In healthy humans, a direct measuring of neural activity is not possible for ethical reasons as the scalp has to be opened for single cell recordings. Still, there is broad evidence from indirect studies that a similar parieto-frontal mirror mechanism also exists in humans (for an overview see Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008). In this opinion paper, we will focus on the thesis that action understanding is a function of the mirror neuron system. We will not address intention understanding. According to our opinion, understanding is a process that runs through hermeneutic circles from the “Vorverständnis” (“previous understanding”) to steps of deeper understanding, capturing assigned meaning in its “Bedeutungszusammenhang” (coherence) and recognizing the historical and cultural conditionality of understanding (Dilthey, 1961; Gadamer, 1990). In the following, however, we will focus on the narrow neuroscientific definition of action understanding: the capacity to recognize several movements as belonging to one action. Following Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2008), a person “understands” the “action” of a friend moving her arm to an apple if she recognizes this movement to be a grasp toward an apple, if she is able to distinguish it from other movements and if she can use this information to organize appropriate future actions (p. 106). Thus, [by] saying “The person grasps the apple,” she understands the action. This definition equates “understanding” with “recognition,” explaining why sometimes the latter term is chosen (Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Buccino et al., 2004; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Jacob, 2008). After a reconstruction of the model's developments, we will challenge the claims of the model by Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2010). By analyzing the relation between the experimental results and its interpretation, we will conclude that there is no proof that mirror neuron activity leads to action understanding.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Stemmer, N. (1987). The learning of syntax: an empiricist approach. First Language, 7, 97-120.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Stemmer, N. (1988). The acquisition of the ostensive lexicon: the superiority of empiricist over cognitivist theories. Behaviorism, 17(1), 41-63
[1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Stemmer, N. (1989). The acquisition of the ostensive lexicon: A reply to Professor Place. Behaviorism,17(2), 147-149. www.jstor.org/stable/41236095
[Citing Place (1989c)]  [Is reply to]  

Stemmer, N. (2001). The mind-body problem and Quine's repudiation theory. Behavior and Philosophy, 29, 187-202. [Ullin Place Special Issue]
[Abstract]Most scholars who presently deal with the Mind-Body problem consider themselves monist materialists. Nevertheless, many of them also assume that there exist (in some sense of existence) mental entities. But since these two positions do not harmonize quite well, the literature is full of discussions about how to reconcile the positions. In this paper, I will defend a materialist theory that avoids all these problems by completely rejecting the existence of mental entities. This is Quine's repudiation theory. According to the theory, there are no mental entities, and the behavioral or physiological phenomena that have been attributed to mental entities, or that point to the existence of these entities, are exclusively caused by physiological factors. To be sure, several objections have been raised to materialist theories that do not assign some role to mental entities. But we will see that Quine is able to give convincing replies to these objections. "Since Ullin Place would surely have agreed with the materialist position defended in this paper, I dedicate this paper to his memory."
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  [Citing Place (1989c)]  
Download: Stemmer (2001) The Mind-Body Problem and Quine's Repudiation Theory.pdf

Steriade, M., CurróDossi, R., Paré, D., & Oakson, G. (1991). Fast oscillations (20-40 Hz) in thalamocortical systems and their potentiation by mesopontine cholinergic nuclei in the cat. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the U.S.A., 88, 4396-4400.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Stevenson, C. L. (1944). Ethics and Language Yale University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Stoerig, P., & Cowey, A. (1997). Blindsight in man and monkey. Brain, 120, 535-559.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Stoljar, D. (2014). Identity theory of mind In G. Oppy & N. N. Trakakis (Eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Second Edition, pp. 228-232; first edition 2010). Monash University Publishing.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Stout, G. F. (1898). A manual of psychology.. University Tutorial Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Stoutland, F. (1971). Ontological Simplicity and the Identity Hypothesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 31(4),491-509. doi:10.2307/2105767
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Stowell, T. (1992). The role of the lexicon in syntactic theory. In T. Stowell & E. Wehrli (Eds.), Syntax and semantics (Vol. 26, pp. 9-20). Academic Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Strawson, G. (2019). A hundred years of consciousness: “a long training in absurdity”. Estudios de Filosofía, 59, 9-43.
[Abstract]There occurred in the twentieth century the most remarkable episode in the history of human thought. A number of thinkers denied the existence of  something we know with certainty to exist: consciousness, conscious  experience. Others held back from the Denial, as we may call it, but claimed that it might be true — a claim no less remarkable than the Denial. This paper documents some aspects of this episode, with particular reference to two things. First, the development of two views which are forms of the Denial — philosophical behaviourism, and functionalism considered as a doctrine in the philosophy of mind — from a view that does not in any way involve the Denial: psychological methodological behaviourism. Second, the rise of a way of understanding naturalism — materialist or physicalist naturalism — that wrongly takes naturalism to entail the Denial.
Note:
Isaiah Berlin Lecture, Wolfson College, Oxford, May 25, 2017 (audio)
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Strawson, P. F. (1950). On referring. Mind, 59, 320-344.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Strawson, P. F. (1952). Introduction to logical theory Methuen.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Strawson, P. F. (1959). Individuals. Methuen.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Strawson, P. F. (1970). Categories. In O.P. Wood & G. Pitcher (Eds.), Ryle (pp. 181-211). Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Stubenberg, L. (1997). Austria vs. Australia: Two versions of the identity theory. In K. Lehler, & J. C. Marek (Eds.), Austrian Philosophy Past and Present: Essays in Honor of Rudolf Haller (pp. 125-146). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[Abstract]According to the received view the identity theory was developed in the decade stretching from the mid fifties to the mid sixties. At the time the identity theory seemed like an outrageous minority view. In the face of near universal opposition the early identity theorists developed a remarkable esprit de corps—they emphasized the similarities and de-emphasized the differences of their respective views. This sort of team spirit may have seemed essential to win a philosophical battle; but it also helped to obscure the crucial differences between the various theories that sailed under the flag of the identity theory. Today I want to invert the strategy of the early identity theorist—I want to emphasize the differences and de-emphasize the similarities between the early versions of the identity theory.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Stubenberg, L. (1998). Consciousness and qualia. John Benjamins.
[Abstract]Consciousness and Qualia is a philosophical study of qualitative consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, experienced colors, sounds, etc.
[Citing Place (1956 )]  

Sturm, T. (2012). Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive physicalism. Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 14(1), 55–63.
[Abstract]This paper is an overview of recent discussions concerning the mind–body problem, which is being addressed at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses on phenomenal features of consciousness or “qualia,” which are distinguished from various related issues. Then follows a discussion of various influential skeptical arguments that question the possibility of reductive explanations of qualia in physicalist terms: knowledge arguments, conceivability arguments, the argument of multiple realizability, and the explanatory gap argument. None of the arguments is found to be very convincing. It does not necessarily follow that reductive physicalism is the only option, but it is defensible. However, constant conceptual and methodological reflection is required, alongside ongoing research, to keep such a view free from dogmatism and naivety.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Sundberg, M. L (1991). 301 Research topics from Skinner’s book Verbal Behavior. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 9(1), 81-96. doi:10.1007/BF03392862
[Abstract]Skinner’s (1957) analysis of verbal behavior addresses some of the most important issues in human behavior. However, relatively few of the analyses presented by Skinner in Verbal Behavior have been subjected to an experimental analysis. The current list of topics was assembled in an effort to stimulate empirical research on verbal behavior. The list contains thirty research areas with ten topics suggested for each area. A final topic, education, is presented as a challenge to behavior analysts.
[Citing Place (1981b)]  

Sundberg, M. L., & Michael, J. (1983). A response to U. T. Place. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 2, 13-17.
[Abstract]Skinner's (1957) analysis of verbal behavior has received an unwarranted amount of criticism over the years, and the recently published reviews of Verbal Behavior by U. T. Place contribute to this body of negative literature. It is argued that Place, like those before him, has failed to appreciate several critical features of behaviorism and Skinner's analysis of verbal behavior. Place's "four major defects in Verbal Behavior" are reviewed and analyzed. The results seem to indicate that Place's dissatisfaction with the book would be greatly reduced by a better understanding of Skinner's work.
[Citing Place (1981a)]  [Citing Place (1981b)]  [Is reply to]  [1 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  
Download: Sundberg & Michael (1983) A Response to U T Place.pdf

