Bechtel, W. (1988). Philosophy of mind : an overview for cognitive science. L. Erlbaum Associates.
[Abstract]Specifically designed to make the philosophy of mind intelligible to those not trained in philosophy, this book provides a concise overview for students and researchers in the cognitive sciences. Emphasizing the relevance of philosophical work to investigations in other cognitive sciences, this unique text examines such issues as the meaning of language, the mind-body problem, the functionalist theories of cognition, and intentionality. As he explores the philosophical issues, Bechtel draws connections between philosophical views and theoretical and experimental work in such disciplines as cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, neuroscience, and anthropology.
[Citing Place (1956)]  [Citing Place (1988a)]  
Citing Place (1956) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
Chapter 6. The Mind-Body Problem: Versions of Materialism
Section MIND-BRAIN TYPE IDENTITY THEORY
* The phrase "Identity Theory" properly refers to the approach developed in the 1950s by U.T. Place (1956/1970), Herbert Feigl (1958/1967, 1960/1970), and J.J. C. Smart (1959/1971) and advocated by a number of philosophers in the following decade. These theories proposed that mental states were identical with states of the brain. The qualifying expression "type" has been introduced more recently to distinguish this view from a weaker view that attained prominence in the 1970s and 1980s, known as the "Token Identity Theory," which is taken up in a later section. The type/token distinction refers to the difference between a class of events (the type) and a specific member of the class (a token). The term chaír identifies a type of object, whereas my desk chair is a token of that type. The Type Identity Theory holds that all instances of a particular type of mental state (e.g., experiencing a certain kind of pain or seeing a certain color) are identical to instances of a correlated type of neural event (e.g., a certain pattern of neural firings).
* One issue discussed in the early literature on the Identity Theory was the range of mental states to which this account should apply. Place was the first to propose the Identity Theory but he accepted the philosophical behaviorist's identification of some mental states with dispositions. He contended only that some other mental concepts could not refer to dispositions- he held that there was "an intractable residue of concepts clustering about the notions of consciousness, experience, sensation, and mental imagery, where some sort of inner process story is unavoidable" (1956/1970, p. 43, see also 1988). These inner processes would be processes in the brain.
Citing Place (1988a) in context (citations start with an asterisk *):
See the citations of Place (1956)