Armstrong, D. M. (1997). A world of states of affairs. Cambridge University Press.
[Abstract]The hypothesis of this work is that the world, all that there is, is a world of states of affairs. Others, Wittgenstein in particular, have said that the world is a world of facts and not a world of things. These theses are substantially the same, though differently expressed.
The general structure of states of affairs will be argued to be this. A state of affairs exists if and only if a particular (at a later point to be dubbed a thin particular) has a property or, instead, a relation holds between two or more particulars. Each state of affairs, and each constituent of each state of affairs, meaning by their constituents the particulars, properties, relations and, in the case of higher-order states of affairs, lower-order states of affairs, is a contingent existent. The properties and the relations are universals, not particulars. The relations are all external relations.
[Citing Place (1988a)]  [2 referring publications by Place]  
Citing Place (1988a) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Chapter 5 Powers and dispositions
Section 5.5 DISPOSITIONALISM
* John Burnheim (c. 1968), C. B. Martin and K. Pfeifer (1986), and U. T. Place (1988) have argued, in Place's words:
that physical dispositions and their descriptions bear all the marks of intentionality mentioned by such philosophers as Elizabeth Anscombe, Roderick Chisholm and Bill Lycan.
As a result, Place goes on:
we reach the conclusion that intentionality is the mark, not, as Brentano thought, of the mental, but of the dispositional.
Here the result that appears objectionable to me is accepted by Place in the spirit of natural piety.