Suojanen, M. (2019). Conscious experience and quantum consciousness theory: Theories, causation, and identity. E-LOGOS – Electronic Journal for Philosophy, 26(2), 14–34. doi:10.18267/j.e-logos.465
[Abstract]Generally speaking, the existence of experience is accepted, but more challenging has been to say what experience is and how it occurs. Moreover, philosophers and scholars have been talking about mind and mental activity in connection with experience as opposed to physical processes. Yet, the fact is that quantum physics has replaced classical Newtonian physics in natural sciences, but the scholars in humanities and social sciences still operate under the obsolete Newtonian model. There is already a little research in which mind and conscious experience are explained in terms of quantum theory. This article argues that experience is impossible to be both a physical and non-physical phenomenon. When discussing causality and identity as transcendental, quantum theory may imply the quantum physical nature of conscious experience, where a person associates causality to conscious experience, and, thus, the result is that the double-aspect theory and the mind/brain identity theory would be refuted.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  

Swartz, N. (1974). Can the Theory of the Contingent Identity between Sensation-States and Brain-States Be Made Empirical? Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 3(3), 405-417. www.jstor.org/stable/40230454
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Taffel, C. (1955). Anxiety and the conditioning of verbal behavior. <em>Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology</em>, <em>51</em>, 496-501.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Tallis, R. (2004). Trying to find consciousness in the brain. Brain, 127(11), 2558–2563. doi:10.1093/brain/awh311
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Tamminga, A. (2009). In de ban van de metafysica. De identiteitstheorieën van Place, Smart en Armstrong [Under the spell of metaphysics. Place's, Smart's and Armstrong's identity theories.]. Tijdschrift voor filosofie, 71, 553-575.
[Abstract]We investigate the genesis of metaphysical physicalism and its influence on the development of Place's, Smart's, and Armstrong's ideas on the relation between the mental and the physical. We first reconstruct the considerations that led Armstrong and Smart to a 'scientific' world view. We call 'metaphysical physicalism' the comprehensive theory on reality, truth, and meaning which ensued from this world view. Against the background of this metaphysical physicalism we study Armstrong's and Smart's analyses of secondary properties and the genesis of their identity theories of mind and matter. We argue that fundamental revisions in Smart's theories on colour and consciousness were driven by his aspiration to fully work out the philosophical consequences of metaphysical physicalism. Finally, we briefly consider the role metaphysical physicalism has played in twentieth-century philosophy of mind.
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  
Download: Tamminga (2009) In de Ban van de Metafysica.pdf

Tarski, A. (1930-1/1936/1956). O pojeciu prawdy w odniesieniu do sformalizowanych nauk dedukcyjnych (On the notion of truth in reference to formalized deductive sciences) Ruch Filozoficzny xii. Revised version in German translation as Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen. Studia Philosophica 1: 261-405. English translation of the German text by J. H. Woodger as The concept of truth in formal languages.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Tarski, A. (1956). Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938 (English translation by J. H. Woodger). Clarendon Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Tartaglia, J. (2005). Place, Ullin Thomas (1924-2000). In S. Brown (Ed.)., The Dictionary of Twentieth-Century British Philosophers (pp. 785-789). Bristol: Thoemmes. doi:10.5040/9781350052437-0328
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  [Citing Place (1967)]  [Citing Place (1990a)]  [Citing Place (2000d)]  [Citing Place (2002)]  
Download: Tartaglia (2005) Place, Ullin Thomas (1924-2000).pdf

Tartaglia, J. (2011). Philosophy between religion and science. Essays in Philosophy, 12(2), 224-241. doi:10.5840/eip20111223
[Abstract]Philosophical concerns are evidenced from the beginning of human literature, which have no obvious connection to philosophy’s mainstream epistemological and metaphysical problematic. I reject the views that the nature of philosophy is a philosophical question, and that the discipline is united by methodology, arguing that it must be united by subject matter. The origins of the discipline provide reasons to doubt the existence of a unifying subject matter, however, and scepticism about philosophy also arises from its a priori methodology and apparent lack of progress. In response, I argue that philosophy acquired a distinctive subject matter when the concept of transcendence was introduced into attempts to gain a systematic understanding of the world and our place within it; philosophy thereby pursues the same aim of achieving a synoptic vision of reality as religion, but resembles science in its development and employment of rigorous methodologies. Philosophy’s subject matter explains why it must be pursued a priori, and it only appears not to have progressed when aims are neglected, and it is inappropriately assimilated to science.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  [Citing Place (1960) in context]  

Tartaglia, J. (2013). Conceptualizing physical consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 26(6), 817-838. doi:10.1080/09515089.2013.770940
[Abstract]Theories that combine physicalism with phenomenal concepts abandon the phenomenal irrealism characteristic of 1950s physicalism, thereby leaving physicalists trying to reconcile themselves to concepts appropriate only to dualism. Physicalists should instead abandon phenomenal concepts and try to develop our concepts of conscious states. Employing an account of concepts as structured mental representations, and motivating a model of conceptual development with semantic externalist considerations, I suggest that phenomenal concepts misrepresent their referents, such that if our conception of consciousness incorporates them, it needs development. I then argue that the "phenomenal concept strategy" (PCS) of a purely cognitive account of the distinction between phenomenal and physical concepts combines physicalism with phenomenal concepts only by misrepresenting physical properties. This is because phenomenal concepts carry ontological commitment, and I present an argument to show the tension between this commitment and granting ontological authority to physical concepts only. In the final section, I show why phenomenal concepts are more ontologically committed than PCS theorists can allow, revive U.T. Place's notion of a “phenomenological fallacy” to explain their enduring appeal, and then suggest some advantages of functional analyses of concepts of conscious states over the phenomenal alternative.
Keywords: phenomenological fallacy
[Citing Place (1954)]  [Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (2002)]  [Related]  
Download: Tartaglia (2013) Conceptualizing Physical Consciousness.pdf

Tawney, R.H. (1926). Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: a Historical Study. Murray.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Taylor, C. (1964). The Explanation of Behaviour Routledge & Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Taylor, C. (1967). Mind-body identity, a side issue? Philosophical Review, 76, 201-213.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [1 reprinting collections]  

Taylor, C. (1969). Two issues about materialism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 19(74), 73–79. doi:10.2307/2218192
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Reviewed publication(s)]  

Taylor, R. (1966). Action and purpose Prentice-Hall.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

te Vrugt, M., Needham, P., & Schmitz, G. J. (2022) Is thermodynamics fundamental? arXiv:2204.04352v1 [physics.hist-ph] 9 Apr 2022 doi:10.48550/arXiv.2204.04352
[Abstract]It is a common view in philosophy of physics that thermodynamics is a non-fundamental theory. This is motivated in particular by the fact that thermodynamics is considered to be a paradigmatic example for a theory that can be reduced to another one, namely statistical mechanics. For instance, the statement "temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy" has become a textbook example for a successful reduction, despite the fact that this statement is not correct for a large variety of systems. In this article, we defend the view that thermodynamics is a fundamental theory, a position that we justify based on four case studies from recent physical research. We explain how entropic gravity (1) and black hole thermodynamics (2) can serve as case studies for the multiple realizability problem which blocks the reduction of thermodynamics. Moreover, we discuss the problem of the reducibility of phase transitions and argue that bifurcation theory (3) allows the modelling of "phase transitions" on a thermodynamic level even in finite systems. It is also shown that the derivation of irreversible transport equations in the Mori-Zwanzig formalism (4) does not, despite recent claims to the contrary, constitute a reduction of thermodynamics to quantum mechanics. Finally, we briefly discuss some arguments against the fundamentality of thermodynamics that are not based on reduction.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Tervoort, B. T. (1961). Esoteric symbolism in the communication behaviour of young deaf children. American Annals of the Deaf, 106, 436-480.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Thagard, P. (2022). Energy requirements undermine substrate independence and mind-body functionalism. Philosophy of Science, 89(1), 70-88. doi:10.1017/psa.2021.15
[Abstract]Substrate independence and mind-body functionalism claim that thinking does not depend on any particular kind of physical implementation. But real-world information processing depends on energy, and energy depends on material substrates. Biological evidence for these claims comes from ecology and neuroscience, while computational evidence comes from neuromorphic computing and deep learning. Attention to energy requirements undermines the use of substrate independence to support claims about the feasibility of artificial intelligence, the moral standing of robots, the possibility that we may be living in a computer simulation, the plausibility of transferring minds into computers, and the autonomy of psychology from neuroscience.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Thalberg, I. (1983). Immateriality. Mind, 92(365), 105–113. www.jstor.org/stable/2253934 doi:10.1093/mind/XCII.365.105
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Thompson, R. F. (1993). The brain: A neuroscience primer (2nd Ed.). Freeman.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Thompson, T. (2017). Fort Skinner in the Desert: The Emergence and Dissolution of Arizona State University’s Behavior Analysis Program 1955–1970. Behavior and Social Issues, 26, 27–50. doi:10.5210/bsi.v26i0.7107
[Abstract]An innovative behavior analysis program was created, developed and matured, then unexpectedly imploded at Arizona State University between 1955 and 1970. The program included many who later became leaders in behavior analysis, and trained distinguished doctoral students. The conditions giving rise to the program in the first instance, and what caused the abrupt dissolution of the program in 1970 is the subject of this historical investigation. Consideration is given to more general implications of this series of events with possible lessons learned.
[Citing Place (1988b)]  

Thorndike, E. L. (1898). Animal intelligence: an experimental study of the associative processes in animals. Psychological Monographs, 2(8).
[10 referring publications by Place]  

Thorndike, E. L. (1911). Animal intelligence Macmillan.
[15 referring publications by Place]  

Tiehen, J. (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 96 3), 501-522. doi:10.1111/papq.12126 philarchive.org/archive/TIEGCC
[Abstract]What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every introductory class in the philosophy of mind, that dualism has a special problem accounting for mental causation.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Tinbergen, N. (1948). Social releasers and the experimental method required for their study. Wilson Bulletin, 60, 6-52
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Tinbergen, N. (1951). A study of instinct Clarendon Press.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Titchener, E. B. (1896). An outline of Psychology. Macmillan.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Titchener, E. B. (1901). Experimental Psychology: A Manual of Laboratory Practice (Volume II. Quantitative Experiments: Part i. Student's Manual). Macmillan.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Titchener, E.B. (1909). Lectures on the experimental psychology of the thought processes Macmillan.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Todorović, T., & Bregant, J. (2025). At the Edge of Understanding: A Dialogue on Gaps in Cognitive Science Ars & Humanitas, 19(1), 33-50. doi:10.4312/ars.19.1.33-50
[Abstract]The article reevaluates Jerry Fodor’s key argument for the autonomy of the special sciences, which rests on the notion of multiple realization and the claim that special science predicates must be natural kinds. After outlining how Fodor’s view was shaped by the “syntactic” conception of scientific theories, it shows that the recent “semantic” approach in scientific theories challenges the idea that special science kinds must be natural and ontologically committing. On the semantic account, scientific models often invoke idealized or domain-specific predicates that do not have to be natural. We use Fodor’s example – Gresham’s law – to articulate a semantic perspective that preserves the unity of science: higher-level explanations can remain useful, real, and relatively autonomous without irreducible natural kinds. By “sacrificing” natural kinds, we retain the explanatory powers of the special sciences, create a simpler ontological picture of the world, and justify the modus operandi of the sciences, such as cognitive science, where knowledge from the different levels or disciplines that constitute it informs and refines our overall understanding of the world.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Toh, K. (2014). Four Neglected Prescriptions of Hartian Legal Philosophy. Law and Philosophy, 33, 689–724. doi:10.1007/s10982-013-9203-4
[Abstract]This paper seeks to uncover and rationally reconstruct four theoretical prescriptions that H. L. A. Hart urged philosophers to observe and follow when investigating and theorizing about the nature of law. The four prescriptions may appear meager and insignificant when each is seen in isolation, but together as an inter-connected set they have substantial implications. In effect, they constitute a central part of Hart's campaign to put philosophical investigations about the nature of law onto a path to a genuine research program. The paper takes note of certain prevalent and robust trends in contemporary legal philosophy that detract its practitioners from the four prescriptions, and that have them revert to the some older modes of thinking from which Hart sought a decisive break. A number of contemporary legal philosophers' views and commitments are taken up and assessed, and in particular those of John Gardner and Leslie Green.
Note:
See also Toh, K. Erratum to: Four Neglected Prescriptions of Hartian Legal Philosophy. Law and Philos 34, 333–368 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-015-9226-0
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Tolkien, J. R. R. (1954) The Lord of the Rings.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Tolman, E. C. (1932). Purposive Behaviour in Animals and Men. University of California Press.
[11 referring publications by Place]  

Tolman, E. C. and Honzik, C. H. (1930), Introduction and removal of reward, and maze performance in rats. <em>University of California Publications in Psychology</em>, <em>4</em>, 257-275.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Tomberlin, J. E. (1965). About the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 43(3), 295-299. doi:10.1080/00048406512341251
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Tonneau, F (2001). Equivalence Relations: A Reply. European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 2(1), 99-128. doi:10.1080/15021149.2001.11434185
[Abstract]Some commentaries on Equivalence relations: A critical analysis (this issue) have questioned the consistency and generality of a correlation-based alternative to equivalence-class research, whereas others defend the use of matching-equivalence concepts in behavior theory. In this reply I reiterate the most important points of the target article, provide further clarifications, and discuss various misunderstandings. In contrast to equivalence class notions, the concept of function transfer is clear, simple, and coherent; and it necessarily plays a crucial role in the behavioral analysis of complex psychological functioning. A molar view based on environmental networks is well qualified to explain function transfer and thus provide insights into a variety of complex behavioral phenomena.
[Citing Place (1995/6)]  

Tonneau, F (2004). Consciousness outside the head. Behavior and Philosophy, 32, 97-123
[Abstract]Brain-centered theories of consciousness seem to face insuperable difficulties. While some philosophers now doubt that the hard problem of consciousness will ever be solved, others call for radically new approaches to conscious experience. In this article I resurrect a largely forgotten approach to consciousness known as neorealism. According to neorealism, consciousness is merely a part, or cross-section, of the environment. Neorealism implies that all conscious experiences, veridical or otherwise, exist outside of the brain and are wholly independent of being perceived or not; nonveridical perceptions of the environment over an arbitrarily short period of time are supposed to be objective constituents of the environment over a more extended time scale. I argue here that neorealism fares at least as well as brain-centered theories of consciousness on a number of fundamental issues. On one fundamental issue—the nature of the relation between veridical and nonveridical perceptions—neorealism outperforms its competitors.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Tooley, M. (2025). Causation: A defense of a non-reductionist approach. Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]Outlines and criticizes all major alternative approaches of causation, both reductionist and non-reductionist
Provides an account of the relation of causation that is compatible with any approach to laws of nature
Offers a new discussion of causation that addresses the crucial but often neglected problem of the justification of beliefs about laws of nature
Demonstrates that if causation is viewed as a theoretical relation between events, a simple analysis is possible that avoids the objections to which reductionist accounts are exposed
Michael Tooley offers detailed criticism of various approaches to understanding causation and makes an argument for the superiority of a theoretical-term, non-reductionist analysis of causation.
He begins by offering detailed criticisms of alternative approaches, including the competing non-reductionist view that no analysis of the concept of causation is needed, since the relation of causation is directly observable, thereby entailing that the concept of the relation of causation is analytically basic. In response, Tooley argues that the relation of causation is not directly observable.
His argument then considers reductionist approaches to causation, which can be divided into those that accept David Hume's thesis that there can never be logical connections between distinct existents, and those that reject that thesis.
In the case of the former, Tooley outlines and criticizes at length accounts that attempt to analyze causation in terms of laws of nature, counterfactual approaches, a variety of probabilistic accounts, analyses in terms of agency, and conserved quantity accounts. Here Tooley offers both specific, detailed objections to each approach, and powerful general arguments that warn against any Humean-style reductionist analysis. Finally, the book discusses non-Humean-style approaches that attempt to analyze both causation and laws of nature in terms of dispositional properties. Tooley argues that the idea of intrinsic, irreducible dispositional properties leads to a contradiction.
Clearly outlining the faults in other approaches, the book concludes that a very simple and sound analysis of causation can be given if the relation of causation is viewed as a theoretical relation between events.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Toulmin, S. (1950). The Place of Reason in Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Toulmin, S. (1961). Concept Formation in Philosophy and Psychology. In S. Hood (Ed.), Dimensions of Mind (pp. 191-203). Collier.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Towl B. N. (2012). Mind-brain correlations, identity, and neuroscience. Philosophical Psychology, 25(2), 187–202.
[Abstract]One of the positive arguments for the type-identity theory of mental states is an inference-to-the-best-explanation (IBE) argument, which purports to show that type-identity theory is likely true since it is the best explanation for the correlations between mental states and brain states that we find in the neurosciences. But given the methods of neuroscience, there are other relations besides identity that can explain such correlations. I illustrate some of these relations by examining the literature on the function of the hypothalamus and its correlation with sensations of thirst. Given that there are relations besides identity that can explain such correlations, the type-identity theorist is left with a dilemma: either the correlations we consider are weak, in which case we do not have an IBE to an identity claim, or else the correlations we look at are maximally strong, in which case there are too few cases for the inductive part of the strategy to work.
[Citing Place (1988a)]  

Tranel, D. & Damasio, A. R. (1985). Knowledge without awareness: an autonomic index of facial recognition by prosopagnosics. Science, 228, 1453-1455.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Treffner, P. & Peter, M. (2002). Intentional and attentional dynamics of speech–hand coordination. Human Movement Science, 21(5–6), 641-697. doi:10.1016/S0167-9457(02)00178-1 http://metaffordance.com/papers/gestures-HMS-2002.pdf?origin%3Dpublication_detail
[Abstract]Interest is rapidly growing in the hypothesis that natural language emerged from a more primitive set of linguistic acts based primarily on manual activity and hand gestures. Increasingly, researchers are investigating how hemispheric asymmetries are related to attentional and manual asymmetries (i.e., handedness). Both speech perception and production have origins in the dynamical generative movements of the vocal tract known as articulatory gestures. Thus, the notion of a “gesture” can be extended to both hand movements and speech articulation. The generative actions of the hands and vocal tract can therefore provide a basis for the (direct) perception of linguistic acts. Such gestures are best described using the methods of dynamical systems analysis since both perception and production can be described using the same commensurate language. Experiments were conducted using a phase transition paradigm to examine the coordination of speech–hand gestures in both left- and right-handed individuals. Results address coordination (in-phase vs. anti-phase), hand (left vs. right), lateralization (left vs. right hemisphere), focus of attention (speech vs. tapping), and how dynamical constraints provide a foundation for human communicative acts. Predictions from the asymmetric HKB equation confirm the attentional basis of functional asymmetry. Of significance is a new understanding of the role of perceived synchrony (p-centres) during intentional cases of gestural coordination.
[Citing Place (2000c)]  

Treisman, A. (1988). Features and objects: The Fourteenth Bartlett Memorial Lecture. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 40, 201-237.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Treisman, A., & Gelade, G. (1980). A feature integration theory of attention. Cognitive Psychology, 12, 97-136.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Treisman, A., & Gormican, S. (1988). Feature analysis in early vision: Evidence from search asymmetries. Psychological Review, 95, 15-48.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Trentman, J. (1970). Ockham on mental. Mind, 79, 586-590.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Tsou, J.Y. (2022). Philosophical naturalism and empirical approaches to philosophy. In M. Rossberg (Ed.), Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
[Abstract]This chapter examines the influence of the empirical sciences (e.g., physics, biology, psychology) in contemporary analytic philosophy, with focus on philosophical theories that are guided by findings from the empirical sciences. Scientific approaches to philosophy follow a tradition of philosophical naturalism associated with Quine, which strives to ally philosophical methods and theories more closely with the empirical sciences and away from a priori theorizing and conceptual analysis.
In contemporary analytic philosophy, ‘naturalism’ is an ambiguous and equivocal term (Papineau, 2020) that can be distinguished into weaker and stronger methodological commitments:
N1. Philosophy should be constrained by scientific results. Philosophical theories should not be inconsistent with the findings of empirical science (e.g., the positing of supernatural entities).
N2. Philosophy is continuous with science. Philosophical standards (e.g., the assumption that knowledge is fallible) and methods (e.g., empirical and experimental methods) should not be different in kind from those adopted in the natural sciences. Moreover, genuine philosophical problems should be tractable with naturalistic empirical methods.
N3. Philosophy should be empirically driven. Philosophical theorizing should be guided by the results of science and empirical science provides the most promising route to formulating sound philosophical theories.
N1 implies that philosophical theories should be consistent with scientific theories. N2 implies that philosophical standards and methods should be continuous with those adopted in science. N3 implies that the empirical scientific findings should be utilized to direct philosophical inquiry. Whereas N1 is a platitude among many contemporary analytic philosophers, fewer are committed to N2 or N3. This chapter examines philosophical theories (e.g., theories of mind and ethics) that are committed to N2 and N3, with particular emphasis on N3.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Tucan, G. (2021). A Cognitive Approach to Ernest Hemingway’s Short Fiction. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
[Abstract]How do readers make sense of Hemingway’s short stories? How is it possible that the camera-like quality of his narrative can appeal to our senses and arouse our emotions? How does it capture us? With reserved narrators and protagonists engaged in laconic dialogs, his texts do not seem to say much. This book consciously revisits our responses to the Hemingway story, a belated response to his invitation to discover what lies beneath the surface of his iceberg. What this pioneering critical endeavor seeks to understand is the thinking required in reading Hemingway’s short fiction. It proposes a cognitively informed model of reading which questions the resources of the reader’s imaginative powers. The cognitive demonstrations here are designed to have potentially larger implications for the short story’s general mode of knowing. Drawing from both cognitively oriented poetics and narratology in equal measure, this book explains what structures our interaction with literary texts.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Tugby, M. (2024). The property of goal-directedness: Lessons from the dispositions debate. Ratio, 00, 1–14. doi:10.1111/rati.12417
[Abstract]The system-property or ‘cybernetic’ theory of goals and goal-directedness became popular in the twentieth century. It is a theory that has reductionist and behaviourist roots. There are reasons to think that the system-property theory needs to be formulated in terms of counterfactuals. However, it proves to be difficult to formulate a counterfactual analysis of goal-directedness that is counterexample-free, non-circular, and non-trivial. These difficulties closely mirror those facing reductionists about dispositions, though the parallels  between the two debates have been overlooked in the literature. After outlining those parallels, the paper considers what goal theorists might learn from the dispositions debate. In particular, the paper discusses the need for a realist, non-reductionist account of goal-directedness, and explores the idea that properties of goal-directedness are themselves dispositions or ‘powers’ of a certain sort.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Turing, A. (1937). On computable numbers with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem. Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 42, 230-265.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Tweedale, M. (1987). Aristotle's universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65, 412-426.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Tye, M. (1993). Blindsight, the absent qualia hypothesis, and the mystery of consciousness. In C. Hookway and D. Peterson (Eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences (pp. 19-40) . A supplement to Philosophy. Cambridge University Press,
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Tye, M. (2023). A new solution to the hard problem of consciousness. In Alex Grzankowski (Ed.), Thought: Its Origin and Reach, Essays for Mark Sainsbury. Routledge.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Tylor, E. B. (1868). On the origin of language. Fortnightly Review, 1, 22.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Tylor, E. B. (1871). Primitive culture. John Murray.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Ulrich, R. E., & Azrin, N. H. (1962). Reflexive fighting in response to aversive stimulation Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 5, 511-520.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Underhill, E. (1911/1930). Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness (12th Edition). Methuen.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Ungerleider, L. G., & Mishkin, M. (1982). Two cortical visual systems. In D. J. Ingle, M. A. Goodale, & R. J. W. Mansfield (Eds.), Analysis of Visual Behavior. M.I.T. Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Urmson, J. (1968). Criteria of Intensionality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes, XLII, 107-122.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Urmson, J. O., & Cohen, J. (1968). Symposium: Criteria of Intensionality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 42(1).
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Usher, M., Negro, N., Jacobson, H., & Tsuchiya, N. (2023). When philosophical nuance matters: Safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions. Frontiers in Psychology, 14(1306023). doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1306023
[Abstract]In this paper, we revisit the debate surrounding the Unfolding Argument (UA) against causal structure theories of consciousness (as well as the hard-criteria research program it prescribes), using it as a platform for discussing theoretical and methodological issues in consciousness research. Causal structure theories assert that consciousness depends on a particular causal structure of the brain. Our claim is that some of the assumptions fueling the UA are not warranted, and therefore we should reject the methodology for consciousness science that the UA prescribes. First, we briefly survey the most popular philosophical positions in consciousness science, namely physicalism and functionalism. We discuss the relations between these positions and the behaviorist methodology that the UA assumptions express, despite the contrary claim of its proponents. Second, we argue that the same reasoning that the UA applies against causal structure theories can be applied to functionalist approaches, thus proving too much and deeming as unscientific a whole range of (non-causal structure) theories. Since this is overly restrictive and fits poorly with common practice in cognitive neuroscience, we suggest that the reasoning of the UA must be flawed. Third, we assess its philosophical assumptions, which express a restrictive methodology, and conclude that there are reasons to reject them. Finally, we propose a more inclusive methodology for consciousness science, that includes neural, behavioral, and phenomenological evidence (provided by the first-person perspective) without which consciousness science could not even start. Then, we extend this discussion to the scope of consciousness science, and conclude that theories of consciousness should be tested and evaluated on humans, and not on systems considerably different from us. Rather than restricting the methodology of consciousness science, we should, at this point, restrict the range of systems upon which it is supposed to be built.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Uvarov, E. B., & Chapman, D. R. (1951). A dictionary of science (Rev. ed., first edition 1943). Penguin.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Valentine, E. (2000). Ullin Place (1924-2000). History & Philosphy of Psychology, 2,(1), 72-74.

Valentine, E. R. (1978). Perchings and flights: introspection, In J. Radford &amp; A. Burton (Eds.), <em>Thinking in perspective</em> (pp. 1-22). Methuen.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Valentine, E. R. (1996). Folk psychology and its implications for cognitive science: Discussion. In W. O'Donohue, & R. Kitchener (Eds.) The Philosophy of Psychology (Chapter 17, pp. 275-278). Sage. doi:10.4135/9781446279168.n17
[Citing Place (1954) in context]  [Citing Place (1996l) in context]  

van Dijk, T. A. (Ed.) (1985). Handbook of discourse analysis. Academic Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Van Fraassen, B. C. (1996). Science, materialism, and false consciousness. In J. Kvanvig (Ed.), Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge (pp. 149-181). Rowman Littlefield.
[Abstract]As activity, science has become a large-scale cultural phenomenon. As product, it is drawn on by industry, agriculture, and medicine, thus affecting not only the scene of its activity but all the rest of the world as well. Western philosophy has always harboured a tradition which regards scientific inquiry as a paradigm for rational inquiry in general. Yet almost every philosopher in that tradition has pointed to limits of this paradigm and its scope.
Every philosophy provides a different lens through which to view this object of common admiration. In this essay I shall reflect on two views of science which are at first glance inimical to each other. The first is Pierre Duhem's, who saw science as neutral on all issues of metaphysics, theology, and religion. The second is exemplified by Paul Feyerabend, who called for alternate research programs guided by rival metaphysics, and argued that such rivalry has always been a driving force in science. I will argue that Duhem is right, in the main, though our picture of science must be leavened by the insights of the contrary point of view. This will not be an archaeological inquiry into those thinkers' thought; I will make it mainly an independent reflection on these same issues.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1960)]  

Van Gulick, R. (2009). Functionalism In: B. P. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann, & S. Walter (Eds.), Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 7, pp. 128-151).
[Abstract]Functionalism at its core is the thesis that minds and mental kinds are to be understood in terms of the roles or functions that specific states and processes play within suitably organized systems. From a functionalist perspective, minds differ from non-minds not in any distinctive substance or fundamental substrate, but in their systemic organization and the roles played by their parts and sub-parts within it. A minded system is simply one that is organized in the right sort of way, though just which ways those are is a difficult and disputed matter. Functionalists classify states or processes largely, if not solely, in terms of the relevant roles or functions that they play in some such system.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

van Lier, M. (2023). Introducing a four-fold way to conceptualize artificial agency. Synthese, 201(85). doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04083-9
[Abstract]Recent developments in AI-research suggest that an AI-driven science might not be that far off. The research of [for] Melnikov et al. (2018) and that of Evans et al. (2018) show that automated systems can already have a distinctive role in the design of experiments and in directing future research. Common practice in many of the papers devoted to the automation of basic research is to refer to these automated systems as ‘agents’. What is this attribution of agency based on and to what extent is this an important notion in the broader context of an AI-driven science? In an attempt to answer these questions, this paper proposes a new methodological framework, introduced as the Four-Fold Framework, that can be used to conceptualize artificial agency in basic research. It consists of four modeling strategies, three of which were already identified and used by Sarkia (2021) to conceptualize ‘intentional agency’. The novelty of the framework is the inclusion of a fourth strategy, introduced as conceptual modeling, that adds a semantic dimension to the overall conceptualization. The strategy connects to the other strategies by modeling both the actual use of ‘artificial agency’ in basic research as well as what is meant by it in each of the other three strategies. This enables researchers to bridge the gap between theory and practice by comparing the meaning of artificial agency in both an academic as well as in a practical context.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Van Rysewyk, S (2013, April 30). Philip Ball on neuroaesthetics. Simon van Rysewyk. simonvanrysewyk.com/tag/philip-ball/
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Vanni, S., Revonsuo, A., & Hari, R. (1997). Modulation of the parieto-occipital alpha-rhythm during object-detection. Journal of Neuroscience, 17(18), 7141-7147.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Vauclair, J. (2004). Lateralization of communicative signals in nonhuman primates and the hypothesis of the gestural origin of language. Interaction Studies, 5(3), 363-384. https://centrepsycle-amu.fr/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Vauclair-Interaction-Studies-041.pdf https://www.academia.edu/12007254/Lateralization_of_communicative_signals_in_nonhuman_primates_and_the_hypothesis_of_the_gestural_origin_of_language
[Abstract]This article argues for the gestural origins of speech and language based on the available evidence gathered in humans and nonhuman primates and especially from ape studies. The strong link between motor functions (hand use and manual gestures) and speech in humans is reviewed. The presence of asymmetrical cerebral organization in nonhuman primates along with functional asymmetries in the perception and production of vocalizations and in intentional referential gestural communication is then emphasized. The nature of primate communicatory systems is presented, and the similarities and differences between these systems and human speech are discussed. It is argued that recent findings concerning neuroanatomical asymmetries in the chimpanzee brain and the existence of both mirror neurons and lateralized use of hands and vocalizations in communication necessitate a reconsideration of the phylogenic emergence of the cerebral and behavioral prerequisites for human speech.
Keywords: evolution, communication, primates, gesture, language, vocalization, mirror neurons
[Citing Place (2000c) in context]  

Vaughan, M. (1987). Rule governed behavior and higher mental processes. In S. and C. Modgil (Eds.), B. F. Skinner: Consensus and Controversy (pp. 257-264). Falmer Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Vaughn, C. J. (1964) The development and use of an operant technique to provide evidence for visual imagery in the rhesus monkey under `sensory deprivation' [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Pittsburgh
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Velmans, M. (1987). Why a mind/body group? The British Psychological Society: History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 5, 8-9.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Velmans, M. (1991). Consciousness from a first-person perspective, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 14(4), 702-719.
Note:
Reply to commentaries on Velmans, M. (1991), Is human information processing conscious? BBS, 651-669.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Velmans, M. (1996). An introduction to the science of consciousness. In M. Velmans (Ed.), The science of consciousness: (Chapter 1, pp. 1-22). Routledge.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Velmans, M. (2002). How could conscious experiences affect brains? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(11), 2002, pp.3-29.
[Abstract]In everyday life we take it for granted that we have conscious control of some of our actions and that the part of us that exercises control is the conscious mind. Psychosomatic medicine also assumes that the conscious mind can affect body states, and this is supported by evidence that the use of imagery, hypnosis, biofeedback and other mental interventions can be therapeutic in a variety of medical conditions. However, there is no accepted theory of mind/body interaction and this has had a detrimental effect on the acceptance of mental causation in science, philosophy and in many areas of clinical practice. Biomedical accounts typically translate the effects of mind into the effects of brain functioning, for example, explaining mind/body interactions in terms of the interconnections and reciprocal control of cortical, neuroendocrine, autonomic and immune systems. While such accounts are instructive, they are implicitly reductionist, and beg the question of how conscious experiences could have bodily effects. On the other hand, non-reductionist accounts have to cope with three problems: 1) The physical world appears causally closed, which would seem to leave no room for conscious intervention. 2) One is not conscious of one's own brain/body processing, so how could there be conscious control of such processing? 3) Conscious experiences appear to come too late to causally affect the processes to which they most obviously relate. This paper suggests a way of understanding mental causation that resolves these problems. It also suggests that conscious mental control needs to be partly understood in terms of the voluntary operations of the preconscious mind, and that this allows an account of biological determinism that is compatible with experienced free will.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Velmans, M. (2009). Understanding consciousness (2nd Edition). Routledge. Understanding_Consciousness_(2nd_ed__Routledge__2009).pdf
[Abstract]Understanding Consciousness, 2nd Edition provides a unique survey and evaluation of consciousness studies, along with an original analysis of consciousness that combines scientific findings, philosophy and common sense. Building on the widely praised first edition, this new edition adds fresh research, and deepens the original analysis in a way that reflects some of the fundamental changes in the understanding of consciousness that have taken place over the last 10 years. The book is divided into three parts; Part one surveys current theories of consciousness, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. Part two reconstructs an understanding of consciousness from first principles, starting with its phenomenology, and leading to a closer examination of how conscious experience relates to the world described by physics and information processing in the brain. Finally, Part three deals with some of the fundamental issues such as what consciousness is and does, and how it fits into to the evolving universe. As the structure of the book moves from a basic overview of the field to a successively deeper analysis, it can be used both for those new to the subject and for more established researchers. Understanding Consciousness tells a story with a beginning, middle and end in a way that integrates the philosophy of consciousness with the science. Overall, the book provides a unique perspective on how to address the problems of consciousness and as such, will be of great interest to psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists and other professionals concerned with mind/body relationships, and all who are interested in this subject.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Velmans, M. (2021). Is the universe conscious? Reflexive monism and the ground of being. In E. Kelly, & P. Marshall (Eds.), Consciousness Unbound (pp. 175-228). Rowman & Littlefield. Is-the-Universe-Conscious-Reflexive-Monism-and-the-Ground-of-Being.pdf
[Abstract]This chapter examines the integrative nature of reflexive monism (RM), a psychological/philosophical model of a reflexive, self-observing universe that can accommodate both ordinary and extraordinary experiences in a natural, non-reductive way that avoids both the problems of reductive materialism and the (inverse) pitfalls of reductive idealism. To contextualize the ancient roots of the model, the chapter touches briefly on classical models of consciousness, mind and soul and how these differ in a fundamental way from how mind and consciousness are viewed in contemporary Western philosophy and psychological science. The chapter then travels step by step from such contemporary views towards reflexive monism, and towards the end of the chapter, to more detailed comparisons with Hindu Vedanta and Samkhya philosophy and with Cosmopsychism (a recently emergent, directly relevant area of philosophy of mind).
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Vendler, Z. (1967). Linguistics in Philosophy Cornell University Press.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Verplanck, W.S. (1955). The control of the content of conversation: reinforcement of statements of opinion. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51, 668-676.
[7 referring publications by Place]  

Vesey, G. N. A. (Ed.) (1964). Body and mind. Readings in philosophy. George Allen and Unwin ltd
[Reprints in this collection]  

Vickers, G. (1973). Motivation theory - A cybernetic contribution. Behavioral Science, 18, 242-249.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Vogel, G. W., Vogel, F., McAbee, R. S., & Thurmond, A. J. (1980). Improvement of depression by REM sleep deprivation. Archives of General Psychiatry, 37, 247-253.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Voltolini, A. (2005). How to Get Intentionality by Language. In G. Forrai, & G. Kampis (Eds), Intentionality. Past and Future (pp. 127-41). Rodopi, . HOW-TO-GET-INTENTIONALITY-BY-LANGUAGE.pdf
[Abstract]One is often told that sentences expressing or reporting mental states endowed with intentionality — the feature of being “directed upon” an object that some mental states possess — contain contexts that both prevent those sentences to be existentially generalized and are filled by referentially opaque occurrences of singular terms. Failure of existential generalization and referential opacity have been traditionally said to be the basic characterizations of intentionality from a linguistic point of view. I will call those contexts directional contexts. In what follows, I will argue that this traditional conception is incorrect. First, the above characterizations do not provide both necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for directional contexts. Appearances notwithstanding, these characterizations are not the adequate linguistic counterparts of two elements folk-psychologically featuring intentionality, namely existence-independence and the possible apparent aspectual character of the intentional object, the target of a mental state endowed with intentionality. Indeed, they do not retain the prima facie ontological commitment to intentional objects the above elements contain. I will replace failure of existential generalization and referential opacity with other linguistic factors, namely success of mere existentially unloaded particular quantification and pseudo-opacity. I will contend that they provide both necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for directional contexts, and claim that these factors are the adequate counterparts of the above folk-psychological elements, precisely because they retain the prima facie ontological commitment to intentionalia those elements possess.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Voltolini, A. (2020). Why the Mark of the Dispositional is not the Mark of the Intentional. The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts, 1(1), 19-32.
[Abstract]In this paper, first of all, I will try to show that Crane’s attempt at facing Nes’ criticism of his two original criteria for intentionality (of reference), directedness and aspectual shape, does not work. Hence, in order to dispense with Nes’ counterexample given in terms of dispositions, there is no need to strengthen such criteria by appealing to representationality, Moreover, I will stress that such criteria are perfectly fine when properly meant in mental viz phenomenological terms that appeal to the possible nonexistence and the possible apparent aspectuality of the object of a thought, its intentional object. For once they are so meant, dispositions clearly lack them.
[Citing Place (1996g) in context]  

Voltolini, A. (2024). Intentionality as constitution. Routledge.
[Abstract]This book develops a novel theory of intentionality. It argues that intentionality is an internal essential relation of constitution between an intentional state and an object, or between such a state and a possible state of affairs as subsisting.
The author’s main claim is that intentionality is a fundamentally modal property, hence a non (scientifically) natural property in that it does not supervene, either locally or globally, on its nonmodal physical basis. This is the property, primarily for an intentional mental state, to be constituted by the entities it is about. In the case of intentionality of reference, such constituents are objects, in the sense of individuals; in the case of intentionality of content, such constituents are possible states of affairs as subsisting. Constitution is meant in a mereologically literal sense: those constituents are essential parts of the relevant states. As a result, the theory claims not only that intentionality is relational but also that it is an internal, essential relation holding between an intentional state and its object or proposition-like content.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  

Von Hügel, Baron F. (1908). The Mystical Element in Religion: As Studied in St. Catherine of Genoa and her Friends. Dent.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

von Uexkull, J. (1926). Theoretical biology Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Vygotsky, L. (1934/1986). Thought and Language (English translation by A. Kozulin). MIT Press.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Wahler, R. G., & Fox, J. J. (1981). Setting events in applied behavior analysis: Toward a conceptual and methodological expansion. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 14(3), 327-338. www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1308218/pdf/jaba00045-0120.pdf
[Abstract]The contributions of applied behavior analysis as a natural science approach to the study of human behavior are acknowledged. However, it is also argued that applied behavior analysis has provided limited access to the full range of environmental events that influence socially significant behavior. Recent changes in applied behavior analysis to include analysis of side effects and social validation represent ways in which the traditional applied behavior analysis conceptual and methodological model has been profitably expanded. A third area of expansion, the analysis of setting events, is proposed by the authors. The historical development of setting events as a behavior influence concept is traced. Modifications of the basic applied behavior analysis methodology and conceptual systems that seem necessary to setting event analysis are discussed and examples of descriptive and experimental setting event analyses are presented.
[References]  [1 referring publications by Place]  

Wallace, A. R. (1881). Review of Anthropology by Edward B. Tylor. Nature, 24, 242-245.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wallace, A. R. (1895). Expressiveness of speech, the mouth gesture as a factor in the origin of language. Fortnightly Review, 64, 528-543.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Waller, B. (1977). Chomsky, Wittgenstein, and the behaviorist perspective on panguage. Behaviorism, 5(1), 43-59. www.jstor.org/stable/27758883
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wann, T. W. (Ed) (1964). Behaviorism and Phenomenology: Contrasting bases for modern psychology. University of Chicago Press.
[Abstract]This volume in the Rice University Semicentennial Series includes a series of papers which examine the places of behaviorism and phenomenology in psychology. The papers are as follows: Psychology and Emerging Conceptions of Knowledge as Unitary, S. Koch; Phenomenology: A Challenge to Experimental Psychology, R. B. MacLeod; Behaviorism at Fifty, B. F. Skinner; Toward a Science of the Person, C. R. Rogers; Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology, N. Malcolm; and Views of Human Nature, M. Scriven. These papers disclose considerable conciliation between behaviorism and phenomenology. Koch and Skinner, however, are not convinced that coexistence is possible.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Warburton, N. (Ed.) (1999). Philosophy: Basic Readings. Routledge.
[Reprints in this collection]  

Watson, A. J. (1966) Consciousness and perception in psychology I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. XL, 85-100. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/40.1.85 [this doi is for the Supplementary Volume consisting of part I by A.J. Watson and part II by U. T. Place]
[2 referring publications by Place]  [Is replied by]  

Watson, J. B. (1919). Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist Lippincott.
[6 referring publications by Place]  

Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychological Review, 20, 158-177.
[8 referring publications by Place]  

Watson, J. B. (1914). Behavior, an Introduction to Comparative Psychology. Holt.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Watson, J. B. (1924). Behaviorism. Chicago University Press.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Watson, J. B., & Rayner, R. (1920). Conditioned Emotional Reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 3, 1-14
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wearden, J. (1987). Presentation to a symposium on 'Rules and rule‑governed behaviour'. Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, University of Manchester, April 1987.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wearden, J. H. (1987). Is there such a thing as contingency governed behaviour in humans? [Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, Manchester].
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Wearden, J. H. (1989). Problem solving as the shaping of rules [Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group, Cambridge].
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Weber, E. H. (1834). De pulsu, resorptione, auditu et tactu. Köhler.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Weber, M. (1904-5). Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus. English translation as The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism by T. Parsons (1930/1958). London: Allen & Unwin. New Edition. Scribner. Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, XX-XXI.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Webster, W.R. (2002). A Case of Mind/Brain Identity: One Small Bridge for the Explanatory Gap. Synthese, 131, 275-287. doi:10.1023/A:1015726204005
[Abstract]Based on the technique of pressure blinding of the eye, two types of after-image (AI) were identified. A physicalist or mind/brain identity explanation was established for a negative AI produced by moderately intense stimuli. These AI's were shown to be located in the neurons of the retina. An illusory AI of double a grating's spatial frequency was also produced in the same structure and was both prevented from being established and abolished after establishment by pressure blinding, thus showing that the location was not more central. The illusory AI was predicted from the known non-linearity in the retina and this is the first case of a clear cut type-type identity of a sensation and a neural process. Some implications for the concepts of the explanatory gap between neurology and consciousness and multiple neural realizations of conscious states and topic neutrality are discussed.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Weir, R. S. (2023). The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781003378600
[Abstract]This book evaluates the widespread preference in philosophy of mind for varieties of property dualism over other alternatives to physicalism. It takes the standard motivations for property dualism as a starting point and argues that these lead directly to nonphysical substances resembling the soul of traditional metaphysics. In the first half of the book, the author clarifies what is at issue in the choice between theories that posit nonphysical properties only and those that posit nonphysical substances. The crucial question, he argues, is whether one posits nonphysical things that satisfy an Aristotelian-Cartesian independence definition of substance: nonphysical things that could exist in the absence of anything else. In the second half, the author argues that standard and Russellian monist forms of property dualism are far less plausible than we usually suppose. Most significantly, the presuppositions of one of the leading arguments for property dualism, the conceivability argument, lead by parity of reasoning to the view that conscious subjects are nonphysical substances. He concludes that if you posit nonphysical properties in response to the mind-body problem, then you should be prepared to posit nonphysical substances as well. Mainstream philosophy of mind must take nonphysical substances far more seriously than it has done for the best part of a century.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Weiskrantz, L. (1986). Blindsight: A Case Study and Implications Clarendon Press.
[12 referring publications by Place]  

Wertheimer, M. (1945). Productive Thinking. Harper.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wetherick, N.E. (2000). U. T. Place (1924-2000). The Psychologist, 13, 233.

Whellan, T., and Co. (1859). History and topography of the City of York and the North Riding of Yorkshire (Volume II). John Green
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Whipple, G. M. (1914-1915). Manual of Mental and Physical Tests, Part I and Part II. Baltimore, MD: Warwick and York.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

White, A. R. (1960). Different Kinds of Heed Concepts. Analysis, 20(5), 112–116. doi:10.2307/3327080
[Citing Place (1954)]  

White, A. R. (1963). Attending and noticing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LXIII, 103-126.
[Citing Place (1954)]  

White, A. R. (1964). Attention. Blackwell
[Citing Place (1954)]  

Whorf, B. L. (1940). Science and linguistics. Technology Review, 44, 229-231, 247, 248.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Whorf, B. L. (1956). Language, Thought and Reality. Technology Press, M.I.T. and Wiley.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Widrow, G., & Hoff, M. E. (1960). Adaptive switching circuits. Institute of Radio Engineers, Western Electronic Show and Convention, Convention Record, Part 4, 96-104.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics Wiley.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wiese, W. (2018). Toward a mature science of consciousness. Frontiers in Psychology, 9. www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00693 doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00693
[Abstract]In Being No One, Metzinger (2004[2003]) introduces an approach to the scientific study of consciousness that draws on theories and results from different disciplines, targeted at multiple levels of analysis. Descriptions and assumptions formulated at, for instance, the phenomenological, representationalist, and neurobiological levels of analysis provide different perspectives on the same phenomenon, which can ultimately yield necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the concept of phenomenal representation. In this way, the “method of interdisciplinary constraint satisfaction (MICS)” (as it has been called by Weisberg, 2005) promotes our understanding of consciousness. However, even more than a decade after the first publication of Being No One, we still lack a mature science of consciousness. This paper makes the following meta-theoretical contribution: It analyzes the hurdles an approach such as MICS has yet to overcome and discusses to what extent existing approaches solve the problems left open by MICS. Furthermore, it argues that a unifying theory of different features of consciousness is required to reach a mature science of consciousness.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Wilkes, K. V. (1978) Physicalism. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  [Reviews]  

Wilkes, K. V. (1984) Is consciousness important? British Journal of the Philosophy of Science. 35,  223-243. British Journal of the Philosophy of Science. 35,  223-243.
[2 referring publications by Place]  

Williams, B. (1978). Descartes: The project of pure enquiry. Penguin Books.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Williams, N. E. (2019). The powers metaphysic. Oxford University Press.
[Abstract]Systematic metaphysics is defined by its task of solving metaphysical problems through the repeated application of single, fundamental ontology. The dominant contemporary metaphysic is that of neo-Humeanism, built on a static ontology typified by its rejection of basic causal and modal features. This book offers a radically distinct metaphysic, one that turns the status quo on its head. Starting with a foundational ontology of inherently causal properties known as "powers", Neil E. Williams develops a metaphysic that appeals to powers in explanations of causation, persistence, laws, and modality. Powers are properties that have their causal natures internal to them: they are responsible for the effects in the world. A unique account of powers is advanced, one that understands this internal nature in terms of blueprint of potential interaction types. After the presentation of the powers ontology, Williams offers solutions to broad metaphysical puzzles, some of which take on different forms in light of the new tools that are available. The defence of the ontology comes from the virtues of metaphysic it can be used to develop. Particular attention is paid to the problems of causation and persistence, simultaneously solving them as is casts them in a new light. The resultant powers metaphysic is offered as a systematic alternative to neo-Humeanism.
[Citing Place (1996g)]  [Citing Place (1999b)]  [Citing Place (1999f)]  

Wilson, J. M. (2014). No work of a theory of grounding. Inquiry, 57(5-6) ,535–579. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2014.907542
[Abstract]It has recently been suggested that a distinctive metaphysical relation —‘Grounding’—is ultimately at issue in contexts in which some goings-on are said to hold ‘in virtue of’’, be (constitutively) ‘metaphysically dependent on’,or be ‘nothing over and above’ some others. Grounding is supposed to do good work (better than merely modal notions, in particular) in illuminating metaphysical dependence. I argue that Grounding is also unsuited to do this work. To start, Grounding alone cannot do this work, for bare claims of Grounding leave open such basic questions as whether Grounded goings-on exist, whether they are reducible to or rather distinct from Grounding goings-on, whether they are efficacious, and so on; but in the absence of answers to such basic questions, we are not in position to assess the associated claim or theses concerning metaphysical dependence. There is no avoiding appeal to the specific metaphysical relations typically at issue in investigations into dependence—for example, type or token identity, functional realization, classical mereological parthood, the set membership relation, the proper subset relation, the determinable/determinate relation, and so on—which are capable of answering these questions. But, I argue, once the specific relations are on the scene, there is no need for Grounding.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Wilson, J.M. (2018). Grounding-Based Formulations of Physicalism. Topoi, 37, 495–512. doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9435-7
[Abstract]I problematize Grounding-based formulations of physicalism. More specifically, I argue, first, that motivations for adopting a Grounding-based formulation of physicalism are unsound; second, that a Grounding-based formulation lacks illuminating content, and that attempts to imbue Grounding with content by taking it to be a (non-monotonic, hyperintensional) strict partial order are unuseful (since ‘over and above’ relations such as strong emergence may also be non-monotonic hyperintensional strict partial orders) and problematic (in ruling out reductive versions of physicalism, and relatedly, in undermining the ostensive definition of primitive Grounding as operative in any context where idioms of dependence are at issue); third, that conceptions of Grounding as constitutively connected to metaphysical explanation conflate metaphysics and epistemology, are ultimately either circular or self-undermining, and controversially assume that physical dependence is incompatible with explanatory gaps; fourth, that in order to appropriately distinguish physicalism from strong emergentism (physicalism’s primary rival), a Grounding-based formulation must introduce one and likely two primitives in addition to Grounding; and fifth, that understanding physical dependence in terms of Grounding gives rise to ‘spandrel’ questions, including, e.g., “What Grounds Grounding?”, which arise only due to the overly abstract nature of Grounding.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Winch, P. (1958). The Idea of a Social Science. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Winch, P. (1964). Understanding a primitive society. American Philosophical Quarterly, 1, 307–324.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wittgenstein, L. (1921/1971). Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Annalen der Naturphilosophie. Tractatus Logico-philosophicus. With second English translation by D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuiness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
[26 referring publications by Place]  

Wittgenstein, L. (1930/1964). Philosophische Bemerkungen. Edited by R. Rhees from his posthumous writings; translated into English as Philosophical Remarks by R. Hargreaves and R. White. Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations (English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe). Basil Blackwell.
[55 referring publications by Place]  

Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The Blue and Brown Books Blackwell.
[16 referring publications by Place]  

Wittgenstein, L. (1980). Remarks on the philosophy of psychology (2 volumes G. H. von Wright & H. Nyman (Eds.) English translation C. G. Luckhardt & M. A. E. Aue). Blackwell.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wolters, A. W. (1933). On conceptual thinking. British Journal of Psychology, 24, 133-143.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wright, C., Colombo, M., & Beard, A. (2017). HIT and Brain Reward Function: A Case of Mistaken Identity (Theory). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science: Part A, 64, 28-40 doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2017.04.002
[Abstract]This paper employs a case study from the history of neuroscience - brain reward function - to scrutinize the inductive argument for the so-called ‘Heuristic Identity Theory’ (HIT). The case fails to support HIT, illustrating why other case studies previously thought to provide empirical support for HIT also fold under scrutiny. After distinguishing two different ways of understanding the types of identity claims presupposed by HIT and considering other conceptual problems, we conclude that HIT is not an alternative to the traditional identity theory so much as a relabeling of previously discussed strategies for mechanistic discovery.
[Citing Place (1956)]  

Wright, E. (1992). The entity fallacy in epistemology. Philosophy, 67(259), 33-50. doi:10.1017/S0031819100039814
[Citing Place (1989b) in context]  

Wu, J. C., & Bunney, W. E. (1990). The biological basis of an anti-depressant response to sleep deprivation and relapse: Review and hypothesis. American Journal of Psychiatry, 147, 15-21.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wundt, W. (1896). Grundriss der Psychologie. Engelman.
[3 referring publications by Place]  

Wundt, W. (1897). Outlines of Psychology [English translation by C. H. Judd of the Grundriss der Psychologie.] Engelmann.
[4 referring publications by Place]  

Wundt, W. (1900). Völkerpsychologie, Vol. I: Die Sprache. Engelmann
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Wundt, W. (1907). Über Ausfrageexperimente und über die Methoden zur Psychologie des Denkens. Psychol. Stud., 3, 301-360.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Xitco, M. J., & Roitblat, H. R. (1996). Object recognition through eavesdropping: passive echolocation in bottlenose dolphins. Animal Learning and Behaviour, 24, 355-365.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Yetter-Chappell, H. (2026). What a Bing Really, Really Wants: Zigazig Ah. Journal of Consciousness Studies
[Abstract]It’s natural to assume that if Large Language Models (LLMs) have intentional states, these states can be straightforwardly read off of their outputs. I argue that this is a mistake. Given plausible assumptions about consciousness and intentionality, the content of their intentional states will essentially be inaccessible to us. ‘Pain’ talk from an LLM may be meaningful, but there is no reason to think it expresses pain. ‘Desire’ talk from an LLM may be meaningful, but there is no reason to think it expresses desires. Our epistemic position regarding LLMs is radically and hopelessly impoverished.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Ylikoski, P. (1999). Review of Dispositions: A Debate. D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin, and U. T. Place Tim Crane, editor London: Routledge, 1996, viii 197 pp. doi:10.1017/S0012217300010258
[Reviewed publication(s)]  
Download: Ylikoski (1999) Review of Dispositions - A Debate.pdf

Zahnoun, F. (2018). Mind, mechanism and meaning: Reclaiming social normativity within cognitive science and philosophy of mind [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Antwerp. www.academia.edu/37116459/Mind_Mechanism_and_Meaning
[Abstract]The dissertation, titled Mind, Mechanism and Meaning, critically investigates two central assumptions of mainstream cognitive science and philosophy of mind: the commitment to the notion of internal representation on the one hand, and to the idea of the multiple realizability of the mental on the other. With regard to the notion of internal representation, the dissertation argues that this notion is ultimately untenable in that, to the effect that internal representations are understood as content-carrying vehicles with causal explanatory power, the notion is grounded in a confusion between the descriptive and the prescriptive/normative. The thesis is defended that all content-carrying entities, including representations, are socio-normatively constituted and should therefore be excluded from non-normative causal explanations of cognition. The results of the research support a non-representational approach to mind and cognition, as exemplified in various forms of E-Cognition, particularly in radical enactive/embodied approaches. Understanding human cognition requires taking into account the whole subject, that is, the subject as ‘embrained', embodied, and embedded within an enacted normative intersubjective niche. With regard to the idea of the multiple realizability of the mental, the dissertation argues that the idea can only be made intelligible against a particular metaphysical background, one that does not sit well with the intersubjective normative notions the idea of multiple realization conceptually relies on (types). Furthermore, it is argued that, even if we were to accept such a metaphysics, multiple realization is still not capable of providing the argument against identity theory which has come to be so widely accepted. The thesis is defended that there really is no strong argument against an identity theory, and that, in addition, assuming a strict identity between the mental and the physical is still a viable, perhaps even the only viable approach to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Zettle, R. B., & Hayes, S. C. (1982). Rule-governed behavior: A potential theoretical framework for cognitive behavior therapy. In P. C. Kendall (Ed.), Advances in cognitive-behavioral research and therapy (Vol. 1, pp. 73-118). Academic Press.
[5 referring publications by Place]  

Zihl, J., Tretter, F., & Singer, W. (1980). Phasic electrodermal responses after visual stimulation in the cortically blind hemifield. Behavior and Brain Research, 1, 197-203.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Zilio, F. (2019). (Never) minding the gap? Integrated Information Theory and Philosophy of Consciousness. In M. Curado, & N. Gouveia (Eds.), Automata's inner movie: Science and Philosophy of Mind (chapter 6, pp. 103-124). Vernon Press. www.researchgate.net/publication/333136202_Neverminding_the_Gap_Integrated_Information_Theory_and_Philosophy_of_Consciousnessxt www.academia.edu/44452243/_Never_Minding_the_Gap_Integrated_Information_Theory_and_Philosophy_Of_Consciousness
[Abstract]The aim of the article is to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness and challenge it through contemporary issues in philosophy of mind and phenomenology. I argue that some objectivist theories of consciousness underestimate the constitutive role of the subjective perspective and seem to face the same problems of the dualism that contemporary sciences would like to avoid. IIT faces the hard problem of consciousness from the axioms of experience to the postulates of its physical substrate and considers the phenomenal aspect not as an illusory property to be reduced, rather as the theoretical starting point of the research. The aim of IIT is to account for both the quantity and quality of consciousness in a non-reductive way. However, despite the potential relevance in the empirical domain, this theory presents some theoretical limitations, which are here discussed from a metaphysical, epistemological and phenomenological perspective. Based on this critical discussion it will be suggested to recalibrate IIT in order to redefine its ontological and epistemological grounds.
[Citing Place (1956) in context]  

Zimmerman, D. W. (1957). Durable secondary reinforcement: method and theory. Psychological Review, 64, 373-383.
[1 referring publications by Place]  

Zimmerrnan, D. W. (1959). Sustained performance in rats based on secondary reinforcement. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psycholology, 52, 353-358.
[1 referring publications by Place]